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ABSTRACT.
The utilization of foreign soldiers by the sovereigns of
England is as ancient as the monarchy itself.
Saxon kings

The Anglo-

employed their hu's'Carles, William the Conqueror,

his Norman barons, and the later Plantagenets and Yorkists, a
motley host of European adventurers, including Flemings, Bur
gundians, Gascons, and Braba^ons, who almost invariably
formed a sizeable, if not in fact the strongest, element in
the English army.
The early Tudors were no different.

Lacking standing

armies, the foundations of which had been laid on the Contin
ent during the course of the fourteenth and fifteenth centu
ries, these rulers were obliged when they made war to seek
out foreign professionals in large numbers.

Some of the

alien warriors were auxiliaries, soldiers provided at no cost
to the Tudors by gracious allies; others were mercenaries,
soldiers of fortune with no national allegiance, whose sole
business was war and the selling of their martial talents.
During the early Tudor period, from the accession o£
Henry VII until the death of Henry VIII, auxiliaries were ob
tained most commonly from the Hapsburg Empire and Spain,
since it was with these two powers that England normally
threw her lot.

Mercenaries, on the other hand, were hired

in whichever quarter they were available.

v

Italy provided

many; not a few were obtained indirectly from Greece and Al
bania; some were acquired from Denmark; but the majority—
used in the reign of Henry VIII— were drawn from the Hapsburg states of Germany, the bo w Countries, and Spain, whose
rulers, whether allied with the Tudors or not, found it im
possible to prevent their soldier-subjects from taking employ
ment with England.
Auxiliaries were rarely used within the realm itself,
and mercenaries only sparingly so until the last years of
Henry VIII.

That it happened thus can be attributed to the

stability of the first two Tudor regimes and to the weakness
of England's island neighbors, Scotland and Ireland, neither
of which possessed the political cohesion, financial re
sources, or manpower needed to upset English hegemony in the
British Isles.
It was only in competition with non-island foes that the
weakness of Tudor armies revealed itself.

On the Continent,

a veritable revolution in which England played no part had
transfigured the face of war.

Spain, the Empire, and France,

the most contentious of the European monarchies, had modern
military establishments before which the strength of England
paled.

But, since it was against one of these powers, France,

that England chose to compete for military laurels, it was
found necessary by her sovereigns to recruit mercenaries and
auxiliaries in the largest numbers possible.

vi

ABBREVIATIONS
Add. MSS.

Additional Manuscripts in the British Museum

(B. M . )

British Museum

C66

Chancery, Patent Rolls

D. N. B.

Dictionary of National Biography

E 101

Exchequer, Accounts Various

E 351

Exchequer, Lord Treasurer's Remembrancer, Pipe
Office, Declared Accounts

Harl. MSS.

Harleian Manuscripts in the British Museum

Lands. M S S .

Lansdowne Manuscripts in the British Museum

L. & P.

Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the
Reign of Henry VIII

P. R. O.

Public Record Office

S. P. 1

State Papers, Henry VIII

INTRODUCTION
In conformance with the popular notion of history as the
plaything of pedants and historians as students of micro
scopic glosses, the idea for this present treatise was pro
vided by nothing more than a single footnote in an intriguing
study of the reign of England's short-lived Tudor sovereign,
Edward VI.

The note in question, appearing in W. K. Jordan's

1
Edward V I , the Young King, alludes briefly to the use of
German and Italian conscripts in the suppression of the West2
ern or "Prayer Book" Rising of 1549.
More to the point its
author concludes, after insisting that the recruitment of mer
cenaries "was relatively recent in England" and that it was the
Duke of Somerset, uncle to Edward and Protector of the realm,
"who really first employed them on a considerable scale," that
the entire subject of foreign troops is deserving of more
thorough investigation.

Implied in this latter observation is

a challenge, and what follows in the body of this work is an
attempt within the framework of the reigns of Henry VII and
Henry VIII to place in some kind of perspective the role of

K. Jordan, Edward V I , the Young King: The Protec
torship of the Duke of Somerset (London:
George^AXlen and
Unwin Lt s . , 1968), p. 466, n. 2. Hereinafter cited as Ed
ward V I , the Young K i n g .
2

This rebellion, centering as it did in the counties of
Cornwall and Devon, sprang from the fear of Edwardian Pro
testantism and the new liturgy as contained in the first
Book of Common Prayer.
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the foreigner in the English army of that time.
The choice of this period, extending as it did from 1485
to 1547, has been made for good reason.

First, it was the

early Tudors who engaged these soldiers in the greatest num
bers; second, there exists such a plethora of material on the
subject that the problem for the researcher is not the lack
but the superabundance of sources; and third, disregarding
the fact that scholars have all but ignored these foreigners,

3

in the context of Tudor history the bulk of military studies
4
produced have been Elizabethan in their bias.
Inasmuch as a work of this sort is exploratory in nature,
the narrative approach has been largely avoided in favor of
the historical survey.

The object is not to dissect cam

paigns or analyze battles but rather to answer a number of
fundamental questions respecting the origins, prevalence.

3
A notable exception was the late Sir Charles Oman, who
in his standard survey, A History of the Art of War in the
Sixteenth Century {New York!
E. P. Dutton ancT“Co., Inc.,
15371 recognized fully the importance of continental troops
in Tudor armies.
Hereinafter cited as The Art of War in the
Sixteenth Century.
^Check, for instance, the sections on military history
in any of the following bibliographies:
Conyers Read, ed.
Bibliography of British History: Tudor Period, 1485-1603
(Ox'ford": Clarendon Press, 1959) ; Mortimer Levine, e d ., Tu
dor England, 1485-1603 (Cambridge: University Press, 1955);
C. G. Cruickshank, "Military Developments of the Renaissance,"
in A Guide to the Sources of British Military History, ed.
Robert Higham "(Berkeley an3“ Los Angeles:
University of
California Press, 1971), pp. 65-8 3.

ix

availability, and competence of the alien element in early
Tudor armies.

Who, for example, were these foreigners; how

wide-spread was their employment; which monarch most availed
himself of their services; and why was it considered neces-i
sary to engage them at all?
are hopefully in store.

Some unanticipated disclosures

For one thing, to the reader who so

far has been disconcerted by the infrequent use of the term
"mercenaries," it may come as a surprise that not all for
eigners were.

Many at least in early Tudor armies were auxil-

5

iaries,

that is to say allies provided at no cost by sympa

thetic but nonetheless self-serving heads of state, who more
often as not stood more to gain from such transactions than
the Tudors themselves.
As is generally the case when new ground is broken, cer
tain problems have been encountered which for the moment seem
impossible of solution, the most frustrating being the absence
in contemporary accounts of any substantial estimates of how
well these foreigners performed in English service.

That they

did fight is incontestible, but precisely how they fought goes
largely unrecorded in Tudor annals, so that to provide the
reader with some assessment of the skills and accomplishments
that made these men so desirable as recruits in English armies
it has been necessary to resort to continental sources and

5Below, p. 44.

x

military histories in order to trace their rise to prominence
as experts in the profession of arms.
The ommission of such critical information from contem
porary Tudor descriptions of particular actions in which m e r 
cenaries and auxiliaries are known to have participated seems
incomprehensible, since it appears somehow reasonable to ex
pect amid the myriad battle-front despatches, eye-witness re
ports, and published narratives that someone somewhere would
have been sufficiently moved to provide for posterity an
actual analysis of how, in a given engagement, these men
helped to win the day or lose the field.

Why early Tudor com

mentators, who in most other respects were faithful recorders
of military occurents, should have shied away from such ana
lyses is a mystery unless, as this writer sometimes suspects
the case to have been,

it was deliberately done to avoid the

inevitable comparisons in which the gross inadequacies of the
English military establishment would have been revealed.
Plainly speaking, Tudor annotators had good readon for
withholding information of this type since, for reasons made
clear in Chapter One, mercenaries and auxiliaries made better
soldiers than Englishmen.

Further, not only were they better;

they were also indispensible when it came to fighting in
France where the most protracted campaigns of the period were
waged.

Such dependency would not be readily admitted by

proud inheritors of a glorious military tradition, whose not

xi

so distant forebears had been esteemed for their warlike pro-*'
ficiency.
Unfortunately, for early Tudor Englishmen the glory be
longed to the past, and all that remained of the tradition was
the wasted remnant of a medieval military organization which,
if capable of intimidating primitive Scots and Irishmen, was
hardly likely to survive without mercenary or auxiliary help
on the Continent where wars were modern and the foundations
of Europe's first professional armies had already been laid.
It is strange, considering the attention showered upon
foreign soldiers in other eras of English history, that those
w h o served the early Tudors should have been so far over6

looked.

Except for my own article on the German Landsknechte *

the substance of which appears in Chapter Three, no in-depth
investigation of this absorbing aspect of Tudor history has
been attempted, with the result that, if mentioned at all, the
foreigners have been afforded little more than a few short
notices in the monographic and general literature of the
period.
In seeking partially to fill the void the plan followed
has been first to examine the state of the Tudor army itself
w i t h a view towards uncovering those factors which made the

^"The Landsknecht:
His Recruitment and Organization,
W i t h Some Reference to the Reign of Henry VIII," Military
Affairs, XXXV (Oct., 1971), 95-99.
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enlistment of foreigners both desirable and essential.

Chap

ter Two reviews the history of mercenary and auxiliary war
fare in the reign of Henry VII, while the remainder of the
dissertation is devoted to a survey of the particular national
"types" employed, their organization, recruitment, and military skills.

As will become apparent, considerably more atr

tention is devoted in the later sections to the reign of Henry
VIII than to that of Henry VII.

Chapters Eight through Ten, .

for example, concentrate on the Boulogne campaign of 1544-46.
For this the author makes no apology because it was Henry
VIII who engaged mercenaries and auxiliaries on the grandest
scale, and it was in the taking and subsequent defence of
that town that the largest contingents were involved.

No

apology is made either for skirting clear of the Scottish
campaigns, the Western Rising, of Kett*s Rebellion of the
later Edwardian period; each is deserving of its own separate
study.

Besides, no auxiliaries were engaged in any of these

endeavors, and of the mercenaries employed their strength
pales before the numerically superior forces hired earlier
for Henry VIII's wars in France.
The subject treated herein, despite its somewhat con
stricted focus, is vast, and having chosen to concentrate
mainly though not exclusively on its continental aspects, it
is time to mention some of the working conventions observed
in its writing.

Full bibliographic information is provided

xiii

on the first mention of e work with, only a short-title nota
tion thereafter.

For those unfamiliar with certain of the

m o r e specialized references to manuscripts, calendered mater
ials, and the like, a "Table of Abbreviations" is provided as
likewise is a "Glossary" of technical terms.

In most in

stances in quoting original sources, spelling and punctuation
have been modernized.

Except for a few colorful phrases or

passages incapable of literal translation quotes from foreign
materials have been rendered in English.

xiv

CHAPTER X
THE EARLY TUDOR ARMY
Albeit that war is to employ men of divers
quality; yet ought they only to be reputed
soldiers that make profession of arms.
William Segar, Honor Military, and Civill, p. 8.
From the vantage point of the twentieth century, the
armies of the early Tudors appear unimpressive and puny, and
comparison with the numerically and professionally superior
forces of England's chief rivals

1

during the same period elic

its a wonderment that she survived the era at all.

Tudor

troops might with confidence give battle to Scottish raiders
and Irish rebels;

for these foes ranked among the most back

ward of adversaries.

But even so, English success against
2
them was never complete.
Flodden Field,
the most convincing

victory of an English army between Agincourt and Blenheim,
provided no more than a stopgap in Scottish troubles, while
in Ireland, after years of exhaustive effort, the narrow
coastal Pale between Dhblin and Dundalk remained the extent
of Tudor authority.

1
France, Spain, and the Holy Roman Empire.

2
The battle was fought just below the Scottish border in
Northumberland on September 9, 1513.
Perhaps as many as ten
thousand Scots were slain, including their king, James IV,
ten of twenty-one peers of the realm, and thirteen of twentynine barons.
1

2
On the Continent,, English. a,pins wejre hardly more impress
sive.

Every Tudor monarch between 1485 and 1558 sent armies

to the mainland of Europe either to enlarge upon that remnant
of empire remaining to England from the Hundred Years * War or
to retain it.

Henry VII*s success in 1492 gained a French

pension but no territory, and given the circumstances of
Charles V I I I ’s Italian ambitions and the Franco-Spanish ri
valry, Charles’s award of the pension had every appearance
of being more a bribe to an annoyance than a surrender to a
real military threat.
occasions:

Henry VIII invaded France on three

1513, 1523, and 1544.

On two of these forays,

without actually defeating the French, he succeeded in add
ing to his continental holdings.

Tournai was siezed in 1513^

and the fortress of Boulogne in 1544, but both triumphs were
marred by an inordinate wastage of men and material, and
both prizes were relinquished by treaty long, within the de
cade after their occupation.

Tournai was returned in 1519,

and the sum of Edward V I 's military adventures was reflected
in the surrender of Boulogne in 1550.

Under Edward’s suc

cessor, Mary, the lack of military accomplishment was simi
larly reflected in the loss of Calais, originally the first,
and then the last, hope of continental empire for the Tudors.

3
For the Tournai campaign, see the recent study by C. G.
Cruickshank, Army Royal: An Account of Henry V I I T 1s Invasion
of France in 1513 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1969), Chaps. X,
XI. Hereinafter cited as Army Royal.

It is easy of course to be overly critical of the Tudor
army.

Foreign observers, who could be expected to be most

harsh in their appraisal of the English military establish
ment, were often lavish in their compliments.

The author of

the Italian Relation, an oft-quoted critique of English life
written at the beginning of the sixteenth century, mentions
the high esteem in which English soldiers were held.

Accord

ing to this anonymous onlooker, they had "a very high reputa
tion in arms," one which,

"from the great fear the French en

tertain of them,'1 had to be justly acquired;^ and writing
sometime later, the Venetian ambassador, Sebastian Giustinian,
while regarding the Englishmen's insistence on regular pay
and dislike of hardship as weaknesses, maintained that "when
they had their comforts" they would fight unabated with a
"valor that defied exageration.1

Even the cynical Ferdinand

II of Aragon conceded that English troops had strength and
courage, an attitude shared by his grandson, the great eraperor Charles V.

^Charlotte Augusta Sneyd, trans., A Relation, or Rather
A True Account, of the Island of England (London: Camden
Society, No. XXXVII, 1847), p. 23.
5
Rawdon Brown, et auL., e d s . , Calendar of State P a p e r s ,
Venetian (9 vols.; London:
H. M. Stationery Office, 186498), II, No. 562.
Hereinafter cited as Venetian Calendar.
^Pascual de Gayangos, et a l ., eds. Calendar of State
Papers, Spanish (13 vols. and 2 supplements; London:
H. M.
Stationery Office, 1862-1954), II, 94; VI, 506. Hereinafter
cited as Spanish Calendar.

Nevertheless, even if it is accepted that the combative
spirit of Tudor soldiers remained high and relatively con
stant throughout the early sixteenth century, the conclusion
that English armies were inferior to their counterparts on
the Continent can scarcely be escaped.

Basically, the root

of the problem lay in the nation's unprofessional approach
to war, the most obvious failing being that the Tudors lacked
a standing military force.

Elsewhere the foundations of the

first professional armies had been laid.

The pikemen of

Switzerland had been building on their reputation as Europe's
steadiest infantrymen since the fourteenth century, though
they were fast being equalled, if not superseded, by the
landsknechts of the Germanies.

Spain, too, after the initial

campaigns of the Great Italian Wars

(1494-1559) had an envi

able professional army, while in France experiments with per
manent forces had been in progress since before the close of
7
the Hundred Years' War.
The Tudors of course were not without some regular
troops.

Henry VII, the founder of the dynasty, had created

by statute a body of archers, the Yeomen of the Guard, and
his son, Henry VIII, raised by similar means a mounted con
tingent, the "King's Spears," which he later reconstituted

7

On these developments, see the works of Sir Charles
Oman:
A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages (2 vols.
London:
Metheun and Company, 1924) and The Art of War in the
Sixteenth Century.

5
as his Gentlemen Pensioners.

Finally there were the garrison

troops strategically placed at various critical points through
out the Jcingdom and which from the standpoint of experience
and preparedness came closest to fulfilling the requirements
of a standing army.

Dover, Berwick, Carlisle, and Calais had

the largest contingents, though in all there were over one
hundred such posts.

However, the majority of them, unless

directly threatened, were manned by no more than a handful
of soldiers.

In the 1530's for instance, when in the midst

of Henry VIII's religious revolution fear of Catholic inva
sion prompted a spate of defense building, the twenty-six
fortified places between Portland and Gravesend contained
Q

somewhat less than 170 soldiers.

In peacetime on the Scot

tish. border, the frontier most regularly menaced by attack,
if the major strongholds at Carlisle and Berwick are ex
cluded, the typical tower or bulwark was garrisoned by no
more than a constable or deputy and his household retainers.

9

The total strength of garrison troops in England did not ex
ceed three thousand men, which number could have served as
a strong nucleus around which to build a standing army; but
such a move was out of the question, since any incendiary

O
John Jeremy Goring, "The Military Obligations of the
English People, 1511-1558" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univer
sity of London, 1955), pp. 244-45.
9I b i d . , p . 241.

situation, such as rebellion or invasion which w o u l d have
necessitated.the withdrawal of these forces from their posts,
would have left the country more vulnerable than such deploy
ment would have justified.
The Yeomen of the Guard, the other of the two remaining
bodies of regulars, had been raised as a royal bodyguard, but
its numbers fluctuated drastically.

Two hundred at its incep

tion in 1485, the Guard rose to six hundred in 1513, but there
after fell away in subsequent economy moves to about three
hundred in 1528, less than 250 in 1541, and somewhere near
125 during the French war in 1545.

Further, the military

duties of the Yeomen varied as often as their complement;
when not attending the king in person, many were assigned to
garrisons both at home and in France, and occasionally they
10
served at sea.
However, first and foremost they were a
royal guard, not an army.
The third body of regulars, the Gentlemen Pensioners,
were originally established in 1510 under the title of the
"King's Spears."

Fifty in number, each man was served by
11
a retinue of three including an archer, a demilance,
and

10Ibid., pp. 230-31.
11
See Glossary.

12
a custrel, . making in all a company of two hundred.

The

initial contingent, the "King's Spears," was deactivated in
1515 again, as in the pruning of the Yeomen of the Guard, as
an economy measure, the liveries and expense being so great
in the estimate of one contemporary as "there were none of
them but they and their Horses were apparelled and trapped
in Cloth of Gold, Silver, and Goldsmith's work and their servents richly apparelled also."

13

After lying dormant for

twenty-four years, the unit was resurrected in 1539 on the
occasion of Henry VIII's marriage to Anne of Cleves, but this
time as the "King's Honorable Band of Pensioners," each Pen
sioner receiving &50 in wages per year "for the~maintenance
of themselves, two Horses or one Horse and a Gelding of service."

14

Recruited from among the cadets of noble households

and from the upper grades of the gentry, these horsemen formed
an elite corps perhaps in imitation of the French k i n g ’s pen
sioners, the "gentlemen of the vingt escus,11 so named after
the twenty crowns a month they drew, in wages,

H enry’s "spears,

Ibid. On the evolution of the Gentlemen Pensioners,
see Samuel Pegge, Curialia: Or An Historical Account of Some
Branches of the Royal Household ~(2 v o l s ,; London: J. NicKols,
1791-1806TV If pt. 2, 3. Hereinafter cited as Curialia«
13

Edward Hall, The Union of the- Two Noble and Illustre
Famelies York and Lancaster,- ed. Henry Ellis [London:
J.
Johnson, et a l ., 1809), p. 512. Hereinafter cited as H a i l ’s
Chronicle.
■^Pegge, Curialia, I, pt. 2, 4.

as they continued to be called, complemented the Yeomen of the
Guard, since their principal function was the protection of
the royal person; but moreover their unit assumed the impor
tant secondary role of training future officers, becoming a
"pool” from which, after having served an apprenticeship, re
cruits could be deployed to various captaincies either in
England or a b r o a d . ^
Nevertheless, by no stretch of the imagination could
these miniscule detachments of "spears," Yeomen archers, and
garrison troops be regarded as an army.

Even at maximum

strength and allowing for the impossibility that most of
these professionals could be drawn together at one place at
one time, somewhat less than four thousand regulars could
hardly have been expected to accomplish much when confronted
by the combination of internal and external dangers posed
England in the early sixteenth century.

At the very best,

what few professionals there were could only furnish a lit
tle continuity in military affairs, thereby linking what was
in essence the last phase of medieval militarism in England
with a British "Army," whose real beginning lay in the seven
teenth century.
As has been noted, England was lagging far behind her
continental neighbors in the development of permanent forces.

15Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English Peo
ple, 1511-1558," p. 239.

Why this dculd have been so is not entirely explicable, espe
cially when the most immediate result of the trend towards pro
fessionalism had been the expulsion of the English from France,
during the Hundred Years' War.

England's insular position no

doubt abetted her conservatism in military innovation and,
moreover, there was the matter of national pride:

generations

after the fall of the empire which Henry V had so manfully
built in France the memory of Agincourt still blinded English
men to the realities of the situation.

No Tudor Englishman

worth his salt believed that he was not a fair match for ten
Frenchmen, and even in 1549 on the very eve of the surrender
of Boulogne to the French, an Englishman could write that de
spite the existence of a professional French army "we have
been counted hitherto superiors in success through stoutness
of our subjects only."16
A modern historian has written of the Tudors that their
"progress towards a permanent professional army may have been
hindered by accidents of g e n e t i c s . F o r most of the six
teenth century, England was without an active commander-^inchief:

Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth were all barred from

the battlefield, the first by age and the latter two by sex,

^ J o h n Hales, A Discourse of the Common Weal of This
Realm of England, ed. Elizabeth Lamond (Cambridge: University
Press, 1954), p. 95.
Hereinafter cited as Discourse of the
Common Weal.
•^Cruickshank, Army Royal, p. 189.

so that during the nearly sixty years of their combined
reigns "the monarch had no personal professional interest in
developing a standing army."

But what of the first two Tudors

Both Henry VII and Henry VIII were active commanders-in-chief,
and together they ruled England for sixty-two years,

Whyr

therefore, during their reigns beyond the creation of the
Yeomen o f the Guard and the Gentlemen Pensioners wa s there
no attempt at imitating the example that had established it
self on the Continent?
In answering this question,

it is necessary to consider

the condition of England at the time of Henry VII*s accession.
The country was still engrossed in the civil Wars of the
Roses w h ich feud had been sapping the patience and resources
of the nation since the close of the French War in 1453; for
the Tudor victory at Bosworth was not m a d e secure u n t i l the
defeat of the last Yorkist army at Exeter in 1497.
time Henry was an assiduous practitioner of peace.

A f t e r that
Wa r as an

end in itself did not interest him, and though he accumulated
the largest train of artillery in the realm he preferred
statecraft to force, persuasion to military despotism.
Henry VII devoted few thoughts to a permanent army,

If

it was

not because he was not an innovator— that was far from true.
Rather it was because it was not in his interest to create
such a force.

As the founder of a n ew dynasty b a r e l y fixed

on the throne, Henry would have invited the charge of tyranny,

11
a charge which for centuries past and centuries to come in
England was equated with a standing army.
The position of Henry VIII was much the same.

Only the

second of his line and forever worried about a successor, he
could not afford to antagonize his subjects by forcing on
them the physical and financial responsibilities which a per
manent army would have entailed.

A permanent army was not

wanted in Tudor England as the Discourse of the Common Weal
makes amply clear:
Second Dialogue,
us."

"God forbid," says the Husbandman in the

"that we should have any such tyrants amongst

"Merry," agrees the Merchant,

"I think that would be

rather occasion of commotions to be stirred than to be
quenched,

for . . . the stomachs of Englishmen would never

bear that."
ment:

The Doctor in the Dialogue reinforces the argue-

the establishment of a professional army "for avoiding

of sedition among people" would, by curing the smaller ague,
only cause a greater evil in that its creation would "bring
in a continual yoke and charge both to the king and his sub18
jects."
Among contemporaries it would appear that the yoke was
as much feared as the charge; for the reputation of English
soldiers in times of peace was far from honorable.

Sir

Thomas More was but one .of many who inveighed against the

18Hales, Discourse of the Common Weal, p. 95.
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disreputable lives led by discarded warriors, men who having
no trade but war turned in peacetime to brigandage:

"robbersf"

he wrote, "do not make the least active soldiers, nor do sol
diers make the most listless robbers; so well do these two
pursuits agree."
In France, a nation which seemed perennially at war and
thereby served opponents of regular armies as an example to
be avoided, permanent military garrisons were the scourge of
the civilian population.

There it was said that professional

soldiers satisfied their every craving and paid nothing "ex
cept it be an evil turn, as to ravish
ter for it."

[a man's] wife or daugh-

20

The popular feeling against standing armies was backed
by centuries of tradition and by the not entirely misplaced
faith in existing arrangements; for while England lacked sub
stantial bodies of regular troops, it would be a grave mistake
to imagine her in the sixteenth century as void of defenders.
The military organization of the state was such that in the
ory at least England was a nation in arms, as from his medie
val predecessors Henry VII inherited the remnant of feudal
levy in its bastard form of noble retainers under contract

19

Sir Thomas More, Utopia, ed. Edward Surtz and J. H.
Hexter (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1965),
pp. 63, 65.
20

Hales, Discourse of the Common Weal, p. 95.
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and the posse commitatus, a national conscript militia based
on quotas supplied by the counties, which in time of crisis
could be quickly mobilized to produce "an enormous array of
well-equipped bowmen and billraen, who would be capable of
beating back any invasion or of overcoming any rebellion."

21

Of these two types of forces, those raised for the mili
tia were of more ancient origin, having been utilized by the
kings of England from Saxon times.

Behind their service lay

the principle of allegiance which bound all men to fight when
called upon in war or civil emergency in defense of the realm;
and though it is impossible to accurately gage the number of
citizen-soldiers available for this duty, with England's pop
ulation approaching four million, the estimate of the Italian,
Giacomo Soranzo, of one hundred thousand in 1554 seems plau22
sible.

21

Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English People,
1511-1558," p. 19.
22

Venetian Calendar, V, No. 934, p. 547. Soranzo served
as Venetian ambassador in England from 1551 to 1554.
His pre
decessor in that post, Daniel Barbaro, arrived at precisely
the same estimate in 1551, though in a report to the Doge in
1519, Sebastian Giustinian set the figure at 150,000.
See
ibid. , No. 703, p. 350, and J. S. Brewer, et al., eds.. Let
ters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry
V I I I , 1509-1547 (21 vols. in 33 pts.j London: H. M. Station
ery Office, 1862-1920) III, pt. 1, No. 402.
Hereinafter cited
as L. & P.

The machinery for exploiting this vast national reserve
was ingeniously simple, as by law

23

every able-bodied man

between the ages of sixteen and sixty was obliged, according
to his estate and degree, to furnish himself with arms and
equipment and to keep himself in training and readiness for
action.

Supervision of this system was entrusted to Commis

sioners of Array, local officials who within each shire were
empowered to review the militia with an eye towards assessing
the fitness cf the men, as well as enforcing all statutes that
pertained to the possession and maintenance of w eapons.

It

was their responsibility when the militia was levied for war
to see that the fittest and most expert men were chosen and
that these reached their destination in good order.
Only in the gravest emergency, however, was it likely
that the entire militia would be called on to serve, as so
large a muster "would have been quite unmanageable, would
have robbed the land of its cultivators, and left the country
undefended except at headquarters."^

Such practical consid

erations required that only a percentage of the men eligible
in each shire be raised, these being ideally not only the
strongest and best armed but also the closest to the action )

23

The principal authority was the Statute of Winchester
of 1285.
24

William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England
in Its Origins and Development (3 vols.; Oxford:Clarendon
Press, 1874-78), II, 283.
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for geography along with fitness and preparedness played a
crucial part in determining which units should be placed on
a war footing.

As the Venetian ambassador noted in the reign

of Edward VI, it was customary for the English to muster the
southern counties when threatened by France and the northern
counties when menaced from Scotland.

25

This was a slight

overstatement, but in general the formula held true, and for
all practical purposes, with the River Trent as the line of
demarcation, England was divided into two military, provinces,
each respectively and roughly corresponding to the ecclesias
tical jurisdictions of Canterbury and York.

Scottish inva

ders were therefore opposed by militiamen recruited predomi
nantly from the northern shires beyond the Trent, while trou
ble in the south was met by their counterparts below that
^
^
26
boundary.
The armed retainers under contract, the second source of
fighting men available to Henry VII, were of more recent ori
gin than the militia.

Their initial appearance has been

traced to the thirteenth century when written contracts in
the form of indentures replaced the classical feudal obliga
tion of knight's service as the customary mode of raising
the aristocracy and the landed gentry.

25
26

Venetian Calendar, V, No. 703, p. 350.

Goring, ’’The Military Obligations of the English Pe o 
ple, 1511-1558,” pp. 53-55.
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In times past, between the Norman Conquest of the elev
enth century and the introduction of indentures in the thir
teenth,

it had been incumbent upon the holder of a k n i g h t ’s

fee, the basic unit of feudal land tenure, to serve the king
in full armor and on horseback for forty days in every year.
Landholders who held several or even hundreds of knight's
fees, as in the case of the greater magnates, were expected
to provide a requisite number of deputies,

so that in theory

there was always a substantial body of heavy cavalry ready to
answer the royal call to arms.

In practice, however, this

m ethod of raising troops was far from efficient or even d e 
sirable,

since the knights' tour of duty was limited and

hardly conducive to long campaigning, and there was strong
27
resistance to foreign service.
By the reign of Edward I the feudal host had ceased to
have any practical importance,

so that the crown, to ensure

itself of that core of men-at-arms who formed the backbone
of all medieval English armies, wa s obliged to develop a
system of pay by awarding regular wages and granting annui
ties to knights who would fight when summoned.

Efforts to

improve the system led to the evolution of indentures,

for

mal contracts which provided the leaders in both the Hundred
Years* War and the Wars of the Roses with the larger part of

Austin Lane Poole, e d . , Medieval England
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958), I, 137-38.

(2 vols.:
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their forces and set forth the precise terms of military ser
vice, regulating the numbers of troops to be levied, their
wages, equipment, length of enlistment, and rewards that
might be expected for satisfactory performance during the
28
course of campaigns.
Such a system was highly more pre
ferable than the vagaries of feudalism, since the method of
recruitment by indenture, one of the most important military
innovations of the Middle Ages, proved a great boon to Eng
lish kings, for by "including all soldiers as contracting
stipendaries,

lit’] made even the greatest dependent to a

large degree on the crown, produced discipline and a quicker
response to orders, and led to an effective subordination of
commands."

29

In the,fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, after the per
fection of indentures, the structure of the English military
establishment experienced few changes.

When in 1485 Henry

28

Prom the standpoint of military organization the au
thoritative works on indentures are N. B. Lewis, "The Organ
ization of the Indentured Retinue in Fourteenth Century Eng
land " in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th.
series, XXVIT
E. “Morris, Tne Welsh Wars of
Edward I (Oxford: University Press, .1901); and two articles
oJt A, ET Prince:
"The Indenture System of Edward III," in
Historical Essays in Honour of J.‘ Tait, ed. J. G. Edwards,
V. H. Galbraith, and FI
JacoH (Manchester: University
Press, 1933), pp. 283-97; and "The Army and Navy." in The
English Government at Work, 1327-1336, ed. J. P. Willard
and W. A. Morris ("Cambridge, Mass.: The Medieval Academy of
America, 1940), pp. 332-^93.
oq

Prince,

"The Army and Navy,", p. 352.
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Tudor stood poised to invade England, the army of his rival,
Richard XXI, was raised in traditional fashion by commissions
30
of array and private indentures.
H e n r y 's triumph brought no
change.

His creation of the Yeomen of the Guard may indeed

have marked a positive advance towards professionalism in
the English armed service, but in every other respect he re
tained the methods of his predecessors, relying for the secur
ity of his realm on the militia and on the loyalty of his in
dentured retainers.
Significant attempts to improve on the system did not
come until after the accession of Henry VIII.

In 1511, in

the face of growing estrangement with France, the second
Tudor took steps to tighten up the general obligations of
those of his subjects who would be called upon to serve him
in the wars.

The first step had as its primary objective

"the revival of the militia system
theoretically in force,

which, though always

[had] practically of late

displaced by the baronial levies."

31

fbeeh]

More precisely, what
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For an example of the former, see Calendar of Patent
Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office: Edward I V ,
Edward V, Richard I I I , 1476-1485 (London:
H. M. Stationery
Office, 1901) pp. 488-92"T For' an example of the latter, see
The M S S , of His Grace the Duke of Rutland. Historical M S S .
Commission, 12th. Report, Appendix IV (London:
H. M. Stationery Office, 1888), p. 20.
O I

A. D. Innes, England Under the Tudors (London: Methuen
and Company, 1937), p. 47.
Innes erroneously attributes this
revival to Henry VII.
On this point, see Goring, "The Mili
tary Obligations of the English People, 1511-1558," p. 14.
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Henry VIII sought was the better enforcement of the provisions
on which the militia was grounded, namely those set forth in
the Statute of Winchester.

Thus on July 5, 1511, writs were

issued to the sheriffs ordering them to make proclamation
"that every man have in his house armor for keeping of the
peace according to his havior and substance, as they have
been and shall be ordered by the commissioners after the old
n32
assize.11
The re-issue of this statute, which was "translated out
of French into vulgar tongue of English" and incorporated in
to the proclamation for its better enforcement, marked possi33
bly its first renewaT since the reign of Richard II.
Since
that time, particularly during the Wars of the Roses when
heavier reliance had been placed on indentured baronial lev
ies, the kings of England had not been overly concerned about
the armament of their shire forces.

The crown had been con

tent as long as the militiamen had appeared with some arms
and in sufficient numbers.

Now in 1511, Englishmen were

strictly charged to equip themselves as the law required;

^ P u b l i c Record Office (hereinafter cited as P. R. 0.)
C66/615, mem. 7d.
See also L. £ P ., I, pt. 1, No. 1771.
33
Arthur H. Noyes, The Military Obligation in Medieval
England (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1930), p.27,
n. 26. The proclamation as issued in 1511 is reproduced in
Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin, eds., Tudor Royal Pro
clamations (3 vols.; New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1964- ), I, 85-93.
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for b y this proclamation, as the original statute intended,
future Commissioners of Array once again became the instru
ments through which in peace and war the military obligations
of the public sector were enforced.

34

Henry VIII also took steps in 1511 to tighten up the
military obligations due from the private sector of the com
munity, that "other half of the military system" comprised
of his noble lords and gentlemen.

On September 8, soon after

the publication of the Statute of Winchester, letters issued
under the Privy Signet were sent to various lords and gentle
men commanding them to make their retinues ready for the wars
with orders to submit their number to his secretary, Thomas
Ruthall, Bishop of Durham, by November 1.

This at first

glance was but a continuance of the indenture system; how
ever,

included in the letters was the significant proviso

which instructed the recipients to
neither prepare nor take any persons for the
war but only such as be your own tenants or
inhabitants within any office that ye have of
our grant or of the grant of any other person
or persons or commonality, not being tenants
or officers to any other person or persons
having semblable commandment.

34 Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English Peo
ple, 1511-1558," pp. 15-16.
35

Historical M S S . Commission Report on the M S S , of Lord
Middleton, ed. W. H. Stevenson (London: H. M. Stationery
Office, 1911), p. 126.
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This rendered the indenture system a blow from which it would
not recover.

36

Heretofore an indentured captain could recruit

where he wished; he had not been required to recruit among his
tenants and dependents as henceforward he must.
This new manner of contracting with the chief landholders
differed appreciably from the older indenture system which
Henry VIII in effect abandoned by reemphasizing the ancient
feudal prerogative which demanded military service as a right
from those who held fees of their lord.

As the system of re-

'* -I

cruiting within the private sector/ it has been described by
Dr. Jeremy Goring as quasi-feudal,

"for it was a system under

which the crown sent out writs of military summons to the
principal landowners, and the principal landowners answered
the call by taking steps to enforce the military obligations
of their tenants.
By and large throughout Henry V I I I 1s reign the greater
part of the English troops were raised by private individuals,
and it was on the country gentry that the main burden of pro
viding forces for the wars fell, particularly for the French
wars.

It was from that remnant of the feudal host, the quasi-

feudal aristocracy, that the larger part of the troops for the

36

The last indentures of the medieval type issued in Eng
land appeared in 1512.
See Goring, "The Military Obligations
of the English People, 1511-1558," p. 17.
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i
t
1513 expedition were recruited.

38

The same procedure was fol

lowed in Suffolk's invasion of 1523 and for the Boulogne cam
paign in 1544.*^
The practice of relying on private levies, as opposed to
the militia, for service in foreign parts was sanctioned both
by custom and law.

Custom held that the militia could on no

account be made to serve outside the realm, while by a stat
ute of Edward Ill's reign it was stipulated that no man could
be compelled in the service of his king to leave his shire ex40
cept to meet the threat of foreign invasion.
Such contin
gents as were necessary for the waging of war on foreign soil
were by strict interpretation of the statute to be composed of
volunteers or those tenants who owed knights' service.

In

practice, however, the crown successfully evaded such restric
tions by "taking its stand on the ground of national emergency
or the common law," doggedly holding to the precept that it
was a subject's duty to serve his sovereign.

Thus, while it

38
Cruickshank, Army Royal, p. 198.
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Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English Peo
ple, 1511-1558," p. 268.
^ 1 Edward III, c. 5. The pertinent phrase in the stat
ute which was reissued in 1402 (4 Henry IV, c. 13) reads "that
none shall be constrained to go out of their counties, but
only for cause of necessity of sudden coming of strange ene
mies into the realm." A. Luders, T. E. Tomlins, J. Raithby,
et a l . , Statutes of the Realm (11 vols.; London:
Record Of
fice, 1810-28)„ I, 255.
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is true that the vast majority of the soldiers provided for
the French wars in early Tudor times were supplied by individ
ual lords and gentlemen, militiamen were never entirely exempt.

41

In fact, while quasi-feudal recruitment remained in

vogue through the reign of Mary, Goring notes that a decay of
the system can be observed as early as Henry VIII's last
French campaign:
Ever since 1544 the crown had been gradually
abandoning it in favor of the national [i.e.
militiaj system.
The militia had become the
principal fighting force in the realm, not
so much because the .[Tudorsj had become strong
enough to disregard the old custom that the
shire levies must never be sent overseas, as
because the national military system had be
come efficient.
The frequent issue of commis
sions of musters in the years after 1535 had
caused the gentry to become skilled in the
machinery of the militia and the people to be
come more conscientious in the fulfillment of
their military obligations.42
Eventually, by the early years of Elizabeth's reign, the
national militia system would prevail, although the quasi-feu
dal system would continue in use at least through the reign
of Charles I.

Nonetheless, the regularization of the new

Militiamen served in all of Henry VIII's overseas cam
paigns.
One of the largest contingents, four thousand strong,
was ordered across the Channel in July, 1544, to reinforce the
army before Boulogne.
See L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 292, 347,
397.
^2Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English Peo
ple, 1511-1558,'.' pp. 279-80.

24
office of Lord L i e u t e n a n t ^ under Elizabeth, by creating "a
truly effective local authority,” negated the value of pri
vate commissions, with the result that they were rarely used
and gradually disappeared.

But these developments lie out

side the scope of this study.

Through the early years of

the sixteenth century, private commissions were the means by
which the predominant number of English troops destined for
service outside the realm were levied.
From the purely military point of view, despite the
praise heaped on them by foreign observers, the caliber of
the forces raised by the first Tudor sovereigns left much
to be desired.

Whether recruited by private commission or

shire levy the average conscript, even when most proficiently

43

The office of Lord Lieutenant originated in 1539 as an
emergency creation designed to meet the military exigencies
of the time, namely the domestic unrest created by Henry VIII's
religious reformation and the threat of invasion from Catholic
Europe.
Lieutenants were first appointed on a temporary basis
over one or more counties, and in 1551 the system was made per
manent.
Their commissions gave them wide authority at the
local level, but their main task throughout the Tudor period
remained the control of the county militia.
The Lord Lieuten
ant's commission "gave him the right to call up the men of his
county;
to array, to try them out, and arm each according to
his capability; to lead them against the enemies of the crown;
and, still within the county limits, 'to repress, subdue, slay,
kill and put to execution or death these enemies by all ways
and m e a n s . " 1 C. G. Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army (Oxford;
University Press, 1966), p. 19. The fullest treatment of the
office is provided in Gladys Scott Thomson, Lords Lieutenants
in the Sixteenth Century (London:- Longmans, Green and Company,
1923T7
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trained and armed, was at best a talented amateur.

Intermit

tent practice at the butts, the muster, or even the knightly
lists was a poor substitute for actual combat experience.
To be sure, England was not without her veterans and native
soldiers of fortune, but more often than not in the arts of
war her rank and file were as unskilled as they were inexpe
rienced.^

The same shortcomings permeated the of ficer ranks,

particularly at the lower levels.

In theory "only the most

suitable gentlemen" were picked to command, but the complaint
was rife during the reigns of the early Tudors that "captains
be chosen in England by favor and not by worthiness;" hence
if the quality of the English soldier was poor, it was be
cause "his captain

[was,] as ignorant as he and was made cap-

tain ere ever he was a soldier."

45

To a great degree the situation reflected errors of omis
sion rather than commission.

The problem was not that the

English high command was wilfully neglectful.

Rather it op

erated in the vacuum of its own limited experience, and for
better or for worse that experience was medieval.
Allusion has already been made to the military record of
the early Tudors.

All these sovereigns were sufficiently
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successful in stamping their authority on English rebels, in
policing the Irish, and in defending the northern frontier
against the Scots.

However, it is difficult to escape the

conclusion that this was so in large part because the apti
tude for war of these troublemakers was somewhat less than
that enjoyed by the Tudor state itself.

From the point of

view of military progress,the British Isles lagged sadly be
hind the Continent.

Inevitably then, if a true indication

of E n g l a n d ’s military worth is to be determined, her record
on the Continent must be considered.
Though it is far from glorious,
a bad record.

it is surprisingly not

Technically, if the debacle of Calais at the

end of the period is excluded, no Tudor army lost a war,

46

but by the same token strong arguements can be brought for
ward as to whether the Tudors ever waged a continental war,
at least in the literal sense of what war had actually be
come in that quarter.
In France, Spain, Italy, the Germanies, and not the
least in Switzerland, military techniques and institutions
were undergoing revolutionary change at a time when English
military innovation was at a virtual standstill.

Across the

^®It is difficult to attribute the loss of Calais to the
defeat of an English army? the incompetence of the Marian
government would be a better place to lay the blame. When
the French Duke of Guise launched his attack in January,
1558, the defenders of the principal garrison numbered only
eight hundred.

Narrow Sea before the death of Henry VII the first series of
modern wars, the Great Italian Wars of 1494-1559, were already
in progress, and the first professional standing armies were
already in their formative state.
anything Europe had yet seen.

These armies were unlike

Everywhere, for the first time

since the demise of the Roman legions, the emphasis was on
infantry; not hastily raised militiamen or volunteers, though
these were certainly employed, but highly drilled and well
furnished veterans, whose expertise and specialization, as in
the case of the pikemen and the newfangled arquebusiers or
hand-gunners, made them the bane of the knightly class which
had dominated European battlefields since the beginning of
the Middle Ages.

Even this latter class, unlike its English

counterpart, was moving with the times, if only to preserve
its position as first in war.

The dense masses of unruly

feudal horsemen were fast giving way before a more skillful
heavy cavalry which now tended to be well trained and well
paid, not b y the great nobles as in the past but by their
sovereigns as commanders-in-chief; and encased as they still
were in steel from head to toe, the gendarmes "were 'profes
sional* cavalry capable of tactical m a n o e u v r e . i n

cata

loguing further changes across the Channel, the superiority
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28
enjoyed by the continentals in tactics, organization, artil
lery, small arms, fortification, and siegecraft could be men
tioned.

However, to critically appraise the developments in

each of these areas would be to restate that which is already
48
common knowledge.
How then, if England was so woefully behind the times,
did she escape disaster?

Excluding fate, part of the answer

lies in the premise suggested above that England simply did
not wage war on a scale or with a proficiency great enough to
merit the type of opposition that might have assured her de
feat.

The Tudors' interest in war was as transitory as their

armies.

While continentals waged continuous war and, as a

result, provided themselves with permanent armies, England,
when it so moved her to participate in the greater European
struggles, "only furnished expeditions" between which her
forces were disbanded.
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Her part in any of the campaigns thus far mentioned has
a certain sideshow quality about it.

Never were English ar

mies forced to fight the main body of the enemy; nor were her

4R
The best single-volume survey of military developments
in the sixteenth century is still Sir Charles Oman's standar<* History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century,
though it can be profitably supplemented by Frederick Lewis
Taylor, Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529 (Cambridge: Univer
sity Press, 1921).

^ B a r n e t t , Britain and Her Army, 1509-1970, p. 16.
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forces ever put to the test of a pitched battle like Marignano
or Pavia.

The reason for these seeming anomalies is not hard

to find, since England's part in the military drama being en
acted on the Continent was that of bit player.
roles belonged to the established protagonists:

The starring
Valois France

on the one hand, and England's allies, Spain and the Holy Ro
man Empire, on the other.

That England's intervention on the

side of the latter powers had some nuisance value cannot be
denied; still, the main actions involved the major combatants
and were always fought far from the theater of English partic
ipation, as Italy in 1513 and 1523 or Italy and Champagne in
1544.

Neither Louis XII nor Francis I were ever foolish

enough to ignore an Imperial or Spanish army for the privilege
of defeating an inferior English force; for Tudor practice in
war was sufficiently clear to France, exemplifying as it did
"a pattern of thought and result long to be repeated in Bri
tish military history:

transient intervention by an army un

fit to encounter and defeat a continental power's main body .
. . and intervention therefore without effect on the issue of
the wa r . "
Though England was not considered a threat sufficient
enough to warrant the full attention of her Valois foe, the
survival and even limited successes of her expeditionary

50Ibid., p. 12.
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forces were attributable to more than French preoccupation
with the Tudors' more dangerous confederates.

England might

have lagged behind in military proficiency, but she was not en
tirely unreceptive to the changes being made.

For example,

practical Henry VII stimulated the growth of a native iron
industry in the Sussex Weald by ordering large quantities of
shot and sponsoring experimentation in the casting of iron
guns.^

However, of the early Tudors it was Henry VIII who

demonstrated the keenest interest in military science.

He

was the first to break the monopoly enjoyed in England by
the foreign merchants of modern military hardware, though he
had to employ continentals to do it.

Sizeable numbers of

alien armorers and gunfounders were not only encouraged to
settle in England, but also beginning about 1515 "to form
schools for the production of war material . . . ."
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A

large colony of German armorers worked for a time in South
wark.

Other Germans, plus contingents from Milan, a princi

pal center for the production of small a r m s , were maintained
on a permanent basis at the Armoury at the Tiltyard at

Carlo M. Cipolla, G u n s , Sails and Empires: Technolog
ical Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion,
1400-1700 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965}, p. 37^
Herein
after cited as Guns, Sails and Empires.
bridge:

Charles Ffoulkes, The Gun Founders of England
University Press, 1937), p. 5.

(Cam
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Greenwich.

co

Later in the reign the Italian, Peter Baude,

"the best founder of bronze guns in the k i n g ’s service," p r e 
sided over the production of cannon by a group of his fellow
countrymen off Fleet Street in Salisbury Court, while in the
eastern London suburb of Houndsditch a group of French masters
engaged in similar work.
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Henry VIII also served as patron

of a nascent English gunpowder industry, but again the need
was felt for foreign technicians and specialized skills, so
that, as in the case of the manufacturers of firearms, native
English craftsmen served their apprenticeship under continen
tal instructors.
The k i n g ’s interest in moderization was no t confined to
firepower.

"Alien m i litary engineers and fortifiers were e m 

ployed throughout the reign, but especially in the later
years when extensive w o r k was done on the Scottish border."

EE

Among the m o r e noteworthy were the M o r a v i a n S t e p h e n Von
56
Haschenberg,
and the Italians, Archangel de li Arcane and

T. G. Wyatt, "The Part Played by Aliens in the Social
and Economic Life of England During the Reign of Henry VIII
(Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of London, 1952), pp.
144-45.
Hereinafter cited as Wyatt, ’Aliens."
54I b i d . , p. 135.
55I b i d . , p. 141.
56

An excellent article detailing H a s c h e n b e r g 1s not alto
gether happy work in England has b e e n written by B. H. St. J.
O'Neil, "Stefan von Haschenperg, A n Engineer to King Henry
VIII, and His W o r k ,11 A r c h a e o l o g i a , XCI (1945), 137-55.
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Girolamo da Treviso.

57

.

.

.

Other alien artificers in the military

arts included French crossbow-makers, pike-makers, and harnessmakers,
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the latter no doubt practiced in the manufacture of

the famous "almain rivets," suits of flexible armor which, un
like the metal prison worn by men-at-arms, allowed for greater
freedom of movement.
Early Tudor armies were therefore not completely devoid
of the benefits of modern military science.

However, at the

expense of belaboring the obvious, the technological resources
available to a Henry VIII pale before those available to lead
ers like Francis I or Charles V:

what were a few score gun-

founders and pike-makers in England by comparison to the thou
sands of skilled armaments workers on the Continent?
Viewed from any angle England was a second-rate power.
Domestic manufacture of war materiel never kept pace with need
at any time during the early Tudor period, as evidenced par
ticularly during times of trouble by the substantial orders
placed abroad.

A few random examples from the reign of

C* T

For some interesting details of Treviso's life, see
A. E. Popham, "Hans Holbein's Italian Contemporaties in Eng
land," The Burlington Magazine, LXXXIV (1944), 12-17; and
Philip Pouncey, "Girolame da Treviso in the Service of Henry
VIII," ibid., XCV (1953), 208-11.
Girolamo or "Jeronimo,"
as he was known to the English, began his career as a painter.
Examples of his artistic work, several in "the style of the
Bolognese and Ferrarese imitators of Raphael," are on exhibi
tion at Hampton Court, the Louvre, and in Bologna.
^^Wyatt,

"Aliens," pp. 147, 148.
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Henry VIII will suffice to illustrate the point,

Prior to

the French, crossing in 1513 special heavy; guns, including the
famous "Twelve Apostles," and an assortment of lesser caliber
were ordered from the foundries of Hans Poppenruyter in
Malines.
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For the same expedition Henry commissioned J o h n

de Castro, a Spanish merchant, to supply him with eighty hand^
guns, while additional orders were placed for war furnishings
of all sorts, including arquebuses and thirteen thousand suits
60
of almain rivets.
More artillery was obtained from Poppenruyter for a raid in France in 1522 and the campaign there in
1523.

In fact, from Malines alone, within the first two d e c 

ades of his reign, Henry received from Poppenruyter "at least
140 bronze guns of all c a l i b e r s . T h e

invasion of France

in 1544 and the subsequent efforts to retain possession of
captured Boulogne produced the best equipped of Henry V I I I 1s
armies.

Nevertheless, the forces employed, "the most formid

able," in Oman's estimation, "which ever crossed the Channel
during the existence of the old English monarchy" were p a r 
ticularly dependent on foreign suppliers of the necessaries
of war:

1,050 suits of armor for horse and foot and fifteen

^^John Bowie, Henry VTII (London; George Allen and U n 
win Lts,, 1964) , ppl 54-55; ^ i p o l l a , G u n s , Sails and Empires
p. 38,
6 0 CB, M,> Stowe MS. 146, f f v 60, 61, 62, 65, 68,
61Cipolla,' Guns,' galls' and Empires, p. 38.
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hundred arquebuses ordered from Brescia, 1544; five thousand
pikes and munitions from the Low Countries, 1545; saltpetre,
62
glaives, and gunpowder from the Low Countries, 1546.
Certainly England's ability to wage war was not solely re
stricted by the relatively depressed state of her armaments in
dustry, for guns, munitions, and pikes were not her only lack.
More basic to England's problem in time of war was her want of
modern soldiers.

Engrossed in domestic affairs since the

close of the Hundred Years' War and only fitfully engaged in
the wider quarrels around her, the nation's "military ideas
had failed to progress beyond those of Agincourt."

Bills and

bows were still the order of the day, the bowyers' trade being
specially protected in the law both by obligatory use of the
weapon on the part of the subject and from export by foreign
ers.

The act of 1511 concerning "shooting in long bows" re

quired that "every man being the :King’s subject not lame, de
crepit, or mained . . . being within the Age of forty years,
except to those men, spiritual men, Justices of the one bench
and of the other, Justices of Assize, and Barons of the Ex
chequer, do use and exercise shooting in longbows, and also
have a bow in his house and do use himself in shooting."
*
/TO

Harold Arthur Dillon, "Arms and Armour at Westminster,
the Tower, and Greenwich, 1547," Archaeologia, LI (1888), 22930; L. & p . , XX, pt. 2, Nos. 131, 147; i b i d ., XXI, pt. 1, No.
162. England even found it necessary to import bowstaves at
this time.
On this point, see Cruickshank, Elizabeth's Army,
p. 103.
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Fathers, guardians, "and rulers of such be of tender age"
were instructed to raise their charges "in the knowledge of
the same shooting."

The statute likewise ordained that "Butts

be made in every City, Town, and place . . . And that the In
habitants and dwellers of every of them be compelled to make
and continue such butts and to exercise themselves with long
Bows in shooting at the same . . . ."

Where necessary, Jus

tices of the Peace were empowered to appoint bowyers for the
making of bows "to serve the commonality," and aliens were
forbidden both to export or to use longbows without the king's
63
.
64
license.
This statute was made perpetual in 1515.
The use of modern weapons was actually discouraged.

The

act of 1515 bemoaned the fact that certain of "the King's sub
jects daily delight themselves in shooting of Crossbows and
hand-guns."

To remedy the situation the government provided

confiscation and stiff fines; "no person from henceforth
[will] shoot in any Crossbow or any handgun upon pain of for
feiture of the same bow and gun unless he or other to his use
or use of his Wife have lands tenements, fees, annuities, or
other profits to the yearly value of three hundred marks, And
for every time so using to shoot in Crossbows or handguns to
forefeit BIO for every time so offending."

63

A similar act was

3 Henry VIII, c. 6, Statutes of the Realm, III, 25-26.

646 Henry VIII, c. 2, Statutes' of the Realm, III, 123-24.
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passed in 1541.
Small wonder that the early Tudors lacked modern infantry,
that every expedition mounted for service either against the
Scots at home or the French abroad was practically devoid of
modern armament, artillery excepted.

At Flodden in 1513 the

most novel weapons employed by the English commander, the Earl
of Surrey, were a few light pieces of ordnance:

his men had

no pikes, no handguns of any kind, and relied for victory on
66
their conventional bows and bills.
A few pikes and arque
buses were utilized during the French invasions of 1513 and

jTC

33 Henry VIII, c. 6, Statutes of the Realm, III, 832-35.
At the time of the French war in 1544, for the only time dur
ing the period, encouragement was given to the users of m od
ern weapons when by royal proclamation "all and singular his
majesty's subjects born within his grace's dominions being
of age sixteen and upwards" were permitted to "shoot in hand
guns and hagbushes [i.e. arquebuses]" without penalty.
See
Cruickshank, Army R o y a l, p. 81, who quotes the pertinent text.
The proclamation was rescinded in 1546. As Cruickshank cor
rectly perceives it, the proclamation of 1544 "was much too
liberal for the time." Though "the danger of war had receded"
— the reason given for the revocation of the proclamation —
"it seems likely that the change of heart was as much a
social as a military decision.
If too many people had guns,
it would encourage lawlessness in a variety of forms; and in
the long run it would put dissident groups into a position
to challenge the authority of the crown."
Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 311,
314, 320.
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1523;

67

yet neither weapon figured conspicuously in English

hands at any time during the first half of the sixteenth cen
tury.

Even in the French campaign of 1544 bows and bills pre

dominated as of old, and of the twenty-eight thousand infan
trymen of the army of invasion hardly more, and perhaps less,
than one-tenth had modern weapons.

68

In the other military arm, the cavalry, much the same
canker is found, namely the failure to keep abreast of the
times.

Heavy cavalry in particular was lacking in early Tu

dor armies, in part because the tactics of the Hundred Years'
War and the Wars of the Roses had conditioned the English
knightly class to fight on foot,

69

a habit not easily overcome,

67

Cruickshank, Army Royal, p. 68, makes mention of "pay
ments for repairs to harquebuses" in the 1513 expedition, while
on the eve of that invasion one English captain alludes to news
that he was to be furnished, among other things, with pikes.
See L. S. P •, If pt. 2, No. 855.
Similarly, see above, p. 33.
Why would Henry VIII make purchases of small arms if he did not
intend his soldiers to use them? No mention is made of English
handgunners or pikemen in Suffolk's army in 1523, partly, one
suspects, because the records pertaining to that affair are
much scantier than those available for the earlier and later
campaigns of the reign.
However, in the autumn of 1523 fire
arms were being purchased abroad.
L. £ P ., III, pt. 2, No.
3494.
68
The elaborate preparations and the majority of the mus
ter lists for the 1544 invasion are preserved in L. & P ., XIX,
pt. 1, Nos. 271-76.
A fair number of English infantrymen were
armed with "sprinklers," that is a type of spiked club or
cudgel.
See ibid.. No. 275 (4), p. 164.

W. C. Oman, The Art of War in the Middle A g e s , A. D.
378-1515. ed. John H. Beeler (Ithaca, N. Y.:
Great Seal Soolcs,
1953), pp. 129, 134, 149-50.
Hereinafter cited as Beeler, ed.,
The Art of War in The Middle A g e s .

38
the more so when it was recalled that such methods had won the
day at Crecy and Agincourt.

Unfortunately, what had been for

gotten was that this self-same stratagem of fighting from the
defensive with knights afoot interspersed with billmen and
flanked by archers had resulted in the expulsion of the English
from France, and that the Hundred Years’ War, which had begun
so gloriously and ended so shamefully, had reversed the posi
tions of the two most famous adversaries in northwestern Europe.
England had emerged from the struggle a second-rate military
power, while France had developed one of the best armies in
Europe; and the strength of that army was built around perma
nently employed companies of men-at-arms, the Compagnies
d ’Ordonnance, in which each knight rode off to battle with a
squire, valet, page, and two mounted archers to serve him.
Mobile, numerous, and above all disciplined, the French' gen
darmerie was generally acknowledged the best of its kind.
How contrary the English stituation.

Writing to the Doge

in 1519, Sebastian Giustinian observed that in England little
use was made of men-at-arms, adding that "The real military
force of the country" consisted of its infantry whose prowess
was in archery.

70

The paucity of heavy cavalry in early Tu

dor armies is made painfully clear by examining the personal
retinue of Surrey at Flodden Field:

70L.

&

P., Ill, pt. 1, No. 402.

of the five hundred men
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assigned to him, only one, Avery of Berwick, was a fullfledged man-at-arms.
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Heavy horse were singularly scarce

among the twelve thousand Englishmen recruited for Suffolk's
expedition in 1523, while at Boulogne in 1544, except for the
fifty Gentlemen Pensioners assigned largely to the person of
72
the king, English men-at-arms were almost non-existent.
The early Tudors were somewhat better served by light
73
74
75
cavalry: demilances,
"prickers,"
mounted arquebusiers,

71
72

Ibid., I, No. 4376.
Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 289,

333.
73

See below, pp. 109-10.
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"Prickers," utilized primarily as scouts and foragers,
were also referred to as "northern horse" and were recruited
largely from among the moss-troopers which infested the bor
derlands with Scotland.
Their principal weapon was a light
spear or "chasing stave" shorter than the demilance and not
unlike the boar spear which they may also have used.
For a
description of the boar spear, see Dillon, "Arms and Armour
at Westminster, the Tower, and Greenwich, 1547," p. 238.
75

These, of course, were not very numerous, appearing
in the English army for the first time around the date of
Henry VIII1s last French war.
Patterned after the mounted
arquebusiers with whom the English had come in contact dur
ing their earlier forays in Scotland (which nation employed
French auxiliaries) and in France, they were variously used
as scouts, skirmishers, and protectors of convoys on the
march.
Their equipment, at least that which was most desired
was described c. 1548:
"The arquebusier shall likewise be
well mounted, and their armor shall be like unto [light horse
men], except the head-piece:
for they only shall have Morions
to the intent to see the better round about them, and to have
their heads more at liberty, a sword by their side, a mace at
the pommel of their saddles on the one side, and an arquebus
in a case of leather on the other, which must be made fast
that it stir not: which arquebus may be two foot and a half

40
and archers on horseback.

The Venetian, Barbaro, estimated

in 1551 that a levy en masse of the militia might produce as
76
many as fifteen thousand light cavalrymen,
but certainly
no such mounted force of Englishmen was ever put into the
field between 1485 and 1558.
How then, with such feeble and antiquated forces, did
the early Tudors hope to win success in that martial cockpit
which was sixteenth-century Europe?

The answer is simple:

they did not expect success, not if they had to fight a con
tinental war alone; and the Tudors, with the exception of
Henry VII, who took a calculated risk and won in 1492 but
otherwise abstained from long-term military adventuring,
never fought on the mainland of Europe alone.

In 1513, Eng

land campaigned in France as a member of the Holy League with
Spain, the Papacy, the Holy Roman Empire and, at least for a

or three foot long or rather more, so [long as] it be light."
Paul Ive, trans., Instructions for the Warres. A p p l y , learn
edly, and politiguely discoursing the method of Military Dis
cipline . Originally written in French by . . . Monsieur
William de Bellay, Lord of Langey . . . (London:
Thomas Man
and Tobie Cook, 1589) , p. 62. This work was in fact written
by Raymond de Beccarie de Pavie, Sieur de Fourquevaux.
For
a modern edition in French and an explanation of the confu
sion regarding the authorship, see G. Dickinson, ed., Instruc
tions sur le Faict de la Guerre of Raymond de Beccarie de
Pavie, Sieur de Fourquevaux (London:
The Athlone Press,
1954).
Hereinafter cited as Fourquevaux, Instructions sur .
le Faict de la Guerre. Dickinson's edition provides a use
ful Introduction in English which analyzes the French army
under Francis I.
7 fi

Venetian Calendar, V, No. 703, p. 350.

time, Venice and Switzerland as allies, while the armies of
1523 and 1544 fought in partnership with Spain and the Empire.
Nevertheless, despite well laid plans and good intentions
the French wars waged by England and her confederates were
never truly coordinated affairs.

Each member of any partic

ular alliance had its own general staff, its own objectives,
and its own strategy, with the result that concerted action as
a team was out of the question and never attempted.

Never did

an early Tudor army combine with the main body of an allied
army in joint action, for that main body was always elsewhere
generally engaging the principal array of the enemy's forces;
but herein lay the military value of continental alliances
to the Tudors.

Only when France was distracted in other quar

ters could England's substandard soldiery dream of battle hon
ors beyond the Channel.
However, the first Tudors could never afford the luxury
of overconfidence; for even if France could not commit her
full strength to repelling English intruders, it was inevi
table that she would resist and that whatever forces she

77

Since 1519 both Spain and the Holy Roman Empire had
enjoyed the same ruler, Charles of Burgundy, grandson and
heir of Ferdinand the Catholic (d. 1516) and of Maximilian I
(d. 1519).
As Charles I he ruled Spain until 1556, in which
year he resigned in favor of his s o n , Philip I I . As Charles
V, the title by which he is more commonly remembered, he
ruled the Holy Roman Empire until 1558, abdicating a few
months before his death that same year in favor of his
younger brother, Ferdinand I.
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could spare in that endeavor would be representative of her
best.

Therefore, to assure themselves of at least a chance of

victory the early Tudors were obliged, when fighting on the
Continent, to retain in their service foreign mercenaries and
auxiliaries, dedicated professionals who could hopefully coun
ter the stratagems of an equally professional foe.

It is to

the study of these foreigners that the remainder of this
thesis is dedicated.

CHAPTER II
MERCENARIES AN D AUXILIARIES
I do affirm 'tis not money (as common
opinion will have it) but good soldiers
that is the sinews of war; for money can
not find good soldiers, but good soldiers
will be sure to find money.
Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Bk. 11.
Before proceeding further some attempt at a definition of
terms m u s t be made,

specifically with regard the meaning of

"mercenaries" in sixteenth-century parlance and the difference
between them and auxiliaries.

Fortunately, there is no need to

be original, as the most famous contemporary student of the
art m i l i t a i r e , Niccolo Machiavelli, provides the answer.

It

is m a nifest from his chapters in The Prince and the Discourse
on the First Decade of Titus Livius which explicitly treat of
these two kinds of soldiers that mercenaries were free lancers,
owing allegiance first, to themselves,

second, to their offi

cers, and third, and sometimes only incidentally,
ployers.

to their em

Mercenaries were the lineal descendants of the "free

companies" of the Middle Ages, transient bands of rugged

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci (New
York:
The New American Library, 1964), chaps. XII, XIII.
Here
inafter cited as The P r i n c e , trans. Ricci.
Allen Gilbert,
M a c h i a v e l l i : The Chief Works and Others (3 vols.: Durham, N . C . :
Duke University Press, 1965), I, 381-83.
Hereinafter cited as
Machiavelli, Chief W o r k s . The term "free lance" was itself a
contemporary euphemism for mercenary.
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individualists, professional warriors temporarily recruited
from among all nations, and held together by leaders of strong
personality.

While nnot entirely indifferent to the claims of

honor and legality or to the interests of their country of ori2
gin,1' they were motivated principally in the exercise of arms
by their desire for financial gain.

Consequently, whichever

prince's purse was fullest, he it was who could expect to at
tract them in the greatest numbers.
Auxiliaries were a somewhat different breed.

These were

troops, to use Machiavelli's phraseology, who were borrowed
from and, more importantly, paid for by an ally: "When one
asks a powerful neighbor to come to aid and defend one with
his forces," he noted in The Prince, "they are termed auxil
iaries;"^ they are soldiers "who are sent to you by a prince .
. . under his own officers, under his own ensigns, and who
are paid by him . . . ."^

Potentially more troublesome than

mercenaries, since they were united in their allegiance to
the ruler who lent them, auxiliaries were nevertheless em
ployed in considerable numbers by the early Tudors, being
acquired from Prance by the uncrowned Henry VII and from
Spain and the Empire by Henry VIII.

Anthony Mockler, Mercenaries (London: Macdonald and
Company, 1970, p. 23.)
3
Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Luigi Ricci, p. 77.
4
Machiavelli, Discourse on the First Decade of Titus
Livius, in Chief Works, I, 382.
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However clear their differences in theory, .it is not air
ways possible to distinguish between mercenaries and auxilia
ries.

Both were foreign; both were professional; both served

under alien officers;

5

and both were impelled to a greater or

lesser degree by hope of material reward; for even auxiliaries,
though drawing no pay from the ruler in whose cause they fought,
could hope, like mercenaries, for pensions, booty, ransoms, and
similar extraneous emoluments.

In addition, it was relatively

simple to switch roles, to play the part of auxiliary one day
and become a thoroughgoing mercenary the next.

If, for exam

ple, as frequently happened, an auxiliary’s natural prince
chose to withdraw from an alliance, there was little more than
moral censure to prevent him from continuing in the service
of his foreign master; and in an age when patriotic national
ism was still in its infancy, such censure had little effect
provided wages remained sufficiently attractive.
The retention of mercenaries and auxiliaries by English
sovereigns was nothing new; hence the practice was not, as
6
has recently been suggested, a Tudor innovation.
On the co n 
trary, employment of foreign soldiers by the rulers of England

c
Though mercenaries did serve under their own officers,
the units which they formed, unlike those comprised of auxil
iaries, were incorporated directly into the army of their
employer and as such were subject to his dictates and the
orders of his subordinate commanders.

6Above, p. .vii.
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is as old as the military history of the nation itself.
Tacitus speaks of the Batavi, the Tungri, and the Usipi, Ger
m a n auxiliaries who assisted Agricola in the conquest of Bri7

tain.

The Venerable Bede, writing some three hundred years

after the fact, recounts the not implausible tale that the
first Anglo-Saxons were invited to Britain as mercenaries,
that they were awarded grants of land "on condition that they
protect the country."®
Modern students of military history are no less cogni
zant of the importance of foreign arms in England's developQ
ment:
C. Warren Hollister, in two recent studies,
devotes
a chapter in each to the mercenaries and auxiliaries
served the earlier dynasties of English kings.

10

who

Mercenaries

^H. Mattingly, trans., Tacitus on Britain and Germany:
A Translation of the "Agricola" and the Germania"
(Balti
more:
Penguin Books, 1965), pp. 77, 86.
Q
Bede, A History of the English Church and Peo p l e , trans.
Leo S h e r l e y - P n c e (Baltimore: Penquin Books, 1965), p. 55.
9
C. Warren Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions
(New York: Oxford Press, 1962), and The Military Organization
of Norman England (New York:
Oxford Press, 1965).
10Hollister does not in fact distinguish between merce
naries and auxiliaries, classifying both as stipendarii, i.e.
"soldiers who served for pay." However, from the examples
he cites, it is plain that many of the troops would better
fit the description of auxiliaries.
For instance, the
great barons from France and the Low Countries who, from
time to time, served the Anglo-Normans Were often independ
ent rulers in their own right and were frequently committed
to the kings of England by treaty. When wars were waged in
a common cause, some troops provided for English use must
occasionally have been auxiliaries.
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comprised "the elite corps" of the Saxon fyrd, the forerunner
of the national militia, while under the Normans, "the most
significant military expense" was the outlay for hired sol
diers.

Hollister quotes no figures on the probable strength

of these foreigners, but he makes it clear that they played
a substantial part in pre- and post-Conquest warfare:

"per

haps the similarities between Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman
mercenaries outweigh their differences.

The most startling

similarity is the very fact that mercenaries were important
to the military structures of both societies in an age when
they were relatively rare elsewhere in Europe."11
John Schlight's study of the eleventh and twelfth centu
ries advances the more controversial thesis that it was mer
cenaries rather than the baronial levy which "constituted a
dominant institution in feudal society."

12

The unreliability

of the Anglo-Norman aristocracy in the performance of it m i l 
itary obligations "led . . . to a mercenary policy" on the
one hand, while preventing "the operation of an effective

11Hollister, Anglo-Saxon Military Institutions, p. 19.

12

John Schlight, Monarchs and Mercenaries: A Reappraisal
of the Importance of Knight Service in Norman and Early
Angevin England (Bridgeport, Conn.:
University of Brrdgeport,
1968), vii. Schlight does not distinguish between mercenaries
and auxiliaries either, though again examples could be cited
demonstrating that certain of the stipendarii were probably
auxiliaries, receiving pay from their own princes rather than
from the kings of England.

system of knight-service" on the other.

13

Other authors of

more standard works dealing with almost any period pre-dating
the Tudors could be quoted with the same effect.

Representa

tive of these is the late Sir Charles Oman, an authority with
few equals in the field of early military history, who in a
simple sentence sums up in general terms what was common prac
tice:

"From the time of Stephen onward, we perpetually find

the feudal levies of the realm supplemented by great bodies
of professional soldiers, nearly all foreigners."

14

Merce

nary and auxiliary troops, therefore, have a long, if not al
ways distinguished, career in the service of England.
As regards the Tudors, foreign troops figure prominently
in the very foundation of their regime.

Henry VII, while yet

Earl of Richmond and fugitive in France, received from the
Yorkist-hating government of Charles VIII money, ships, artil
lery, and auxiliaries in quantities sufficient to secure a
beachhead in the kingdom whose crown he claimed.

Philip de

Commines, French councillor-historian and witness to the
events surrounding the successful invasion of 1485, placed
the number of auxiliaries at between three thousand and four

13Ibid., p. 75.
140man, A History of the Art of War in the Middle Ages,
I, 368.
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thousand,

15

though modern estimates favor a figure closer to

two thousand.

16

Little is known of these Frenchmen, though

Commines states plainly that they were Normans, "the loosest
17
and most profligate persons in all that country."
Writing
sometime after the fact, the blind poet Andre, a chief apol
ogist of the first Tudor, tells of horsemen and foot and
identifies their leader as Philibert de Chandee.18
Concerning this man, some few details do survive.

He was

1 C

Andrew R. Scoble, e d . , The Memoirs of Philip de Commines .
. . Containing the Histories of Louis XI and Charles V I I I ,
Kings of France and of Charles the B o l d , Duke of Burgundy . .
. {2 vols.; London:
Henry G. Bohn, 1855-56), I, 397.
Herein
after cited as Commines, M emoirs.
16
See Wilhelm Busch, England Under the Tudo r s , King Henry
V I I , trans. Alice M. Todd (Reprint, New YorJTi 3 u r t Franklin,
n. d.), p. 19; Sir Charles Oman, The History of England from
the Accession of Richard II to the Death of Richard III
(London and New York:
Longmans, Green and C o . , 1930), p . 491;
and Paul Murray Kendall, Richard the Third (New York:
W. W.
Norton and Co., 1956), p. 410.
Busch sets the figure at some
thing less than two thousand.
Oman, who interestingly enough
refers to the foreigners as both mercenaries and auxiliaries,
puts it at 1,800.
Kendall stipulates precisely two thousand.
17

Commines, M e m oirs, II, 65.
See also J. D. Mackie, The
Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1952),
p. 51.
Mackie indicates that a small Scots contingent may
have fought at Bosworth on Henry's side.
18

/
Bernard Andre, Historia Regis A Bernardo Andrea
Tholosate Conscripta; Necnon Alia Queadam Ad Eundem Regem
Spectantia in Memorials of King Henry the Seventh, ed. James
Gairdner (London:
Longmans, Brown, Green, Longmans, and
Roberts, 1858), p. 25.
Hereinafter cited as Historia R e g i s .
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apparently a Breton by birth and may have counted among his
relations the powerful Dukes of Savoy.

19

At the initial

landing at Milford Haven, prior to the advance through Wales
and the English Midlands, Chandee was knighted, presumably
by Henry himself.

How he and his men performed at Bosworth

has not been recorded, but their assistance must have been
invaluable.

The exact size of the contending armies has long

been a subject of debate, as no reliable contemporary account
of the battle was ever produced.

Nonetheless, the consensus

of modern scholarship places the number of troops brought to
the engagement by Henry at approximately five thousand or
six thousand, while Richard III may have had twice that
amount.

20

Thus C h a n d e e 1s command comprised a third or more

of the pretender's array before it was joined, late in the
fray, by the additional five thousand or six thousand men of
the phlegmatic Stanleys,

21

who fortuitiously chose that

19

G. E. Cokayne and Vicary Gibbs, eds., The Complete
Peerage of E n g land, Scotland, Ireland, Great Britain and the
United Kingdom E x t a n t , Extinct or Dormant (13 v o l s . ; London:
The St. Catherine Press, 1910-40), II, 15 and n.

20

One of the best and most readable accounts of the bat
tle of Bosworth is to be found in Kendall, Richard the Third,
Chap. XI.

21

Lord Thomas Stanley, Constable of England under Rich
ard III, was Henry Tudor's step-father, being the third hus
band of Henry's mother. Lady Margaret Beaufort, Countess of
Richmond.
Lord Stanley's brother, Sir William, also held
high office in Richard's government, holding— among other
things— the Chief Justiceship of North Wales.
Both Stanleys
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August day for reasons best known to themselves to gamble on
the prospective rather than the actual king of England.
Evidence of Henry's satisfaction with the performance of
his auxiliaries manifested itself within three months of his
October coronation.

On January 6, I486, in an action with

out precedent in Tudor annals, the Breton adventurer, Phili
bert de Chandee, was created Earl of Bath with 100 marks
yearly out of the issues of Dorset and Somerset.

22

This was

the stuff of which the dreams of soldiers of fortune were

had pledged themselves to defend King Richard, but at Bos
worth they refused to commit their forces until Richard had
committed himself in person to attacking the Lancastrian
lines.
This done, the Stanleys betrayed their trust; they
attacked Richard from the rear, enveloped him, and brought
about his death.
For details of the Stanleys' treachery
see ibid.
2 2 The preamble to the letters patent, in which Chandee
is styled 11consanguinem nostrum" is reproduced in William
Campbell, e d . , Materials for A History of the Reign of Henry
VII from Original Documents Preserved in the Public Record
Office (2 vols.; London:
Longmans and Co., Trubner and Co.,
1873-77), I, 246. A darker aspect of the history of the
Norman auxiliaries is related by William Hutton, The Battle
of Bosworth Field . . . (Birmingham:
Pearson and Rollason,
1788), p. 17:
the auxiliaries were "charged with bringing
over that dreadful scourge called the sweating sickness."
From all accounts this unknown malady appeared towards the
end of September, 1485, a month after Henry's triumph.
It
first appeared in London and spread from there through most
of the realm.
Symptoms included a foul-smelling sweat, high
fever, and thirst.
Highly contagious but of short duration,
epidemics of sweating sickness were frequent in England until
c. 1551, when the disease seems to have made its last appear
ance.
For further information see Busch, England Under the
Tudors, King Henry V I I , pp. 24, 323.
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made:

a guaranteed income and, above all, that most signal

honor, a peerage, both won on the strength of a good sword
arm.

Somewhat abruptly, though, the name of Philibert van

ishes from view.

He functioned briefly as ambassador for

Prance and was in residence for some undetermined length of
time at the court in Greenwich in the winter of 1486-87.

23

After that, nothing further is known, his title presumably
becoming extinct at his d e a t h . ^
Foreign soldiers figure prominently in the military

23

Campbell, e d . , Materials for A History of Reign of
Henry V I I , II, 193, 194, 195.
24
.
A second possibility suggests itself. Chandee may
have forfeited his peerage.
His native Brittany was an in
dependent country, but at that time, it was involved in a
losing struggle to prevent its absorption by France.
Henry
VII, despite his obvious debt to the government of the lat
ter, was intent on aiding the Breton cause. Francis, Duke
of Brittany, had been the first on the Continent to grant
him sanctuary; but more to the point the fall of Brittany
meant the extension of French power in a quarter most threat
ening to England.
Brittany, flanking the mouth of the Chan
nel and jutting ominously towards the west, was as much a
pistol aimed at the heart of England as ever were the Nether
lands .
All Bretons did not, however, share Duke Francis' pas
sion for freedom.
There existed within his duchy a strong
French party. Philibert de Chandee, since he was appointed
French ambassador, must be presumed to have been a member of
that party.
Similarly, since Henry VII's active assistance
on behalf of Breton independence began in 1487, it must again
be presumed that his friendship with Chandee was of short
duration.
It was, as noted above, in the early days of 1487
that mention of the new Earl of Bath ceases.
For diplomatic
relations and problems during the period, see R. B. Wernham,
Before- the Armada: The Growth of English Foreign Policy,
1485-1558 (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1966), Chap. II. Hereinafter cited as Before the Armada.
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annals of the remainder of the reign, though curiously, fol
lowing Henry’s success at Bosworth, the new dynast appears
to have made but sparing use of them; for when mercenaries
or auxiliaries are mentioned, they are almost always in the
employ of the opposition, the supplanted Yorkist faction of
the deceased Richard III.
Bosworth did not end the Wars of the Roses; rather it
marked the beginning of the last phase of that civil conflict,
the fortunes of which had oscillated back and forth in favor
of one side and then the other for over thirty years.

This

fact was appreciated by the Yorkists, who almost immediately
set to work in an attempt to win back that which had been
wrested from them.

Their hopes normally would have lain

with a principal member of their house, either Elizabeth of
York, daughter of Edward IV, or Elizabeth's cousin, the tenyear-old Earl of Warwick, son of Edward's brother, the Duke
of Clarence.

But Henry VII, to strengthen his own position,

had, on taking the crown, married Elizabeth and placed War
wick in the Tower.

The Yorkists' ploy, since they lacked

access to actual candidates of the first blood, was to manu
facture them.
The first imposter was Lambert Simnel, a joiner’s son
and the twelve-year-old prodigy of an Oxford priest named
Symonds.

Lambert was groomed to play the part of Warwick,

who rumor had it had been privily murdered by Henry after
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the manner of Edward IV's heirs, the boy-king Edward V and
pC
his brother, Richard of York.
The plot was inspired by
three staunch Yorkists, John de la Pole, Earl of Lincoln,
Francis, Lord Lovell, and Margaret, widowed Duchess of Bur
gundy and vengeful sister of the dead Richard III.

Her dowa

ger 's court in the Low Countries was probably where the Sim
nel conspiracy was hatched, and it was certainly Margaret
who served as broker in the hiring of the German captain,
Martin Schwarz, and his two thousand landsknechts, who were
sent to aid Simnel in the late spring of 1487.
Of this Schwarz little is known except that he was a
native of the free Imperial city of Nuremberg, a former shoemaker, and a mercenary leader of some reputation.

26

Certain

English commentators erroneously describe him as a Dutchman
of a Fleming,

27

and Polydore Vergil, a native of Urbino and

25These two boys, better known perhaps as "the little
princes in the Tower," were presumably dispatched in 1483 by
their uncle, Richard of Gloucester, afterward Richard III.
This theory is still generally adhered to in historical cir
cles, though two fascinating books, Kendall's Richard the
Third and Josephine Tey's critically acclaimed "detective
story," The Daugher of Time (London: The Macmillan Co.,
1952) , have done much to rehabilitate the character of the
last Yorkist king, while at the same time raising the possi
bility that the first Tudor may have had a hand in the murders.
26
Hans Delbruck, Geschichte der Kriegskunst
Berlin: G. Stilke, 1900-36) , IV, Io7

27

(7 vols.;

C. L. Kingsford, ed., Chronicles of London (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1905), p. 1947 Richard Turpyn, The Chronicle
of Calais in the Reigns of Henry VII and Henry VIII to the
Year 1540, ed. John C. Nichols (London:
Camden Society, XXXV,
1846) , p. 1, Hereinafter cited as Chronicle of Calais.
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official historian to Henry VII, while emphatically stating
that he and his men were German, makes the interesting obser
vation that the latter were "rugged men of the mountain,"
thus raising the very real possibility that some at least
were Swiss.

28

Whatever the case, these mercenaries sailed

from the Netherlands to that hotbed of Yorkist affection, Ire
land, where in May they joined Simnel and Symonds in Dublin,
and from whence,

strengthened by an undetermined force of wild

rebel Irish, they spearheaded an invasion of England in early
June.
The Yorkist host landed in Lancashire where it was met
by the retinue of a notorious sympathizer, Sir Thomas Broughton,

29

and from thence it proceeded to Yorkshire, the home of

the cause, in the hope of rallying more to the standard.
men came:

Few

Henry VII, long aware of the trouble brewing, had

already made a number of arrests, and the real Warwick had
been paraded in London, revealing to the world the futility
of the sham being attempted.

But the Yorkist leaders, unde

terred by their limited following and buoyed by the presence

2ft

Denys Hay, trans. and ed., The Anglica Historia of
Polydore V e r g i l , A. D. 1485-1537 (London:
Camden Series,
L XXIV, 1950), p. 23. Hereinafter cited as Vergil, The
Anglica H i storia. One cannot be positive where Schwarz re
cruited his troops on this occasion, but he generally drew
on Swabia and the neighboring Swiss cantons for his men.
See Delbrtick, Geschichte der Kreigskunst, IV, 10.

29

Vergil, The Anglica Historia, p. 23.
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of the mercenaries in their midst, pressed southward, resolv
ing "to try the fortunes of war, recalling that two years
earlier Henry, with a smaller number of soldiers, had conquered
the great army of King R i c h a r d . " ^
The two armies met near Stoke on June 16.

Almost nothing

is known of the tactics employed or of the disposition of the
combatants, though the official summary of the fight indicates
that the strength of the government troops was such that only
one of Henry's three divisions or "battles"
action:

31

was sent into

"For some time the struggle was fought with no advan

tage to either side, but at last the first line of the king's
army

(which was alone committed to the fray and sustained the

struggle) charged the enemy with such vigor that it at once
crushed those hostile leaders who were still resisting."^2
The mercenaries and the Irish fought with desperate cour
age.

The latter under their captain, Lord Thomas Fitzgerald,

were armed so lightly, having only knives and spears and no
body armor, that they were fitter "to move wonder than to op
pose good defenses and well ordered troops."

Employed essen

tially as skirmishers, they were the first to be overwhelmed.
The Germans, as Vergil indentifies them, proved more resolute

See Glossary.
^2Vergil, The Anglica Historia, p. 23.
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"and yielded little to the English in valor . . * Kn

They

stood their ground, but in the end, their ranks decimated by
hails of arrows and artillery fire, they too went down, fight
ing fiercely almost to the last.

What few of the enemy re

mained fled the field, only to be ridden down and killed or
captured:

"of their leaders, John, Earl of Lincoln, Francis,

Lord Lovell, Thomas Broughton, the most bold Martin Schwartz,
and the Irish captain, Thomas Geraldine were slain in that
o *5

place."

As for Lambert Simnel and his mentor, Symonds,

they were taken alive; but their lives were spared, the boy
because he was held too young to bear the responsibility of
his treason, Symonds because he was a priest.
After Stoke foreign troops next receive attention in
connection with the second imposture of the reign, that of
the Fleming, Perkin Warbeck.

This young man was discovered

at age seventeen by Yorkist partisans in Ireland, wither he
had gone in 1491 in the service of a Breton merchant.

Ap-

proached by the mayor of Cork, he was persuaded after some
initial hedging to impersonate Richard, Duke of York, young
est of the murdered sons of Edward IV.
Warbeck was from the outset a more dangerous threat
than Simnel had ever been.

33

Handsome, aristocratic in bearing

Lovell's corpse was never identified, giving rise to
the conjecture that he somehow escaped the field.
A skele
ton found in a hidden room at his manor house at Minster
Lovell in Oxfordshire in the eighteenth century may have
been his.
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and possessed of a keen intelligence he successfully sustained
the role of legitimate king of England for five years.

Much

of Europe fell under his spell , and at one time or another he
was befriended by all the many troublesome princes who desired
an end to Tudor rule.

The Earls of Kildare and Desmond susr-

tained his cause in Ireland,, until in the spring of 1492 he
was invited with all the honor befitting his deception to
France.

There Charles VIII intended to use him as a counter
A

to the support then being supplied Brittany

a

by Henry V I I ,

but the hazard to England was averted when, following Henry's
35
invasion of France and the investiture of Boulogne,
peace

3^See above p. 52, n. 24.
^ T h e attack on France, such as it was, was not under
taken until late 1492.
Henry did not disembark in Calais
until October 2, and he and his army of twenty-six thousand
spent two weeks in further preparation before moving on
Boulogne, which fortress was not attacked until the 22nd.
Under normal circumstances the investitute of Boulogne would
have been considered an act of the gravest provocation.
How
ever, the lateness of the season, the lukewarmness of the
siege operations, and the fact that both sides had been seek
ing a settlement since February served as proof that Henry's
warlike notions were intended solely as a goad to peace.
The demonstration had the desired effect.
Charles VIII, his
Italian schemes looming ever larger on the horizon, agreed
to Henry's principal demands, including payment of an indem
nity of almost 1159,000 and the abandonment of Warbeck, and
the Treaty of Etaples was signed on November 3, twelve days
after the commencement of the siege.
For bibliography r e 
garding operations see Busch, England Under the Tudors,
Henry V I I , p. 333.
There is little at all to suggest the
employment of foreign troops in this brief campaign except
for reference to a payment of BIO earlier in the year to one
Jacob van Walthuysen, a Dutch captain of 155 "men of war of
Holland."
See James R. Hooker, "Notes on the Organization
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was arranged at Etaples and W a r b e c k was expelled from the
country ,
It was a frustrating setback for the counterfeit Duke
of York, but at this juncture hardly critical.

Across the

frontier in Flanders, Margaret of Burgundy had everything in
readiness,

and Warbeck was publicly received as her nephew,

son indeed of her dead brother, Edward IV.

Through the d o w 

ager's good offices a more dangerous champion was gained in
the person of the emperor, Maximilian I.

As an enemy of

France and sometime ally of England during the Breton affair,
Maximilian looked upon Henry V I I 1s negotiation of the Etaples
agreement as a betrayal,

so that he was more than eager to

use Warbeck to repay the slight to his dignity.
found to outfit an expedition ,

and in midsummer,

Money was
1495, four

teen ships and a small army led by the pretender sailed for
the Kentish coast.
Few particulars survive regarding this operation.

War-

beck appeared off Deal on July 3 w i t h a mixed following of
English renegades,

Imperial auxiliaries, and a few hundred

mercenaries led by French and Spanish captains:
all nations and conditions of men, bankrupts,

"Here were

sanctuary men,

thieves, robbers, vagabonds, and divers servants of

and Supply of the Tudor Military under Henry VII,
don Library Q u a r t e r l y , XXIII (1959-60), 23.

"Hunting
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dishonest rebellion,"*^

Six hundred of these desperados were

set ashore, while Perkin remained safely aboard ship.

Cau

tious to the point of indecision, a weakness fatal to wouldbe usurpers, he had high hopes of being welcomed as Richard
IV: but his flight of fancy was short-lived.

The mayor of

Sandwich, having been alerted in advance of the landing, had
the local militia in readiness and compelled the invaders to
fight, slaying or capturing above a third of their number
before the survivors made it back to their ships.

Of those

siezed eight were captains, among them four or possibly five
Englishmen,

37

one Frenchman, and two Spaniards, Don Fulano

de Guevara and Diego el Coxo.

38

Francis Bacon describes

how the prisoners, yoked liked horses in harness, were drag
ged to London where they were sentenced and afterwards exe
cuted at divers spots along the southeast shore, their re
mains being used "for seamarks or lighthouses to teach

■^Thomas Gainsford, The True and Wonderful History of
Perkin Warbeck (London: E. G . , 1618), in T h e ~Harleian
Miscellany: A Collection of Scarce, Curious, and Enter
taining Pamphlets and Tracts . . . Selected from the L i 
brary of Edward Harley, Second Earl of Oxf ord . . . ., ed.
Thomas Park (10 v o l s . ; London:
White and Co., et a l ., 18081813), VI, 568.
37
James Gairdner, ed., The Paston Letters, 1422-1509
(6 vols.: London:
Chato and Windus, 1904), III, 937.
38

Spanish Calendar, I, No. 98. El Coxo ("the Lame")
was the derisive name given Diego by his captors.
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Perkin's people to avoid the coast."

OQ

Special attention

was given the principal captains, the Englishmen no doubt,
as well as one of the Spaniards and the Frenchman:

they

were drawn and quartered at the beginning of September and
their heads impaled on London Bridge.^®
Meanwhile, Warbeck had sailed for Ireland where the
fiasco at Deal was completed.

Part of his squadron, dis

persed in a panic-stricken flight through the Channel, aban
doned him, and an attempt to take Waterford in Munster was
repulsed with further serious losses among his international
recruits.

41

After this defeat the pretender momentarily

disappeared, only to resurface in November at Stirling in
Scotland as the protege of James IV.
To Henry VII, Warbeck in Scotland constituted as grave
a threat as Warbeck either in Ireland or on the Continent.
The latter's benefactor, the king of Scots, was young, able,
impetuous, and above all wedded to the goal of increasing
Scottish influence in European affairs.

The hegemony of

England in the British Isles naturally rankled so ambitious

qg

J Francis Bacon, History of the Reign of King Henry VII
in the Works of Francis B acon, ed. Basil Montagu (3 vols.;
Philadelphia: Carey and Hart, 1848), I, 355. Hereinafter
cited as Bacon, W o r k s .
40
Busch, England Under the Tudors; Henry V I I , p. 96.
41

A. F. Pollard, e d . , The Reign of Henry VII from Con
temporary Sources (3 volb.; London: Longmans, Green, and
Co. Ltd., 1913-14), III, 278.
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a monarch, with the result that no opportunity was lost by
James in impressing upon Henry how far Warbeck's presence
north of the Tweed could be used to suit Scottish interests.
Plans for an attack on England were laid almost immedi
ately, w i t h James in the role of allied and, therefore, au x 
iliary commander.

He agreed to provide Warbeck with an army

at Scots' expense^2 on the written understanding that when
Perkin was victorious the town and castle of Berwick would be
surrendered into Scottish hands and that "for the costs made
on him" 50,000 marks would be delivered to James within two
AO
years of his accession.
Simultaneously, appeals for m i l i 
tary aid were lodged in France, the Empire, and the Nether
lands, as clearly Warbeck and James hoped to mount a grand
campaign; but sadly their pleas fell far short of expectation.
Charles VIII had already embarked on his Italian adventure
and had n o intention of chancing an English attack on his u n 
protected western front.

A canvass of the Imperial court and

the Netherlands provinces produced the same negative reaction,
for the months immediately following the collapse of the Deal
expedition had brought an almost complete reversal of the

Though it brought small return, James levied a charge
on his subjects for the maintenance of Perkin's cause.
Busch,
England Under the T u d o r s , King Henry V I I , p. 104.
See also
William Croft Dickinson, Scotland from Earliest Times to 1603
(London and Edinburgh:
Nelson, 1965), p. 244-45.
43Pollard, The Reign of Henry VII from Contemporary
Sources, I, 138-39.

attitude of these states toward England.

Each for its own

purpose now sought to conciliate Henry VII, the emperor be
cause he was committed with Venice, Milan, Spain, and the
Papacy to a new Holy League to drive the French from Italy,
the Netherlands because of the crippling economic sanctions
imposed on her trade in 1493.
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In the end, in a skillful exercise of give and take, the
continentals placated the English king by leaving James and
Warbeck to their own devices, denying them the massive sup
port in mercenaries, auxiliaries, and military supplies that
they had hoped would be theirs for the asking.

By the terms

of the Intercursus Magnus, a commercial agreement signed in
February, 1496, trade was resumed with the Netherlands in re
turn for which that government agreed to in no way sustain
Henry's enemies and to insist on the stringent enforcement of
these provisions in the lands of the dowager duchess.

It was

not specifically mentioned in the treaty, but all knew that
Warbeck and his confederates were encompassed in its language.
Maximilian was less inclined to forsake his former client
nonetheless, the needs of the hour forced him to be practical.

44

Because of the moral support given Warbeck by the
Netherlands and the Empire and the mercenaries and auxil
iaries provided him through the Flanders ports, Henry VII
had prohibited all trade with the Low Countries.
This had
proven extremely damaging to the Imperialists, but more par
ticularly to the Flemish cloth industry whose chief supplier
of unfinished woollens was England.
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He had neither the men nor the means to spare for subsidising
Warbeck.

Habitual wars had insured a chronically empty Haps-

burg purse, and in the end good common sense persuaded him
that France, not England, was his real enemy.

In exchange

for Henry VII's adhesion to the Holy League which Henry joined
xn September, 1496,

45

Maximilian grudgingly abandoned Warbeck.

Characteristically, even though all hope of foreign back
ing was gone and his councillors raged against the stranger
in their midst, the chivalrous James stood by his undespairing guest.

The king of Scots may have genuinely believed War

beck to have been the authentic Duke of York, for in truth he
treated him well.

James gave him a yearly pension of £1200

and married him to his own kinswomen. Lady Catherine Gordon,
daughter of the Earl of Huntly.
The long-awaited campaign against England was finally
gotten underway in mid-September, 1496.

Needless to say, it

fell considerably short of the great crusade envisioned dur
ing the planning stages of the past winter and spring.

The

whole people and baronage of Scotland were opposed to the
enterprise, with the result that the army, if such it can be
called, which James and Warbeck mustered at Ellam Kirk within
ten miles of the borden consisted of scarcely fourteen
—

For the background of events leading up to the sign
ing and Maximilian'is part in the proceedings see Busch, Eng
land Dnder the Tudors, King Henry V I I , pp. 124-27.

65
hundred men "of all manner of nations

but chiefly of poorly

disciplined borderers and a few Yorkist Englishmen who had
followed Perkin into Scotland.

Of the non-British element,

only one company can be identified, that of Rodyk de la Lane,
who came "out of Flanders with two small ships" and sixty Ger46
mans.
It was hardly a force with which to conquer a king
dom, though undeniably its leaders were disposed to think
that once in England a popular rising on Warbeck's behalf
would sweep Henry from his throne.

No such rising material

ized, and except for the foreign component in the army, there
was little to set apart the undertaking from any other fron
tier raid.

It was over in three days; Warbeck and James quar

relled over the excessive depredations of the Scots auxilia
ries, who distinguished themselves in burning and looting be
fore recrossing the border well in advance of the four thou
sand English troops sent north from Carlisle to intercept
47
them.
It was not appreciated at the time, but this impudent
and miserable incursion into English territory proved Warbeck's undoing.

Henry VII, safe in the friendship of his

continental neighbors, was free at last to concentrate his

Pollard, The Reign of Henry VII from Contemporary
Sources, I, 136, 138, 140.
York:

^ J a m e s Gairdner, Henry the Seventh (London and New
Macmillan and Co. , 1892) , pp. 117-18.
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considerable energies on ending the threat from Scotland.
On September 25, four days after the invaders had recrossed
the Tweed, he issued a proclamation declaring that a state of
war now existed between the two kingdoms;

£>120,000 in taxes

and £>40,000 in loans were voted for its prosecution; and two
armies, one by land and the other by sea, were ordered to be
48
made ready for an offensive in the summer of 1497.
In the interim, the collection of supplies in England
proved hardly popular.

Among the men of Cornwall there were

murmerings "that for a little stir of the Scots soon blown
over" they were being ground down by payments.

49

Led by

Michael Joseph, a blacksmith, and Thomas Flammock, a lawyer,
the West Countrymen decided on a demonstration rather than a
rebellion and marched, fifteen thousand strong, in May, 1497,
towards London to demand exemption from their taxes and r e 
moval of those ministers who had so evilly advised the king.
It was a dangerous situation, more so as the Scots themselves
were girding for the war which had been declared against them.
Henry had been caught unaware by the Cornish outbreak,
but he could not afford to parley with contumacious subjects
in arms.

With internal security and the safety of the

^ H , A. L, Fisher, The History of' England- from the' Ac
cession of Henry V I T to the' Death: of''Henry VIII (.London:
Longmans, Green, and Co,T 1913), pp. 68-69, Hereinafter
cited as' History of England.
49

Bacon, W o r k s , I, 360.
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northern frontier at stake, he quickly concentrated an over
whelming force about London.

An army, already enroute to the

north, was recalled, and the gentry of the home counties were
mustered.

Finally, on June 16, as the protestors lay below

the city of Blackheath, Henry launched a sudden attack which
overran their defences.

Two thousand West Countrymen died in

the onslaught, while the captured survivors were held to ran
som by the victors.
James, Baron Audley,

Of their leaders, Joseph, Flammock, and
50

were executed.

Henry pardoned the re

mainder, moved perhaps by the slaughter on the heath or, as
Bacon would have it, because "he made a great difference be
tween people that did rebel upon wantonness and them that did
rebel upon want."
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With the West Country restored to obedience, attention
was once more riveted on Scotland where with untoward slowness
James IV and Warbeck prepared to exploit the Cornish trouble
with one last assault on Henry's throne.

For this purpose War

beck was sent into Ireland where it was expected he could
rally a force for the White Rose and lead it into England.
James, meanwhile, would try to coordinate the landing by leading another army of auxiliaries across the border.
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50
Audley was a desitute peer whom Flammock and Joseph had
recruited during their passage through Somerset.
51
Bacon, Works, I, 363.
52
.......
Busch, England Under the Tudors, King Henry VIX-, p. 144.
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It was another grand scheme doomed to

failure, for al-

ready it would seem that the Scottish king was at pains

to be

rid of this pensioner on whom he had showered so much atten
tion at great expense and for such small return.

There were

rumors that all was not well between the two troublemakers,
and it is to be suspected that when Warbeck took ship for
Cork at the beginning of July, James was not sad to see him
go.

53

Everywhere enthusiasm for the "Duke of York" had waned,

even in Ireland where the imposter found there were
men to be had.

few Irish

Kildare and Desmond, the rebel earls who had

befriended him at the beginning of his odyssey, had gone over
to Henry, and Sir James Ormond, the turbulent war chief who
had solicited his coming on this occasion, was dead, slain in
54
a brawl with the feuding Butlers.
How many men joined Warbeck in Ireland is uncertain.

In

two dispatches Rairaondo de Soncino, the Milanese envoy in Eng
land, makes mention first of "eighty savage Irishmen" and
later of "about three hundred persons of various nationali
ties," 55 among whom was a Spanish veteran of wars in the Low
Countries, Don Pedro de

53

Guevara, who might well have been

Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p. 144.
54
.
Gaxrdner, Henry the Seventh, pp. 130-^31.
55
......
Allen B. Hinds, ed., Calendar of State Papers' and Manu
scripts,' Existing in the Archives and Collections of Milan
(London;
H. M. Stationery Office, 1912), Nos. 325, 327.
Hereinafter cited as Milan Calendar.

the brother of that Pulano de Guevara who had died in London
for his part in the Deal landing of 1495.
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If this be the

case, Don Pedro and the other foreigners, who are described
57
as having "followed [Perkin] for some time before,"
may have
been the remnant of that mercenary and auxiliary force with
which, after the repulse at Deal, Warbeck had attacked Water
ford, and which on the latter defeat had been stranded in Ire
land.

Whatever the case, Warbeck's reception i n Ireland was

poor:

a price had been placed on his head, and he and his

retinue had to be surreptitiously smuggled out of Kinsale harCO
bor aboard three Spanish merchantmen
lest the inhabitants
of the district cut their throats and claimed the bounty on
their skins.

A course was set for Cornwall, and on September

7, nearly two months after leaving Scotland, Warbeck and his
company put ashore in Whitesand Bay.
The delay in Ireland cost Warbeck dearly.

He had gained

no army; but more hurtful, he had frustrated his only worth
while confederate, James IV, in the latter1s attempt at a simul
taneous demonstration in the north.

As agreed at Warbeck's

"^Concerning Don Pedro, see Busch, England Under the Tu
dors, King Henry VII, p. 115; see also Spanish Calendar, I,
No. 98.
^ Milan Calendar, I, No. 327.
58
Busch, England Under t h e Tudors, King Henry VII, pp.
115^16.
There is some question as to the nationality of these
vessels.
Busch describes them as Spanish merchantmen, while
Mackie,' The Earlier Tudors, p. 144, refers to one as a Breton
pinnace.
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departure, James had waited some weeks, and then, when he
might reasonably have expected his ally to be ready to take
the field, he advanced on Norham Castle in the East March
while his scourers laid waste the countryside.

59

Forced to

retreat before the superior army of the Earl of Surrey, his
kingdom was invaded, and many strong towers and castles be
tween Coldstream and Ayton were pulled down, all before War
beck had made his move.
support:

Small wonder that James withdrew his

negotiations for ending the war with England were

immediately begun and were successfully concluded by the sign
ing of a seven years' truce on September 30.6^
Left to his own devices in Cornwall and deprived at last
of foreign aid, Warbeck's luck soon ran out, though one final
merry chase was needed to bring him to bay.

The West Country,

still chafing under the exactions of Henry's assessors, had
enough dissidents to risk their lives again in a cause which
held out the possibility of financial relief.

Eight thousand

rallied for an attempt on Exeter, but as with Warbeck's pre
vious military undertakings, his demonstration was contemptible
in the extreme.

CQ
p. 147.
60

Two days of shouting at the defenders and

Bacon, Works, I, 363; Mackie, The Earlier Tudors,
“

Fisher, History of E ngland, p. 73.
The initial agree
ment was extended on December 5 to the lifetime of the two
sovereigns, and in July, 1499, "until one year after the death
of him who should survive the longer."
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prying at the gates of the city with crow bars accomplished
nothing/ and with four hundred dead he marched off to nearby
Taunton towards which loyalist forces were hurrying in relief.
At this place his courage failed him.

On the eve of the in

tended attack on the town he rode secretly from camp and in a
vain attempt tried to reach the coast.

Tracked to Beaulieu

Abbey in Hampshire by the horsemen of the king, he surrendered,
throwing himself on Henry's mercy.

A public confession and

Henry's generosity saved his life, but only for the moment.
Held under easy house arrest for almost a year he attempted to
escape in June, 1498, after which he suffered stricter con
finement in the Tower.

A second try for freedom involving the

still imprisoned Earl of Warwick sealed his fate, and on N o 
vember 23, 1499, he was hanged, drawn, and quartered a week
after his public trial at W h i t e h a l l . ^
Warbeck was twenty-five years old when he died.

He had

been a cunning and resourceful challenger for Henry's crown
but, as the record shows, too timid a leader to have ever made
a success of the charade he attempted.

While the forces at

his disposal, in particular the mercenary and auxiliary levies

®^For good accounts of the operations at Exeter, Warbeck's
flight, and his subsequent capture, see Bacon, W o r k s , I, 365-70,
and Busch, England Under the Tudors, King Henry V I I , pp. 116-21.
Sad to say no mention is made of the fate of the foreigners,
though one must assume that if they fell into loyalist hands
they were executed, as this had been the end reserved for those
taken in 1495.
See above, p. 60.

supplied by the Imperialists and the Scots, were not numerous
or for that matter proficient, more able men in similar circum
stances had achieved their purpose with less.

On the question

of foreign troops some writers have queried Warbeck1s wisdom
in utilizing them at all.

fi2

The implication is that he would

have been more readily supported had he forgone their use en
tirely and relied wholly on his appeal to the English.

Such

reasoning is but empty rhetoric, since it confers on the pre
tender a popularity far in excess of that which he actually
enjoyed.

Similarly it ignores what was, and long has been,

common practice among usurpers of the English crown, namely
that from Hengist to Henry VII those who would make themselves
king had accepted relief from whatever quarter it could be
obtained.
It is strange, however, that after Bosworth instances of
foreign soldiers in Henry VII's service are both hard to find
and difficult

to substantiate.

There is no question that he

used them, but apparently only sparingly and as specialists.
The instance of the Dutch captain, Jacob van Walthuysen, and
his band of 155 men of war has already been cited;

and

Andre, in an obscure passage of his Historia Regis, relates
that in August, 1508, there was a band of Germans in the

®2Bacon, Works, I, 354; Fisher, History of E ngland, p. 68.
See above, p. 58, n.

35.

country and that they were sent on some unknown errand by the
king.

Unquestionably the Dutchmen were mercenaries, but the

status of the Germans is less clear since Andre provides no
clue.
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Most probably they too were mercenaries, though the

possibility exists that they were merely transients blown
ashore, as

were so many wayfarers, in that age of sail; for

certain it

is that in 1508 Henry VII had little need of for

eign troops.

England was at peace with herself and the world.

Only in Italy, where Pope Julius II was urging the destruction
of Venice, were war clouds threatening.
That the first Tudor should in fact have shied away from
the use ofalien conscripts is understandable.
all, campaigned at

He had, after

Bosworth as king of England, and his Eng

lish subjects could not have been expected to take kindly to
policing by continental hirelings.

On the other hand, it is

too much to presume that a progressive monarch like Henry
would have dispensed with foreign soldiers entirely.

He there

fore did maintain a few mercenaries from time to time, if only
like the French gunfounders he employed in the Weald,
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to

64Andre, Historia R e g i s , p. 27.
The pertinent text reads
as follows:
"Rex autem magnum Teutonum numerum, nescio quorsum
hujus mensis initio misit cum apparatu bellico, Hevetiorum more
A number of these have been identified in an illuminat
ing article by H. Schubert, "The First Cast-Iron Cannon Made in
England," The Journal of the Iron and Steel Institute, CXLVI
(1946), 131~40, among tHem Patrick de la Mote, an appointee of
Richard III.
Not only was la Mote retained by Henry; he was
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serve as an example and an inspiration to native practitioners
of the military arts.
Nonetheless, it is with the reign of his son and succes
sor, Henry VIII, that one finds the first mass exploitation
of mercenaries and auxiliaries by a Tudor.

The second Henry,

the most remarkable man, in Pollard's estimation, who ever
wore the English crown, came to the throne in April, 1509,
just two months prior to his eighteenth birthday.

He ruled

England for thirty-eight years, during which time he engaged
in three wars with France, wars which in their sterility and
high expenditure bankrupted the nation and marred an other
wise brilliant reign.

In none were England's essential in

terests ever served, while in each, as is universally conceded,
Henry was used as a cat's paw to secure advantages for his
•

principal allies, Spain and the Hapsburg Empire.
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promoted to the office of chief "'canoner' or master founder
and surveyor and maker of all the King's cannon in the Tower
of London and elsewhere." Two other Frenchmen, Theobald
Ferrount and Gland Pyroo were assigned to him as assistants,
while shortly after 1490 three of their countrymen, Pierre
Roberdes and Simon and Blasius Byllard, "gunners of the Tower
of London," were employed as founders in and around the A sh
down Forest in Sussex.
Another Frenchman, John Stile, oper
ated a forge near Hartfield to the north of Ashdown, and it
was near Newbridge within the forest itself that the first
iron cannon were cast in 1508 by yet another Frenchman,
Pauncelett Symart, who remained at his foundry in the Weald
until 1511.
The best military history of the reign is still the
brief summary provided by Oman, The Art of War in the Six
teenth Century, pp. 285-357.
The French aspect of Henry
V I I I 's first French war has been admirably covered by
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Contrary to the recent assertion that the second Tudor
67
made only modest use of alien troops ,
the fact is that Henry
VIII enlisted foreigners by the thousands.

True, most were

used on the Continent, and none were employed in England or
against Scotland, France's pugnacious ally, until 1545; but
the impressive revalation is that in all of Henry VIII's wars
"the only engagements during his reign at which they were not
present were . . . Flodden and Solway M o s s ," both of which
were fought with makeshift northern levies.
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Five hundred

German mercenaries, the first foreign troops ever to serve the
second Tudor, accompanied the Marquis of Dorset on the illfated Spanish expedition in 1512.

69

From that time up to the

end of the reign the numbers of "soldiers strangers" utilized
by Henry increased until for the defence of captured Boulogne
and the intimidation of the Scots he sought to retain them by
the tens of hundreds at a time.
Those mercenaries and auxiliaries obtained at the begin
ning of the reign were almost exclusively landsknecht pikemen

Cruickshank, Army R o y a l . No monographs have yet been attempted
on the later wars, though the accounts of Fisher, History of
E n g l a n d , Chap. IX and pp. 454-71; Mackie, The Earlier Tud o r s ,
pp. 267-85, 402-10; and Wernham, Before the Armada, Chaps. VIII
and XII can be read profitably.

a7

See above, p. 45 and n. 6.

68
Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 288.

69

On their recruitment see L. & P., I, pt. 1, No. 1146.
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and heavy cavalry; but for his last military foray Henry showed
keen interest in supplementing these with arquebusiers and
light cavalry.

Pikemen and men-at-arms were recruited mainly

in the Germanies and the Low Countries, while light horsemen,
acquired initially in the same territories, were increasingly
sought following the siezure of Boulogne among the bands of
Italian and Spanish free lancers and among the exiled Albanian
and Greek stradiots.
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Those soldiers equipped with firearms

were invariably Italians or Spaniards, though in consequence
of the changing tactics in the Great Italian Wars of which
Henry's continental jaunts were but extensions, each company
of landsknechts contained a definite quota of arquebusiers,
71
the figure increasing as the reign progressed.
The employment of such specialists attests to the obvious
deficiencies of Henry's own national force.

The English army

lacked pikemen; it lacked handgunners; and it was almost to
tally deficient in heavy horse.

As to the actual numbers of

foreigners utilized by Henry VIII, the sources, while not en
tirely satisfactory, fairly bulge with information.

The Eng

lish army which invaded France in 1513 totalled about twentyfour thousand men.

These were joined by approximately seven

^®These were the famous "Albanoyes horsemen" on whose
history see below, pp. 169 f f .
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The rise and development of the landsknecht is re
counted below, Chap. III.

77
thousand mercenaries,
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of which six thousand were "Almain

pikemen” and the remainder "Burgundian horse," that is, heavy
cavalry raised in the Netherlands patrimony of the Hapsburg
dukedom of Burgundy.

Seven thousand mercenaries out of a to

tal force of thirty-one thousand can scarcely be termed a mod
est number, considering the size of early Tudor armies.

Rela

tive to total strength, in 1513 foreigners comprised between
one-quarter and one-fifth of that English army which forced
the surrender of Therouanne and Tournay and which drove the
chivalry of Prance from the field in the farcical Battle of
the Spurs.
Henry's second war with France, "one of the most purpose
less and unnecessary contests" in which England ever engaged,
began in 1522, the major thrust coming in 1523 when the king's
brother-in-law, the Duke of Suffolk, led an invasion force as
far as Montidier.

This was the deepest incursion into French

territory by an English army since the close of the Hundred
Years' War, so it is unfortunate that there is much less reli
able information about this exercise than the earlier and
later expeditions of the reign.

Nevertheless, the strength

of the invaders, including contingents from the garrisons at

^ D r . John Taylor, the king's chaplain and clerk of Par
liament, left a diary of this campaign.
He placed the number
of mercenaries at eight thousand.
See L. &, P ., I, pt- 2, 1058.
^3Fisher, History of England, p. 240.
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Hammes, Guisnes, and Calais, can be safely fixed at around
fourteen thousand, which host, in accordance with an agreement
signed by the Imperialist commissioners at Valladolid, was sup
plemented by three thousand auxiliary foot and a similar number
of auxiliary horse provided at the expense of Margaret of Savoy,
mm «

Governess of the Netherlands.

Suffolk would have had several

thousand more had not his ally, Charles V, diverted them for
the use of the French rebel, Charles of Bourbon, whose failure
to effect a juncture with the English led to the demoralization
of the invaders and the abandonment of the campaign.

Six thou

sand men out of a combined strength of twenty thousand:
an awesome figure but almost a third of the allied army.

hardly
75

The great undertaking of Henry VIII.'s last years was the
aborted "Enterprise of Paris," an overly ambitious scheme aimed
at nothing less than the destruction of France.

Attempted in

^ M a r g a r e t of Savoy was the daughter of Maximilian I and
aunt of his successor, Charles V. The treaty against France
which placed upon her the burden of providing these troops is
outlined in L. £ P ., III, pt. 2, No. 3149.
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During the previous year, in 1522, an undetermined num
ber of foreigners participated in the Earl of Surrey's vicious
but inconsequential raid through the French district of Picardy.
One veteran of this and the later French campaigns, in alluding
to those foreigners who served in 1522, leaves no doubt that
they too were auxiliaries; for he writes of them that "the King
of England did not have to pay any of the cost . . . ." Elis
Gruffyd, "Suffolk's Expedition to Montdidier," trans. M. B.
Davie?,Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, Fouad I University,
VII (1944)”, 437

the summer of 1544 in conjunction with Charles V, the project
called for a simultaneous invasion of France, the Imperialist
forces to drive west through Champagne, the English forces
south through Picardy.

Both monarchs in accord with the sched

ule worked out between them were to effect a meeting on the
Marne and then make a combined assault on the Franch capital
where the spoils of war were to be divided between them,
French Burgundy to Charles and the remainder, including the
French crown, to Henry.

In the end, since neither monarch

advanced more than a few miles inside French territory, the
trophies obtained fell considerably short of the heady claims
of the confederates.

The emperor withdrew from the war by

the September Peace of Crepy, renouncing in the process all
title to Burgundy and engaging with the French king, Francis
I, to unite in defending Christendom against the Turk.

Mean

while Henry, to assuage his martial pride, satisfied himself
with the useless conquest of Boulogne, which fortress he com
mitted himself to defend until a face-saving formula allowing
for its eventual return to France could be worked out in 1546.
During those two years of ruinous war, from the first in
vasion to the cessation of hostilities, England assembled
what was certainly the largest and most cosmopolitan army ever

76sy the terms of the Treaty of Ardres or Camp, as it is
variously known, Henry agreed to return Boulogne to France in
1554 in return for 2,000,000 crowns.
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raised by a Tudor.

Forty-two thousand men participated in

the initial operations resulting in the taking of Boulogne.
Of these fully ten thousand were foreigners, the largest con
tingents being auxiliaries, six thousand foot and horse sup
plied by the Imperialists,

The bulk of these were employed

in the subsidiary siege of neighboring Montreuil, an almost
theatrical affair which served to cover Henry*s main offen
sive at Boulogne, and as anticipated, all were recalled to
the Netherlands within days of the emperor’s entente with
France. 77
The loss of the auxiliaries cut deeply into English effec
tiveness, and the withdrawal of the Imperialists could have
proved fatal, as France was now free to concentrate all her
resources against the invader.

But the over-caution of Fran

cis I and the availability of mercenaries combined to pre
serve at least the illusion of victory for Henry.

No precise

estimate of these latter troops is possible for the last
phase of this war, though it was far in excess of the four
thousand or so involved in the capture of Boulogne.

In truth

between October, 1544, and the Treaty of Camp which ended
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The part played by the mercenaries and auxiliaries
during the Boulogne campaign is treated in detain below, pp.
256 ff.
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formal hostilities
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in June, 1546, so many were retained,

both for service in France and against the Scots, that there
were times, as in the summer of 1545, when express orders
79
were issued that no more should be hired.
In the quest for mercenaries Henry's agent scoured all
Europe from the Baltic to the Mediterranean,
their spawning grounds were missed:

Few, if any, of

Denmark, the Hanse towns

of Bremen, Hamburg, and Lubeck; the duchies of Mecklenberg,
Luneburg, Cleves, Wurttemberg, and Brabant; the counties of
Flanders, Artois, and Hainault; Friesland, Holland, Gelderland; and a score of Imperial cities, chief among them Aachen,
Cologne, Frankfurt, and Metz,

In addition Henry had his

special agents in Italy, the best known being the Englishmen,
Edmund Harvel, who doubled as ambassador to the Venetian Doge.
Four others were Italian condottieri, among them the notorious
bravo, Ludovico da l'Armi, nephew of one cardinal, Lorenzo

Despite the terms of the peace, the agreement of Camp,
at least as regards Boulogne, was hardly honored, and the gar
rison there was under almost constant threat of attack until
1550 when the fortress was ceded to the French for 400,000
crowns.
79 (B. M . ) Harl. MSS. 283, f. 305.
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Campeggio,

and terror of another, Reginald Pole,, detested

cousin of Henry. VIII, opponent of the English Reformation,
81
and supporter of Catholic orthodoxy.
As will be shown in the analysis of H e n r y ’s last French
war, the which will be used to illustrate the extent of Eng-'
land's reliance upon foreign troops, the hunt for soldiers
of fortune was not always successful.

Contracts made with

rapacious captains were easily broken; princes in distant corners of Europe were reluctant to grant passports for the transit of unruly men of war through their dominions; and in the
case of auxiliaries, allies were as easily lost as won.
nally, England hardly had a monopoly on war:

Fi

competition for

the hire of mercenaries was rife, for despite the HapsburgValois reconciliation the Boulonnais was not the: only battle
ground in the West.

In the Germanies alone, even before the

signing of the Treaty of Crepy, a dozen petty conflicts raged,
as Lutherans and Catholics sparred for advantage in a series
of preliminary bouts that were to culminate in the Schmalkaldic

80
Cardinal Lorenzo Campeggio had sat in judgement on
Catherine of Aragon at the initiation of Henry's divorce pro
ceedings in 1528.
He incurred the wrath of the king by postponing a decision, thus allowing the case to be translated to
Rome where it was eventually decided, though too late, in
Catherine's favor.
81

On the extraordinary career of da l'Arrai' see below,
pp. 344-52 and Appendix B.
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War,
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Nevertheless, even in the face of such impediments,

Henry's liberality attracted stipendiaries in droves, with the
result that around Boulogne and the Calais Pale he had in his
army "many depraved brutish foreign soldiers from all nations
under the sun— . . . Scots, Spaniards, Gascons, Portingals,
Albanians, Greeks, Turks, Tartars, Almains, Germans, Burgun
dians, Flemings"— all of whom, in the estimate of one dour
Welshman who was forced to serve with them, came "to have a
good time under the king of England, who by nature was too
hospitable to foreigners."

83

This was a harsh, though entirely justified, indictment.
Henry VIII did, as a rule, treat mercenaries far better than
his native conscripts; and for good reason.

In the absence

of a standing army and without reliable allies, he was depend
dent upon them, since beyond his Yeomen of the Guard and Gen
tlemen Pensioners they were the only professionals constantly
available to him.

Besides, any man like Henry VIII, who in

dulged in the fancy that by waging war he could be the arbiter
of Europe, was in need of all the help he could muster,

82The Schmalkaldic War (1546-1555) was the first of the
several wars of religion which, with little pause, kept Eu
rope in turmoil until the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.
83Elis. Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,"
trans. M. S. Davies, .Bulletin o f the Faculty of Arts, Fouad I
University,- XII (1950) , p, 14-15*,

CHAPTER III
THE LANDSKNECHT:

ORIGIN, RECRUITMENT, AND ORGANIZATION

A landsknecht thrown out of paradise
cannot get into hell because he would
make the devil afraid.
Sixteenth-century French proverb.
Of the mercenaries and auxiliaries who served Henry VIII,
the overwhelming majority were Germans, and of these the pre
ponderant number were landsknechts.

This fact says much for

the veritable revolution which had transformed the face of
continental warfare even before the beginning of the Tudor
century.

For a thousand years following the collapse of Rome/

battlefields in the West had been dominated by the aristocra
tic and heavily armored knight on horseback.

But during the

late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that domination had
been ended, as first the Swiss and later the German peasant
had unleashed on an unsuspecting nobility the dreadful power
of the phalanx reborn, an

infantry formation against which no

cavalry in Europe could prevail.
While the origin of the Swiss pikeman has been carefully
documented,1 the genesis of his counterpart, the German lands
knecht, is somewhat obscure, though it is generally agreed

1For a brief but solid account see Beeler, ed., The Art
of War in the Middle Ages, Chap. V.
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that the latter w a s ultimately the creation of that famous
King of the Romans and later Holy Roman Emperor,. Maximilian I,
Hardly a consistently successful commander r-in«chief, Maxir*
milian was nevertheless capable of learning from his enemies..
This he demonstrated early in his career when, as acting-Duke
2
of Burgundy,
he adopted the Swiss tactics of the Netherlands
ish rebels to defeat them.
Heretofore, Hapsburg armies had been the laughing stock
of Europe.

Now a new army was born, the soul of w h i c h was

formed of infantry pikemen recruited in the Hapsburg dominions in south Germany.

In 1486, Maximilian had two regiments

skilled in the Swiss tactics in the field, each numbering be^
tween three thousand and four thousand strong.

They had been

trained by a Swiss captain, and significantly in this year,
for the first time, the name Landsknechte appeared to describe
them.

They were not "lance soldiers;" nor were they "servants

of the land," as some have called them to distinguish them from
the Swiss Gebirgsknechten or "servants of the mountains."
What percisely was originally understood by the term

Maximilian was not elected emperor until 1493.
He had
become ruler of Burgundy in 1477 by his marriage to Mary,
daughter of Charles the Bold.
However, the title of duke
automatically devolved at birth on their son, Philip the Hand
some, and on Mary's death in 1482 a struggle developed be
tween Maximilian and his opponents in the Netherlands for
control of the regency.
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3
Landsknechte is still a subject of considerable debate, . but
what is certain is that before the end of -the fifteenth cen^
tury it was employed exclusively to describe those soldiers
who were trained and fought after the manner of the Swiss*
In copying the arms and to some extent the organization
of the Swiss, Maximilian laid the foundation of that awesome
German infantry which did such effective service in Italy
and elsewhere for his grandson, Charles V*

Yet the creation

of the landsknechts was not without its disadvantages *

Once

they had achieved the efficiency of the Swiss, they like the
Swiss found themselves in great demand.

They adopted the

mercenary habits of the Swiss and frequently took, service
with the enemies of their country*

Too, the recruitment of

landsknechts was never the sole privilege of the emperor, as
in fact, except when there was an Imperial pronouncement to
the contrary, those subjects who held directly of the emperor
claimed the right, by ancient custom and the constitution of
the Reich, to enter foreign employment and to recruit unlimited

3
Delbriick, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, IV, 9-10, points
out that the word Landsknechte was not new to the German vo
cabulary , that it had been i n u s e in both High and Low Germany
from at least the beginning of the fifteenth century and
could be variously translated to mean bailiff, marshal, court
messenger, or policeman.
He further suggests that Maximilian
deliberately chose a confusing term to obscure his real pur
pose, the establishment of a military force which would
strengthen his position as King of the Romans.

numbers for the same service.

4

But Imperial pronouncement

or no, the mercenary predilection of the landsknechts was
such that wherever war was waged they were invariably found
in the ranks of the belligerents.
More than the Swiss, their most serious competitors in
the mercenary market, the Germans lacked a permanent politic
5
cal commitment.
At least the Swiss, after 1516,
tended to
serve but one master, France.

The landsknechts, however, re«

mained free agents, bound to no one in particular and to all
who could afford them.

As Germans they were tied perhaps to

a particular territory but not to a political community, for
unlike the Gebirgsknechten they were "singularly indifferent
about their nationality:"

"We care little about the Holy

Roman Empire," runs a line from one of their ribald songs.

4Friedrich Blau, Die Deutschen Landsckiechte (Gbrlitz:
C. U. Starke, 1882), p. 14.
C
The year 1516 marked the signing of the "perpetual
peace" of Freiburg, concluded some months after the battle
of Marignano in which the Swiss suffered terrible losses at
the hands of the French.
This agreement created a special
relationship between Switzerland and France which lasted un-r
til after the French Revolution.
Gabriel Daniel, Kistoire
de la Milice Franpoise (2 vols,; Paris:
Jean-Baptiste Coignard, 1721), II, 287-90, traces in broad outline the early
history of this relationship.
Sir Sibbald Scott, in his
history of The British Army (3 vols.; London: Cassell, Petter,
and Galpin, iS’68-^80) , I"J TZ4, includes a quote from the Revue
Militaire Swiss (June 1856) which states that between 1477
and 1830 "750,000 Swiss fought and spilled their blood" in
the service of France. More recently Mockler, Mercenaries,
p. 103, makes the claim that "Over a million Swiss served in
the French army from the time of Louis XI to that of Louis X V I .
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"Whether it perishes today or tomorrow is all the same to us."
Only in unusual circumstances, such as in civil war, did
the Swiss take up arms against each other; for it was the pol
icy of the confederated cantons that their troops never be
7
contracted to both sides in any conflict.
Time and again
Maximilian and Charles V decreed that landsknechts would not
take service abroad, and those who ignored the ban and were
unlucky enough to be caught suffered, and expected to suffer,
the supreme penalty.

Nevertheless, throughout the sixteenth

century the lure of foreign gold proved forever irresistible.
But in the landsknechts' defence let it be said that their
lack of national conscience was but a mirror of the state of
things in Germany, a country which at this time was among the
most heterogeneous in Europe.

Rent by political faction and

divided in faith, it was both unwilling and unable to provide
a place for the landsknechts as national soldiers.

Small

wonder then that their ultimate commitment was generally to
themselves.
As the mercenary habit was so deeply ingrained in the
landsknechts, it was comparatively easy, providing resources
were available, to recruit them.

In fact any sixteenth-cen

tury ruler engaged in war could expect to be deluged by

^Quoted in Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 99.
7

William Robertson, History of the Reign of Charles V
(2 vols.; London:
George Routledge and Co., 1857), I, 266.
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offers to provide troops from German captains who were either
unemployed or dissatisfied with their current assignments.
Typical was the letter received by Henry VIII in 1545 follow
ing the occupation of Boulogne:
Henry, Lord of Duren, esq., offers His Ma
jesty the King of England, Prance, and Ireland
etc. to lead in His Majesty's service six hun
dred fighting horsemen, men of war and of service,
which he will levy in the country of Ostland and
surrounding districts upon such letter of re
tainer as His Majesty had given the horsemen in
the charge of Christopher van Prysborch [Pressburg?] and other commanders before Boulogne dur
ing His Majesty's last war . . . .
Furthermore, the said Lord Henry, with the
aid of Captain William van Dinther, who was one
of the five captains under the command of Mons.
the Count of Buren in the service of His Majesty,
offers four thousand good landsknecht footmen,
men of war and of service . . . which he will
levy in the countries of the Duchy of Gelders
and Ostland upon such letters of retainer and
terms as His Majesty of whosoever will agree to
g
with the said Lord Henry and William van Dinther.
During the struggle around Boulogne, Henry VIII's court in Eng
land and his agents on the Continent attracted mercenaries in
droves, not all of them Germans by any means; for as has been
noted Henry had under contract soldiers from many lands.

True

were the words of Sebastian Frank, the contemporary Swabian
chronicler and despiser of mercenaries:

"Whenever the devil

offers pay, then there is a humming and crowding together like
of flies in the summer, so that you will be completely baffled

8 (P. R. 0.) s. P. 1/212, f. 173.
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and wonder where . . . this swarm came from and how it survived
the winter."

9

The first step in hiring landsknechts or for that matter
any mercenary band

was to find a leader, one in whom the even

tual recruits could place their trust.

Not any man would do;

and ideally the mercenary captain was an experienced warrior,
a man of some reputation and accomplishment.

This leader,

after he had been found, entered into negotiations with his
prospective employer to agree upon the terms of service.
Once these had been mutually approved a contract was drawn up
in the form of a "letter of articles" or "capitulary" in which
the obligations of both parties were set f o r t h . ^
If several companies, otherwise known as ensigns or stand
ards,.

were contracted for, the normal procedure was for the

ruler to appoint their leader his colonel.

However, if the

contract called for but a single company, the officer who
supplied it normally had to be content with the rank of cap
tain.

This business out of the way, the ruler next issued a

letter patent authorizing his new placeman to raise the number of troops specified in the contract.

11

If he were to earn his pay the mercenary leader had his

Quoted An Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechts, p. 13.
"^For an example of a landsknecht contract see Appendix F.
11L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 438.
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work cut out for him.

First, to be on the safe side, he ob

tained written permission and passports from the princes in
12
whose territories he planned to recruit.
This was only good
business practice, for if he were to retain his contract he
had to convince his employer that he was capable of delivering
the promised men; and what better way than to be- able to dem
onstrate that he had the goodwill and cooperation of the au
thorities from whose states his men would be drawn and through
whose lands they would have to travel before reaching their
prearranged destination.^
Once a landsknecht colonel had obtained permission to re
cruit from the Emperor and the local magnates his next step
was to choose, usually from among his acquaintances, his senior
officers.

A lieutenant-colonel was appointed second in command,

and beneath him the requisite number of captains.

This done,

the actual recruitment of the rank and file could begin, which
function was the primary responsibility of the captains, each

19
Refusal of these passports by Charles V after his sepa
rate peace with France in 1544 caused considerable strain on
Anglo-Imperial relations.
See lb i d ., No. 471; XX, pt. 1,
xii-xiii, and pt. 2, No. 2857"
13

This is not to say that mercenary captains always
sought the cooperation of local officials, Henry VIII*s correspondence during war years, 1544-46, is full of complaints
from European heads of state inveighing against the depreda
tions of his hired bands. See ibid. , XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 860,
941; XX, pt. 2, Nos. 124, 287; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 147,
and VIII, No. 151.

92
of whom was delegated the task of raising his own company.

14

After the countryside had been informed in advance they set
off with fife and drum and copies of their commissions in
search of volunteers.

Their efforts were rarely disappointed,

and one can imagine the desperate characters which such calls
to arms attracted:

"unchristian, God-forsaken folk," robbers,

burners, slayers, gamers, "who delight in wine-bibbing, whor*]C
ing, blaspheming, and in making widows and orphans."
Faced
with an assemblage like this, it took a hard man with a vet
eran's aptitude to select wisely.
Fortunately, entrance into a mercenary company was never
automatic.

Certain rules, specified in the contracts, existed

which governed the arming and condition of the men.
plified the captains' task.

This sim

In the letter of articles agreed

upon in 1544 between Henry VIII and Maximilian, Count of
X6
Egmont-Buren,
it was stipulated that his two thousand

14The strength of landsknecht companies could vary con
siderably.
Generally, however, those contracted for by Henry
VIII numbered four hundred.
■^Quoted in E. Belford Bax, German Society At the Close
of the Middle Ages (London: Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1894),
p. 158.
^ B u r e n , besides raising mercenaries, was also entrusted
as Charles V's lieutenant-general in the Low Countries with
the leading of four thousand auxiliaries which the emperor
had agreed to lend Henry. The bulk of the count's troops,
both mercenaries and auxiliaries, served with the Duke of
Norfolk at the siege of Montreuii. Below, pp. 274-75.
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footmen be "well disciplined and equipped for war . . . .

And

that for each ensign there will be so many pikemen, halberdiers,
and small shot up to the number of four hundred."

Buren's cap

tains in this particular instance were charged to sign on no
more than fifty of sixty arquebusiers,
and the rest pikemen."

"up to thirty halberdiers,

17

Naturally/ a monarch like Henry VIII was not likely to take
for granted that his admonitions would be complied with in a
foreign land by foreign soldiers who were as quick as ever he
was to turn a situation to their own profit.

Therefore/to pro

tect his interests and to oversee the proceedings surrounding
the recruitment of mercenaries he appointed native English com
missioners of the musters who served as intelligence agents,
his eyes and ears.

Their finely detailed instructions were

designed to prevent any misunderstanding or misconstruction of
the letters of articles.

Note for instance their charge r e 

grading the mustering of the eight thousand landsknechts of
Friedrich von Reiffenberg:
They shall first diligently see that every Stand
ard be furnished with four hundred of good per
sons sound and able, and to muster out of them
those that be crooked, lame, or faulty, and to
see that their furniture of harness, weapons, etc.,
be according to their covenants, and the whole
ensign be well appointed and in good order . . .
they shall not muster nor let pass any that is
reported to be a strifemaker, wrangler, or quarreller, or that is of any inordinate fashion.

1 7 (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/185, f. 142.
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They shall also refuse them that be wounded
and especially in the hand . . . diligent
heed shall they take that in Mustering one
Soldier not borrow any other Soldier1s har
ness, weapon, Morris pike, or gun.-*-®
From these instructions it is obvious that the type of man to
be entertained by the captains should be experienced, physi
cally fit, properly armed, and conformable to discipline.
This ideal was not always possible to fulfill, but even un
scrupulous officers like Reiffenberg, who in the end managed
to escape his obligation completely, seem to have done their
best to select good men.
If a landsknecht met the requirements of a recruiting
captain, his name, place of birth, age, and speciality^® were
entered on a tentative muster roll.

He was then given a sum

of money, "conduct money," informed of the place of assembly
of the regiment, and instructed to be there by a specific date.
After he and his follow recruits had been assembled, the

18 CB.. M.) Add. MS. 6362, ff. 8-9.
Reiffenberg, a subject
of the Protestant Landgrave of Hesse, agreed to serve Henry
VIII with eight thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse. This
force was supposed to enter France through the Ardennes Forest
and march to the relief of Boulogne which in 1545 was being
threatened by the French army.
In the end, having extorted
three months pay from the English commissioners, Reiffenberg
was bought off by the French, and in 1546 entered the service
of the Landgrave, who with other Protestant princes in Ger
many, was arming for the impending Schmalkaldic War with the
Catholic Imperialists.
For the trials and tribulations of
the English commissioners appointed to negotiate with him
see below, pp. 367 ff.
^ T h a t is, halberdier, arquebusier, pikeman, etc.
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actual mustering

20

of the troops took place under the watchful

eye of the regimental muster master, the Musterhernn, and the
English commissioners of the muster, who were the final asses
sors of how well the captains had done their duty in selecting
the men.
In an open place where all the prospective hirelings
could be gathered, a gateway was constructed "by planting two
halberds into the ground and laying a pike across them.

21

"

The landsknechts were then ordered by the muster master to
arrange themselves by companies in double ranks facing each
other behind the gate.

Next the men filed through the gate

singly, their persons and weapons subjected to a last inspec
tion.

Unscrupulous captains were the order of the day, and

fictitious names for non-existant men meant extra pays in
their pockets.

Therefore/in accord with the letter of arti

cles and the instructions of the English commissioners, great
care was taken that the full compliment of each company was
provided and that no weaklings or cripples were recorded in
22
the final muster book.
Every man was sharply watched that

^ F r o m the Old French monstre, to show or "pass inspec
tion ."
21
J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (13
vols.; London: Macmillan and Co., 1910-19), I, 86.
22

The names of those chosen to serve were entered in
the muster book by the muster master's assistants, the clerks
of the muster.
There were several of these in each regiment,
ideally one for each ensign. Within the ensign each clerk
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he might not pass muster twice or pass through with deficient
weapons or weapons borrowed from a fellow landsknecht.
On completion of the muster the men were called together
as a regiment for the first time.

They formed a circle around

their colonel, who read aloud the letter of articles in which
were defined the conditions of service.

Also, agreement was

reached on the common points of discipline, for in a war com
munity rules and regulations governing the soldiers' conduct
in the field, on the march, and in camp were essential.

Loy

alty to the king and the officers serving him was expected.
The violation of women, clerics, and churches was forbidden;
cowardice and desertion were punishable by death; private
feuds were to be laid aside until the completion of the cam
paign; quarrelling with fellow landsknechts or allied troops
was prohibited, as was gambling, drunkedness, the selling of
23
spirits during divine service, and womanizing.
It was an
unfulfilled hope, particularly when large numbers of merce
naries were involved, that the men would bring with them none

was responsible for the bulk of the paperwork that needed to
be done. Not infrequently these men were multir-lingual,
since they often acted as liasons between the company comman
ders and the foreign commissioners of the muster.
For these and a multitude of other prohibitions not
infrequently imposed for the sake of good order, see Blau, Pie
Deutschen Landsknechte, pp. 16-20.

but their legitimate wives,.

24

Following the reeding of the letter of erticies end agree
ment upon discipline an oath was administered, binding the mer
cenaries to obey that which they had heard and to which they
25
had given their consent.
Finally, the principal officers of

OA

So onerous was the problem of camp followers and hang
ers-on that a special officer with the rank of captain was
often appointed to keep them in line.
He was known by the
colorful title of Hurenweibel, the sergeant of the whores.
See ibid., pp. 27-28, and Fort.escue, A History of the British
Army, I, 89.
I have not been able to find mention of this
oFficer in any of the foreign bands employed by Henry VIII,
though there is every reason for believing that his peculiar
talents could have been put to good use, especially by the
English commanders at Boulogne.
During the English occupation
Henry's troops proved no less lusty than the landsknechts:
"Adultery was frequent among them, for scarcely one lived with
his married wife, but kept a mistress or two . . . numbers of
shameless prostitutes came at every tide from England . . . .
These descended on Boulogne dressed as gallently as they knew
how in velvet and silk of the finest cloth, and the soldiers
took them up so that no one could call himself worthy without
a whore or two following him from every house like the sheath
after the dagger."
Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545
to 1550," pp. 13-14.
^ A copy of such an oath to be administered to the "cap
tain strangers in the marches of Calais" in 1545 is to be
found in (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/198, f. 50a.
It reads as follows:
"You will swear to be [a] good and loyal servant of
the King, our sovereign Lord, and that you will serve His
Majesty well and loyally against all his enemies.
The things that will be entrusted to you [to do] on
the part of His Majesty, His Majesty’s Governors or Cap
tains you will handle and conduct according to the best of
your ability and understanding and will keep secret so far
as will be necessary and meet.
You will be obedient and attentive in all things to
the orders of His Governors and in all that will be good
and will touch the office and profession of good soldier
ing and accordingly will govern those under your charge^
In no way will you consent to any treason or mutiny,
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the regiment were introduced and the company standards en
trusted to the ensign-bearers, the latter swearing a special
oath to defend their flags unto death.
This concluded the common business of the regiment.

The

community of warriors separated, each company gathering round
its captain to be presented to the men whose appointments
formed part of his patronage and would assist him in the m a n
agement of the company.

A lieutenant, chaplain, company quar

termaster or harbinger, and surgeon were introduced in that
order.

Then followed the election of the non-commissioned of

ficers by the landsknechts themselves, which election was pre
sided over by the colonel's appointee, the Feldweibel or sergeant.

26

Under his direction voting took place for two

but you will produce in evidence the authors and all others
who will do anything improper so as to be punished as may
be required.
And to do all you possibly can to maintain all and
singular the rules, orders, and laws which have been made
or hereafter will be made and ordained by the King, our
said Lord, or by the Lords of His Great Council or other
wise by the Lieutenant-General for the w a r .”
^ H i s principal function was the drilling and training
of the men and their arrangement in battle.
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corporals,

27

28
29
a conductor, . arid a furrier,

Finally, the eiir

sign was divided into twenty rfive files of sixteen, each, file
electing its own leader, the- Rottmeister,^^ whose election
completed the company hierarchy*
However, at regimental staff level another hierarchy ex^
isted, comprised of a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, bailiff,
watchmaster, regimental quartermaster, paymaster, master of
supplies, and provost.
to be taken by

In a memorandum entitled "precautions

[King Henry VIII]

in retaining German soldiers,"

the recommendation made is that "these high officers . . .
be men highly experienced in the art of war."

must

The colonel, as

commander of the regiment, bore chief responsibility for the
performance of his troops, which responsibility devolved on the

27

The corporals or Gemeinweibels acted as assistants‘to
the Feldweibel and as liaison agents between him and the rank
and file,
3®He served as a type of scout or reconnoiterer, seeking
out the best routes on the march.
29

Known on the Continent as fouriers, these officers
served as assistants to the company quartermasters; among
their duties was the assignment of living quarters in camp.
30
These men enjoyed no special privileges except that m
crowded conditions, if a bed were available they were entitled
to it. They would seem to have been responsible for the dis
tribution of food and, if the men of their file were arquebusiers, ammunition.
3 1 {P, R, O.) S. P. 1/212, f. 171.
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lieutenant-colonel during his leader's absence.
was a man skilled in martial law.

32

The bailiff

Known to the Germans as the

Schultheiss or Justi zamptmann, he was expected to be a seasoned
soldier; for when the martial law was contravened his was the
duty to select the jury, appoint the officers of the court ma r 
tial, and pronounce sentence on the accused.

The master of

the watch "was in charge of the proper ordering of guards . .
. rounds and patrols," while the regimental quartermaster, trav
elling in advance of the troops, was accountable for finding
lodgings for the men on the march.

The paymaster, assisted by

a staff of clerks, was in charge of the financial business of
the regiment and acted as chief banker.

All wages and debts

incurred on behalf of the regiment were paid out of his trea
sure chests.

The master of supplies or Proviantmeister, aided

by the company harbingers, had the task of securing and dis
pensing victuals.

Lastly, police power was exercised by the

provost, an officer whose functions broadly paralleled those
of an English justice of the peace.

He had the power to ar

rest and prosecute offenders of the law and to establish mar
kets and fix prices of the goods sold in camp.

It was a most

lucrative post, for he was entitled to demand a fee from every
prisoner released from his jail, and in return for the protec
tion granted to the sellers in his market and for the rating

^^Otherwise, except for the fact that he drew extra pay,
the lieutenant-colonel exercised no more authority than an
ordinary captain.
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of foodstuffs he levied a share*

The tongue of every slaugh^-

tered animal was his, and from every cask of wine or barrel
of beer he drew a liter or t w o .33
The principal weapon of the landsknecht was the pike,
though the complexity of the developing art of war necessitated that he be proficient in several others, notably the
halberd and arquebus.

The pike, like much else in the lands

knecht's arsenal, was borrowed from the Swiss.

It was an

eighteen foot long ashen shaft to which was fitted a spear
head of steel.

Sir Charles Oman, following Blaise de Mont-

luc's commentary on the battle of Ceresole (1544), gives an
account of how differently the weapon was employed on that
occasion by the opposing German and Swiss forces:
. . . the difference between the landsknechts
and the Swiss is that the former hold the pike
very low down [towards the blunt end of the
shaft] and always keep the point down, which
is much better in 'push of pikes' when the
staves are crossed . . . I presume that the
advantage was that when the two pike-columns
had clashed men whose points were held high
were likely to find them shoved up well over
the heads of the enemy, while those whose
points were down would get a better chance of
thrusting at the body of an opponent .34
Whatever the advantage or disadvantage of holding the ipike^
point up or down, that weapon, before the perfection of

33

All these officers and their duties are described at
length in Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, p p . 24-27, 37,
34

Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century,

76- 17.

------------------------------
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firearms , was the surest defence aginst heavy cavalry, and in
massed formations against infantry armed w i t h less, the shock
of the pike charge was near invincible.
The second most useful weapon of the landsknecht was the
halberd.

In fact, before the development of the pike, the

halberd had been the favorite weapon of the Swiss,
combination short pike and battle-axe.
length,

It was a

About eight feet in

it was tipped by a sharp stabbing point beneath which

was a blade like a hatchet.

A curious feature was the iron

hook attached to the blade, which hook could drag a horseman
from his saddle or his mount to the ground.

"If the enemy

succeded in checking the onset of the pikemen,

it was

[the

h a l b e r d i e r s 1] duty to pass between the front ranks . . . and
throw themselves into the fray."

35

The arquebus or hackbut was relatively new to the b a t 
tlefields of Europe.

It made its first appearance around the

middle of the fifteenth century, and, from the first lands
knecht companies included a certain proportion of handgunners
O£
in their ranks. ° Arquebusiers were utilized as skirmishers

^Beeler,
36

e d . , The Ar t of War in the Middle A g e s , p. 78.

Since England lacked sufficient handgunners in the
early sixteenth century, the letters of articles agreed to by
Henry VIII w i t h merce n a ry captains are quite specific about
the numbers to be recruited.
The agreement with the Count of
Egmont-Buren in 1544 stipulated fifty or sixty arquebusiers
per ensign.
See above, p. 93.
Friedrich von Reiffenberg*s
articles in 1545 called for one hundred arquebusiers per

and to protect the flanks of their units in retreat or on the
inarch.

In massed formations they were interspersed with the

pikemen and their firepower used to thin the ranks of the ad
vancing enemy.
Almost without exception German infantry confronted their
foes in defence and offence in solid bodies of enormous depth.
The usual formation employed by the landsknecht in battle ar
ray was the gevierte Ordnung or square, which formation had
been copied from the Swiss and which in prototype was trace
able to the Macedonian phalanx.

Whole regiments, some of

them containing as many as ten thousand men, are known to
have been arranged in this fashion, though the Swiss tactic
of dividing the regiment into three divisions or battles in
echelon was more commonly adopted.

Discipline was the key

to success, as "victory could only be won if submission to
the unit was perfect, if the advance was resistless."

38

ensign or fully one-quarter of his eight thousand foot.
(P.
R. 0.) S.P. 1/203, f. 18b.
In a separate agreement govern
ing the 1,500 horsemen he was to recruit, Reiffenberg prom
ised that 450 would be mounted arquebusiers, that is, 150
per troop of 500.
(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/203, f. 15.
37

Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, p. 47. The type of
terrain and the nature of the obstacle to be overcome could
result in a variety of formations.
OQ

JOGunter Franz, "Von Ursprung und Brauchtum der Lands
knechte ,H Mitteiiungen des Instituts fur Osterreichische
Geschichtsforschung, LXI (1951), 97.

1Q4.
Failure to act in concert invited disaster/ and for this rea^
son cowards and deserters were cut down with impunity by their
fellow landsknechts.
The square or hedgehog

(Igel) , as it was sometimes called f

was formed by arranging the men at regular intervals in equal
numbers of ranks and files.

39

Around it, guarding the four

sides exposed to the enemy, were ranged three rows of the best
armed pikemen,

40

weapons extended and with gaps between into

which could step the reserve or "rear-rank men" in the event
of casualties.

Behind the wall of pikes in special units

stood the men with shorter weapons, the halberdiers, arque
busiers, and the wielders of the terrible Zweihanders, great
two-handed swords which in the press of the pikes were em
ployed in hacking the way into the enemy ranks.
If it were possible before a fight, the chaplains led
the men in prayer and, in the case of Protestant landsknechts,
in the singing of hymns, a custom which the Italian historian,
Jovius, foolishly attributed to the landsknechts' fear of

oq
•^Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, p. 49.
^ °Ibid. Allusion is made to the two different grades of
pikemen in the "Articles Somair" of Reiffenberg which pertain
to the recruitment of his twenty ensigns of foot:
"Firstly,
Friedrich von Reiffenberg promises that each ensign must be
four hundred head, having 150 well armed men carrying pikes,
one hundred arquebusiers or a little less, and the rest 150
pikes, according to the order of war."
These latter pikemen
are presumably the "rear-rank men" mentioned in Blau.
See
(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/203, f. 18b.
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cannonballs.
rite:

This done, the men performed a more primitive

they shook the dust from their doublets or scooped up

clods of earth and threw them over their shoulders in an act
of symbolic purification, dedicating themselves to death and
the gods of war.4^

The landsknechts were now ready to give

b attle.
The widespread use of landsknechts and other mercenary
and auxiliary troops in the sixteenth century demonstrates
two obvious facts.

First, the success of armies during the

period relied upon the skillful combination of a variety of
arms, and second, no single government had the resources in
manpower and quality to provide that variety.

Only by hiring

mercenaries or by engaging allies to lend auxiliaries could
these drawbacks be overcome.

It would be wrong, however, to

assume that foreign troops were recruited as mere cannon-fod
der.

With some duplication and overlapping of talents each

national group was able to provide a certain type of unique
service of which it was the recognized master.

Thus, in the

early sixteenth century the French men-at-arms were adjudged
the best heavy cavalry in Europe; Spaniards and Italians made
the best handgunners; Gascons were the best crossbowmen; and

4 1 Blau, Die Deutschen Landsknechte, p. 49; Franz, "Von
Ursprung und Brauchtum der Landsknechte," p. 90.
The origin
of this ceremony is by no means clear.
It would not appear
to be of Christian derivation and was probably a holdover
from the pagan past.
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the Albanian stradiots, until towards the m i d d l e of th e century northern Europeans learned to imitate them, made the
b e s t light cavalrymen.

To this list one m a y add the lands-

knechts, who, w i t h the Swiss, ranked as the finest foot sol"
diers in Europe.

They had d o n e something w h i c h no other in"

fantry had been a b l e to do; namely, they h ad combined shock
w i t h mobility.

I n these troops were united the attributes

w h i c h had made the mounted k n i g h t the prince of medieval battlefields.

The compact mass an d serried p i k e s of the lands"

kn e c h t regiment g a v e it the solidity and w e i g h t heretofore
only enjoyed by men-at-arms.

Coupled with this was rapidity

of movement, the ability to execute maneuvers coolly, and,
m o s t importantly,

discipline.

The pikeman's competence in

m e e t i n g and defeating heavy h o r s e had established his reputa"
42
tion,
and it w a s this singular skill w h i c h had first brought
him into favor w i t h the paymasters of E u r o p e .
Unfortunately perhaps for the landsknecht, who b o r e the
b runt of many a b r a v e fight,

it was not f u l l y appreciated

that by the m i d d l e of the sixteenth century his supremacy as
the m o s t effective infantryman w as being successfully c h a l 
lenged by a new power, the infantry of Spain.

The father of

this force was the "Great Captain," Gonsalvo de Cordova, who

4 ^This r e p utation had f i r s t been made b y the Swiss in
their national w a r s against the chivalry of Austria and B u r 
g u ndy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
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during the initial stages of the Great Italian Wars developed
the rudiments of the tactics which were to end forever the
paramountcy of the pikeman.

43 '

To do so he not only followed

Maximilian's example by including landsknechts in his format
tions; he increased the mobility of his foot soldiers by arm**
ing them with shorter weapons.

For defence he issued them

shields, and to increase their firepower he added more hand*'
gunners.

Half of his infantry was armed.with pikes, one-sixth

with firearms, and the remainder, after the fashion of the Ro44
man legionnaires, with short thrusting swords and bucklers *
Except for a few bodyguards attached to principal officers,
the halberd was not adopted, so that in comparison with German
and Swiss contingents a far larger portion of Spanish infantry**
men carried weapons that were more manageable.

This meant that

in close fighting pikemen and halberdiers were at a disadvan**
tage.

The instant a breach was made in a German or Swiss

square the great length of their weapons became their undoing.
Without shields they were at the mercy of the sword and buck
ler men, and their only hope of safety was in flight.

4^The development of Spanish tactics is treated at some
length in F. L. Taylor's Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529
{Cambridge: University Press, 1921), chap. VI and passim.
^ T o w a r d s the latter part of Henry VIII's reign sword
and buckler men began to be discarded in the Spanish array in
favor of increased numbers of arquebusiers, and eventually
the percentage of pikemen and handgunners came to be about
even.
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Given these developments one might ask wh y the pike was
not abandoned*

The answer is simplei

suited for repulsing a cavalry charge,
ued to be used for that purpose

,Kthe sword was not
[and] the pike contin^

[until] the invention of the
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bayonet at the end of the seventeenth ce n t u r y .11

Even

Machiavelli, who had little confidence in pikes or in the men
who handled them, was obliged to concede that for those ideal
armies, for whose instruction he intended his art o f W a r ,
large numbers of pikemen had to be retained.
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As has been

noted, this was the view of the Spaniards, who were to suc’ceed the landsknechts as E u r o p e 1s most admired infantrymen.
Therefore, as long as the need for pikes existed, there were
Germans to use them.

4 5 Beeler,

e d , , The Art of War in the Middle A g e s , p. 110.

4 6 Machiavelli,

Chief Works,

IX, 625.

CHAPTER IV
THE SPANISH INFANTRYMAN:

NATIONAL SOLDIER

AND SOLDIER OF FORTUNE
War is m y country, my harness, my house;
I am ready at all time to fight for a sous,
Francois de la Noue, The Politicke
and Milltarie Piscourses, p . 118,
Of the many turbulent foreigners who fought as mercenar
ies and auxiliaries in English causes during the early Tudor
period, none were more deserving of their reputation as pro
fessional soldiers than the Spaniards whom Henry VIII engaged
in the taking of Boulogne and in his concurrent war with the
Scots.

Employed mainly as infantrymen, their unique talent

was in the use of the arquebus, which weapon they had adopted
late in the fifteenth century on the formation of their na
tional army, and for which they had devised the tactics that
had made them along with the German and Swiss pikemen the
most feared foot soldiers in western Europe.
The foundations of Spanish greatness were laid during the
reigns of the Catholic Sovereigns, Ferdinand II of Aragon and
Isabella I of Castile.

Their marriage in 1469, while it had

produced no actual union of the Christian kingdoms of Spain , 1

'j'Each ruler enjoyed sovereign power only within his own
dominions, being allowed a mere courtesy title within those of
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did result in the establishment of a common policy which
achieved among other things the centralization of the two ad
ministrations , the creation of royal absolutism, and the ex
pulsion of the Moors from Granada.

Prom the military point

of view this latter accomplishment is particularly noteworthy,
since it was during the Granadan War of 1481-1492 that the
Spanish army began the transformation which before the end of
the Great Italian Wars would make it the most proficient na
tional force in the Renaissance world.
To fully appreciate the vast changes in recruitment, arm
ament, and tactics that occured within this relatively short
span it must be understood that at its outset the Spanish army
operated in the best of feudal tradition.

Much more deeply

ingrained in the Spanish character than in the English was the
obligation of personal service, for in Spain in the fifteenth
century the noble who could not afford the cost of a horse
and arms lost his status and with it his immunity from taxa
tion.

As in the majority of late medieval states, when the

sovereigns made war the bulk of their soldiery was provided
by vassals whose contingents varied in size in accord with

the other. As for the official union of Aragon and Castile,
that had to await the succession of Charles of Burgundy, bet
ter known to history as the Holy Roman Emperor, Charles V.
As grandson and heir of Ferdinand, he succeded to the throne
of Aragon on the latter's death in 1516, assuming shortly
thereafter the administration of Castile from his mother,
Joanna la Lo'ca (d. 1555) , who had become queen of that state
on Isabella's death earlier in 1504.

Ill
their wealth and the extent of. their estates.

Lords generally

commanded their levies in person, but might on account of age,
infirmity, or royal dispensation be permitted to provide some
other leader.

Conscripts raised on crown lands were brought

into the field by adelantados, provincial governors whose
broad civil and military powers were reminiscent of the later
Elizabethan Lords Lieutenant.

Municipal militias were sent

under their own captains or entrusted to corregidores, royal
officials who supervised the affairs of the locally elected
town councils.^
Once a Spanish host had been marshalled it was divided
like any medieval army into numerous companies, ranging in
size from a few hundred to several thousand mixed horse and
foot.

There was little rationale behind this organization,

companies customarily being formed by grouping together troops
from the same locality.

This inevitably led to disparities

among these units, for not only were they "unequal in numer
ical strength and solidity," but also was there no proportion
between the different arms:

"one [company] was stronger in

cavalry, another in infantry, all according to chance or the
whims of the l e a d e r s . Yet, despite its feudal appearance

2

Jean Hippolyte Mariejol, The Spain of Ferdinand and
Isabella, trans. Benjamin Keen (New Brunswick,'to. J . R u t gers University Press, 1961), p. 193.

3Ibid., pp. 192-93.
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the Spanish army was already experimenting with, new methods
of organization and recruitment which quickly lent themselves
to its modernization.
Hernando del Pulgar, secretary to Isabella and chroni
cler of the war in Granada in the early part of the joint
reigns, speaks of the existence of regular troops, native pro
fessionals paid by the crown.

One such body was permanently

maintained in Castilian Galicia, while another patrolled the
southern frontier against the Moors.

The same author des-

scibes a royal guard of heavy and light horse, its members,
4
one thousand strong, trained from youth to serve the king.
Finally, adding to this air of nascent professionalism, was
the presence in Spain of numerous foreign volunteers and mer
cenaries.

These, drawn from such militarily advanced states

as France, Germany, and Switzerland, taught their employers
much by their example.

This was true even of the backward

English, for at the second siege of Loja in 1486, when the
three hundred followers of Sir Edward Woodville dismounted
to fight the enemy with sword and axe the Spanish knights

4Roger Bigelow Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire
in the Old World and in the New {3 v o l s .; New Y o r k : The Mac
millan Co., 1918-25), II, 156 (hereinafter cited as The Rise
of the Spanish Empire) ; William H. Prescott, History of the .
Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella the Catholic (3 v o l s . ; Boston:
American Stationers' Company, 1839, I, 395.
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5
were astounded at the destruction they wrought.

However, of

the foreigners in Granada it was the hardy Swiss pikemen who
made the greatest impression.

Their reputation having been

so recently established, they were held in complete awe, and
as a mark of respect to their notoriety, the corps which they
6
formed was assigned to fight under the royal standard.
The high esteem in which the Spaniards held the Swiss
was largely due to the increased reputation won by infantry
men in general during the fighting in the south, for the
Granadan War, unlike some of the earlier phases of the Moor
ish crusade, was not essentially a cavalryman*s war.

Granada,

a land of rugged sierras and highland fortresses, was unsuited
for widespread mounted operations, so that inevitably there
were few pitched battles and many long sieges in which infan
try and artillery predominated.

This is indeed significant,

as henceforward the foot soldier remained the mainstay of the
Spanish army, so much so that fifty years later, with a French
army hovering on the frontier, less than two thousand horse
of any kind could be raised for the defence of the kingdom.

7

5

The story, as told by the Audalusian chronicler, Peter
Martyr, is related in Prescott, History of the Reign of Fer
dinand and Isabella the Catholic, I, 397-98.
6 Ibid., p. 396.
7

Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, II, 68; Oman,
The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 62.
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I
Behind this development, which had its parallel in Engg
lish history,
one can perceive the wily machinations of
Ferdinand and Isabella, who saw in the war to crush the Moors
an opportunity of wresting control of military affairs from
the barons.

In 1495, three years after the conquest of Gra

nada, the serious attempt at the organization of a non-feudal
force was begun with the issuance of an ordinance requiring
all subjects to provide themselves with arms proportionate
to their wealth.

This was followed by a census, and in Feb

ruary, 1496, a second ordinance decreed that of every twelve
able-bodied men between the ages of twenty and forty-five,
one would be taken to serve the state both "at home and
abroad."

These conscripts were not regular troops, as they

were mobilized only in the event of war, "but they were paid
by the crown from the day on which they entered active ser
vice, and their employment may be justly regarded as a long
9
step towards the formation of a standing army."
The Great Italian Wars into which Spain plunged in 1495

®Due to severe losses of stock in both the English Wars
of the Roses and the Granadan War and to a contemporaneous
decline in good breeding practices, there was a severe short
age of heavy horses in both countries, which shortage produced
a natural reduction in the numbers of men-at-arms.
On the
Tudor aspect of this problem, see H . C . B . Rogers, The Mounted
Troops of the British Army, 1066-1945 {London: Seeley Service
and Co. Ltd., 1959), Chap. II.
9
Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, II, 156-57.
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revealed certain deficiencies in the system, chief of which
was that irregularly trained militiamen did not make good
soldiers when forced to fight on foreign soil.

Still, all

things considered, these new wars, coming so close on the
heels of the last, accomplished the end desired in that pro
tracted service through several campaigns made professionals
of the very recruits who sought to avoid the taint.

By the

close of the fifteenth century war had become a way of life
in Spain, and since the central government controlled con
scription the days of mustering feudal levies soon passed for
ever.

Yeh the reorganization of recruiting procedures did

not of itself create a modern army; the first encounters with
the French in Italy demonstrated that tactics and armaments
had to be improved to complete the transformation.
With this originative phase the name of the Great Captain,
Gonzalo Fernandez de Cordova, is inseparable.

The younger son

of a Cordovan nobleman, he had better than twenty years' ex
perience as a leader of men behind him when at the age of
forty-one he commanded the expeditionary force which crossed
to Calabria in support of Ferrante II, ruler of the Aragonese
kingdom of Naples .10

Gonzalo's effective strength did not

l°The kindgom of Naples passed into the hands of Alfonso
V ("the Magnificent") of Aragon in 1443 after a twenty-three
year struggle with the last Angevin rulers of the realm.
On
Alfonso's death in 1458 he divided his inheritance, bequeath
ing Naples to his illigitimate son, Ferrante I (1458-94), and
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exceed 3 , 1 0 0 mainly sword-and-buckler men supported by arba
lesters, some pikemen, a few arquebusiers, and six hundred
horse of which only one hundred were men-at-arms.

The re

mainder of the cavalry, and the arm on which he initially de
pended, were jinetes, a type of light horse of ancient origin
that apparently developed in Castile and bore a marked resem
blance to the Moorish light horse of Granada.

These troops

took their name from the jennets or small coursers they rode
and from the jinetas or javelins which they carried in pairs
and were their characteristic weapons.

The rest of their

gear was not unlike that worn by Albanian and Turkish light
horse, as for their protection they wore steel helmets and
mail shirts and carried huge shields.

Swords were used in

close fighting, albeit only after their javelins had been expended or the enemy taken unawares.

11

Useful troops for light

ning raids and ambuscades, they were hardly the equal of the
heavy gendarmerie and mercenary pikemen of France who swept
them from the field at Seminara in Gonzalo's first Italian
engagement in June, 1495.

the remainder, including Aragon and Sicily, to his brother,
John II (1458-79), father of Ferdinand the Catholic.
F er
rante II, the grandson of Ferrante I, succeeded to the throne
of Naples in 1495 on the abdication of his father, Alfonso II
(1494-5).
^ G e o r g e T. Denison, A History of Cavalry from Earliest
Times (London: Macmillan and Company, 1877), p. 243.
See
also Oman's description of the "genetours" in his History of
the Art of War in the Middle A g e s , II, 180-81.
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This defeat proved to be the Great Captain’s first and
last in the Italian wars, as in the years following he set
himself the task of adapting Spanish infantry methods to meet
the threat of the French and Swiss military systems as he
found them there.

His immediate problem was the terrain oyer

which he fought, relatively open country which favored the
shock tactics and close formations of the enemy, while it
placed his own forces at a definite disadvantage.

Raised es

sentially as guerillas to fight in mountain fastnesses they
excelled in stealth and agile movement, but were helpless
without cover against couched lances and long pikes.

None

theless, their very flexibility and speed "were precious as
sets which could not lightly be cast aside; the problem was
to preserve them and gain needed stability at the same time." ^
In solving the dilemma Gonzalo de Cordova reacted in a
number of ways:

pitched battles were temporarily avoided,

while the Roman art of entrenchment was revived in an effort
to force upon the enemy the burden of attack.

The proportion

of arms rapidly changed, the ratio becoming fixed in Gonzalo's
army at one-half pikes, one-third swords-and-bucklers, and
the remaining sixth firearms of the most portable variety.
In the matter of pikes and small arms the influence of the

■^Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, II, 157-58.
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Swiss and landsknechts is m o s t perceptable,

13

though Gonzalo

did more than borrow from these men he so admired.

The foot

men on whom he came to rely so heavily were protected with
more body armor than their northern counterparts, their pieces
4A

being morions, gorgets, cuirasses, and tasses,

the which

combined to preserve freedom of movement and give the men a
decided advantage in close action.
Since new harness alone was unlikely to win battles the
modifications in arms and equipment coincided with a simulta
neous reorganization of tactical formations.

The company,

the basic unit in the Spanish army as in all others at the
time, had proven too weak to be of value in the early fighting
in Naples, so that to increase the strength of his army in
action Gonzalo experimented w i t h new groupings by combining
l c

several companies under the "regiment"

1 C

of colonels.

The

number of companies combined to form a colonelcy or squadron,
as the new formation was variously labelled, fluctuated con
siderably, but was eventually fixed by Gonzalo at twelve.

^ I t is a fact that the Great Captain recruited many
landsknechts in Italy, and it can be safely assumed that they
were employed to instruct the Spaniards in their methods as
well as to fight.
See Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 14941529, pp. 16, 37.
14For these and similar terms see Glossary.
15

On the origin of this term see Glossary.

16Ibid.
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Each company contained five hundred men, so that in theory at
least the first Spanish regiments totalled six thousand men.
Of the twelve companies, ten consisted of pikemen, sword-andbuckler men, and arquebusiers in equal proportions of two hun
dred, two hundred, and one hundred respectively, the two re
maining companies being formed of pikemen alone.

The squad

ron thus formed was commanded by a colonel, each company by a
captain, and every one hundred men by a company chief or cabo
de batalla, who was assisted by ten cabos de d i e z , non-commis
sioned officers corresponding in rank to our present-day cor
porals,

Finishing out the complement were a standard-bearer,

two drummers, and a fifer.
Mariejol relates that a regiment on the march was led
by pikemen, behind whom in order came the sword-and-buckler
men, the arquebusiers, and several additional rows of pikemen
bringing up the rear.

Six hundred cavalrymen, a meager con

tingent for so large a body of foot, comprised of genitours
and men-at-arms, were generally attached to each colonelcy
under their own captains,

17

their small number indicative of

the rapid changes being effected in the sixteenth-century mode
of waging war.

17

Infantry was fast eclipsing the mounted

Mariejol, The Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella, p. 206.
The size of these infantry units was > reduced to one thousand
effectives sometime during the first decade of the sixteenth
century, perhaps by Ferdinand's renovations in 1505.
On this
point see Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp.
56-57.
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service as the indispensible component in Renaissance armies,
an d before Gonzalo's death in 1515 Machiavelli could write
that infantry was "the substance and sinew" of any army,
p a r t of it which ought constantly to be most considered."

"that
X8

This maxim was in part inspired by Spanish example, and it is
instructive to note that in 1505 King Ferdinand divided his
whole military force into twenty colonelcies of pikemen and
handgunners with a proportion of sword-and-buckler me n in
, 19
each.
To his everlasting fame Gonzalo de Cordova created a pro
fessional infantry which soon came to equal and finally sur
pass the pikemen of Switzerland and Germany.

What gave the

Spaniards their eventual margin of superiority was the adapt
ability of their formations and their refusal to be wedded to
a single tactical system.

Swiss and Germans made formidable

opponents in the field, but their method of war had definite
limits.

When fighting over broken terrain or in narrow con

fines they either left gaps in their ranks or were unable to
form the phalanx in w hich lay their power.

Stubbornly they

refused to adjust to changing conditions and occasionally
refused to participate in sieges, so that a generally held
reproof was that while Swiss and landsknechts had no superiors

Machiavelli, Chief W o r k s , I, 322.
1 9 0man,

The Art of War in the Sixteenth Ce n t u r y , p. 56.
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on open ground they were very little esteemed when used in
20
the defence or storming of fortified positions.
The conservatism which sapped the reputation of Europe's
most famous infantrymen did not afflict the Spaniards, who by
a continuing process of observation and experimentation con
stantly modified their tactics and became the most innovative
soldiers of the day.

As has been intimated above, the experi

mentation began promptly after Gonzalo de cfcrdova's lone set
back at Seminara.

Pikemen were increased to provide the

steadiness necessary to meet alike the serried masses of
French horse and mercenary Swiss.

Arquebusiers,too, were em

ployed in greater numbers to tear breaches in the enemy ranks;
and into these, to paraphrase Machiavelli1s colorful descrip
tion of the Spaniards in action, poured the sword-and-buckler
men who could nimbly rush in with their shorter weapons and
make great slaughter in the hand-to-hand combat which inevi
tably f o l l o w e d . ^
The Spanish manner of fighting at the beginning of the
sixteenth century was reminiscent of the victories won by the
Roman cohorts of Aemilius Paullus over the Macedonian

20

Niccolo Machiavelli, "Portraits of the Affairs of
F r a n c e i n Niccolo Machiavelli' and the United States of Ame
rica, e d . Anthony J . Pansini (Greenvale, N . Y . ; Greenvale
Press, 1969), p. 640.
^Machiavelli, Chief W o r k s , I, 600-01.
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pezataeri

22

in the second century B.C,

In the former as in

the earlier contest, the thrusting sword proved superior to
the long pike.

Even Spanish body armor recalled a likeness

to Roman equipment, but Gonzalo, in contrast to many of that
epoch, was no slave to the past in that he supplemented the
lessons taught by the ancients by adding a few nuances of his
own.
This was particularly true of his exploitation of the
tactical potentiality of small-arms fire.

He discovered

early in Naples that he could defend extensive frontages and
outmaneuver numerically superior French forces by deploying
arquebusiers in Roman fashion behind field fortifications.
In April, 1503, Gonzalo won the first major truimph fought
on these precepts at Cerignola in northern Apulia.

The French

and their Swiss hirelings, induced to charge the hillside vine
yard in which the Spanish had entrenched themselves, were cut
down by withering arquebus-fire, their commander, Louis d 1
Armagnac, Duke of Nemours, being among the slain.

"Cerignola

was a battle of small political significance, and small armies
were engaged; but in the history of warfare it was a major
turning-point.

Gonzalo de Cordova had raised the infantry

soldier armed with a handgun to the status of the most impor
tant fighting man on the battlefield— a status he was to

2^see Glossary.
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retain for over four hundred y e a r s ."

23

For the remainder of the century the infantry tactics of
the Great Captain received more than acceptance;

they were

built u p o n b y the commanders of Spanish troops wh o succeeded
him, Pedro Navarro, Prospero Colonna, and the Marquis de
Pascara.
Navarro was a superior leader of infantry, though he was
famed largely as an engineer whose achievements in a long c a 
reer were legendary.

As Gonzalo's captain in Greece against

the Turks in 1500, he devised "the first mine that was p r e 
dominantly explosive in character," while as commander of the
Spanish infantry in 1512, he introduced a version of the
24
Hussite war-wagon
in Ferdinand's losing cause at Ravenna.
Captured in that fight, he transferred his allegiance to
France w h e n his pecunious master refused to ransom him and
ended his days in 1528 as the trusted advisor of Francis I.
Prospero Colonna, one of the m o s t resourceful of the
Italian condottieri,
soldiering.

also combined the engineers'

craft w i t h

Like N a v a r r o , with and against whom he served

in several campaigns, he was a master of siege warfare

23

Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, A H i s 
tory of Warfare (Cleveland and New York:
The World Publish
ing Company, 1968), p. 219.
24A portable w a gon filled with arquebusiers which was
designed to check the shock of charging cavalry.
For no 
tices on the career of Navarro, see Taylor, The A r t of War
in I t a l y , 1494-1529. pp. 87-88, 137, 145.
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in which the Latins, both Spaniards and Italians, excelled.
Fighting "with his brains more than his sword," he earned the
title Cunctator for his conquest and successful defence of the
Milanese for Charles V in 1521-2 by "accept[ing] battle only
when it was needful and when he had placed all advantages on
his own s i d e . " ^

His crowning triumph was Bicocca, during

Charles V's first war with Francis I, when he led the Spanish
arquebusiers to victory over the French and the Swiss.

Like

Gonzalo de Cordova he entrenched himself in a strong defen
sive position in a garden fronted by a sunken lane, flanked
on the left by a marsh and on the right by the main road to
Milan.
He built up the bank on the garden side into a
rampart, mounted some artillery on it, disposed
his arquebusiers four deep to man the rampart,
and in the rear of them placed continous units
of pikemen. As the Swiss pikemen advanced across the fields they were mown down first by
artillery and then by arquebus fire. Those who
succeeded in pressing forward to jump down into
the lane found themselves trapped in an abattoir
and were slaughtered by the arquebusiers who
were so high above them that the Swiss pikes
could not even touch them .26
The contribution of Fernando de Avalos, Marquis de Pes
cara, was no less an outgrowth of Cordova's tactics.

2 ^Oman,

26

At

The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 175.

Montgomery, A History of Warfare, p. 220.
It is not
without significance that Colonna's success at Bicocca has
tened Henry VIII's decision to join with the Imperialists in
their war with France.
See Fisher, History of E ngland, p. 240.
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Bicocca this man, who became the most famous Spanish general
after the Great Captain, evolved the method of firing in ranks
27
by volleys on command,
and at the rout of the Sesia two
years later, a refinement of this system won for him a vic
tory as yet unparalleled in the history of warfare.

The bat

tle was preceded by an auspicious Imperial offensive designed
to clear north Italy of the invading French, who under William
de Bonnivet, Admiral of France, were threatening Milan.

The

decisive engagement, the Sesia, matched the retreating French
against a mobile force of light cavalry and infantry directed
by Pescara, and when the battle was joined arquebusiers sup
ported by pikemen poured in on the striken foe on foot, on
horseback, and on the cruppers of the Italian light horse.
Withering volleys wounded Bonnivet and destroyed his Swiss
who bravely tried to stem the tide, and the Chevalier Bayard,
the knight "sans peur et sans reproche ,11 died in agony from a
stone shot which shattered his spine while trying to mount a
28
counter-attack.
Before this time handgunners had sniped at will from be
hind breastworks and natural cover preliminary to the push of
pikes.

Henceforward, after the Sesia, in what became the

^ T a y l o r , The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, pp. 51-52.
28

Ibid., p. 54; Joseph Jay Deiss, Captains of Fortune;
Profiles of Six Italian Condottieri {New York:
Thomas Y. Cro
well, 1967), pp. 273-74. Hereinafter cited as Captains of
Fortune.
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pattern for Spanish units, arquebusiers maneuvered indepen
dently, with pikes, formerly the pivotal arm, operating in
relief.

This did not mean that the longer weapon had been

superseded.

On the contrary:

pikes were still essential to

shield arquebusiers from the shock of attack and to protect
them while they recharged their heavy pieces, some of which
weighed in excess of thirty pounds.^9
Although this function was defensive, the pikes
served also to deliver the counterstroke.
The
eighteen-foot shaft, weighing ten pounds, ap
peared a fearsome thing to foemen awaiting the
oncoming thicket of steel points.
The arquebus
in contrast seemed no more than a harassing wea
pon.
After its work had been done, then came
the turn of the iron-clad pikeman to advance
shoulder to shoulder . . . .30
This was Pescara's tactic at Pavia,

"the most decisive victory

of that generation , " ^ 1 when after his arquebusiers had broken
the French formation by an enfilading fire along its flanks

pQ
Dudley Pope, G u n s : From the Invention of Gunpowder to
the 20th Century (New York:
Delacorte Press, 1965), p. 52
and passim. Hereinafter cited as Guns. See the excellently
illustrated Chaps. IV and V on the development of gunpowder
weapons during the first half of the sixteenth century.
30

Lynn Montross, War Through the Ages
and Row, Publishers, 1960), p. 213.
31

(New York:

Harper

This battle, fought on Charles V's twenty-fifth birth
day on February 14, 1525, resulted in the capture of Francis I
and gave the Imperialists the preponderant influence in Italy.
Though Francis, after his release in 1526, and his successors
attempted to reassert themselves, no Frenchman succeeded in
controlling Italian affairs until Bonaparte made his appear
ance in the peninsula.
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they were joined at close quarters by pikemen and cavalry to
render the coup d'grace.
Throughout the first quarter of the century the European
military phratry had marvelled at, but largely ignored, Span
ish inventiveness; but the havoc reaped by Imperial firepower
at Pavia shocked it into the realization that a new era was at
hand.

Not surprisingly the French, who formerly complained

that Spanish tactics were "against all laws of war and the
order of battle," were the first to react, and when in 1534
Francis I sought to reform his infantry with a view towards
avoiding the hiring of mercenaries,
busiers were vastly increased.

32

the numbers of arque

Contemporaneous trends can be

detected in other quarters, notably among the landsknechts,
who raised their ratio of handgunners from sixteen per hun
dred men at the beginning of the century to roughly twentyfive per hundred by 1544.
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Even in England where conservative

Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le Faict de la^ Guerre,
pp. xxxii, xliii.
Handgunners in the French army up to this
point were something of an aberration, and there was a defin
ite antipathy towards them on the part of those commanders
raised in the older medieval tradition.
Blaise de Montluc,
later to be a Marshal of France, wrote of firearms that he had
"seen brave and valiant men killed with [them] in such sad num
bers, and it generally happened that they were struck down by
those abominable bullets which had been discharged by cowardly
and base knaves, who would never have dared to have met true
soldiers face to face and hand to hand." Firearms, he con
cluded, were definitely the Devil's invention.
3 3 Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 41;
(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/203, f. 18b
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tradition and government policy eschewed

"the newfangles and

wanton pleasure" obtained from "shooting in handguns," the
frequent attempts to limit the use of firearms by statute and
p r o c l a m a t i o n ^ indicate, despite the absence of precise figures,
a steady increase in their popularity.

Cavalry troops also

took to handguns more readily after Pavia, and imaginative
tactics were devised for them; but no Renaissance state ever
relied upon small arms more heavily than Spain.
Despite the acceptance of the handgun, the years follow
ing Pavia generally witnessed a return to military conserva
tism, a period distinguished by cautious advances, hurried
withdrawals, and battles avoided.

The reaction which set in

had its roots in myriad causes, not the least of which was a
healthy concern for costs.

The wars in Italy had been fought

with little pause for over thirty years, and the consumption
of men and material had been horrendous.

Peace, the obvious

answer for ending the drain, was never seriously contemplated,
for the emperor's victory at Pavia had been too complete.

■^In the reign of Henry VIII, between 1523 and 1546,
three parliamentary statutes and at least five proclamations
prohibited the possession or use of firearms, excepting only
those "persons having lands, tenements, fees, annuities, or
other yearly profits in his own right or in his wife's to the
yearly value of 1100."
14 Henry VIII, c. 7. Permission to
"shoot in any handguns, hackbuts, or other guns" was extended
in 1546 to all Englishmen who obtained the king's license
under the Great Seal.
For the pertinent proclamations see
Hughes and Larkin, eds., Tudor Royal Proclamations, I, Nos.
107, 121, 171, 194, 2 7 1 . ------------------------ ---
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With Francis captive in Spain, it seemed to the lesser Euro
pean princes that they soon stood to share the same fate.
And so they drew together in self-defence, the Pope, the Vene
tians, the Florentines, and Milan, with encouragement from
Henry VIII, concluding with France the Holy League of Cognac
in 1526.

35

The scene was set for the revival of hostilities, but
the subsequent campaigns were unlike those of the past gener
ation.

Gone were the dash and daring of frontal assaults, or

pitched battles between contending arrays willing to risk
their all.

The only contest in the later stages of the Haps-

burg-Valois rivalry "in which both sides met with a fixed in
tention to fight" was at Ceresole in Piedmont which, fought
*3g

in 1544, postdated Pavia by almost twenty years.
Wastage of manpower and treasure does not alone account
for such temerity, so that other operational factors need to
be considered:

the unreliability of mercenary and auxiliary

troops, who continued to constitute the backbone of the contending armies;

37

the near impossibility of provisioning men

C
The alliance was actually signed on May 22, four months
after Francis' release.
Henry VIII's dealings with the League
are recounted in Scarisbrick, Henry V I I I , pp. 142-46.
Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 229.
37

In 1536 at the commencement of the third war between
Charles V and Francis I, the breakdown of troops in the Span
ish army, totalling 65,153 effectives, was as follows:
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and beasts through long campaigns in unfriendly territory;
and, not the least, the expertise of thel military engineer,
who in the science of fortification between 1525 and the end
of the Great Italian Wars in 1559 more than held his own
against the artilleryman.^**
For whatever reasons, war after 1525 became more defen
sive, albeit if the tactics of caution replaced those of con
quest, Spanish superiority in small arms firepower remained

Spaniards of all arms, 12,160; German cavalry, 2,060; Italian
cavalry, 950; German infantry, 24,080; Italian infantry,
25,903.
Ibid., p. 61.
■3 0

The sixteenth-century revolution in fortification was
in part inspired by Gonzalo de Cordova, who pointed the way
by his return to the Roman practice of entrenching.
Artil
lery weapons, though they failed to keep abreast of the rapid
development of small a rms, achieved such destructive power in
the earlier part of the century due to the increased caliber
of cannon that towering defences of medieval design were use
less against them.
High ramparts gave way to walls that were
lower and thicker, both to inhibit breeching and accomodate
defensive artillery.
Triangular outworks, called bastions by
contemporaries, were built into walls, allowing additional
guns to cover the approaches to the stronghold.
Ditches were
deepened and widened to discourage subterranean mining, and
in a further attempt to keep besiegers at their distance, a
counterscarp was constructed on the exterior slopes of the
ditches beyond which light artillery could be positioned to
play on the attackers.
Lastly, downward and outward sloping
glacis were devised of the earth excavated from the ditch,
thus reinforcing the defensibility of the counterscarp by
shielding its defenders from direct fire.
Though most of
these aforementioned developments were manifest before Pavia,
their full worth was not realized until the last three-quar
ters of the century.
This account of the developments in sixteenth-century
fortification is based largely on the summary appearing in
R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of
Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present (London: Mac
donald, 1970), pp. 453-4.
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unchallenged, with few changes discernable.

However, in the

matter of armament and organization two important modifications
deserved mention.
First, for motives that are by no means clear, sword-andbuckler men were gradually phased out of the Spanish formations.
They performed well at Ravenna in 1512

39

and were present at

Pavia in 1525; yet in 1534, when larger infantry units were
fashioned out of the older colonelcies,

40

the swordsmen had

given way completely to increased numbers of handgunners.

The

new units were tercios, forerunners of the modern regiments.
Each had a strength of over three thousand and was composed of
anywhere from ten to twelve companies of some 250 men, the
companies being equally divided between pikemen and arquebus
iers.

Company officers included a captain, an ensign or

alferez, a sergeant, a quartermaster, and ten corporals.

At

the staff level the tercio was commanded by a colonel or
maestre del campo, who was assisted by a descending hierarchy
of officers including a major, an adjutant, a staff captain,
and his lieutenant.

Halberdiers, so prominent in the German

and Swiss armies, were all but excluded by the Spaniards,
there being only eight in each of the three original tercios
commissioned by Charles V, all of whom served as orderlies or

don:

^ 9E. N. Lloyd, A Review of the History of Infantry (Lon
Longmans, Green, and Company, 1908), p. 87.

^ S e e below, p. 119, n. 17.
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bodyguards,

to the colonel.

The spiritual needs of all ranks

were ministered unto by thirteen chaplains, an inordinate num
ber for a single regiment when it is considered that of med41
ical personnel there were only three.

A physician, a surgeon, and an apothecary.
For the m a 
terial on the tercio I have relied heavily on the description
provided b y Oman, The A r t of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp.
59-61. No such large Spanish corps ever served the early Tu
dors. However, in the spring of 1545 a daring experiment may
have been attempted when Pedro Gamboa, a Madrilenian captain
recently hired by Henry VIII with some eight hundred or a thou
sand of his countrymen for service against the Scots, was made
’'Captain General" of all the Spaniards in the king's service.
To the English, who had no well defined command system at that
time, the title conveyed the meaning of "senior captain."
However, to continental observers familiar with Spanish mili
tary organization it is obvious that they considered Gamboa's
command to be a colonelcy and his rank to be that of colonel,
for as such they refer to him in their dispatches.
See Span
ish Calendar, VIII, Nos. 186, 193, and passim. The circum
stances surrounding Gamboa's appointment are related in M. A.
S. Hume, t r a n s . , Chronicle of King Henry V I I I , Being A Con
temporary .Record of Some of the Principal Events of the Reigns
of King Henry VIII and Edward VI {London: George Bell and
Sons, 1889), p. 124. Hereinafter cited as Chronicle of King
Henry V I I I . If indeed Henry empowered Gamboa to serve him as
colonel-in-chief of his Spanish mercenaries, this would make
Gamboa the first officer to function with that rank in Eng
land, as no native English colonels were created until circa
1572. Cruickshank, Elizabeth1s A r m y , p. 53. At least two
other foreign soldiers served in early Tudor England as colo
nels, both like Gamboa against the Scots.
One was the German
knight, Conrad Pennink, who was hired initially with what
amounted to a regiment of landsknechts some three thousand
or four thousand strong in January, 1546, and who was later
reemployed with something less than three thousand of the
same by Edward VI in 1549.
(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/123, ff. 15152; E 101 531/39, mem. 16.
The other was an Italian, "Coronall" Malatesta, about whom little is known except that he
led a body of men^at-arms at the battle^ of Pinkie in the Duke
of Somerset's invasion of Scotland in 1547.
(P. R. O.) E
351/43, mem. 10; Jordan, Edward VI: The Young K i n g , p. 253.
On the further history of Gamboa and Pennink, see below, pp.
355-56, 358-59 and Appendix C.
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The striking feature about the new infantry organization
was the high percentage of arquebusiers.

Fully half of the men

were armed with handguns, a higher proportion than could be
found in any other army of that day.

In the very year that the

tercios made their appearance it is recorded that in a French
army of forty-two thousand only twelve thousand served with
firearms, while in 1544, ten years after the Spanish reform,
Henry VIII felt himself well served if his German captains
could, in their companies of four hundred men, provide him
"more or less" with fifty handgunners .42
Esprit de corps and its adjunct, good discipline, were
other hallmarks of the Spanish soldiery, while among the offi
cers and men there persisted a comradeship atypical of other
national armies.

In disparaging his own countrymen for their

lack of spirit, Francois de la Noue, the celebrated French
Huguenot who fought against the Spaniards many t i mes, sought
to uphold his enemies as an example to be emulated:
I wish they [the French infantrymen] would practice
some of the Spanish customs which in my opinion are
very good.
One is that when any new Soldier cometh
into their bands, the old do instruct him in his
duties:
if he transgresseth they reprove him:
and
if he be meanly apparelled they help him, lest he
should be a dishonor to their nation:
and he like
wise taketh these admonitions as courteously where
we do the contrary . . . .
Secondly, among the

42
R„Coltman Clephan, "The Military Handgun of the Six
teenth Century," The Archaeological Journal, LXVII, n. s.
(1910), 115; (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/185, f. 142.
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Spaniards ye shall not have a brawl in six months:
for they disdain quarrellers and delight in mo d 
esty:
so as if any do happen, they endeaver dil
igently to take them up:
and yet when they cannot
be ended without blows they discharge themselves
honorably . . . .
Thirdly, if a Soldier among
them be hurt, he that hath but one crown will give
him half.
Fourthly, if any one do any notable act,
all his companions will praise and honor him, and
seldom do they through envy conceal any virtue.
This likewise is good in them that in their mili
tary commandments even the bravest Soldiers and of
greatest military calling will obey a simple Ser
geant; so pliable are they to their officers . . .
Finally, in the body of their guard they will not
suffer any insolency, but the same are as Schools
where their ordinary talk is of the duty of Sol
diers, Captains, Honor, and such like matter con
cerning Arms . . . these be no customs of Monks,
as the proverb goeth, but of excellent Soldiers.
La Noue's picture of the Spanish army as a seedbed of
honor, virtue, and discipline must not, however, be taken too
literally.

Professional as that establishment was, it can

scarcely be said to have been free of those defects which
perenially plagued less practiced military establishments.
Like armies everywhere the Spanish army too often functioned
as the refuge of malefactors and violent men for whom military
service afforded an opportunity to slake their thirst for plun
der and carnage.

That nation, wrote Bartholomew Sastrow, no

tary in 1544 to the Margrave Ernst of Baden, was "greatly ad
dicted to pilfering;" its soldiers were worse brigands than

4 3 Fran£ois de la Noue, The' Politicke and Militarie Dis
courses, Trans. E. A. (London: Printed for T. C. and E. A.,
1587), pp. 174-75.
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landsknechts; and they were guilty of unspeakable atrocities.

44

Arrears in wages were no more tolerated by Spaniards than by
Germans or Swiss, and mutinies, though perhaps more rife in the
second half of the century, were not unknown, as witnessed in
the brutal sack of Rome by the Imperial army in 1527.
Yet,when all is said and done, Spaniards made exceptional
soldiers.

Competency more than atoned for their shortcomings,

and in studying the documentary and published literature which
pertains to these men, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that at all times Spaniards in the field, whether in the ser
vice of their king or in the pay of some foreign potentate,
esteemed themselves professionals, eminently superior to mere
citizen-soldiers or mercenaries.
Nonetheless, however much they may have resented the epi
thet Spanish fightingmen did hire out for w a g e s , and in the
capacity of mercenaries, like all of that stamp, they were
rarely discriminating in their choice of paymasters.

Spain's

foremost national rivals were, of course, France and the Otto
man Empire.

Notwithstanding, Spaniards served both with zest.

Five hundred genitours accompanied Francis I in the recovery
of Milan in 1515, and eight years later, subsequent to the
battle of Pavia, when the same king invaded Italy six thousand

44Albert D. Vandam, trans., Social Germany in Luth e r 1s
T i m e , Being the Memoirs of Bartholomew Sastrow (Westminster:
Archibald Constable and Company Ltd., 1902), pp. 161, 168,
192-93, 206.
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Spaniards marched in the French rearguard.

45

Spaniards sold

their talents in Italy and Denmark; they fought side by side
with Lutherans against their coreligionists in Germany; and
among the least of their accomplishments, they graced the
hollow triumph of Henry VIII at Boulogne.

46

The first Spanish mercenaries to fight in an English cause
in Tudor times postdated the Boulogne affair by some fifty
years.

It has already been remarked that Perkin Warbeck em

ployed at least three, two of whom, Fulano de Guevara and
Diego el Coxo, were captured at Deal in 1495, while the third,
Pedro de Guevara, sailed with the pretender from Kinsale to
47
Cornwall in 1497.
From that year until Charles V's with
drawal from Henry VIII*s third French war in 1544, nothing
further is heard of Spanish mercenaries in English pay, though
in 1523 brief reference is made to Spanish auxiliaries, a
small but indeterminate band of infantrymen who served with
the Burgundian contingent of Floris d*Ysselstein, the emperor's
Captain-General in Flanders,
across the Somme.

in Suffolk's energetic drive

They appeared to have been competent troops

and distinguished themselves during the struggle for Bray,

4 5 Fourquevaux, Instructions sur le Faict de la Guerre,
pp. xlv, xlviii.

4'fi
See below, pp. 285, 286.

4’
7See above,pp. 60, 68.

137
which town was taken preparative to the descent on Montdidier.

4

In all, however, the .1523 war presents a perfect example
of the futility of joint operations in the sixteenth century.
The Anglo-Imperialist strategy, agreed upon in advance of the
campaign, called for a vigorous triple attack converging on
poorly defended Paris, the emperor with a Spanish army advanc
ing from the south, and his pensioner, the Constable Bourbon
with ten thousand landsknechts subsidized by Henry from the
east, both in support of Suffolk, who alone of the partici
pants fulfilled his assignment by striking inland from Calais.
The English general executed his charge in admirable fashion
by advancing to within eleven leagues of the French capital in
the face of the most alarming difficulties.

Virtually every

promise made him by his confederates went unhonored.

While

Bourbon vascillated and eventually bolted for Italy on the
desertion of his troops, Charles and his Spaniards, after a
weak probe towards Guienne, withdrew behind the Pyrenees; the
Imperial commissariat set up in Flanders to supply the English
broke down; and Burgundian and German auxiliaries meant for Suf
folk were siphoned off in an unsuccessful attempt to reinforce
the army of Bourbon.
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It was, as the Calais recorder so aptly

L. & P., Ill, pt. 2, No. 3462.
One of the better ac
counts of this poorly documented campaign is given in H a l l 1s
Chronicle, pp. 601 ff. A brief outline of Suffolk's move
ment from Calais to Montdidier is given in L. & P., Ill, pt.
2, No. 3516.
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put it, "an evil journey for the Englishmen,"

49

In the end,

harassed by smallpox, destitute of pay, of powder, and above
all of the Imperialist reinforcements they had daily looked
for, they turned their backs on Paris when "grey bearded w i n 
ter began to show his face in black cold frost" so intense
that among the indolent or those too weak to properly care for
themselves "the nature of the flesh was unable to strengthen
the blood to give natural warmth to the members which had been
overcome by the cold, wherefore they were lost . . .

50

The 1523 campaign was unfortunate when viewed in the light
of Henry VIII's martial ambitions which were eternally blighted
To be king of France was a puerile fancy which recurrently tor
mented him, and he may, on the return of Suffolk's emaciated
company, have pondered his Chancellor's prediction that never
would he have "such or like opportunity . , . thereafter far the
attaining" of that prize.

51

Self-serving allies once more had

played him false, but in this regard Henry VIII unlike his fa
ther failed to profit by experience, remaining to the end of
his days an easy mark for scheming princes who would use his

49

Turpyn, The Chronicle of Calais, pp. 33-34.

50

Gruffyd, "Suffolk's Expedition to Montdidier," pp. 4042. This account of the campaign has been largely ignored
by historians.
^ S t a t e Papers of Henry VIII (11 vols.; London: H. M.
Stationery Office, 1830-52), I, 143. Hereinafter referred to
as State Papers.
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adolescent enthusiasm for war to meet their own ends.
Twenty years elapsed before Henry again had use for for
eign troops, Spanish or otherwise, though he considered offen
sive action on the Continent on several occasions during the
interim.

Most always the intended victim was France, albeit

once, in a fit of real megalomania, he audaciously declared
war on Charles V only to think better of the idea and tender
52
his apologies.
When continental war did come again it was
with Francis I, a monarch whose love of self and military
aspiration ranked scarcely above Henry's.
This conflict, the most herculean undertaking in early

^ The declaration was made on January 21, 1528 at the in
itiation of his divorce or "great matter .11 Having separated
from his first wife, Catherine of Aragon, the previous summer,
he desired the pope, Clement VII, to grant him an annulment,
but the anti-imperialist Clement, who had joined with France
in the League of Cognac, was now, since the occupation of
Rome by Charles' Lutheran and Spanish troops in 1527, the
pawn of the emperor; and the emperor was the English queen's
nephew, his mother, Joanna la L o c a , and Catherine being sis
ters.
The declaration was probably not seriously intended to
lead to an Anglo-Imperial rupture, though Henry hoped that if
he could persuade the League to act on his behalf Charles
might be encouraged to support the annulment.
On both counts,
however, Henry was soon disappointed:
the forces of the League
were decisively defeated on June 20, 1528/ at Landriano near
Genoa, and in the year following the pope composed his quarrel
with the emperor, with the result that in July, 1529, the di
vorce case which had opened in England was ordered transferred
to Rome where it was eventually decided in 1534 in Catherine's
favor. As for the war between England and the Empire, except
for some mutual interference with shipping and trade, nothing
came of Henry's bellicose posturing.
Scarisbrick, Henry VIII,
p. 199.

14D
Tudor military annals, involved a capital outlay far exceeding
any previous expenditure, an army, the largest which had passed
out of the realm in a hundred years,
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and the engagement of

mercenaries and auxiliaries in quantities unheard of since the
close of the Hundred Years' War.

Among these latter forces

none were to be more prized than the companies of Spanish arque
busiers utilized first in the capture of Boulogne and later in
the desultory and collateral brawling with the Scots.

The words are those of Thomas Wolsey (d. 1530), Car
dinal and Chancellor of England, who used them euphorically
in describing the puny command of less than thirteen thou
sand with which Suffolk crossed to Calais in 1523.
See L.
& P . , Ill, pt. 2, No. 3281.

CHAPTER V
THE COM DOTTIER!:

THEIR DEVELOPMENT AND MANNER OF WARFARE

The Italian soldiers are spirited and courageous,
but proud and insubordinate.
They are so badly
paid by their Commanders that they have often
been driven to mutiny and to seek for better mas
ters and more reasonable terms.
Bernardo Navagiero, Address to the Doge and
Senate of V e n i c e , p. 460.
Among the more renowned mercenaries to ply their trade
for English gold in the early sixteenth century were the Ital
ian condottieri, who not unexpectedly most closely conformed
in style and technique to the Spaniards.

Sixty years of di

rect exposure in the Great Italian Wars to such as Gonzalo de
Cordova, Pedro Navarro, and the Marquis de Pescara‘S could
scarcely have failed to leave its mark, though in point of
fact Spaniards, more so than Italians, were deemed the stead
ier troops.
Francesco Guicciardini, the Florentine statesman and his
torian, in describing the military forces in Italy on the eve
of the French invasion of the peninsula in 1495 wrote of them
that they were unreliable and treacherous, driven by ambition

■^On these commanders' contributions to the art of war
see below, pp. 115ff.
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and greed, faithless in any cause.

2

The major determinant of

these contemptible flaws in character was of course Italy it
self.

Like the Germany of the landsknechts that region was

but a geographical expression, an agglomeration of sometimes
powerful but petty states which viciously competed as politi
cal and commercial rivals.

Since Italian armies were almost

exclusively mercenary they suffered from "the instability of
3
changing masters," and "many men-at-arms, peasants of common
citizens were subjects of other rulers and entirely dependent
on captains with whom they agreed to serve and who were re
sponsible for recruiting and paying them, so that neither by
nature nor circumstances had they any special incentive to
4
give good service .11
The way of the Italian condottieri was an ancient and
time-honored one, dating in its then current form from the
twelfth century, though the impetus which had given it birth
was somewhat older.

The years 1000 to 1300 had brought the

revival of Mediterranean trade, destroyed in the chaos attend
ing the collapse of the old Roman Empire.

With the revival

2Cecil Grayson, trans., Guicciardini: History of Italy
and History of Florence, ed. and abr. John R. Hale (New York:
Washington Square Press, 1964), p. 154.
Hereinafter cited
as Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence.
A contemporary term often used to denote ordinary foot
soldiers.
^Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence,
p. 154.
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came the growth of towns,

some of which,

like Milan and Genoa,

developed as republican communes, self-governing city-states
w h i c h resisted alike the overlordship of nobles, popes, and
emperors.

However, as proficiency in arms was not a pursuit

happily engaged in by capitalistic merchants and struggling
tradesmen,

it became necessary for them to hire others to do

their fighting.

Thus in Italy the profession of mercenary
5

came into being.
Machiavelli explained the emergence of the condottieri in
less delicate terms:
. . . as soon as the empire began to be repu d i 
ated in Italy and the Pope to gain greater r e 
putation in temporal matters, Italy was divided
into m a n y states; m a n y of the principal cities
took up arms against their nobles, who, favored
by the emperor, had held them in subjection, and
the Ch u r c h encouraged this in order to increase
its temporal power.
In many other cities one of
the inhabitants became prince.
Thus Italy h a v 
ing fallen almost entirely into the hands of the
Church and a few republics, and the priests and
other citizens not being accustomed to bear arms,
they b e gan to hire foreigners as soldiers.®
The title of the Italian mercenary was functional, a
condottiere being the leader of a free company who engaged

£
JA recently published study of the medieval Italian com
m u n e is Daniel Waley, The Italian Ci ty-Repub 11 cs (New York:
Mc G r a w Hill B o o k Co., 1969).
6Machiavelli, The P r i n c e , trans., Ricci, p. 75.
The term
*foreigner' as employed in the above passage does n ot neces
sarily mean just the hordes of non-Italians who swarmed into
Italy as soldiers of fortune in the late Middle Ages, but also
m e n from one city-state w h o contracted to fight for another.

his band by a written contract or condotta to serve an em
ployer.

The condotta, of which there were several variations,

specified, like Edward Ill's indentures,

"length and terms of

service, number of men, pay, and so on" and was carefully
7

drafted by lawyers representing both parties.

Anthony Mockler

lists three of the more typical types of condotte in Use in
fifteenth-century Florence:

the condotta a soldo disteso

which bound the condottiere and a fixed number of his men to
active service under a native-born commander; the condotta a
mezzo soldo which was less restrictive in that it allowed the
mercenary leader his own command with freedom to harass the
enemy more or less at will; and the condotta in aspetto which
was "basically a retainer paid to condottieri in time of
peace in order to keep their loyalty.11®

Whatever the shades

of difference between them, these instruments of hire were
calculated business ventures in which both employer and wage
earner hoped to gain, the former, if nothing else, the uncer
tain comfort that his adversaries had been denied the good
offices of his client, the latter, the equally uncertain prom
ise „ of regular pay, without which his mercurial recruits
would melt away in search of a more circumspect agent through
which to peddle their highly saleable wares.

^Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 44.
8 Ibid.

14 5
In the fifteenth century the major subscribers to, and
hence the most liberal rewarders of, mercenary labor in Italy
were the Papacy, Florence, Milan, Venice, and the kingdom of
9

Naples,

and the condottieri they employed were as numerous

as their quarrels.

A conspicuous case in point was Venice,

whose army at least through the Renaissance, was exclusively
mercenary, her citizens barred by law from military service
even as officers.

10

Through the greater part of the later Middle Ages the
condottieri, first non-Italian captains like the Essex-born
adventurer, Sir John Hawkwood, and subsequently native cap
tains like the lowborn Francesco Bussone who won fame as the
Count of Carmagnola,

gained international reputations of

^Deiss, Captains of F o r t u n e , p. 21.
^ M a chiavelli, Chief W o r k s , II, 586,
11

924.

The careers of Hawkwood and Bussone demonstrate respec
tively how remunerative and dangerous the lives of soldiers
of fortune could be.
The former was a native of Sible Hedingham, Hinckford, Essex. A veteran of the Hundred Years' War
and organizer of the famed "White Company" of mercenary free
booters, he entered Italy in 13 62 and successively served the
Marquis of Monferrato, the Republic of Pisa, the Visconti
Dukes of Milan, and various other masters before ending his
days in 1394 as an honored pensioner of the Florentine govern
ment.
As a soldier of great renown, his remains at the re
quest of Richard II were presumably returned to England and
are thought to rest in the chantry erected to his memory in
the parish of his birth.
Bussone, the son of a shepherd, was born at Carmagnola,
which name he assumed as his own, in the Piedmont in 1390.
A soldier by trade, he rose by dint of his own ability to com
mand the army of the last Visconti duke of Milan, Filippo
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sorts, and their contemporary, the humanist scholar and edu
cator of princes, Piero Paolo Vergerio or Vergerius, as he
styled himself, could write that Italy was "the best possible
school of warfare" and that those who had not fought there
were "of no military use anywhere."

12

Yet less than a cen

tury later, on Charles V I I I ’s invasion in 1494, the Italians
were found to be peculiarly ineffective as soldiers, permit
ting the French, who "scarce considered

[them] men," almost

free passage to Naples.i 3
What had happened in the intervening years was that Italy
had become, at least from the standpoint of military progress,
a closed community.

Too intensely involved in her own inter

necine struggles, she, like England, had marked time, while
such states as France, Switzerland, the Germanies, and Spain
had passed her by.

In contrast to them Italy was singularly

Maria, in 1424.
Shortly thereafter he passed into Venetian
service, and as Captain-General of the republic's forces d e 
feated the Milanese army in 1427.
However, in ensuing cam
paigns against his former employer, Duke Filippo, he was de
feated for which he was treacherously siezed and executed in
1432. For brief accounts of the careers of both Bossone and
Hawkwood, sjee Deiss, Captains of Fortune, Chaps. Ill and IV.
12

See his instructions "Concerning Training in the Art
of War," part of his essay De Ingenius Moribus in William
Harrison Woodward, Vittorino da Feltre and Other Humanist
Educators (New York:
Teachers College, Columbia University,
1963), pp. 112-161! Hereinafter cited as Vergerius, De
Ingenius Moribus.

i3Coramines, Memoirs, II, 164.
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uninfluenced by the military revolution that was about to en
gulf her.

As in Vergerius' time the chief reliance of the

condottieri was on c a v a l r y , ^ the footsoldier being still de
spised:

"He skirmished in open order with his crossbow,"

leaving the important fighting to the knight on horseback;
"he was unacquainted with the halberd.
as a novelty of very doubtful value,

Firearms were regarded

[and] many rulers still

encouraged the practice of archery on appointed d a y s ."15
Machiavelli somewhat exaggerated the faults of the con
dottieri at whose door alone he laid the blame for Italy1s
shameful performance at the opening of the Great Italian Wars.
Nevertheless his endless diatribes, if considered objectively,
against the background of his personal experience, have a cer
tain ring of truth that are worth considering.
It is in The Prince that he most eloquently berates the
condottieri:

"the present ruin of Italy is the result of no

thing else than her reliance upon mercenaries for a stretch
of many years.

For some princes they gained real advantages,

and they seemed valiant against each other; but when the for
eigners came they showed what they were, so that Charles, the

14 Vergerius,
1 5 Taylor,

De Ingenius Moribus, p. 115.

The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, pp. 34-35.
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16
king of France, was allowed to take Italy with chalk ,'1
Their employment, along with auxiliary troops, whom
Machiavelli considered no better than condottieri, was to be
utterly avoided:
The mercenary and the auxiliary are useless
and dangerous; if a prince continues to base his
government on mercenary armies he will never be
either stable or safe; they are disunited, ambi
tious, without discipline, disloyal; valiant
among friends, among enemies cowardly; they have
no fear of God, no loyalty to men. Your ruin is
postponed only as long as attack on you is post
poned; in peace you are plundered by them, in war
by your enemies.
The reason for this is that they
have no love for you nor any cause that can keep
them in the field other than a little pay, which
is not enough to make them risk death for you.
They are eager indeed to be your soldierj^as long
as you are not carrying on a war . . . .
As for their manner of giving battle, Machiavelli mercilessly
lampoons it:

"these men," he writes in his History of Flor

ence, "made among themselves a compact and understanding . .
. by which they turned war into a technique for so wasting

Machiavelli, Chief W o r k s , I, 47. The reference to
chalk originated with Commines, Memoirs, II, 153.
In allud
ing to the faint hearts of the Italians, Commines had this to
say:
"though they beheld the storm afar off, yet had they
not courage or wisdom enough either to resist or avoid it.
For, except the castle of Naples, there was not one place
which stopped the progress of the king's arms for one day,
which occasioned Pope Alexander VI to say that the French
came into Naples with wooden spurs and chalk in the harbin
gers 1 hand to mark out their lodgings which they took up with
out any more trouble . . . .
In short, this expedition into
Italy was performed with so much ease and so little resis
tance that our soldiers scarce ever put on their armor . . . ."
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time that when two states made war both of them generally
lo s t . " 18

How this was accomplished is described in The Prince;

First, in order to give reputation to their own
forces, they took away the reputation of the in
fantry.
They did this because, being without
territory and dependent on their employment, a
few infantry did not give them reputation, and
for a large number they were unable to provide
pay.
Hence they turned to cavalry which, with
manageable numbers, brought them income and
honor.
And things came to such a state that in
an army of twenty thousand soldiers there were
not two thousand footmen.
Besides this they
used every effort to rid themselves and their
soldiers from hardship and fear, not killing
one another in their combats but taking one
another prisoner without asking r a n s o m . ^
They

1 8 Ibid., III,

19

1079.

This practice is supported by the independent testimony
of an eyewitness, Commines, Memoirs, II, 127, who reports that
in a skirmish in the Piedmont in 1494 at the beginning of the
Great Italian Wars, when Charles VIII's'ally, Ludovico Sforza,
Duke of Milan, took some prisoners they "were stripped to
their shirts . . . and dismissed . . . for in Italy that is
the law of arms." As to be expected, however, the condottieri
did not long continue in this custom and quickly adopted the
more remunerative North European habit of ransoming their pri
soners .
In the early Tudor army foreigners, like native English
conscripts, were constrained by martial law to turn over "all
dukes, counts, captains, generals, sovereigns, high officers"
and princes of the blood royal to the king or his principal
commander, with the understanding that the captor would re
ceive adequate compensation for his pains.
All other prison
ers could be ransomed by their captors at pleasure and for
whatever sums they could bring, except that before such trans
actions could be initiated permission had to be obtained from
the company commander and, in the case of foreigners, from the
English commander-in-chief.
(P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, f. 16.
In reward for the capture of "Monsieur Dostanges, French gen
tleman, whom they took prisoner at Broughty Crag" on the
estuary of the River Tay during the Duke of Somerset's
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did not fire on cities at night, and the mer
cenaries in the cities did not fire on tents;
around their camps they did not provide either
stockades or ditches; they did not campaign in
the winter.
And all these things that they al
lowed among their military customs they are said
to have devised in order to escape hardship and
dangers— with the result that they conducted [an
Italy to slavery
anu

xiii.aiujr •

History of Florence recounts at least three battles
in which no single casualty resulted from hostile action.

One

in 1424 involved the defeat of the Florentines at Zagonara by
Filippo Visconti, Duke of Milan.

The contest was fought in a

rainstorm, and "in so great a defeat, reported everywhere in
Italy, nobody died except Lodovico degli Obizzi with two of
his followers; these three, falling from their horses, were
drowned in the mud."

At Anghiari in 1440, "In this great de

feat and long fight lasting from two until six o'clock, not
more than one m a n died, and he perished not from wounds or
any honorable blow, but by falling from his horse and being
trampled."

Finally, in the war between Florence and Venice in

invasion of Scotland in 1547, Gualtero Bergamo and Bernardo
Piezon da Lodi, two Italian arquebusiers, received 35200.
(P. R. O.) E 351/43, mem. 10.
The rules and regulations gov
erning the ransoming of prisoners of war by the soldiers who
fought for Henry VIII in France in 1513 were set forth in a
proclamation of that year and have been included in Hughes
and Larkin, e d s . , Tudor Royal Proclamation, I, 116-18. For
further details on the subject consult Cruickshank, Army
R oyal, Chap. IX.
^Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 51.
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1467/ in the battle of Molinella "which lasted half a day with
out either side yielding . . . nobody was killed; merely some
horses were wounded and some prisoners taken . . ."21
Machiavelli's casualty lists are not to be taken too seri
ously, and other historians, both contemporary and modern, have
criticized his too harsh assessment of the condottieri.

22

None

theless, the concensus of scholarly opinion still holds that in
the fifteenth century Italy's mercenary captains had made of
war a kind of game in which maneuver and selfish pecuniary in
terest took precedence over obligations to employers or the
hazardous verdict of arms.

But all this came to an abrupt end

owing to the invasion of the French, who according to Guic
ciardini turned everything "upside down as if by a sudden
storm . . . .:"
used to take

states were conquered "in less time than it

[the condottieri] to occupy a villa;" cities fell

"not in months, but in days and hours.
and bloody in the extreme.

2 1 Ibid., III,

22

Battles became savage

In fact states were now saved or

1192-93, 1280, 1363.

S e e , for example, Oman, A History of the Art of War in
the Middle A g e s , II, 309, for the appraisal of the sixteenthcentury historian, Ammirato, of the battle of Molinella, and
Denys Hay, Europe in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries
(London:
Longmans, 1968), p. 185.
Machiavelli himself heaps
praise on any number of condottiere whom he regards as atypi
cal because they fought to win.
Francesco Carmagnola was
such a captain, as was Castruccio Castracani ("Dog Castrator"),
who served as the subject of Machiavelli's biographical study,
The Life of Castruccio Castracani of Lucca. This work in
translation is included in the Chief Works, II, 533-59.
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ruined, given and taken, not by plans made in the chancery,
23
but by feats of arms in the field." .
A similar pragmatic approach to war attended Spain's en
try into the conflict on behalf of the king of Naples in 1495,
and like the French, Gonzalo de Cordova held the Italians in
considerable contempt.

24

Nonetheless, to the credit of the

condottieri, after the initial shock of scorched earth and
war to the knife had abated, they adjusted their thinking and
quickly imbibed of the lessons the foreigners had to teach.
The condottieri, in assessing the strengths of the latter,
had m u c h on which to reflect.

In almost every practical as

pect of campaigning the Italians had been out-matched:

their

tactics of delay and maneuver had failed miserably against
the more direct approach of the French; their cavalry, mainly
through lack of support from other arms, had been ineffective;
and as was to be expected of a people who had long regarded
infantry as next to worthless, they had been embarrassed by
their lack of sufficient numbers of foot soldiers and the ob
solescent weapons with which they had been armed.

23
p. 2 0 .
24

Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence,

Prescott, History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isa
bella the Catholic, II, 305.
Rather than trust his Sicilian
and Calabrian auxiliaries to defend the strongholds which
still held out against the French, Gonzalo detached "a con
siderable part of his Spanish forces to garrison these places."
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25
Of tactics and cavalry something has been said elsewhere,
but the deficiencies' of the Italian infantry were rapidly rec
tified by simply conscripting more me n and training them in the
methods of their adversaries.

In 1497, within two years of

Gonzalo's first triumpts in Naples, Vitellozo Vitelli, a condottiere later murdered by Cesare Borgia, drilled native
troops in the "ultramontane fashion" of the Swiss

and led

them to victory, albeit on behalf of Charles VIII, at Soriano
26
in central Italy.
Borgia himself used similar troops in
his wars in Romagna, while Machiavelli* s attempt at forming
an efficient Florentine militia based on a combination of R o 
man, Spanish, and Swiss methods is so famous that it is best
27
read elsewhere.
As for the Italian aversion to firearms so prevalent in
the fifteenth century, that too was amended, though grudgingly
perhaps in some quarters.

In his Art of War published in 1521,

Machiavelli could still describe the arquebus as "a new weapon,"

2R

Above, Chap. VI, passim.

26

Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence,
p. 345.
For the manner of Vitelli's death consult the "De
scription of the Method Used by Duke Valentino In Killing
Vitellozo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Ferrao, and Others" in Machi
avelli, Chief Works, I , 163-69.
The "execution," as Cesare
called it, took place at Senigallia, near Fano, on the
Adriatic at the end of December, 1502.
27

One of the more scholarly accounts is rendered by
Pasquale Villari, The Life and Times of Niccolb Machiave 11 i ,
trans. Linda Villari” (2 vols.: New York: Greenwood Press,
Publishers, 1968), I, 392-99 and passim.
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useful for terrorizing raw levies in that the noise of "one
arquebusier
men."

[could] frighten them more than twenty other armed

Obviously the philosopher-statesman-historian put lit

tle faith in firearms, and if the arquebus was chiefly useful
for making noise, artillery, he felt, was of no value at all,
particularly in the field, where the heavy guns obstructed an
army's view of the enemy by their smoke.

28

For these reasons

Machiavelli preferred for his model infantrymen the swords and
bucklers of Spain, while of artillery he would have limited
its use to sieges.
There were others, Guicciardini for instance, who consid
ered gunpowder weapons a "great pest," but among the condot
tieri these were a minority.

Gone were the days when such

men as Gian Paolo Vitelli, who during an illustrious freelanc
ing career unflinchingly tore out the eyes and cut off the
hands of captured arquebusiers because it offended his sense
of honor that gentlemen on horseback should be struck down by
common infantrymen.

29

Instead, on the outbreak of the Great

Italian Wars the use of handguns rapidly increased in Italy.
About 1510, when the ratio of arquebuses to other arms in the
landsknecht companies stood at one in sixteen, the proportion

28 Machiavelli,

29

Chief W o r k s , II, 607, 625, 637, 654.

Deiss, Captains of For t u n e , p. 25.
Gian Paolo (d.
1499), the brother of Vittelozzo, was executed by his Floren
tine employers who feared he might make himself their lord.
See Machiavelli, Chief Works, I, 49, 166.
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in Italian armies was as high as one in ten, and in 1527, in
the Duke of Urbino's command, more, than one-third, all of them
Italians, were arquebusiers.

Even that great skeptic, Machi

avelli, felt constrained to bend to the bias of his times by
recommending that one-sixth of all infantry units be provided
with firearms.
The later history of the Great Italian Wars demonstrates
only too well how completely the condottieri assimilated the
instruction of the foreigners, as names like Prospero Colonna,
Giovanni de'Medici, and Piero Strozzi fairly leap from its
pages.

Each of these men were notable commanders of Imperial

and Valois troops, and none of them, the foremost condottieri
of their age, were content to simply imitate, so that the
Italian military genius applauded by Vergerius a century ear
lier reasserted itself through them.

It was Colonna the care

ful practitioner of Fabian strategy and meticulous entrencher
who expelled the French from Milan in 1521 and destroyed the
31
army sent to retake it at Bicocca.
His systematic sapping
during the siege of Padua in 1513, though it failed for lack
of laborers, was the first instance of a besieging array mov
ing on a citadel "with its artillery by means of zigzag
trenches," while his field fortifications before Milan in

on

Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1495-1529, pp. 41,
47; Machiavelli, Chief W o rks, II, p. 601.
^ A b o v e , pp. 123-24.
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1521 w e r e considered b y Guicciardini "as the finest military
wo r k of the a g e ."

32

Giovanni de*Medici, better known to his compatriots as
Giovanni delle Bande Mere from the black accouterments of his
followers' harness, was a highly talented cavalry officer
whose exploits will be recounted more at length in a subse
quent chapter, b u t w h o in a short but meteoric career devel
oped a force of m o u nted arquebusiers,

thereby enlarging upon
33
the infantry system of Gonzalo de Cordova.
The house of Strozzi bulks large in the annals of six
teenth-century Italy.

The founder of the family's fame was

the Florentine, Filippo, who amassed a fortune in various
mercantile enterprises before his death in 1491.

His son,

Filippo II, acquired considerable status as the husband of
Clarice de'Medici, neice of Leo X, who first as cardinal and
later as pope restored the Medicis to control in Florence
after a brief republican interlude between 1494 and 1512.

34

Unfortunately, Filippo II's ill-considered attempt to force
the overthrow of Cosimo I, Duke of Tuscany,

led to his undo

ing in 1537, wh e n as one of the leaders of an army of French
and Italian mercenaries he was captured and either took his

3^Taylor, The A r t of War in I t aly, 1494-1529, pp. 143, 149.
33
Below, pp. 182-84.
34

G. F. Young, The Medici
1930), pp. 268 f f .

(New York:

The Modern Library,
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own life or was murdered after excruciating tortures in one of
Cosimo's dungeons.^ ^
It was with his son, Piero, that the family reputation
was restored*

An able leader and condottiere, he entered the

French army, having made himself persona non grata in Florence
by his involvement in his father’s treason, and after distin
guishing himself in a score of hostile actions died a Marshal
36
of France at the siege of Thionville on the Moselle m 1558.
As an innovator, Piero was intimately associated with the adop
tion of the musket, a new weapon which by the close of the cen
tury displaced the arquebus as the predominant type of infantry
handgun in Europe.

While in the service of Francis I he is

credited with having devised the drills by which the first
picked units of French infantrymen learned to handle this unwieldy piece.

37

The condottieri contributed towards the development of

35I b i d ., pp. 552-53, 554.
36Ib i d ., p. 578.
37

Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 225.
The musket, introduced in its original form in the Great Ital
ian Wars, perhaps as early as 1521, "was six feet long and
fired bails weighing two ounces.
Its weight necessitated the
use of a fork-shaped rest, but its unwieldiness was compen
sated for by its greater killing power— its ability to bring
down two armored cavalrymen with one shot.” Taylor, The Art
of War in Italy, 1494-1529, pp. 46-47.
Oman suggests 1527
as the date of the musket's origin and gives 1584 as the year
in which the weapon is first mentioned in an English company.
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the soldier's art in another and perhaps more unique fashion
by being the first of the modern practitioners to approach
the study of war as a science.

Vergerius, about 1404, refer

red to training in arms as second to none among the Liberal
Arts and recommended as an educator and tutor of princes the
cultivation of the broader aspects of war, namely, "the prin
ciples of generalship, strategy and tactics, discipline, supplies, and the ordering of camps and winter quarters."

38

Later, condottieri founded military schools, those of Fran
cesco Sforza, who succeeded Filippo Maria Visconti as Duke of
Milan in 1450, and Braccio Fortebraccio, who contemporaneously
made himself master of Umbria in central Italy, being among
the most renowned.

The scuola sforzeschi excelled in the

teaching of tactics and maneuvering; the graduates of the
scuola braccesca were feared for the ferocity of their attack;
and virtually all of the leading condottieri at the outset of
the Great Italian Wars were products of one or the other of
these institutions, some of them no doubt hired by Catherine
Sforza, granddaughter of Francesco, for her son Giovanni de'
Medici.^
As Taylor so clearly points out, the study of warfare as

38

Vergerius, De Ingenius Moribus, pp. 114-15, 116. He
actually refers to military training as a "scientific" under
taking .
39

Mockler, Mercenaries, p. 70; Young, The Medici, p. 535.
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a theoretical discipline was in no small way due to the unique
mental and political climate of Renaissance Italy,

Its "in

tense intellectual life" and "the aggregation of a number of
competing states within a small area" combined to provide
"both the atmosphere and the soil for fostering this new
branch of knowledge."

In the military schools teachers and

students were not unlettered peasants, but more usually lords
and gentlemen to whom the benefits of neo-classical education
had been made available, with the result that in the lengthy
sessions on tactics and strategy masters and pupils could be
expected to fortify "their arguments with citations from the
Greek and Latin classics."

Such military dilettantism una

voidably contributed to the type of opera bouffe set-pieces
that Machiavelli so sharply inveighed against, "but this de
generation should not obscure the fact that the condottieri
were the medium through which the Renaissance, both as a
classical and as a scientific movement, influenced the develT
opment of the art of war in Europe."4^
It i s ,however, in their capacity as mercenaries and aux
iliaries rather than disseminators of culture that the con
dottieri are of most concern herein.

Materialists at heart,

they were easily tempted by foreign pay, and if in the early
sixteenth century the majority of them remained in Italy

40Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 7.

where war between Valois and Hapsburg and signory and republic
reached epidemic proportion, not a few were enticed to try
their luck beyond the Alps where their long experience and
exceptional virtuosity were assets readily saleable to norths
ern princes such as Henry VIII, whose own armies were defi
cient in both professionalism and specialization.

CHAPTER VI
THE MILITARY REVOLUTION AND EARLY SIXTEENTH CENTURY CAVALRY
There ought nevertheless to be some cavalry . . .
because for scouting, for raiding and laying waste
hostile country, for keeping an-enemy harassed and
worried and under arms all the time, for cutting
off his provisions, they are necessary and very
useful.
But as to the battles and encounters in
the field that are the chief thing in war and the
end for which armies are organized, cavalry are
more useful for pursuing the enemy when he is
routed than for any other service in battle; they
are much less efficient than the foot soldiers.
Machiavelli, The Art of War, Book 2.
Professionalism and specialization are indeed correct
terms to utilize in describing the metamorphisis which trans
figured the face of war during this period.

To briefly sum

up what already has been said, the first half of the six
teenth century saw the coterminous existence in Europe of
several battle-hardened infantries which by exceptional m as
tery of their art ranked far above their less vocationally
oriented counterparts in other armies.

Only the French, among

European states not previously assayed, came close to approxi
mating the high reputation for infantry gained by Germans,
Swiss, Italians, and Spaniards; nonetheless, French commanders
exhibited such a distinct preference for mercenary foot sol
diers, notably landsknechts and Swiss, that contemporaries
were led on occasion to complain that without foreign
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conscription there would have been no French army at all.
Of considerably more significance,' however, was the fact
that in the early sixteenth century among the various national
infantries available for hire a universally recognizable "type
was beginning to evolve as a consequence of their repeated en
counters in Italy.

By a combination of self-preservation and

cultural osmosis each of the combating forces liberally bor
rowed from its rival those special weapons or tactics which
provided their competitors with an advantage:

thus the Ger

mans adopted the Switzers' pike, which weapon was soon appro
priated by the Spaniards, who made restitution be demonstrat
ing to the Italians and the world at large the value of small
arms firepower.

The general outcome of such diffusion was

that, while each protagonist retained their regional flair and
never completely relinquished control of those skills on which
they had built their fame, the German, Swiss, Spanish, and
Italian infantrymen emerged from their struggles as the proto
types of the first modern European foot soldiers.
This was no mean accomplishment, considering that, since
the early Middle Ages, Europe had persisted in regarding only
the mounted knight as worthy of the appellation, "professional

On the French reliance on German and, more particularly,
Swiss infantry see Fourquevaux, Inst r uctions sur le Faict de
la Guerre, p. 5 and passim, and Daniel, Histoire de la Mi'l'xce
Frangoise, I, 257; II, 287 ff.
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Opinion was slightly modified in the aftermath of such four
teenth-century debacles as Cr^cy, Poitiers, Laupen, and
Sempach, when hardy yeomen armed with longbow and halberd
crushed the pride of Europe's haughtiest gendarmerie.

Yet it

took twenty-five years of slaughter, culminating in Francis
I's impulsive charge at Pavia, to convince the sixteenth-cen
tury votaries of medieval warfare that the day of the heavily
armored horseman had all but run its course.
It must not be presumed, however, that after Pavia cav
alry either vanished from battlefields in the West or that
mounted service became obsolete.

Rather, earlier experience

in the Great Italian Wars had taught that cavalry, if it were
to be viable and effective in operations, had to adapt itself
to meet the challenges in tactics and weaponry with which the
new infantry had armed itself.

Fortunately, like their infan'

try counterparts, commanders of horse soldiers responded well
to the problems posed them and experimented successfully with
any number of stratagems which insured their service1s con
tinued usefulness.
There were o f course many kinds of cavalry, and Gervase
Markham, the celebrated Elizabethan horseman and breeder,
categorized the principal troops of horse as they existed
"In the old Wars" of the generation which preceded his own
as men-at-arms, demilancers, and light horse.

Men-at-arms,

because of the expense of maintaining their equipment, were
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invariably noblemen or at the very least gentlemen:
they were armed with defensive Arms at all pieces.
Cap a. p i e , from head to foot; that is to say with
close Casks on their heads, Gorgets about their
necks, fair Breastplates of Arquebus proof,2 and
Backpieces of less proof for their bodies; Pouldrons for their shoulders; Vambraces for their arms,
Gauntlets for their hands, Taces for their belly,
Cuisses for the knee, and Greaves for the legs and
feet, and about their waists rich Bases of Velvet,
Satin, Silk and other stuff, and Girdles and Hang
ers. For offensive Arms they had fair gilt Swords
and Daggers, strong Lances headed with Steel, and
[a] Cask of short Pistols, with priming box. Flask
key, and Bullet bag, a well armed Battle-axe, and
a strong pair of Spurs . . . with long necks and
long Rowels.
As described, the horses for these heavy cavalrymen were
"strong, well shaped, of great courage, and thoroughly [man
aged] and ridden."

Of "lusty age," they were stoned "(because

tiring hurts them not)

. . . and fair t r o t t i n g a n d of these

mounts in Markham’s estimation the Neopolitan were the best,
followed by the Greeks, the Spanish, the English, "the Almain
or the French."

In action such horses were as heavily armored

as their riders, their breasts and flanks protected either by
bards of steel or caparisons of the toughest bend-leather.

3

The heads of the animals were enclosed in steel headpieces or
chamfrons, and their reins were "of broad leather" lined with
iron chain to prevent cutting.

^See Glossary
3Ibid.

A "fair Bit," a steel saddle,
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and a decorative saker for the tail completed the outfitting
of the horse for war.4
The second type of horsemen common to all the armies of
western Europe are called by Markham "demilancers," a word
which everywhere seems to have been unknown in the sense em
ployed here except in England.

Elsewhere, as in France for

instance, demilancers were classified as chevaux legers, li
terally "light horse," a generic term indiscriminately applied
throughout Europe in denoting all cavalry troops other than
men-at-arms.

Why the English, who eschewed the greater part

of the technical jargon arising from the military revolution,
should have been alone in finding a name for these troops is
a mystery; but that a kind of cavalryman recognizable as a
demilancer existed on the Continent is attested by the records
of the payments made to them by the English muster masters who
hired them.

In 1549, for example, Jacques Jermigny, a Vene

tian captain, led more than 150 demilancers and other assorted
cavalrymen, both "gunners" and men-at-arms, against the West
Country rebels in the Prayer Book rising of that year, while
in 1550 Petro Sanga, an Albanian, served in the same theater

4Gervase Markham, The Cavallarie, or the Formes and M a n 
ner of Trayning of Horse, as it hath beene received from the
latest and best experienced Armies (London:
I. D., 1625), pp.
38-39.
Hereinafter cited as The Cavallarie.
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with a contingent of 134 .demilancers.

5 m
The heaviest type of

light horsemen, they were wholly armored like men-at'-arms, ex
cept that from the knees down they substituted long leather
boots for cuisses and greaves, which picture roughly coincides
with the description of the "three thousand demilances, whole
armed . . . except the legs," referred to in the estimate of
g

needs

prepared for Henry VIII in 1512.

Their offensive wea

pons were the lance, a battle-axe, a sword and dagger, and
towards the middle of the century a case of pistols, and as
they were more lightly accoutered then gendarmes, they rode
smaller mounts which were themselves less encumbered.

Markham

specifies that the horses were strong, "well ridden for the
field," and equipped with steel saddles and breastplates, but
7
without the barding and caparisoning of the destrier.
Of the third sort of "ancient Horsemen" called light
horse, Markham relates that "they were armed for defense with
O
Burgonets or steel caps, Gorgets, Cuirasses or Plate coats.
Gauntlets or Gloves of Mail."

Their offensive arms consisted

5

(P. R. 0.) E 351/43, mems. 5, 7. Other foreign demi
lancers in English service are mentioned in (P. R. 0.) E 101
531/39, mem. 26.
6L. &.P., I, pt. 1, No. 1412.
7
Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 40. Destrier or "great
horse" was the name applied to the mount of the men-at-arms.
There were many breeds, as the passage above (p. 164) indi
cates, all of them raised specifically for war.
Q

See Glossary.
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of a light spear or "chasing Staff," a sword, and a dagger to
which arsenal was later added a pistol or two.

Their horses,

furnished with headstalls, breastplates, and leather saddles,
"were nimble light Geldings, fair trotting, and well ridden,"
As light cavalry employment was the least prestigious of the
mounted services, those drafted normally came from the lowest
Q
social grades.
Such were the "prickers"* who rode for the
10
Tudors, the genitours of Spain, and the argoulets of France,
"handsome Yeomen or Serving-men," Markham calls them, "light
timbered and of comely shape," who like "little David (many
times) puts down the greatest Goliath."1^*
Markham of course compressed a great deal of history into
a very few words.

His categorization of early sixteenth-cen

tury cavalry troops is accurate, and allowing for a few sec
tional idiosyncrasies, his generalizations regarding the of
fensive and defensive habilments of men and beasts is admir
able in its economy and exactitude.

What he failed to say is

^Above, p . 39, n . 74.
10

Argoulets, possibly raised for the first time by Louis
XII (1462-1515) in 1499, were a native French light cavalry
trained in imitation of the Albanian stradiots (for whose his
tory see below, pp. 112 ff.).
They fit Markham's stereotype
perfectly, being "armed with a light cuirass and cabasset to
protect the head.
They had as offensive weapons the sword,
the mace, the crossbow, and afterwards the [wheel-lock pistol]."
Denison, A History of Cavalry, pp. 242-43.

■^Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 40,

168
that, except for heavy cavalry which remained the mainstay of
European armies until the inception of the Great Italian Wars,
no other regular standing bodies of horse were to be found any
where in the W e s t . ^

pu t in other words, before the opening

of the Hapsburg-Valois struggle for the mastery of Italy,
Europe had no professional light cavalry.

Obviously light

cavalry forces existed; but whereas the gendarmerie in the
course of a millenium had acquired the character and prestige
of an international institution, light cavalry up to the be
ginning of the sixteenth-century was everywhere underdeveloped,
indisciplined, and held in the lowest respect.
A major restriction on the progress of light cavalry had
always been that it had functioned in conjunction with heavy
cavalry; it had no independent existence of its own.

By medi

eval convention,the untitled light horseman usually served the
man-at-arms as an ancillary both on and off the field, as is
easily demonstrated by examining the "lance" or, as the
French termed it, lance fournie, the basic tactical and admin
istrative unit into which most cavalries in the later Middle
Ages came to be divided.
By definition,a lance consisted of a single man-at-arms
and a variable number of light cavalry auxiliaries.

In

exception may be made of Spain where by 1494 the
genitours recruited for royal service had begun to be organ
ized as distinct units.
Taylor, The Art of War in Italy,
1494-1529, p. 69.

169
France, in the reign of Charles VII

(1403-1461), this unit con

tained a knight, his armor-bearer or coutilier, three mounted
archers, and a page.

The coutilier doubled as serving-man

and fighter, while the page, whose domestic chores were many,
functioned as horse tender when the unit fought on foot.

13

A

similar dichotomy of purpose can be detected among the Italian
and English light horsemen.

In the Italian lance the capo-

lancia or chief was served by a squire, one mounted archer,
and a page, while in 1509 each of the Gentlemen Pensioners
created by Henry VIII was assigned a demilance, an archer,
and a custrell, the latter being simply the Tudor counterpart
14
of the French coutilier.
As in the Middle Ages, during the early phases of the
Great Italian Wars light and heavy cavalry were sent into ac
tion in mixed formations.

Only with the introduction of a

new type of light cavalry did commanders begin to perceive
the advantages that could be had by utilizing the more mobile
horsemen as specialized forces with particular responsibilities.

13H. C. B. Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British
A r m y , 1066-1945 (London:
Seeley Service and Co., Ltd., 1959),
p. 31.
The coutilier took his name from the Old French
coustille, the long poinard with which he was armed.
14

Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the' British Army, 10661 9 4 5 , p. 35.
On the organization of the Italian lance see
Deiss, Captains of Fortune, p. 18, and Taylor, The Art of War
in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 69. According to Deiss, on long cam
paigns the Italian page or ragazzo might expect to be used as
a woman.

17Q
The new light horse in question were the "Albanians," a
predatory and mercenary host of Balkan warriors who must rank
among the foremost cavalry troops of their or any other age.
Principally Albanians and Greeks among whom perhaps mingled
an occasional Croat or Rumanian, they were Christian emigres
who chose exile in the West, settling in large numbers in
Sicily, Naples, Venice, and Calabria, rather than submitting
to Moslem rule which was fastened on their homelands during
the inexorable advance of the Ottoman sultanate in the late
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.
It was the Venetian authorities who initially exploited
the mercenary predilections of the Albanians, organizing
them before the close of the fifteenth century into what al
most certainly were Europe's first regular corps of light cav
alry.

"Stradiots"15 was the name devised to describe these

colorful horsemen, and as Venice was one of Italy's great
mercenary markets, it was not long before the Albanians came
to the attention of other western powers.

15

Gabriel Daniel (d. 1728), the French priest who was
among the first to attempt to unravel the history of the
stradiots, erred it would seem in deriving their name from
the Greek stratiotus (soldier). Their name in fact comes
from the Italian strada (road or way), signifying "wanderers,"
persons of no fixed abode.
See Konstantinos N. Sathas, Docu
ments ine'clits relatifs a 1 *histoire de la Grece au moyen. age
CB v o l s . : Paris! Maisonneuve et C i e . , Editeurs, 1888), IV,
p. lx. Hereinafter cited as Documents inedits. What is per
haps the most comprehensive collection of stradiotic materials
is contained in volumes VII, VIII, and IX of this series.
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The earliest reference made by the historians of north
Europe to the Albanians is found in the history of Commines.
He relates that at the battle of Fornova, during Charles V I I I ,s
withdrawal from Italy in 1495, the French troops were terri
fied of these men because in their appearance and manner of
fighting they were like nothing the French had ever encoun
tered.^^

Regardless, Louis XII, Charles' successor, had two

thousand Albanians in his service when he punished the revolt
ing Genoese in 1507, and six years later when the English army
of Henry VIII laid siege to Therouanne, it was stradiots whom
the French employed in a vain attempt to revictual the town.

17

The Albanians had now entered the mainstream of western Eu
rope, and having found their way across the Alps, they became
in the process a permanent feature on the battlefields in the
West for almost the duration of the sixteenth century.
Stradiots not only figured prominently among the merce
nary troops hired by France.

They were introduced early to

Spain, where like the native light cavalry they too were
dubbed jinetas.

In 1534 many thousand late-comers from

Greece, fleeing before the continuing Turkish advance, were
granted sanctuary in the Italian dominions of Charles V, and

16

Commines, Memoirs, II, 205, 207.

^ D a n i e l , Histoire de la Milice Francois, I, 231; Hall's
Chronicle, pp. 543, 548.
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in gratitude they entered his service en masse.

18

Stradiots

fought in Germany and in 1545 were hired for th e first time
by the English, whose Albanian captains led bands of "Pelopon
nesians" against the Scots and brawled with the French in the
Pas-de-Calais and around the fortress of Boulogne which had
fallen to Henry VIII in the previous year.19
This wide-spread employment of stradiot troops is an in
dication of their worth as fighters.

Likewise,

it is an indi

cation that they filled a particular need, and w h ere the Tu
dors are concerned what that need was is manifestly revealed
in the exceptionally detailed reports prepared for the Vene
tian government by its accredited representatives at the Eng
lish court.
In a word, the Venetians judged English cavalry to be
entirely insignificant during the early Tudor period.

Sebas

tian Giustinian doubted in 1519 whether a hundred men-at-arms
or a thousand light horsemen could be raised in the entire
realm.

20

The latter figure is almost certainly too low; yet

thirty-five years later> Giacomo Soranzo, Venetian ambassador

^ W i l l i a m Miller, The Latins in the Levant:
A History
of Frankish Greece, 1204-1566 (London: John Murray, 1908) ,
p. 506.
Hereinafter cited as The Latins in the Levant.
19

/
Sathas, Documents inedits, IV, lix, and below, pp. 356,

378 ff.
20L. & P., Ill, pt. 1, Mo. 402.
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to Edward V I and Queen Mary f though, placing the number of Eng
lish. light horse at fifteen thousand, hastened to add that it
21
was "not good for war,"
an opinion sustained by his succes
sor, Giovanni Michele, who in 1557 laid the blame for this de
ficiency squarely on the shoulders of the English horse
breeders:
As to the cavalry (I speak of light cavalry), if
it were but a good description, it might be very
numerous as that island produces a greater number
of horses than any other region of Europe; but
the horses being weak and of bad wind, fed merely
on grass, being like sheep and all other cattle
kept in field or pasture at all seasons . . .
they cannot stand much work, nor are they held in
much account, but nevertheless as they are mettledsome and high couraged, most
especially
if they
chance to be Welsh, .. . . t h e y
would do much bet
ter were they better fed. ^
The Albanians labored under no such handicaps, both they
and their swift Turkish mounts being noted for their tenacity
and endurance in war.

Guerillas on horseback, they special

ized in sudden attacks and weakened their enemies by frequent
skirmishing.

Their peculiar offensive weapon was the assagai,

a twelve-foot javelin equipped
both

ends.

with

a

stabbing

steel point at

At their side they wore

a

scimitar, and from their

saddlebows hung a heavy club which they employed after the

^ Venetian Calendar, V, No. 934.

22

Quoted in Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British
A r m y , 1066— 1945, pp. 41-42,
According to Soranzo's predeces
sor, Daniel Barbaro, the English light cavalrymen used "any
sort of horse."
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fashion of a mace.

Their principal defensive weapon was a

targe or shield, and for armor they wore a type of cuirass
with sleeves and gloves of mail, over which was worn a padded
sleeveless jerkin.

Commines described them as he saw them in

1495:
These Estradiots are of the same nature with the
Genitours; they are horse and foot, and habited
like Turks, only they wear no turbans upon their
heads.
They are hardy people, and lie abroad
all the year round with their horses; they were
all Greeks from the places which the Venetians
possess in those parts, some of them from Nauplia
[in] the Morea, others from Albania and Durazzo.
Their horses are all Turkish and very good; the
Venetians employ them often in their wars and put
great confidence in them . . . they are stout,
active fellows and will plague an army terribly
when they once undertake it.23
These were the warriors who at their first encounter terrified
the French in northern Italy, who "with short stirrups, bea
ver hats, small spears, and swords" harassed the English before Therouanne in 1513,

24

and who later fought to save be-

leaguered Boulogne for Henry VIII in 1545.

25

The functions which light cavalry carried out in the six
teenth century fell roughly into two categories— those of a
combative nature which involved actual fighting and those of

23Commines, M e m o i r s , II, 201.
^ H a l T 1s Chronicle, p. 543.
25Below, pp. 356, 378 ff.
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a non-combative nature which encompassed the more-or-less
routine activities connected with military life*

In the first

category it was the task of light horsemen to reconnoiter the
enemy and when ordered cause confusion in his ranks by haras
sing him on the march or while encamped.

Once an army had

been attacked and routed, the light cavalry elements divided
into small squads to pursue the retreating foe, the primary
object being to complete the victory by slaying or taking pris
oner as many of the defeated enemy as possible.

Such work was

generally beyond the endurance of men-at-arms, who with their
barded chargers, if they had taken part in the main action,
were now exhausted.

As for routine duties, light cavalry was

the obvious choice for patrols, the escourting of small con
voys, and foraging.

Albanians were admirably suited to pe r 

form all these functions, but it was as fighters they distin
guished themselves.
The-manner in which Albanians fought was strange by west
ern standards.

In action their primary weapon was the assagai,

that spear with a point at both ends.

It was often wielded

with both hands, so that at close quarters in hand-to-hand
combat the wielder could defend himself or maim an enemy on
two fronts by rapid thrusts either fore and aft or from side
to side.

While the assagai was normally employed as a cav

alry weapon, it could be used when circumstances demanded as
an infantry weapon against superior numbers of attacking
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horse.

26

Perhaps in imitation of the Swiss, whom they first

encountered in the Great Italians Wars, the Albanians were
27
known to use their javelins as pikes.
Their scimitars provided their adversaries with another
cause for concern, for once a foe had been vanquished it was
their not uncommon practice to behead him, and if he had been
a foe of some distinction, to carry away his severed head on
the end of their spears.

This it would seem was but one of

several traits acquired from the Turks.

After Fornova the

heads of Swiss mercenaries were sold to the Venetians for a
ducat apiece.

28

Savage and bold though the Albanians were they had their
weaknesses.

They are spoken of as vain, and while they may

have collected the bloody heads of their victims for bounty
money, the sound of artillery so terrified them that they were
reputed to have carried amulets to protect them from it.

29

They are said to have been "fonder of booty than of battle,"
and at the Battle of the Spurs in 1513, in the only continen
tal action involving an English army during the early Tudor

26

This would perhaps explain Commines1 description of
the stradiots as "horse and foot." He is the only author of
the many consulted to suggest that Albanians served as any
thing other than cavalrymen.
27
Daniel, Histoire de la Milice Francoise, I, 231.
^ C o m m i n e s , Memoirs, II, 201

29

Ibid.; Sathas, Documents inedits, IV, lvi.
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period to approximate a pitched battle, it was the collision
of the stradiots with the French heavy horse which triggered
the headlong flight of the Gallic chivalry.
authors have gloried in their triumphs.

30

However, other

Indeed, their most

ardent publicists came from within their own ranks, and a con
siderable body of their literature has been preserved, much
of it poetry which was composed in a dialect analogous to
that now spoken Calabria.33*

Stradiotic literature reflects

the intense love these exiles had for their subjugated home
lands, the common theme running through much of it being their
rabid hatred of the Turks and a longing to return to the Bal
kans.

The stradiot, however, was mightier with the javelin

than with the pen.

Unfortunately, the thrusts he gave were

rarely struck for his lost patria, and the heads he collected
were rarely Turkish heads, his victims being more often fel
low Christians against whom he had no real quarrel.
In the end the stradiots went the same way as the merce
nary pikemen, though perhaps quicker.

Like the landsknechts,

unable to keep abreast of the ever-changing, habits or war,
they became redundant.
appear

The last Albanians in English service

to have been discharged in 1550 when on the overthrow

^^H a l l 1s Chronicle, pp. 530-31.
"^Sathas, Documents inedi'ts, IV, lvii, Volumes VII, VIII,
and IX of this series contain a number of poems representative
of the best in stradiotic literature.
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of the Protector Somerset peace was arranged with France and
Scotland,

32

and while they lingered longer on the Continent,

they vanished everywhere in the West before the close of the
sixteenth century, their principal north European employers,
the Valois kings of France, recruiting them for the final
time shortly before Courtras in the final stages of the reliO Q

gious "War of the Three Henries."
It is difficult to assess the influence of the stradiots
on the development of sixteenth-century warfare; for while
there is a considerable amount written about them in western
histories, it is largely superficial, so that it provides lit
tle insight into any impact they may have had.

Nevertheless,

it is incontestable that in the development of light cavalry
tactics in the West the Albanians exerted a powerful influence,
if for no other reason than that they themselves proved the
worth of, and the need for, such well organized forces at a
time when the greater part of Europe was without them.

Daniel

may have been correct in refuting BrantSme's contention"^ that

"^(P. R. 0.) E 101 531/39, mem. 2b, lists among the sun
dry foreign captains who served Edward VI in the French and
Scottish wars John de Lanciano and Andreas Rennzor, Albanians,
who according to this accounting drew their last month's wages
on June 28, 1550, four months after the formal cessation of
hostilities.
33

Daniel, Histoire de la Milice Francoise, I, 231.

A

Pierre de Bourdeilles, Seigneur de Brantome (1540-1614),
was a native of Perigord in northern Guienne.
He served in
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it was upon the model provided by the stradiots that regular
companies of French light cavalry were formed,

35

but certainly

it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these strange men
from southeastern Europe helped germinate the idea.
One thing is certain;

the example set by the stradiots,

first in the opening rounds of the Great Italian Wars, and
second in the related and subsidiary campaigning north of the
Alps, encouraged the more enlightened commanders to venture
upon the training of light cavalry for independent action.
The Spaniards, who previously had made some headway in this
area, used their genitours to good effect in expelling the
French from Naples, and it was actually these troops who after
a night ride and the fording of a river secured Gonzalo de
Cordova's first victory, the capture of Laino in Calabria in

numerous armies under many famous commanders, fighting in
Malta, Italy, Africa, Hungary, and against the Huguenots in
the religious wars in France.
On his retirement from active
duty about 1594 he began to write his memoirs.
In one pas
sage in his famous Vies des Grands Capitaines he says that in
the time of Louis XII "one did not speak of French light cav
alry," only of the gendarmerie "which surpassed all the others
in the world . . . .
But the French made use of the so-called
'Albanois,' who brought to us the form of the light cavalry
and the method of making war like they did.
The Venetians,
who wore us down at Fornova, called them their estradiots;
they also called them Croats because of their nation.
The
Spanish called them genitours." Ludovic Lalanne, e d . ,
Oeuvres Completes de Pierre de Bourdeille, Seigneur de
Brant6me (11 vols.; Paris;
Chez Mme. Ve. Jules Renouard,
1864-82), II, 410.
■^Daniel, Histoire de la Milice Frangoise, II, 436.

1496.

36

About this same time other bodies of light cavalry

began to appear as separate units, heralding the beginning of
the abandonment of the lance system in both Prance and Italy.
In 1495 the condottiere, Camillo Vitelli, routed a sizeable
formation of landsknechts at Lucera in Apulia with mounted
bowmen,

37

a type of horse which heretofore had acted only in

conjunction with heavy cavalry.

Henceforth, until the whole

sale adoption of firearms by cavalrymen towards the middle of
the sixteenth century, mounted archers would rank among the
most common of regular light cavalry troops in the West.
Every army had its share;

the Italian,

the Spanish, the

French, and the English, though the latter's bowmen, except
for those few assigned to garrison duty, could hardly be
looked upon as regulars; nor were they organized independently,
but rather like those attached to the Gentlemen Pensioners

38

submerged in a lance system which was retained at least through
the end of the early Tudor period.

The argoulets, two thou

sand of which were raised for the French army in 1499 in

^Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence,
p. 322.
37
Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 70.
Brother to Paolo and Vitellozo Vitelli, Camillo was killed in
the following year while attempting to storm the fortress of
Circello.
Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of
Florence, p. 319.
38
ab(i>*re, p. .'6-8.
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imitation of the Alhanian light horse, . provide the typical
archetype of this widely adopted service.

Only the German

states seem to have lacked them in substantial quantities, a
phenomenon which might be accounted for by the unpopularity
40
of the lance system in that part of the West,
and if German
knights did not utilize mounted ancillaries, then there were
no bowmen to organize into independent companies.
After the initial enterprise of the Albanians and Span
iards, Italians next emerged as the most venturesome promotors
of professional light cavalry.

Camillo Vitelli, the same con-

dottier e who launched the experiment with regular companies
of mounted archers, was among the first to use regular bands
41
of mounted arquebusiers,
a logical stratagem considering the
accelerated dissemination of firearms among infantry.

The

practice was maintained by his brother, Vitellozo, who had
three hundred gunners on horseback in his pay in 1502, as

■^Below, p. 167, n. 10.
40

According to Machiavelli, the lance system was not in
vogue in Germany.
Criticizing Italian practice, he says in
his Art of War that "each man-at-arms has four horsemen in
his service; but to allow it is an abuse, for in Germany the
man-at-arms is alone with his one horse [i.e., with but a
single mount] . . . ." Chief W o r k s , II, p. 625.
It was com
mon where the lance system flourished for the man-at-arms, and
sometimes his entire retinue, to maintain several mounts.

^Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1495-1529, p. 70.
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opposed to fifty for his nemesis, Cesare Borgia,

42

and by the

end of the second decade of the century the practice of arm
ing light horsemen with firearms had become so widespread that
even Machiavelli, who preferred the crossbow, advised the con
scription of at least a few cavalry handgunners, if only to
frighten the opposition .43
It was left to another condottiere, Giovanni de'Medici,
to fully exploit the potential of this new cavalry by combin
ing its rapidity of movement with the massed broadsides of in
fantry firepower.

Giovanni's reputation as a soldier was al

ready well established when, on April 22, 1522, he and his
storied Black Band of Tuscan light horse were swept from the
field at Bicocca by the precisioned volleys of Pescara's foot
men and the hedge of German pikes.

Though scarcely twenty-

four, this veteran, who at eighteen had been awarded his first
command by his uncle, Pope Leo X, pondered his defeat and d e 
vised the tactics which became the foundation of all future

^2Niccolb Machiavelli, Legazione al duea Valentino
(Torino:
Boringhiere, 1959), XI, docs. 44, 85. Francesco
de Luna, the leader of Borgia's arquebusiers, sounds suspi
ciously like a Spaniard.
See Rafael Sabatini, The Life of
Cesare Borgia (New York:
Brentano's, n. d.), p. 349.
^Machiavelli, Chief Works, II, 625. Machiavelli's
preference for the crossbow is not to be ridiculed, for
among his contemporaries the older weapon was more popular.
It was less expensive, easier to handle and maintain, and
less susceptible to the elements.
The intricate mechanical
parts of handguns tended to foul if not meticulously cleaned,
and damp weather caused rust and spoiled the powder.

1S3
operations involving mounted arquebusiers.

His solution in

coping with infantry handgunners and pikemen was ingeniously
simple:

following Bicocca he drilled a proportion of his

lancers as foot soldiers, so that in battle they could dis
mount and fight like infantry when required.

The men of the

Black Band were all Italians and Albanians, the latter being
chosen because they rode Turkish horses, a breed preferred by
Giovanni.

Their armor was light and conducive to high mobil

ity; their weapons were of the highest quality; and discipline
was rigidly enforced.

The me n wore no beards and their hair

short "to save time and discourage lice."

They even wore a

uniform of sorts, a black harness ’'without bright colors, rib,,4 4
bons, plumes, and ornaments.
Two years after Bicocca, Giovanni's efforts were richly
rewarded when, this time in conjunction with Pescara on whose
side he fought, his mounted infantry, the precursors of
Oliver Cromwell's dragoons, pursued and destroyed the French
rear-guard on the banks of the Sesia River west of Milan.
This martial disquisition,

45

so proficiently synchronizing the

tactical advantages of missile weapons and cavalry, was not
wasted on either side.

Mounted arquebusiers henceforth be

came a permanent feature in Imperial armies, and in the autumn

4 4 Deiss, Captains of Fo r t u n e , pp.

45

Above, pp. 124-25.

263, 274.
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of 1524 when the French, seeking to recoup their loss, reen
tered Italy, Giovanni was retained by Francis I and added to
his general staff.

Significantly, however, native French

arquebusiers a cheval remained few in number and of indiffer
ent worth until after 1537 when Piero Strozzi brought one of
his companies to France and instructed the king in its proper
deployment.

46

As always, the Tudor English were much slower to benefit
from the military experiments on the Continent, and few if any
English gunners on horseback can be found before the end of
the reign of Henry VIII, when even on the eve of that sover
eign's last French war in 1544 they, were still a comparative
rarity, probably the weakest in terms of numbers of any of
the English light cavalry services which included in addition
demilancers, "javelins," "light staves," "chasing staves,"
and archers.

47

One of the largest commands of horse troops,

that of Sir Anthony Browne, Constable of Calais, Master of
the Horse and standard-bearer to King Henry VIII, contained
48
514 light cavalrymen of whom only forty-six were arquebusiers,
while the "main battle," that largest of the three divisions
of the royal army and the one in which Henry served in person,

4 ®Brant 6 me,

47

Ouevres completes, II, 268-70; VI, 72-79.

L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1, No. 275

48Ibid., No. 275 (3).

(1).
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departed Calais for the siege of Boulogne with only fifty
mounted arquebusiers in a total force, excluding foreigners,
of some fourteen thousand.

49

To the king's credit, nonethe

less, the deficiency had been anticipated and was soon reme
died:

shortly after Henry's arrival in the English camp be

fore Boulogne he was jointed by fifteen hundred German cavalry,
whereof one third, an entire ensign, were gunners.

50

While the evolution of the mounted arquebusier was no
mean accomplishment, that service was not without its problems,
chief of which was the unwieldiness of the weapon on which it
most relied.

The arquebus, even when used by infantry special

ists, was difficult to manage, since it required both hands
for priming and firing.

Powder in reasonably exact quantities

had to be poured into the barrel and a touch pan which carried
the flash into the chamber, and a bullet, also dropped into
the barrel, had to be rammed home.

The weapon was then aimed

4 9 Ibid., No. 275, 2.
The number of horsed arquebusiers
in specifically mentioned in the order of march published in
Thomas Rymer, Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae, et cujuscunque
generis acta publica inter reges Anglia et alios quosvis
imperatores, r eges, pontifices, p r m c e p s , vel communitates
(17 v o l s . , The Hague, 1739-45), VI, pt. 3, 120” Hereinafter
cited as Foedera.
50
In addition to the fourteen thousand English and fif
teen hundred Germans, the invaders were joined at Boulogne by
five hundred Flemish foot and a hundred horsemen from Cleves.
Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
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from the chest or shoulder, and a "slow match"
the touch pan by means of a matchlock trigger.

51

applied to
It was a dif

ficult process for the foot soldier and certainly a prodigious
feat for a horseman, who might prefer to dismount but was of
ten forced to fire from the saddle.
It was left to German ingenuity to devise a less cumber
some firearm which could be managed with one hand.

The new

invention was the pistol, a word derived, not from the Italian
town of Pistoia where the first models were wrongly believed
to have been manufactured, but from the Bohemian pistal, mean
ing "pipe" or "arquebus."

Its chief advantage, besides its

lighter weight, was the wheel-lock, a mechanism which produced
a spark similar to that of a cigarette lighter thus eliminat
ing the need of a slow match.

As explained by Pope,

The lock consisted of a steel wheel with a milled
edge attached to a spring and chain so that it
could be wound up.
When the trigger was squeezed,
the pan cover opened and the wheel spun round.
Its serrated edge, pressing against a piece of
iron pyrite . . . struck sparks which fell on the
priming powder exposed in the p a n .52

51

This was another awkward feature of the arquebus, a
slow match being a fuse of cotton or hemp, so-called because
it was impregnated with saltpetre or other chemicals to make
it burn slowly.
The match was lit before the soldier went in
to action and fitted to an 'S1-shaped clamp or matchlock at
tached to the side of the gun.
"To fire, the gunner pulled
back the lower part of the "S," and the serpentine or upper
part arched over and pressed the glowing match against the
pan." Pope, G u n s , p. 55.
52
Ibxd., p. 73.
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Early attempts by infantry troops to afix the wheel-lock
to their longer, heavier weapons were adandoned for the most
part, as the mechanism was highly sensitive to rough handling,
the end result being that the matchlock gun remained the pri
mary firearm of European infantries until its displacement by
the flintlock in latter half of the seventeenth century.

How

ever, despite its frailty, the wheel-lock in the form of the
pistol proved in every way the superior firearm for cavalry
men.

Capable of being wielded in one hand, weighing between

four and five pounds, and with a barrel of about one foot in
length, it was easy for horsemen to carry several, all of
them loaded and ready to fire in rapid succession.
Because the pistol was a lighter, smaller weapon that
lacked the power of the arquebus and was only effective at
close range, special tactics were required to exploit it fully.
Once again it was the Germans,

its inventors, who devised them,

their most characteristic manoeuver being the "snail" or "car
acole," a practice specifically intended to smash compact
squares of infantry.

Charging in deep formations, the pisto-

leers delivered their fire in successive ranks at point-blank
range, each rank after its discharge filing to the rear to reCO

load.

Developed during the religious wars in the latter

half of the reign of Charles V, these Schwartzreiters, or

^Delbrdck, Geschichte der Kriegkunst, IV, 147-49.
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cuirassiers as they soon became known, found employment outside
of Germany and were present in the pay of all the combatants
in the French invasion of 1544.

One thousand one hundred and

twenty under 117 captains accompanied the emperor on his march
through Champagne;

54

Francis r recruited an indefinite number

through his agents along the Rhine; and Henry VIII, in raising
his bands of Burgundians, required "of every man of arms hav
ing eight horses belonging unto him to have a 'kouritzer,* for
which person he should have b y the month, besides his own
wages, twelve philips.”

55

Ensheathed from head to knee in black armor to heighten
the effect of their formidable demeanor, the Schwartzreiters
were equipped with three or four pistols, a sword, and a
light spear, and except for their firearms they were not un
like the English demilancers, who themselves adopted the pis56
tol and the name "cuirassier" in Elizabeth's reign.
As the

Ferdinand Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees
Fran^ais des Guerres d 1Italie aux Guerres de Religion, 14941562 (Paris:
Services d 1Edition et de Vent des Productions
de l'Education Nationale, 1962), p. 98.
This exploratory
volume, written by one of France's greatest historians, was
published posthumously.
Hereinafter cited as Recherches sur
les Effectifs des Armees Franyais.
^ ( B . M.) Lansdowne MS. 155, f. 356b.
Hereinafter cited
as (B. M . ) Lansd.
See also' L. £ P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 752.
The philip or philipus guilder, a common unit of currency in
the Netherlands which varied in value from 3s. 1 l/2d. to 3s.
3d. between c. 1544 and 1546.
(B. M.) Add. MS. 5753, ff.
179b, 190, 191.
56

Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British Army, 10661945, p. 44.

heaviest of light cavalry troops, in their own countries,
Schwartzreiters and demilancers gradually replaced men-at-arms
whose barded horses, lances, and full armor fast became superflous in a gunpowder age.

By 1600 only Spain and Italy among

European states retained large bodies of gendarmes, whereas
elsewhere, including Tudor England, the first and principal
cavalry troops were pistoleers.

57

Still, throughout the first half of the sixteenth century
heavy cavalry was as yet several generations away from obsoles
cence; for as Markham noted of this period the handgun, which
resulted in the evanescence of the armored knight, had not at
tained that height of excellence to which it would soon arrive
True enough, the proportion of heavy horse in most armies had
been dwindling at the expence of increased numbers of light
horse and infantry since before the initiation of the Great
Italian Wars.

Charles VIII had thirty-four hundred lances in

the Piedmont in 1494; at Pavia in 1525 Francis I operated with
roughly thirteen hundred; while at Ceresole in 1544 Enghien,
the French commander, had less than one thousand.

59

The same

process can be noted in Spanish army "which began to reduce

57

Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 41.

5 8 Ibid.
59

The Renaissance. Vol. I of the Cambridge Modern His
tory , eds. A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, Stanley Leathes (13
v o l s ,; Cambridge:
University Press, 1902-26), 112; Oman,
The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 289.
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its proportion of cavalry before 1494,"

60

and in England,

where throughout the Tudor era the scarcity of heavy horse
was endemic, a similar trend is detectable.

In the three ex

peditions sent into France by Henry VIII, the numbers of Tudor
men-at-arms are so inappreciable as to defy even an approxi
mate reckoning, thus lending support to Oman's observation
that the English aristocracy had lost the art of fighting on
horseback in the fifteenth century "and had not recovered the
habit ."61
The gradual subordination of the gendarmerie to the other
services seems logically to lead to the conclusion that the
military revolution of the sixteenth century produced at the
least a partial eclipse of heavy cavalry.

As demonstrated,

when dealing in mere arithmetic such a generalization is eas
ily sustained.

There is no question that in general infantry

outstripped cavalry, both heavy and light, in the race towards
modernity, and in consequence, abetted by the defensive guise
which war assumed as the century progressed, the mounted arm
was relegated to a subordinate and supportive role.

Neverthe-

lessfthe importance of that role can be deduced from the pro
fessional air assumed by the new light cavalries and the still
considerable squadrons of men-at-arms that continued to be

60Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 61.
^ Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 289. .
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conscripted.
Until firepower definitely established itself as the pri
mary adjudicator of battles, the steel-clad knight remained
the unequalled weapon of shock.

Obviously, as Taylor insists,

the horseman's tactics could easily be neutralized by the lands
knecht's pike or the engineer's entrenchments; but the latters 1
stratagems were no substitute for the former.
heavy cavalry could produce such driving power.

No troops but
"Consequently
fT2

the man-at-arms remained essential in every battle"
63
known to have decided a few on his own account.

and is

The annals of every European nation are replete with ac
counts of the prowess of their fighting men-at-arms, but in
the sixteenth century the highest reputation for discipline
and professionalism belonged to the gendarmes of France,

"la

vraie ecolle de la discipline militaire, la deffense et bouclier du Royaume."

Originally raised as regular companies by

Charles VII, they were not only a standing but also a national
force which enjoyed a continous history dating back to 1445.
The number of companies, in which service was voluntary, was

6 2 Taylor,

63

The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529, p. 62.

Heavy cavalry, largely Burgundian and German auxilia
ries, won the Battle of the Spurs for Henry VIII in 1513;
Francis I, who personally led twenty-five charges, credited
his men-at-arms with the victory at Marignano in 1515; and
Philibert Emmanuel of Savoy destroyed the French before St.
Quentin in 1557 with his heavy horse.
64
Denison, A History of Cavalry, p. 221.

64

192
highly variable, rising in war, declining in peace.

Most such

units were assigned within France to frontier and garrison du
ties, but when offensives abroad were undertaken the majority
were mustered as the nucleus around which the French army was
, ... 65
built.
From the first, the organization of these compagnies d'
ordonnances was grounded in the lance system.

Forty to

eighty "furnished lances," each by the reign of Francis I con
sisting of a man-at-arms and four light horsemen who fought
independently under their own banner, made up a normal company.
"Captain" was the usual rank of the company leader, and under
him served a lieutenant, an ensign, a guidon, and a marechal
des logis or s e r g e a n t . ^

Every heavy cavalryman was of gentle

birth, and captains were appointed for life.

Death by hang

ing was the punishment for desertion, and the enlistment of
foreigners was discouraged.

67

French men-at-arms, wrote

Guicciardini,
were nearly all from the King's subjects, and no

^ F o u r q u e v a u x , Instructions sur le Faict de la Guerre,
p . xxvi.
Ibid., pp. xxxvi, 24. According to Fourquevaux, "the
Men of arms should follow the Ensign:
and the Light Horse,
Stradiots [i.e. the argoulets attached to the lances fournies] ,
and Arquebusiers a Cheval should follow the Guidon.” The func
tion of the sergeant was to find and prepare lodgings for the
company.

67

Ibid., p p . xxxvi, l v , l x , lxix.
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common people but gentlemen, not just taken on
or laid off at the wish of the captains, and as
the companies were paid, not by them, but by the
King's ministers, they not only had their full
numbers, but were well set up and well provided
with horses and arms— not being unable through
poverty to equip themselves— and all competed to
serve best from the instinct of honor which noble
birth breeds in m e n 1s breasts as well as from the
hopes they had of rewards for courageous deeds
both inside and outside the service, which was
arranged so that they could be promoted through
various ranks up to captain.
The captains had
the same incentives, being nearly all barons and
lords, or at the least of very noble birth, and
nearly all subjects of the King of Prance.
When
they had their full complement of lancers . . .
they had no other ambition than to earn their
King's praise; so that there did not exist among
them either the instability of changing masters
out of ambition or greed or rivalries with other
captains . . . .68
Such was the devotion of French men-at-arms:

except in times

of peace,few were ever found on the side of their country's
enemies, and with no such horsemen of their own, sovereigns
like Henry VIII, who picked quarrels with the kings of Prance
were obliged to find gendarmes in the Netherlands and Germany,
the two regions which produced heavy cavalry of comparable
va lue.
The reputation of the Netherlands men-at-arms was, as
might be expected, almost as high as the French, because be
ginning in 1471 they had been organized on the same model as
the compagnies

68

d 'ordonnances by Charles the Bold.

Guicciardini, History of Italy and History of Florence,
pp. 153-54.
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"Burgundians" is tlie name by which, they were called in the six-**
teenth century, being raised within the Circle of Burgundy,
that administrative district comprising the Netherlands and
Franche-Comte created by the imperial Diet in 1512.

Excellent

troops when led by competent officers, they were the Empire's
69
first line of defence in the Low Countries,
which region,
with the neighboring German states, served as England's chief
entrepot for mercenaries and auxiliaries.
The estimate of the worth of German men-at-arms underwent
a drastic transformation in the early decades of the century.
In 1512, Machiavelli, who four years earlier as head of a
Florentine legation to the emperor at Innsbruck had occasion
to observe them, judged these troops to be greatly inferior
to the French, whom he rated the best.

German knights, though

numerous and warlike, were lightly armored and poorly equipped.
Their horses were hard to manage and for lack of barding

fiQ
In 1544 there were thirty compagnies d 1ordonnance, to
talling seven thousand horse, in the Army of the Low Countries.
Of these, three thousand were assigned to Charles V for the
invasion of France? two thousand were retained at home for
the defence of garrisons and frontiers; and the remaining two
thousand, with four thousand landsknechts, were sent at the
emperor's expense as auxiliaries under the Count of Buren to
join the English.
Buren was separately commissioned by Henry
VIII to raise additional forces of mercenaries, both horse
and foot.
Concerning the number of the latter, see below
pp. 274 ff.
Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des' Armees
Fran^aise, p. 8 8 .
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vulnerable to disabling wounds,
tians,

70

and according to the Vene-

they in no w a y cooperated with other troops in battle.

71

Yet, in 1544 the English commissioners at A a c h e n near the Lux
emburg frontier described the German "gentlemen" with whom
they were sent to bargain as "wondrously w e l l armed as m e n of
arms," well mounted,

and "such a goodly company . . .

have seen the like nowhere."

72

Outwardly,

as they

then, little distin

guished the cavaliers of Germany from those of other countries;
but if, as the Venetian ambassador to the Imperial court re
ported in 1546, they were clad in steel and carried a sword
and lance,

73

there were differences in their organization and

mode of ma k i n g war that were unique.
The style of fighting in w h i c h the German men-at-arms
had been trained since the fifteenth century required them to
charge in compact bodies many ranks deep.

Some of their for

mations involved as few as nine ranks, but one military manual

^Niccol'b Machiavelli, Portraits of the Affairs of Ger
m a n y , in Niccoib Machiavelli and the United States of A m e r i c a ,
ed. Pansini, p. 652.
^Taylor,
7 2 L.
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The A r t of War in I t a l y , 1 4 9 4 - 1 5 2 9 , p. 64.

& P ., XIX, pt. 1, NOS.

6 6 6 , 713.

Relatione del Charissimo M. Bernardo N a v a g i e r o , ritornato Ambasciatore d 'Alemagna da Carlo Quinto I mperator," T r
anno MDXLVI nel m e s e di Iuglio in Correspondence of tKe E m 
peror Charles V and His~ Ambassadors at the Courts of England
and F r a n c e , ed. W i l l i a m Bradford (London:
Richard Bentley,
New Burlington Street, 1850), p. 456.
Hereinafter cited as
Navagiero, R e l a t i o n e .
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of 1532 recommended the ordering of six thousand horsemen in
74
no less than eighty-three.
This was in complete contradis
tinction to the French and Burgundians, who operated with
shallower formations, the former preferring to range their
heavy cavalry en haye along a broad front in no more than two
lines of battle, the latter favoring a narrower front with
four l i n e s . ^
Another trademark of the Germans was the deliberate and
comparatively slow pace of their attack.

Most heavy cavalries

in delivering an assault rushed their adversaries at full tilt,
an excellent tactic only when the whole body charged home.
Too often,

though, men arrived at the shock in loose order,

the more impetuous having raced ahead to claim the first coup,
76
the cowards having held back or left the field.
The Germans,
however,

sacrificed speed for good order, advancing at a trot,
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Oman, The Art of Wa r in the Sixteenth C e n t u r y , pp. 8283; Delbrdck, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, IV, 141.
75

E. H. Wickham, trans., The Influence of Firearms Upon
Tactics (London: Henry S. King, 1976), p. 9.
The word "haie"
is retained in the modern French language with the meaning
of "hedge" or "row of troops."
76
See La Noue's remarks in Fortescue's History of the
British A r m y , I, 102.
77
Navagiero, in his Relatione, p. 456, describes this
peculiar gait in the following t e r m s : Just as the lands
knechts "have a peculiar style of march," so also do the
men-at-arms, who "are mounted on horses which have a partic
ular pace of slow trot."
The horses of the German pistoleers

77
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relying on the weight of their deep masses to push their wa y
through the defences of their opponents.
Such fearlessness under fire was an asset that could
hardly be wasted, and considerable effort was expended by the
emperors in efforts to ensure themselves of their horsemen's
loyalty.

But like landsknechts, the habits of the German c a v 

alry were entirely mercenary.

Of all the nations employed by

the Empire, it was argued that "the best paid and the least
available was the German."

Their insolence was insufferable;

they were pious towards God and cruel towards their neighbors.
In war they turned churches into stables, and whenever their
arose among them a scarcity of money or provisions they abandoned their commanders "without any chance of r e m e d y ."

78

But if German men-at-arms displayed little patriotism or
faithfulness they were at least amenable to new ideas, so that
when, in the middle years of the reign of Charles V, the e m 
peror sought to increase their efficiency by regulating their
formations and standardizing their tactics they cooperated.
Charles is cited as being the first to organize his cavalry
into squadrons,

79

those principal units into w h ich before the

were trained similarly.
According to Navagiero, who accompa
nied Charles V to France in 1544, these latter troops carried
"a small arquebus and have a sword and a boar spear hanging
at their sides and attached to their saddle."
78Ibid.
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Denison,

A History of Cavalry, p. 237.
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disappearance of the horse soldier modern cavalry regiments
were divided.

These bodies, three or sometimes four to a reg

iment, retained the deep order of the medieval German horse
but formed up in squares, forsaking the pointed formation or
Spitz w h ich had gained ascendancy in Maximilian's day.

80

The

strength of squadrons varied, as did the number of ranks; but
uniformity of sorts was gained by matching ranks with an equal
number of files, so that the whole body was as great in depth
as in breadth of front.
squadrons,

81

As regards the organization of

the chief officer or Rittmeister was a captain,

whose deputy, a lieutenant, had under him an ensign and a
quartermaster.

Pre-eminent among non-commissioned officers

was the sergeant or Wachtmeister, wh o as the mounted equivalent of the landsknecht Feldweibel

R?

was responsible for all

matters pertaining to drill and the arrangement of the

8 0 Wickham, t r a n s . , The Influence of Firearms Upon Tac
ti c s , p. 9.

Hi

Though the square formation was typical, a rectangular
battle order was not unknown.
In fact there were times w h e n
the "broad square" was preferable, as for instance against a
numerically superior force which would find it easier to e n 
velop a square than a rectangle.
82

Below, p. 98, n. 26. Besides the above-mentioned per
sonnel it was not unusual to find attached to each squadron
a surgeon, blacksmith, chaplain, and trumpeter.
Just as the
footsoldier was trained to respond to the beat of the drum,
so likewise was the horse soldier trained to respond to the
call of the trumpet.
Markham, The Cavallarie, p. 60, lists
the six "Soundings" of the trumpet "which are most necessary
for the Soldier's knowledge."
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horsemen in battle.
That the squadron system was effective is attested by
the fact that it was adopted by all the Imperial cavalry,
light as well as heavy, before 1544.

Francis I experimented

with the new formation but soon abandoned it, the French gen
darmerie continuing to fight en haye until utterly routed by
the Imperialist squadrons at St. Quentin and Gravelines in
1557 and 1558 respectively.

83

In the meantime the English

stuck to the lance system and the mixed companies of light
and heavy horse which it produced.

At best, however, it was

an unsatisfactory solution, if only because of the extreme
shortage of Tudor men-at-arms.

In the French war of 1544,

for example, if the muster rolls are to be believed no more
than two or three hundred heavy horse were mobilized, and of
these the only professional unit was the Gentlemen Pensioners,
seventy-two of whom under the leading of Sir George Carew
were told off against the main battle.

84

Other than the

"Spears" the remaining men-at-arms appear indiscriminately
and in small numbers:

six in the company assigned to the

Master of the Horse; four to guard the king's "tents, hales,
and pavilions;" four in the retinue of John Dudley, Viscount
Lisle, after his appointment as Lord Lieutenant of Boulogne

^ D e n i s o n , a H i st o r y of C a v a l r y , p. 237.
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in October, 1544.

85

Needless to say men-at-arms were particu

larly necessary to ward off the French gendarmerie , and it was
the threat of annihilation by Europe's chief exponents of
heavy cavalry warfare which drove Henry VIII to enlist as many
German and Burgundian knights as he could procure.
The choice of these latter horsemen by the English is in
structive, because of the states drawn on for foreign troops
Germany and the Netherlands were alone in their ability to
supply them in quantity.
heavy cavalry.

Spain by way of illustration had few

As in England, poor breeding habits had led to

the diminuation of great horses, so that among the Iberian gentry mules were the commonest mode of transportation.
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More

over, the Granadan War had developed light cavalry, and the
success of Gonzalo de Cordova's reformed infantry had removed
much of the stigma attached to that service.

The grandest

hidalgos now competed with the humblest peones for the command
of foot soldiers, and even the emperor on occasion was not
above shouldering a pike or carrying a musket.

Of the thir

teen thousand Spaniards in Italy at the commencement of
Charles V's third war with France in 1536, only 580 were menat-arms, and two years later with a French army operating in

8 5 Ibid., No.

275, pp. 163, 165; pt. 2, No. 799.

®®Rogers, The Mounted Troops of the British A r m y , 106619 4 5 , pp. 41-43; The Renaissance. Vol. 1 of The New Cam
bridge Modern History, ed. 6 . R. Potter (Cambridge:
Univer
sity Press, 1957), 279.
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the Pyrenees a mere 961 were mustered in all of Spain.

87

Like the early Tudors, the emperor relied on his Germans
and Burgundians for the bulk of his heavy horse, and with the
88
exception of the Duke of Albuquerque,
who was loaned by
Charles to the English council of war in 1544, not a single
Spanish man-at-arms can be found under either Henry VIII or
Edward VI, the two Tudors who most heavily drew on Spaniards
for military support.

Hundreds of Iberians did serve these

monarchs on horseback, but always as light cavalrymen and in
variably against the Scots, who to their great discomfort at
Pinkie in 1547 were almost certainly subjected by them to
89
the first caracole ever performed in the British Isles.
Much more numerous was the Italian gendarmerie, but here,
as in Spain, light cavalry and infantry service experienced
a steady increase in popularity at the former's expense.

At

Fornova in 1495, before the lessons of the military revolu
tion had been fully accepted, the whole pride of the Italian

87

Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp.

61-62.
88
Beltran de la Cueva, third Duke of Albuquerque.
89

William Patten, The Expedition into Scotland of the
Most Worthily Fortunate Prince Edward, Duke of Somerset m
Tudor Tracts, 1532-1558, ed. A. F. Pollard (New York:
Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., 1964), p. 123.
Hereinafter
cited as The Expedition into Scotland. See also Sir Charles
Oman, "The Battle of Pinkie, Sept. 10, 1547,” The Archaeo
logical Journal, XC (1933), 14-15.
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army lay in its men-at-arms,

Forty-nine years later in 1544,

after the French and Imperialists had divided the allegiance
of the peninsula between them, not one Italian gendarme par
ticipated in the summer fighting in France, and in the prelim
inary struggle at Ceresole in April of that year, in one of
the rare pitched battles of the last three-quarters of the
sixteenth century, less than two hundred were engaged.

90

Some few may have fought for Henry VIII in the taking and
subsequent defence of Boulogne,

91

but the first Italians in

Tudor livery identifiable as men-at-arms do not appear until
September,
Malatesta,

1547 in the reign of Edward VI, when the colonel,
92

led a band of undetermined strength against the

Scots at Pinkie under the standard of the Lord Protector,

^ L o t , Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Franc a i s e , Chap. VI; Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Cen
t u r y , pp. 231, 232-33.
91

Large numbers of Italian foot and light cavalry were
retained for these undertakings.
In February, 1546, for ex
ample, the garrison at Boulogne contained six companies of
Italians, nearly all of them arquebusiers, totalling 696 sol
diers, while in Calais and other strongholds kept by the Eng
lish there were a thousand Albanian and Italian horse.
S. P.
1/214, ff. 177-78; State Papers, XI, 60.
Qn
It is unfortunate that this soldier of fortune cannot
be more adequately identified since the house of Malatesta
was famous for its condottieri.
For an abridged history of
the family which sank into obscurity in the second quarter
of the sixteenth century see Orville Prescott, Princes of
the Renaissance (New York:
Random House, 1969), Chaps. XVIXVIII.

203 .
Edward Seymour, Duke of Somerset.

93

Later in Edward's reign,

during the Prayer Book rebellion in 1549, twenty-nine men-atarms served in the company of the Italian adventurer, Jacques
Jermigny, while in the following year at Sheen, after the
nuptials of John Dudley, Lord Lisle, and the Lady Anne Sey
mour,

the wedding party was entertained by the king's pen

sioner, Count Pallavicino Rangone, who with three of his
countrymen "ran with all the gentlemen four courses and after
94
ward fought at tourney."
No more than in England or Spain the scarcity of Italian
heavy cavalry was in part caused by the lack of good mounts.
Machiavelli thought that Italian stockmen were more accus
tomed to breeding calves and mules, and "for the sake of a
large supply of horses" he advised those princes who would
raise armies to distribute mares of good blood throughout
their rural estates, so that husbandmen might gain experience
in raising colts.

In recommendations suggestive of the Eng

lish legislation under Henry VIII, he proposed that men be
denied the right to keep mules if they did not also keep
horses and that no one be permitted to dress in silk if he

93

Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 359;
(P. R. O.) E351/43, mem. 10.
94

W. K. Jordan, ed., The Chronicle and Political Papers
of K i n g Edward VI (Ithaca, N. Y . : Cornell University Press,
1966), p. 33.
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did not own a horse.

95

The main cause of the decline in heavy cavalry was of
course only coincidentally related to unscientific breeding
practices,

for at the root of the matter lay the changing

nature of war.

Since sieges and skirmishes came to be p r e 

ferred over pitched battles fewer men-at-arms were needed,
and as the cost of armor proofed against shot increased in
proportion to the effectiveness of small arms fire, gentle
men of meager means with a penchant for soldiering were eas
ily persuaded to set aside the lance and take up other w e a 
pons.

Many young French and Spanish nobles served their m a s 

ters as infantrymen, and the Italian condottieri,

some of

whom occupied the leading posts in the Imperial army, distin
guished themselves as quartermasters, artillerymen, and

^ M a c h i a v e l l i , Chief W o r k s , II, 720-21.
In 1542 the Eng
lish Parliament passed a "Bill for Great Horses" in which all
persons of means were required to maintain a prescribed num
ber of stallions:
archbishops and dukes, seven; marquesses,
earls, and bishops, the value of whose bishoprics was B1000,
five, viscounts, barons, and bishops with a 1000 marks a
year, three; lords spiritual and temporal with 600 marks a
year, two; and those spiritual persons with incomes less
than 500 marks, one.
The novelty of the act was that it de
creed that "all and every other person temporal not afore
mentioned whose Wife . . . shall wear any gown of silk or
whose Wife shall wear any French hood or bonnet of Velvet,
with any habilments past or egg of gold, pearl, or stone or
any chain of gold . . . shall, after the Feast of St. Michael
. . . have, find, keep, sustain, and maintain . . . one
stoned trotting horse" on pain of a fine of B10.
Judges of
assize, justices of the peace, and sheriffs were authorized
to proceed against offenders.
(33 Hen. VIII, c. 5), Stat
utes o f the Realm, III, 83 0-31.
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captains of light horse.

96

In England too, where only the

greatest lords appeared regularly in full armor, a similar
trend is detectable.

For Henry VIII*s first invasion of

France in 1513 not a few of the gentry enrolled as "spears
afoot," while of the 389 captains assigned to the leading of
the companies in the army of 1544 only 52 were appointed to
mounted units in which for lack of heavy cavalry light horse
elements predominated.

97

Though new strategy, new weapons, lack of strong coursers,
and rising costs militated against men-at-arms and brought
about a steady decline in their supply,they remained a tac
tically indispensible branch of all armies in this age of
transition.

Until the evolution in the seventeenth century

of a new type of cuirassier, who abandoned the caracole and
was trained to charge home with the sword after discharging
his pistol, men-at-arms were essential in every action where
the utmost momentum was required in an assault.

Their pres

tige, though somewhat tarnished by the materialization of
professional infantry and light cavalry troops, remained the
highest of any service, but no longer could the view be up
held that they were the most important levy in war.

In fact

in the sixteenth century, so far did the waging of war depart

^Navagiero, Relatione, pp. 451-52, 453.
97L. & P . , XIX, pt. 1, NO. 273

(6).

206
from the medieval ideal that no sector of the military could
claim supremacy.

The best commanders were those who relied

on a combination of arms, fully cognizant of the advantage
that might be theirs if the enemy did not.
Nothing better indicates the arrival of an age of sol
dierly professionalism than the fact that in the sixteenth
century functions and duties became more clearly differenti
ated.

Men-at-arms divested themselves of their light cav

alry ancillaries;

these in turn were grouped as independent

units for the carrying through of specialized operations;
highly mobile arquebusiers evolved to support the less agile
pikemen; and victory went to the side in which these dispar
ate yet complimentary elements could most skillfully cooper
ate.

Shock and missile power were mutually supportive, and

disaster awaited the army which favored the one at the ex
pense of the other.

Pike columns were most easily disposed

of when deficient in shot, hackbuteers when unprotected w i t h
pikes.

As for cavalry,

it could not go everywhere since ter

rain dictated its movements.

More difficult to maneuver,

mo r e easily disordered in violent action, it was, though best
equipped to check the advance of infantry bodies over open
ground, useless unless artillery and missile fire could be
brought to bear on the stationary target which its flanking
charges had created.
In the light of these particulars an absolute essential
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in sixteenth-century armies was the creation of some sort of
balance between the power of missile and shock, infantry and
horse.

However, for individual governments the capacity to

provide this balance through exclusively domestic conscrip
tion was a cherished but unrealizable goal.

As has been

fully demonstrated, no particular nationality or single re
gion produced soldiers skilled in all the aspects of war.
Burgundians and Frenchmen alike shone as cavalrymen but were
unsteady on foot; both Italians and Spaniards excelled in de
fending and attacking fortifications, but in the open for the
press of pikes Germans and Swiss were preferred; the best the
oreticians were perhaps the Italians; but whereas Germans
ranked among the best gunfounders, the foremost artillerymen
were French.

And so the list of superlatives may be extended

to include as well the English, who though military progress
had passed them by still retained something of their past re
putation as formidable bowmen.
The simple fact is that in Europe in the sixteenth cen
tury there was no such thing as a militarily self-sufficient
state, as no country could from its own citizens provide that
combination of arms which military convention and necessity
dictated, so that every warring nation was constrained to
hire mercenaries and to seek out allies.

France, Spain, and

the Empire were easily the most voracious consumers of for
eign professionals and auxiliaries, for as these were the most
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aggressive states, being almost continually at war,
need of specialists and manpower was greatest.

98

their

England by

comparison was only a moderate employer of foreign troops,
and within the narrow limits of her own geographic setting a
case could be made for her self-sufficiency.

Protected by

the sea which acted as a potent deterrent to invasion, she
had little need of mercenaries or auxiliaries, as long as
her government remained aloof from continental campaigning.
Nondescript as Tudor forces were, Englishmen knew them to be
superior to the half-wild levies of their island f o e s , the
Scots and the Irish.

It was only when Tudor sovereigns sent

their armies out of the kingdom, across the Channel, and into
Europe at large that military superiority was lost.

Fortun

ately, few appreciated this better than the Tudor monarchs
themselves.

All of them were aware of the limitations of

English troops, and in part for that reason every Tudor govern
ment save one strove with some degree of success to avoid protracted military entanglements abroad.

99

Of his line only

QO

In addition to the Imperial and Spanish campaigns
against the Turks in eastern Europe and in the Mediterranean,
the Hapsburg-Valois struggle provided at least one war per
decade between 1494 and 1559.
99
Neither Henry VII nor his granddaughters, Mary and
Elizabeth, ever sought to extend their dominion beyond the
frontiers of England and Ireland, and though Edward VI in
herited the forward policy of Henry VIII, it was abandoned
by the Northumberland regime when its objectives, the reten
tion of Boulogne and the conquest of Scotland, proved imprac
tical.

Henry VIII craved battle honors.

Yet it is inconceivable

that he, who was thrice enticed to send armies to France,
would have dared to stir himself without strong assurances
of mercenary and auxiliary support.
m a x i m of war:

Henry knew the cardinal

on the Continent no army survived without

foreign assistance.

Barring miracles, if that maxim held

true for the mo s t militarily advanced states, it could hardly
be less applicable to England.
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CHAPTER VII
FRANCE O R SCOTLAND?
THE BACKGROUND OF THE FRENCH WAR OF 1544-46.
Who that intendeth France to win,
With Scotland let him begin.
Sixteenth-century English proverb.
In 1541 when Henry VIII resolved for the last time to
pursue an aggressive policy in Europe no English army had
fought on the Continent since the Duke of Suffolk's with
drawal from Montdidier nearly twenty years before.

During

the interim, except for her brief flirtation with the League
of Cognac,^ the full thrust of England's diplomatic and mil
itary efforts had been of necessity defensive, since the in
ternational situation created by the king's divorce from
Catherine of Aragon and the resultant breech with Rome had
raised the spectre of invasion by Catholic powers bent on
forcibly returning the nation to papal allegiance.
The gravest threat to English security in the early and
critical stages of the Henrician Reformation came from Char
les V, who as Catherine of Aragon's nephew seemed most
likely to lead his Hapsburg aggregate of Spain, the Nether
lands, and the Empire to his aunt's defence.

1Above, p. 139, n. 53.
210

Between the
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calling of Henry’s "Reformation Parliament" in 1529 and the
death of his unfortunate first queen in 1536 the fear of Im
perialist attack was constant, as is witnessed by the manner
in which the emperor’s enemies were carefully cultivated.
Conversations were opened with the Lutherans, with Denmark,
and the German Hanse; peace was renewed with the Scots, and
in 1532 a league was concluded with France which bound the
Most Christian King to assist Henry with a fleet and fifteen
2
thousand auxiliaries should Charles decide to invade.
Fear of Imperialist intentions produced a plethora of
protective measures at home during the same period, particu
larly during the summer of 1533, when following the king's
marriage to Anne Boleyn and the framing of the papal bull of
excommunication invasion appeared especially imminent.

Notes

were drafted "To remember the king for the reparation of his
navy;" "for granting money for the fortifying of the fron
tiers;" "for repairing the fortifications;" and "for the re
pair of ordnance and the provision of munitions for war;"
while from the Council commands were issued ordering a sur
vey of the works at Calais and the building of blockhouses
3
against the risk of an Imperialist descent.
Twelve months passed with little diminishment of tension,

2
Wernham,~ Before' the Armada, pp. 124, .129, Fisher, Hi s 
tory of England, pp. 358-62.
3L. & P., VI, Nos.

997, 1381, 1460, 1487.
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but in the following year there occured an event which tem
porarily relieved the pressure.

In October, 1535, the death

of Francesco Sforza, the childless Duke of Milan, led immedi
ately to a quarrel between France and the Empire over who
. 4
would succeed him.
By April, 1536/the French had overrun
Savoy and Piedmont, and the third war between Francis I and
Charles V had begun.

Well did Henry receive the news, for

by his own admission he feared no enemy "so long as there
was not perfect amity between the Emperor and the Christian
King."5

But his jubilation was short-lived:

Francis' mer

cenary Swiss failed to take Milan, and Charles' counter-in
vasion of Picardy and Provence ended in stalemate.

Tempo

rary armistices ended hostilities in all theaters by Novem
ber, 1537, while through the intercession of Pope Paul III
the truce was extended for ten years by the signing of an
agreement at Nice in June, 1538.

A month later the same in

termediary effected a formal reconciliation of the two monarchs at Aigues Mortes,^ the ancient port-city from which
had been launched the sixth and seventh Crusades.
For England it seemed an ominous portent confirmed by
word from Rome that the sentence of excommunication, held in

^Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, III, 263.
5L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 1197.
6Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, III, pp.
265-67.
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abeyance from 1533 in the hope that Henry would recant, had
at last been promulgated and that at Paris and Madrid, Paul's
agents were urging a n e w crusade for the extirpation of that
7
"most cruel and abominable tyrant," the king of England.
That the full weight of Catholic Europe would soon fall on
England appeared certain when on January 12, 1539, Charles
and Francis met in Toledo and set their names to a treaty
which bore all the earmarks of a preliminary declaration of
war.

By it the parties agreed to m a k e no compact with Henry

without the consent of the other, w h i l e in London speculation
was rife that the ambassadors from France and the emperor
g

would be recalled.
England assumed the aspect of an armed camp, as the ex
pectation of some sudden assault goaded the nation to extra
ordinary efforts of defense preparedness.

During the winter

of 1538-9 and in the ensuing spring, men, women, and even
children turned out in places with shovels to fashion bul
warks and trenches, and down the coast from Berwick to Lizard
Head the chain of seaboard forts begun in 1533 was extended
9
to discourage attack f r o m the most obvious quarter, the sea.
Elsewhere musters were taken; ships an d mariners were readied

^Spanish Calendar, VI, No. 33; L.

& P ., XIV, pt. 1, No. 36.

8L. & P., XIV, pt. 1, Nos. 62, 345, 365.

9Pollard, Henry V I I I , pp. 300-01.

for action; and coastal patrols constantly circled the king
dom “in order to explore and to correspond . . .
with those who watch by night . . .

by fires

so that no foreign vessel

could show itself without the country being warned."
the fires were never lit.

10

But

In spite of England's fears no at

tack was ever launched, as the secular rivalry of the Hapsburgs and the Valois proved more divisive than any unity that
might have sprung from their common Catholicism.
Though outwardly cordial, relations between Charles and
Francis were unlikely to produce lasting peace so long as the
latter was predisposed to have a share in the governance of
Italy.

Milan lay at the heart of their difficulties:

ruled

by Charles as an Imperial fief, it was claimed by Francis as
his rightful inheritance through his descent from Valentina,
heiress of the Visconti predecessors of the Sforzas and wife
of his illustrious ancestor, Louis, Duke of Orleans

{d. 1407).

The disposition of the duchy proved the main stumbling-block
to a genuine Franco-Imperialist detente, and after two years
of intense negotiations failed to effect the compromise that
the emperor hoped would assuage Valois pride,

12

Charles

10L. & P., XIV, pt., No. 770.

11

F r a n c i s 1 claim was hardly valid, as in the investiture
of the duchy females were excluded.

12

Among the solutions proposed by the Imperialists was
that Francis' youngest son, Charles, marry the emperor's .
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turned his back to Francis in October, 1540, by installing
his son, Philip, as duke.

Twenty months elapsed before the

renewal of war, but in the certain knowledge of its inevita
bility the two parties began at once their preparations which
meant, among other things, a scramble for allies, including
bidding for the support of the heretic king, Henry VIII, who
was only too willing to receive their offers and fashion
their dilemma to suit his own design.
What precisely Henry V I I ! 's design was in 1540 is not
entirely clear.

However, it is at least arguable that the

dissolution of his fourth marriage to the German princess,
Anne of Cleves, effected on July 7, ma y be taken as an indi
cation that after more than a decade of bad relations his
mind was beginning to turn back towards a realignment with
his Catholic Majesty, Charles V.

For Anne had been a bride

of convenience, a tangible symbol and the binding tie in what
had originally been intended as a grand anti-imperialist and
anti-papal alliance between England and the Lutheran states

eldest daughter, Mary, with Milan as her dower, on the under
standing that the duchy would remain in the gift of the E m 
pire.
Alternately it was proposed that if Francis would
withdraw his garrisons from Savoy and Piedmont, renounce his
claims in Italy, and relinquish control of the Duchy of Bur^*
gundy, Mary's dower would be the Netherlands.
Merriman,
The Rise of the Spanish E m p i r e , III, 268 and n, 1; Wernham,
Before the A r m a d a , p. 14V.
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of Germany

13

designed to discourage invasion from Europe and

no doubt to provide Henry with a full storehouse of Protes
tant auxiliary and mercenary support in the event the dread
popish offensive had become a reality.
The treaty of marriage had been hastily concluded in the
fall of 153 9 hard on the heels of the war scare of the pre
vious spring and amid reports that the emperor, preparing to
crush rebellious Ghent, would be allowed passage through
France and consultation with the French king in Paris.

14

But

if the union of Henry and Anne had been conceived as a defen
sive measure it proved unnecessary since, as Charles could
not be cajoled into yielding Milan and prepared to confer it
upon his son, the revival of the Hapsburg-Valois feud was as
certain as the abrogation of any Franco-Imperial plan for the
invasion of England.
Once the uselessness of the Cleves alliance was ascer
tained Henry felt no compunction in setting aside his German

13

Though neither Anne nor her brother, Duke William of
Cleves, were Lutherans they had strong ties with the Schmalkaldic League, their sister, Sibylla, being wife to John,
Elector of Saxony, who with the Landgrave Philip of Hesse
shared supreme command of the forces of this Lutheran asso
ciation.
14

The Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, pp. 512-15,
included in Bradford, ed., Correspondence of the Emperor
Charles V, contains some interesting details of Charles'
journey through France.
The emperor, who entered France on
November 27, 1539, did not arrive in Paris until New Year's
Day, 1540.
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consort.

Only expediency and self-preservation had held him

to the match; but with Anne pensioned off, as indeed she was
with a yearly income of £500 and the manors of Richmond and
Bletchingly,

15

the king was free to pursue what seems to have

been one of the overriding goals of his life, namely the per
formance of some "notable enterprise" in France.

But before

turning on the French Henry complicated matters, at least for
modern-day historians, by turning on their allies, the Scots,
wh o m he feared might violate the safety of England as they
had done in 1513 while the elite of his forces were committed
to the fighting on the Continent.
Unfortunately,because of this determination to settle
first with the Scots, it has become a commonplace of Tudor
history to assign as the major cause of Henry VIII's French
war of 1544-46 that monarch's resolution to complete his lord
ship of the British Isles by fastening his rule on Scotland,
that part of the islands which alone had preserved its inde
pendence of English control.

The northern kingdom, so runs

the theory, was seen by Henry in his last years as the chief
threat to his country's security, a figurative back-door
through which any partisan of the Stewart government might

1C

The details of the divorce are presented in Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 371-73.
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16
enter England unmolested*

To bolt that door he sought

first by fair words to lure the Scots into England's orbit;
but when fair words failed, as they did in 1541 when his nephew, James V, failed as promised to meet with him at York,

17

he resorted to the more forceful approach of war which un
luckily drove James back upon the "auld alliance" with
France and compelled Henry, whose desire to control north
Britain remained fixed, to mount a secondary attack upon
France to prevent the latter1s support of the Scots.
It is an attractive thesis and not without merit.

Ruled

in the French and Catholic interest by James, whose own
father had been done to death by the English at Flodden in
1513, Scotland was hardly friend to the schismatical south
ern king,

who had ever shown himself the enemy of her people

and more recently the betrayer of her religion.

Scotland

then did pose a threat to England, but at this juncture,
with Francis I, the sheet anchor of her defence, willing to
offer Henry "carte blanche for an alliance" against the

16

The idea that Scotland and not the war in France was
the main object of Henry's desire was popularized in Tudor
historical circles through the medium of Pollard's classic
biography of the great king.
See his Henry V I I I , Chap. XIV,
passim,
17

Henry's attempts to win over James are highlighted in
A. J. Slavin, Politics and' Profit:
A Study of Sir Ralph
Sadler, 1507-1547 (Cambridge:
University Press, 1966),
C h a p . V and passTm.
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emperor,

18

it is safe to say that the threat was more poten-

tial than real and would have remained so but for the Tudor
k i n g 1s decision to abandon his neutrality apropos the strug^
gle that was shaping up on the Continent.
tice,

In actual prac19
as Henry's earlier campaigns bear witness,
Scotland

posed a genuine danger only at such times as Henry had made
war in France, and it was probably his resolution to do so
again rather than any farsighted policy to unite the British
Isles which led h i m in August,

1542, to show his preference

for the Imperialists by openly breaking w i t h James by s e n d 
ing a raiding party led by the warden of the Middle March,

20
Sir Robert B o w e s , into T e v i o t d a l e .
The timing of the raid, w h i c h led to undisguised war^fare,

is significant in that it followed by a month Francis

I's July declaration of hostilities against the emperor.

1 8 L.

91

& P ., XVII, No. 124.

19

There are no adequate studies of Henry's Scottish
wars.
The best accounts are to be found in the following:
P. Hume Brown, History of Scotland (3 v o l s .; Cambridge:
University Press, 1908-09); Fisher, History of En g l a n d ; and
Mackie, The Earlier T u d o r s .
20

L. &_ P ., XVII, Nos. 650-51, 661.
The raid actually
resulted in the de f e a t and capture of Bowes at Haddon Rig,
but prompted the m o r e savage incursion of the Duke of N o r 
folk, w h o invaded Scotland w i t h an army of several thousand
in the last week of October.
Ibid., Nos. 994, 996.
2 -^Francis declared formal war on July 10, six weeks and
three days prior to Bowes* capture on A u g u s t 24.
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Adherents of the Pollardian view see in this sequence of
events proof of Henry’s broad vision and confirmation of
their contention that Scotland, not France, was foremost in
his mind:

with the two titans of Europe again at loggerheads,

the time was ripe for weaning the Scots from their French
dependency and for permanently closing the back-door into
England; otherwise the Franco-Scottish combination would have
ended any possibility of a British Empire.

That Henry even

tually failed in his objective and managed solely to stiffen
Scottish resistance to the idea of union with England is attributed to bad luck and the poor management of his political
and military overtures.

His aim, however, is represented as a

noble one since he sought "not mere military glory" but the
creation of a United Kingdom which "was the real objective
99

of his last war with France."
Again the argument has much to recommend it, not the
least of which is the fact that it is upheld by virtually
every major historian of the Tudor period.

23

Nevertheless

as Elton pointed out a decade ago, the evidence rests on lit
tle more than "a story so slanted as to support the interpre
tation,"

Pollard "never argued his case," but like those

2 2 Pollard,

23

Henry V I I I , p. 328.

One of the more resourceful and ingenious restatements
of Pollard’s view is to be found in Wernham, Before the A r 
mada, Chap. 12.
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who have since clung to it "he assumed it"

24

in part perhaps

because there is a certain irresistible logic in the idea
that a great king like Henry would have been able to per
ceive the mutual benefits to be gained from a merger of the
two crowns.

But precisely how obsessed with obtaining Scot

land was Henry?

Hardly at all, according to J. J. Scaris-

brick, the only scholar in better than seventy years to seri
ously challenge the Pollardian position:
we may be . . . skeptical about the farsighted
ness of royal dealings with E n g l a n d 's northern
neighbor.
It is very arguable that concern for
Scotland during the last years of his reign was
secondary to his preoccupation with France and
that, as in 1513, he looked to the North only
because he was about to plunge into the Conti
nent . . . .
The assault on Scotland, far from
springing from any long-term design for the
British Isles, was a concomitant of a new up
surge of ancient belligerence and ancient d y 
nastic ambition against the king of France,^5
Scarisbrick spends little time in substantiating his
view, though the weight of the documentary evidence is cer
tainly in his favor.

As early as April 2, 1542, four months

in advance of the eruption of the Scottish war and nearly a
year before the formal resumption of friendly relations with
Charles, Henry revealed his true mind by confiding in Chapuys,
the Imperial ambassador, his plans for an attack upon France,

24

G. R. Elton, "Henry VIII:
An Essay in Revision,"
The
Historical Association General Series No. 51 (1962), p. 6 .

^Scarisbrick, Henry V I I I , pp. 425-26.

the invasion of w h ich he promised to lead in. person if Char?^
les w o uld do the same and assist him in the procurement of
foreign cavalry.

26

That Henry was serious at this juncture cannot be doubted
since before the end of June his commissioners with the emr
peror in Spain had agreed in principle to a league offensive
and defensive that when concluded in February,

1543, would

bind the two sovereigns to attempt a joint conquest of
F r a n c e .2 7

Meanwhile, before the rupture of the Hapsburg-

Valois peace by Francis on July 10, to increase his credit
with Charles, Henry dallied w i t h the notion supplied hi m by
Chapuys of sending an English array to cooperate with Adrien
de Croy, Grand Master of Flanders, in a surprise assault
up o n the town of Montreuil.

Located deep in the Boulannais

on the banks of the River Canche it was a chief supplier of
victuals and war material to the French strongholds in w e s t 
ern Picardy and a potential threat therefore to the success
of any future Anglo-Imperial operations in that sector.
From June through August, in anticipation of this feat
the already substantial detachments within the English Pale
at Calais, Hammes, and Guisnes were increased by several
thousand, Guisnes, the foremost outpost against the French

2 6 Spanish' C a l e n d a r , VI,
2 7 E,

& P., XVII, NOS.

pt.

2, No. 124.

446-47.
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f rontier, receiving the largest contingents, including the-promise of three hundred arquebusiers for the training of
the garrison troops in firearms.

28

Eighty pieces of artil

lery and an undetermined number of gunners were despatched
to Calais; offers from certain mercenary captains of the
Netherlands were considered in London; while in the Thames
ten great ships of war laden with campaign necessaries rode
29
anchor at the ready.
Nothing, however, came of the Montreuil enterprise due
mainly to the hesitation of the imperialists who balked at
the aid demanded of them for the undertaking.

Ten thousand

auxiliaries was Henry's price for the capture of the town
which was to remain in English hands after it had been won,
and three thousand horsemen of the Low Countries were to be
made available to him as often as necessary for the victual-

i•
j:
- 4. 30
ling
of
it.
In the interim, as English and Imperial functionaries
haggled over these terms in Spain, Flanders, and London,
Henry's enthusiasm for the project waned when in mid-July
the French, siezing the initiative, robbed him of the

2 8 I b i d ., Nos.

559, 740.

2 9 Ib i d ., Nos.

405, 415, 532

(p. 307), 559.

^ 8 Ib i d ., No. 447.
In addition to the three armies sent
against 1 the Low Countries the Dauphin, Henry, led a fourth
which on August 25 initiated an attack on Rousillon.
The
Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, p. 533; State Papers, IX,
101 .
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el e ment of surprise by striking with unexpected fury at the
ill-prepared Netherlands defences of his prospective ally.
Luxemburg, Brabant,

and Artois were invaded in short order,

31

and o n August 1, as an added deterrent to any attempt on Montreuil,

the suspicion was raised by Sir John Wallop, captain

of the castle at Guisnes, that the French troops mustering
for the war in A r t o i s were in reality intended for an incursion into the Pale.

32

Clearly, as H e n r y perceived, with so much of France in
arms it was not an auspicious summer for continental cam
paigning.

The idea of taking Montreuil was immediately

shelved, for even though the Imperialists mounted a success
ful counter-offensive and in September drove the French from
the L o w Countries,
cis,

the season wa s too far advanced, and F r a n 

forewarned t h a t Henry essayed some spectacular feat b e 

yond the Channel, w a s on his guard.
lish king's mind w a s set:

Nevertheless,

the E n g 

the build-up of arms around Calais

continued, and though Henry u tterly refused Charles'

every

request for mil i t a r y cooperation, he steadfastly pursued the
satisfactory consumation of that alliance that would commit
them b o t h to the invasion of France.
war w i t h the Valois,

3 1 L*

if not this year then at some later date

XVII, Nos, 503,

3 2 I b i d . , No.

561.

Henry would have his

533

(2), 534.
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of his own choosing; but for the moment it was best that he
pretend neutrality.
Accordingly, on August 8 , Chapuys and Marillac, the
French ambassador, were summoned to Windsor where the Duke
of Norfolk, speaking for the king, begged them to excuse to
their masters any alarms which Henry's warlike preparations
might have caused.

It was, said Norfolk, his sovereign's

wish to live in peace; but as Henry "was resolved to endure
no wrong," and since Francis and the emperor had assembled
great armies to the prejudice of

his subjects both on and

beyond the Narrow Sea, he "had decided to make such prepa33
ration that he could prevent and [resist] any attack."
Chapuys who had been briefed in advance of this attempt to
propitiate the French made suitable reply:

he had already

forwarded an account of Henry's doings to Charles and was
certain that neither the emperor nor the Netherlands author
ities would misconstrue the king's intentions.

Marillac

tendered a similar rejoinder, though the transparency of
Henry's dissemblings did not escape him.

In his report of

the Windsor interview to Francis he indicated his conviction
that beneath the sweetness of No r f o l k ’s words there was
"much poison hidden," noting ominously that in revealing
their preparedness by land and sea to preserve their

33Ibid., No. 601,
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neutrality the English were in fact announcing their resolu
tion to make war, if not immediately against Francis then
against his ally, Scotland, warning that to hurt France "in
the future they must either overthrow or greatly enfeeble
the Scots in order that, while occupied elsewhere, the Scots
should not be able to harass them."

34

No more succinct anal

ysis of what in fact Henry now proposed could have been made.
With Francis and Charles locked in struggle and the easy cap
ture of Montreuil beyond his grasp, he would turn to smite
the Scots to secure their quiescence before confronting the
French.
From its beginnings, therefore, the Scottish war was en
visioned as preventative rather than punitive with no thought
of conquest in mind, a fact which Pollard himself seems to
have come to accept some eight years after the appearance of
his monumental biography:
Such conquests were beyond the military capacity
of the sixteenth century; popular indifference
to foreign masters which had facilitated the con
tinental exploits of Edward III and Henry V had
passed away; and the growth of national feeling
imposed upon invaders tasks with which they were
as yet ill-equipped to deal.
Wars were border
affairs and were never fought to the finish . .
. . All that Henry VIII sought to do in Scot
land was to make himself so unpleasant that the

34Ibid., No. 770.
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Scots must needs prefer his friendship to that
of the French,
But in that hope he never succeeded, if only because Celtic
pride proved mightier than Sassenach coercion.
As in most Anglo-Scottish clashes, the bulk of the honors
were won by the English, though considering the strategic resuits they were hardly worth the exertion.

After the initial

mauling of Sir Robert Bowes* party by the Gordon Earl of
Huntly at Haddon Rigg on August 24, the Duke of Norfolk with
perhaps ten thousand militiamen crossed from Berwick into
Scotland on October 22 and for six days spoiled the country
as far north and west as Kelso, burning that town and a
36
score of lesser places in the east and middle marches.
Ex
cepting a few Scots "pensioners," thieves and other desper
ate sorts recruited from within the "Debatable Ground" which
formed the border between the two nations, no foreigners
served on the English side.

Requests for Germans sent

through Mary of Hungary, sister of the emperor and Governess
37
of the Netherlands, were apparently spurned,
while the
offer of the Parmesan count, Ludovico Rangone, to lead a

35 A. F. Pollard, The History of England from the' Acces
sion of Edward VI to the Death of Elizabeth- (London: Longmans,
Green, and Co., 1911), p. 10.
3 ®(B. M . ) Add. MS. 10,110, f. 237 consists of a brief
account of the Norfolk campaign.

37

Scarisbrick, Henry V I I I , p. 434, states that Norfolk
was accompanied by a few mercenaries recruited in the Low
Countries, but I have been unable to verify this.

company out of Italy arrived too late to be acted upon.
Considering the horrendous capital outlay which for this
expedition amounted to something in excess of £60,000,

39

Henry was lucky to escape the added expense of providing for
mercenaries.

At 8 d. the day, the going rate for German and

Italian infantrymen, the cost could have been substantial,
the more so as half the army was retained in winter quarters
on the frontier.

However, as the sequel to Norfolk's raid

proved, Henry needed no foreigners to contain the Scots:

his

objective which might normally have been expected to take
months to achieve was attained in a single day when on Novem
ber 24 in Cumberland, between the Rivers Esk and Sark at Sol
way Moss, three thousand Englishmen destroyed a Scottish army
six times their number and accomplished at a stroke the neu
tralization of Scotland as a military power.
The battle, if it could be called such, was a Scottish
disaster of major proportion.

Hardly of the same magnitude

as Flodden Field, the humiliation of the defeat was neverthe
less greater in that the invaders refused to fight.

Panicked

by the sight of the northern "prickers" they broke ranks be
fore first contact and fled back towards the border only to

38

Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 6 6 ; L. & P., XVII,
No. 978.
~ “

& P., XVII, NO. 718.
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be caught by the inrushing. tide flowing up the Solway.

Many

drowned in the sea or in the swollen torrent of the Esk;
twelve hundred,

including two earls, five barons, and five

hundred gentlemen, were made prisoners; and among the other
trophies counted by the English were three thousand horses,
twenty-four cannon, four cartloads of spears, ten pavilions,
40
thirty standards, "and all flags among the footmen."
The enormity of Solway Moss was not wholly realized until
some three weeks later when James, the Scottish king, died,
as it was said, of the shame of it.

He had not actually

been present at the rout itself, but lurking six miles away
on Burnswark Hill in Dumfriesshire he had witnessed the van
of his broken army straggle back across the border.

Heavy

in spirit and with many evil words he had ridden off by way
of Tantallon Castle and Edinburgh to Falkland beyond the
Forth where on December 6 he took to his bed.

On the eighth

his French consort, Mary of Guise, gave birth to his heir,
and a week later he died, vacating his throne to the infant
Mary, Queen of Scots . 41
If ever it had been Henry VIII's aim to m a k e himself
ruler of the northern kingdom, the moment of truth was

40
■ Ibid., No. 1142
Add. MS, 289, f. 17.

(2);

(B. M . ) Add. MS, 32,648, f. 156;

£ P . , XVII, Nos. 1142, 1193, 1214; XVIII, pt. 1,
No. 44 Tp. 29); (B. M . ) Add. MS. 32,648, ff. 207, 218.
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surely at hand.

The bitter combination of Solway Moss and

James' death had rendered Scotland as vulnerable as at any
time in her tragic history; yet because he had only aspired
to bar his back door before striking at France the golden
opportunity was allowed to pass without so much as a minor
demonstration.

In fact, as it did not seem to Henry's honor

"to make war upon a dead body or a widow or a suckling, her
daughter," all raiding across the "Debatable Ground" was im
mediately suspended, and the Duke of Suffolk in his capacity
as lieutenant-general in the north was sent to the frontier
to treat of p e a c e . ^
Only now, with his reputed chief adversary prostrate be
fore him, did Henry think to take Scotland, but not by con
straint.

In his instructions to Suffolk the king commanded

the duke to seek a lasting concord with orders to propose
terms for the marriage of the queen of Scots and her cousin,
the English heir apparent, Edward, Prince of Wales.

If,there

fore, Henry were to have Scotland it would not be directly;
and the establishment of any Tudor sovereignty of the British
Isles would have to await his passing since the union of the
two kingdoms could hardly take effect until Edward’s acces
sion.
Nevertheless,-the marriage in itself was a worthy goal

42

(B. M.) Add. MS. 32,648, f. 224; L. & P . , XVIII, pt. 1,
Nos. 7, 96.
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towards the fulfillment of which a formal abstinence from war
43
was declared on Henry's part in February, 1543.
English
garrisons along the border were reduced as a gesture of good
will, and on March 3 word came out of Scotland that ambassa
dors would soon be sent to initiate the nuptials and conclude
44
a peace perpetual.
The Scottish commissioners arrived in
London in May, signed the necessary documents at Greenwich
on July 1, and were sent back to Edinburgh with many thanks
before the end of the month.
made submissive:

45

Scotland it seemed had been

the back door into England appeared to be

tightly shut, which meant that the side-door through Calais
into France could n o w be forced.
Though the affaire d'Ecosse had seemed at times to engulf
everything,the romantic obsession of personally leading an
English army into France had never left Henry's mind.

The

date in fact had been tentatively fixed even before the c o m 
mencement of the interim truce with the Scots when on F ebru
ary 11, 1543, the

long considered closer

amity w i t h the

em

peror became

a reality on the signing at Westminster of an
46
Anglo-Imperial alliance.
The chief clauses of the agreement

4 3 L.

& P ., XVIII, pt. 1, Nos. 139, 173.

4 4 I b i d .,

Nos.

198, 237, 239.

4 5 I b i d .,

Nos.

570, 804, 908.
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A transcript of the treaty as it appears in Rymer,
F o e d e r a , appears in Ibid., N o . 144.
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established peace and free intercourse between the subjects
of the two princes; provided for the joint defence of the
other's territories should either be invaded, the invader to
be proclaimed the common enemy of both; and committed Henry
"within two years" to the prosecution of war against Prance
with an army of twenty-nine thousand, including two thousand
landsknechts and two thousand Burgundian horse provided at
the emperor's expense.

Lest such auxiliary support be con

sidered insufficient, free rein was given the English to re
cruit mercenaries within the emperor's dominions, but for
this their king scarcely needed encouragement.
Henry had been seeking to cultivate friends among mercen
ary leaders for some time.

Word to this effect had come

from France in June, 1542.

In August of that same year Sir

Thomas Seymour, Henry's operative in Vienna, was instructed
to keep an eye out for likely captains who might be able to
get troops through to Calais, while in December "wishing to
be prepared for war" the English king, acting through Seymour,
tried unsuccessfully to procure two thousand horsemen and
three thousand foot under the Brandenburg baron, George von
Heideck.

The sticking point was costs:

for five months pay

and pensions for his officers Heideck's estimate was nearly
642,000, a sum considered excessive by Henry.

It was perhaps

a wise decision if the baron was in any way like his brother,
who was dismissed from French service for drawing wages for
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almost double the landsknechts he had under contract .47

Be

sides, there was no lack of soldiers of fortune, and further
to his chagrin the "notable enterprise" in France which Henry
had intended for the summer of 1543 had to be postponed for a
year by the revival of troubles in Scotland.

Mercenaries

were therefore considered at this juncture an expensive and
unnecessary luxury.

H e had chastened the Scots in the past

without foreign assistance:

he would husband his finances by

doing so again; or so at least he hoped.
A t the heart of the new imbroglio in the north lay the
marriage treaty between Mary Stuart and Prince Edward.

Though

Henry h a d yielded on the main points, that the queen was to
remain in Scotland until her tenth birthday and that in the
event of the union of the two crowns the ancient liberties
of her nation were to be preserved,
picious and hostile,

the Scots remained sus

remembering his initial stance in the

weeks following their discomfiture on Solway.

Claiming the

right as suzerain of Scotland he had demanded immediate p o s 
session of Mary's person and an end to the "auld alliance."
Tho u g h in consequence of the Scots willingness to negoti
ate H e n r y ’s position had softened, his original terms still
rankled thereby strengthening the hands of the pro-French
party in the north championed by the dowager queen, Mary of

47L.
42.

&.P., XVII, Nos. 701, 1246; XVIII, pt. 1, Nos. 29,
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Guise, and her chief supporter, David Beaton, Cardinal-Archbishop of St. Andrews, who soon after the Greenwich treaties
were ratified at Holyrood was freed from the close confine
ment he had been subjected to at Henry's connivance, rein
stated as Chancellor, and with the queen mother admitted to
the council of regency which governed the realm.

The rever

sal of policy was almost immediately felt when on December 11
the Scottish Parliament annulled the peace and the contract
of marriage with England and renewed the old alliance with
France with whom Henry was now officially at war.

48

Thus, as

regards Scotland, did the year end, everything in smoke and
confusion, the high hopes of the previous summer dashed be
yond repair with the nation thought so secure in Henry1s
thrall more defiant and hostile than ever.
The diplomacy of conciliation might yet have worked had
the king been willing to forego the quest for glory abroad,
but the Tudor's pride would not admit that possibility.
Hence in the winter of 1543-44, while ships, guns, and men
were gathered for the satisfaction of his obligation to
Charles, the Duke of Suffolk, Henry's commander in the
marches, was employed in devising a plan for a spring inva
sion of the Scottish lowlands.

As with Norfolk's incursion

^sDickinson, Scotland From Earliest Times to 1603,
316-17.
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in 1542, what was intended was a raid
quest.

49

rather than a con^

Having suffered a loss of face liy the repudiation of

the treaties of Greenwich, Henry by thrashing the Scots again
would accomplish the double purpose of restoring his honor
and insuring their quiescence during his absence, in France
The foray, as finally approved by the king, was, like all
previous Tudor set-tos with the Scots, a wholly English af-?'
fair.

Henry, fearful that Francis might interpose with pror-

fessional mercenary and auxiliary support, did try with an
offer of 2 0 , 0 0 0 ducats for the emperor's war in Italy to in^
duce Charles to lend him a thousand Spanish arquebusiers for
the venture, but the request was denied on grounds that the
Spaniards were needed for the defence of Luxemburg and the
Low Countries.

50

More to the point, as is clear from the

secret instructions drawn up for Don Ferrante de Gonzaga,
Viceroy of Sicily and special emissary to London, Charles was
anxious lest Henry become so carried away with Scotland that
the Imperialists would be left to fight the French single-

^ See Suffolk's letter to Henry, L, s P,, XIX, pt., 1, No.
136, in which the duke, indicating his preference for an ex
pedition by land, estimates that the English army "might be
in Scotland by April 14 and back by May 15." For details of
the various proposals submitted by Suffolk to Henry see also,
ibid. , Preface, xi-ii; Nos. 71, 83, 95.
Kfl

Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 272; VII, Nos, 17, 22.

236
handed.

51

He need not have trouhled himself:

the Earl of

Hertfordr whom Henry appointed to smite the Scots , accom
plished his task within two weeks.

Sailing into the Firth

of Forth on May 3 with an army of ten thousand reinforced by
four thousand more from the east and middle marches, Hert
ford by his own account cut such a swath of destruction that
"the like devastation hath not been made in Scotland these
many years."

Faithful to Henry's command, that the upper

stone should be the nether and not one stick left standing
by another,

52

the earl systematically burned Leith, Edinburgh,

Holyrood House, and the entire country as far south as the
border across which he passed into Berwick on May 18.

Having

read this grim lesson to the Scots the earl returned to Lon
don to aid the king in the invasion of France, the largest
military undertaking any English sovereign had contemplated
on the Continent, and one which involved the greatest numbers
of mercenaries and auxiliaries ever to serve a Tudor.

5 1 Ibid. , VI,

52

pt. 2, No. 269.

M. St. Clare Byrne, e d . , The Letters of King Henry VIII
(London: Cassell and Company L t . , 1936), p. 346.
A rather
full contemporary account by an anonymous participant in the
expedition is provided in The late expedition in Scotland,
made by the K i n g 1s H i g h n e s s 1 army, under the conduct of the
. . . Earl o f Hertford contained in Pollard, ed., Tudor Tracts,
1532-1588, pp. 38-47.

CHAPTER VIXI
THE INITIATION OF THE FRENCH WAR OF 1544^6
It followeth of strangers, who are rather brought in by
custom than reason, yet tolerable necessity urging it:
So that the Countrymen be the body and Strength of the
Army and Strangers but a part and member thereof.
For
they are unfaithful and shake off both right and law
for greater pay.
They are stubborn and love to do
what them liketh.
They are Runaways in the very Con
flicts, And Spoilers of the Country & people . . . .
Anonymous, "Brief Collection of Excellent Instruc
tions to be Observed in the Excercise of Military
discipline."
(B. M.) Harl. MS. 444, f. 121.
By modern standards it is sometimes impossible to un
cover the true reasons for war in the early sixteenth century,
the problem being, as Elton phrased it, that "the most obvi
ous feature of the age was the near-absence of any coherent
set of principles against which policy could be measured,"
that "the era of Charles V," to whose name might be added
that of Henry VIII, "had difficulty even in finding words
for its hypocrisies."

1

No war was ever initiated, at least by the early Tudors,
without "defiance," that is to say without an ultimatum or
ritualistic preferring of charges by the aggressor.

The Eng

lish, wrote Chapuys, were so grounded in this procedure that
they held it a point of honor not to begin hostilities

■*"G. R. Elton, Reformation Europe, 1517-1559
Collins, 1963), p. 79.
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(London:
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without defiance.

2

The intended victim was allowed a fixed

period of time in w hich to consider the charges and make
amends.

If satisfaction was not forthcoming on the expira

tion of the deadline a state of belligerency was held to
exist between the two states.
The origin on this gentlemanly convention is perhaps as
old as war itself, but in its sixteenth-century style it was
medieval, the rules and regulations governing its use having
been set during the high age of chivalry whose legalists in
the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries had
evolved the theory of the "just war," the sole form of legit
imate warfare countenanced by them.

Lawfully, by the six

teenth century such wars "could only be waged by sovereigns,"
that is by heads of state who in their own right and within
their own dominions were supreme:

"only he who has no supe

rior can declare a just war," wrote the lawyer Bartolus of
Sassoferrato; or again according to Nicholas of Tudeschi,
"wars which are not declared by a prince are not properly
w a r s ."..4
The just war of course required just causes, and these
too had been fairly well delimited by the end of the Middle

2 L. £ P., XVIII,

pt. 1, No. 288.

M. H. Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages
(London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 246.
4 I b i d . , p.

69.
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Ages.

"Wars are defined as just when their aim is to avenge

injury, that is when that people or city against whom war is
to be declared has neglected either to redress injuries done
by its subjects or to restore what they have wrongfully seized:"
so ruled St. Augustine in his City of G o d .
more precise,

Later jurists were

so that in general by the Renaissance the grounds

on which wars could be justifiably fought were universally re
cognized as in support of the Christian religion, to avenge
the dishonoring of a prince or his state, self-defence, and as
a last resort to obtain rightful possession of some desired
object wrongfully withheld.

5

It is patently obvious, however, that just causes were not
necessarily the actual reasons why in the sixteenth century
princes went to war.

Just causes more often as not were mere

pretexts utilized to clothe aggression and ambition in legal
garb.

The murderous raids of Norfolk and Hertford into Scot

land in 1542 and 1544, though made in the name of honor to
avenge respectively the disgrace of Sir Robert Bowes * defeat
and the breach of the Greenwich marriage contract, were both
intended to enfeeble the Scots and render them harmless.

The

Most Christian King claimed honor as his justification for
g

his resort to arms in July, 1542.

The previous summer his

^Ib i d . , pp. 66-67.
g
Byrne, ed., The Letters of King Henry VIII, pp. 355-56.
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ambassadors, Antonio Rincon and Cesare Fregoso, had been murdered by Imperialist agents in the Milanese.

It made no dif

ference that they had been on a secret mission to further an
alliance with the infidel Turks against a fellow Christian,
the Catholic emperor, or that Rincon was a Spaniard born and
therefore a traitor to his king:
was a sacred duty.

the satisfaction of honor

It was also a convenient guise under which

to wage legitimate war for the recovery of Milan, war which
by juristic definition was the exclusive right of princes.
The just causes and the just wars which they provoked
were in a sense so much play acting.

When on May 28, 1543,

Christopher Barker, Garter King of Arms, was despatched to
Francis I to offer Henry VIII*s defiance, the list of griev
ances it contained reeked of righteous indignation but "had
g
little to do with the actual fighting."
Francis was charged
to end his unholy alliance with the Turks; cease his depreda
tions against the emperor; pay the arrears of Henry's annual
pension promised by the treaty of 1532 of which for nine years
past he had not been paid a penny;

"and deliver in security

for the pension in the future the towns of Boulogne, Ardres,

^Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Empire, III, 269.
Q

Lucey Baldwin Smith, Henry V I I I , the Mask of Royalty
(Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971), p. 154. As safeconduct was denied Barker by the French, Henry's ultimatum
was actually delivered to Francis through his ambassador in
London.
See L.
P ., pt. 1, No. 754 (1).
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Montreuil, Therouanne, and the county of Ponthieu."

The

French king was further instructed to abstain from practicing
with the Scots; liberate all English subjects wrongfully im
prisoned; and deliver into Henry's hands all rebels to his
government, including a demented Yorkist, a cobbler's son,
who called himself "la Blanche R o s e ."

Finally, "for the quiet

of Christendom," Francis was to unite with Henry and Charles
in driving the Turks from Europe.

His tres chr^tien Majeste

was apportioned twenty days in which to perform these feats,
at the end of which if he had failed to act Henry would de
nounce war against him, adding for good measure his demands
for "the realm of France, the duchies of Normandy, Gascony,
the Guienne," plus all the lands which Francis and his ances
tors were held to have usurped from him on the Continent.^
It would be easy, as most Tudor historians have found,
from "such an imaginative array of international grievances"
to isolate the Scottish question as the "true" cause of
H e n r y ’s ire; but the fact of the matter is that in his de
fiance there is no "true" cause at all:

"the entire chal

lenge was window-dressing, merely a formal recognition that
a 'just 1 war could only be waged between sovereign princes.
The true cause of the French war of 1543, as in H e nry’s case

^State Papers, IX, 388; Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2,
Nos. 163-64.
^ S m i t h , Henry VIII, the Mask of Royalty, p. 155.
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it always had been, was glory.

He would fight in France

again, not for political gain or economic aggrandizement
but, as Vergil had perceived at the beginning of his reign,
to "create such a fine opinion about his valor among all men
that they could clearly understand that his ambition was not
merely to equal but indeed to excel the glorious deeds of
his ancestors."

11

Through him the halcyon days of English

chivalry would live again.

With Edward III and Henry V he

would tread the sacred battle-ground of Picardy:

"A single

town added to the Calais foothold, a hundred acres of terri
tory trod by the heroes of Agincourt and restored to England, was worth all the lochs and moors of Scotland."

12

At its roots the romantic justification for Henry's
last reentry into the continental lists might have been medi'
eval, but it was an incontrovertible verity that in Europe
the fight into which he proposed to plunge himself was mod
ern and that the troops employed there were professionals..
According to a Spanish informant whose information is said
to have come from Francis I's own secretary, the French in
1542, excluding garrison troops, had some seventy thousand
men in arms against the Imperialists in Italy, the Low Coun
tries,

and Rousillon.

Among these the preponderant number

-^Vergil, Historia Anglica, p. 161.
1 2 Smith,

Henry V I I I , the Mask of Royalty, p. 199.
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came from the most advanced military races of Europe;

forty-

three thousand Swiss and German pikemen; four or five thou
sand Italians, arquebusiers and heavy cavalrymen,- two thou
sand Clevelander horse; an assortment of Basque jinetes and
Albanian stradiots; not to mention the native French forces,
including "four thousand old soldiers formerly in Piedmont,
the best troops in the world;" and a vast collection of upto-date artillery of varied c a l i b e r . ^

A year later, in Oc

tober, 1543, for the relief of Landrecies in Hainault, Fran
cis is said to have raised almost as large an army:

fifty

thousand foot and fifteen thousand horse, the majority again
mercenaries from Switzerland, Italy and the German states.

14

The military strength of the emperor was if anything
greater.

The mind boggles at the thought of the potential

forces available to him:

the soldiery of Spain, Naples,.the

Milanese, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and when it was
not engaged against the Turks that of his brother, Ferdinand
I, king of Hungary and Bohemia, heir-designate of the Holy
Roman Empire.

In Italy alone at the opening of his third

war with Francis I in 1536 he had in excess of sixty-five
thousand men of all arms, the bulk of them being mercenaries

13Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No. 23; L.
Nos. 517 (3), (4), (5) f 528, 554.
14 L.

& P., XVIII, pt. 2, No. 321 (2).

P ., XVII,
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and auxiliaries recruited to supplement his permanent Span15
ish tercios in Lombardy, N a p l e s , and Sicily,
Conserva
tively speaking, considering the many fronts on which the em
peror might at any time be engaged, Charles probably had at
his command and in his pay in excess of one hundred thousand
16
men,
nearly all of them professionals, either mercenaries,
as were the majority of his Italians, or veterans of standing
units like his Spanish tercios,

the Netherlands bandes

d 'ordonnance, or the various military orders like the Teu
tonic Knights, whose Grand Master, Wolfgang Schuzbar,

led a

contingent of "cavaliers" for the emperor during the Anglo17
Imperial invasion of France m 1544.

1 5 0man,

The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 59,

61.
"^Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish
Road, 1567-1659 (Cambridge:
University Press, 1972), p. 6 ,
places the number of Charles' effectives in 1552 at one hun
dred-fifty thousand.
l^Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Francaises, pp. 87, 98.
The Grand ^Masterships of the three great
crusading orders of Spain— Alcantara, Calatrava, and Santiago-were conferred upon Charles by Pope Adrian IV in 1523.
Merriman, The Rise of the Spanish Emp i r e , III, 192.
Don Sancho
Bravo de Mardones (or Lagunas), commander of the Order of
Alcantara, served on Charles' general staff during the French
war of 1544.
Founded in the twelfth century during the Span
ish reconquest of Castile, these military-religious societies
acquired great wealth and property in the years of fighting
against the Moors.
By Adrian's bull their assets were united
with the crown, but to satisfy his creditors Charles was
obliged to relinquish control of the administration of those
assets to the Augsburg banking house of Fugger.
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The m i l i t a r y establishment of the early Tudors is so
weak by comparison that one must consider them audacious in
deed for ever having so m u c h as contemplated w a r outside of
their own bailiwick, the British Isles, except that it is to
be remembered that no large-scale operation was ever consid
ered on the m a inland w i t h o u t at least the promise of support
from either Spain, the Empire, or both.

Henry VII, though

in the end he had to go it alone, had invaded F r a n c e 1 in 1492
on earlier assurances of cooperation from Ferdinand of Aragon,
and so likewise had it b e e n arranged b y the treaty signed
between H e n r y VIII and the emperor in February,

1543:

18

in

conjunction w i t h Charles V the second Tudor, u s i n g the spe
cious and time-worn c l aim of his ancestors to the French
throne, w o uld hazard the possible humiliation of defeat, the
security of his realm, and the bankruptcy of his government
for the satisfaction of a bellicose urge.
was "a prince of royal c o u r a g e ; 1' therefore,

The eighth Henry
in the words of

the late Chancellor, Cardinal Wolsey,

everything and any

thing would be risked "rather than he

[would] miss or want

part of his appetite."1 ^

^ See above, pp. 231-32.
19

George Cavendish, The Life and Death of Cardinal W o l 
sey in Two Tudor L i v e s , ed. Richard S. Sylvester and Davis
P. Harding (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press,
1962), p. 183.

The risk to England probably appeared slight at the be"
ginning of 1543.

Scotland,

recovering from the debacle of

Solway Moss, w a s properly submissive;

the French offensives

of the previous year had b e e n beaten back by the Imperial
ists;

and by the end of the summer, after the deliverance of

Henry's defiance to Francis and the signing of the Greenwich
treaties in July,

things augured well for Charles'

success.

Another attack on the Netherlands by the French and their
confederate, Duke William of Cleves, after some anxious m o 
ments had been repulsed.

In March the duke, who disputed

the c laim of the emperor to the reversion of the duchy of
Gelders,
berg,

20

had invaded the county of Juliers, invested Heins-

and defeated the forces of the Imperialist Duke of

A r s c h o t at Sittard in neighboring Westphalia; while in June
with the Netherlands government thus distracted Francis h i m 
self had forced entry into Hainault, occupied Landrecies,
and for a time ravaged defenceless Luxemburg.

21

By now, however, the Imperialists had rallied under the
energetic leadership of the emperor, wh o in July m arched out
of Italy to Bonn where he mustered a polyglot army of

20
William, brother to A n n of Cleves and therefore former
brother-in-law to Henry VIII, had actually occupied Gelders
on the death of its last duke, Charles of Egmont, in 1538.

21Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, Nos. 117, 121, 125, 159,
181; State Papers, IX, 512.
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Dutchmen, Germans, Burgundians, Italians, and Spaniards with
which towards the end of August he struck into the territories
of the Duke of Cleves.

22

Duren in Juliers was taken by storm

on August 24, and in a terrifying display of summary justice
the male defenders were put to the sword, the town itself be
ing given over in plunder to the Spaniards and Italians who
had distinguished themselves in the assault.

This bloody ex

ample brought the rebellious vassal to heel.

Juliers was

surrendered, and on September 7 the duke himself tendered his
humble submission to the emperor, renouncing all claim to Gelders as the primary condition of his pardon.

23

In the meantime Charles' English alliance had borne its
first fruit, as in June, in the weeks immediately following
the opening of the French offensive against the southern Neth
erlands, Henry was induced, as the treaty required, to send a
force of English auxiliaries to participate in the defence of
the Low Countries.

Command of the expedition which was raised

entirely from retinues provided by private gentlemen was en
trusted to Sir John Wallop, who as "chief captain" with some
five thousand men departed from Calais on July 22 with in
structions to employ his men as required by the government of

22The Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, pp. 538-39;
L. & P ., XVIII, pt. 2, No. 73.

23L. & P., XVIII, pt. 2, Nos. 86, 97, 126, 143, 162, 168.
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Mary of Hungary.

24

It was originally hoped by Henry that Wallop might be
used, as had been contemplated in 1542, in seizing Montreuil
or Boulogne.

However, the rapid build-up of French reserves

in the Boulonnais and the danger to Brussels caused by Fran
cis* irruption into Hainault compelled Mary to utilize Wal
lop's not inconsiderable talents in the more practical busi
ness of expelling the French from her lands.
southern Hainualt was her especial concern.

Landrecies in
An otherwise in

significant dot on the map until captured and fortified by
the French in the last days of June, it was seen as the key
to the control of the whole province and an entrance through
which Francis could strike at Artois and possibly even Brus
sels.

It was therefore to the siege of that town that the

English auxiliaries were sent, but in the almost nineteen
weeks they labored in the company of soldiers from every cor
ner of the Hapsburg empire nothing of consequence was accom
plished.
Not even the appearance of Charles, fresh from his tri
umph over the Duke of Cleves, could effect the reduction of
the fortress.

On October 29 when Francis approached his be

leaguered prize in order of battle the siege was lifted thus
allowing the French to resupply the town with victuals and a

^ S t a t e P a p e r s , IX, 440.
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fresh garrison.

25

Following this, as neither commander was

willing to risk a full engagement, the two sides retired to
winter quarters, and on November 11 amid assurances that they
had acquitted themselves well, the English took their leave
26
of the emperor and headed back to Calais,
their sole conso
lation being that they had gained some badly needed exposure
to military methods they could hardly have obtained elsewhere:
"I promise your Majesty," wrote Wallop on departing: Landrecies,

"that in all the wars I have been in, I have not seen

such another time for youth to learn . . . especially since
the emperor's coming, who brought with him horsemen and foot
of all nations, so as your Majesty's men here might learn and
27
choose what fashion they liked best."
This revealing statement, coming as it did from one of
28
Henry's most expert soldiers,
contained within it the thinly

25
26

L. & P ., XVIII, pt. 2, Nos. 291, 321.
Ibid. , Nos. 354, 384.

27

George F. Nott, The Works of Henry Howard, Earl of
Surrey and of Sir Thomas Wyatt the Eider (2 vols., London:
Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1815-1816) , I, lix, n.
Hereinafter cited as The Works of Henry H o w a r d .
28
Sir John Wallop was one of but a handful of Henrician
Englishmen who could qualify as a professional soldier, as
most of his career was spent on active duty.
His military
experience is presumed to have begun in 1511 when it is sup
posed he was sent as part of an English expedition to the
Low Countries to assist the Regent, Margaret of Savoy, in
suppressing a revolt in Gelders.
Knighted for his services
he was next employed as a captain at sea in Henry VIII*s
first French war, after which between 1516 and 1518 he fought
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veiled admission that Englishmen had in fact a great deal to
learn about the ways of war and the manner of waging it.
Since this was the case, and as there were few about the king
wh o were likely to dispute Wallop's knowledge in such matters,
it was felt that before the English leader withdrew from the
Netherlands he should attempt to secure from among the hun
dreds of foreign captains with w h o m he daily came in contact
the names of a few who might on Henry's crossing the Channel
be willing to join the English in their attack upon France.
Accordingly, Wallop began to take notes.
cies,

29

From Landre-

just before the lifting of the siege, he informed Sir

W i l l i a m Paget, Henry's late ambassador in Paris and one of
30
the k i n g 1s two Principal se c r e t a r i e s ,
that he knew of forty
or fifty Albanians who could be used to augment the squadron

as a gentleman-volunteer in the army of Manuel I of Portugal
against the Moors in North Africa.
On his return to England
he was posted for three years in Ireland and in 1522 and 1523
distinguished himself under Surrey and Suffolk in France.
Apparently a m a n of considerable experience in fortifications
and in leading men, he was created High Marshal of Calais in
1524, elevated to the lieutenancy of that town in 1530, and
finally raised to the captaincy of Guisnes in 1541.
For com
manding the English forces before Landrecies he was elected
Knight of the Garter on Christmas eve, 1543.
William Arthur
J obson Archbold, "Sir John Wallop," Dictionary of National
B i o g r a p h y , ed. Sir Leslie Stephens and Sir Sidney Lee (22 vols.
and suppls., London:
Oxford University Press, 1949), XX
609-12.
Hereinafter cited as D. N. B.
29
30

L. £ P., XVIII, pt.

2, No.

385.

The other was Sir Thomas Wriothesley, w ho was succeeded
in that office by Sir William Petre on the former's elevation
to the post of Lord Chancellor on May 3, 1544.
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of Northern horse stationed at Guisnes; to Henry he wrote
from Douai that he had the names of "divers chiefs" of infan
try and cavalry, Spaniards, Germans, and Italians; while on
November 8 he was ordered by the Privy Council to consult
with the best captains of Cleves "to learn how the emperor
was served by them."

Though the latter instructions arrived

after the disbandment of the Imperial army Wallop anticipated
them, having, as he wrote in reply, previously "practiced
with them" through his intermediary, the Netherlands Count of
Buren, who besides promising an unlimited supply of Cleve
lander cavalry offered of his own retinues "horsemen, footmen,
gunners for mortars, drumslades and fifers, as many as the
king shall need."

There was no end of mercenary applicants:

Joergen van Lesken and Borges van Moncke, residents of Gotten
in Germany, each proffered between three and four hundred
horse; the Saxon Count of Mansfeld promised five thousand
foot; while out of Italy, Alexandro Gonzaga, bastard son of
the Duke of Mantua, offered on two months' notice four thou31
sand infantry and three hundred mounted arquebusiers.
Such declarations of intent were gratifying, particularly
as it was now certain that the combined assault on France
would take place sometime in the new year.

The details had

yet to be hammered out, but on December 10, as Wallop

31L. &.P., XVIII, pt. 2, Nos. 310, 384-85.
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settled back in at Guisnes for the win t e r , Don Ferrante Gonzaga, the Imperial Viceroy of Sicily, was sent from Brussels
by the emperor with full authority "to conclude all things
pertaining thereto."32
A firm timetable for the invasion and a plan of action
were Charles' primary concerns, the more so as Henry's deep
ening rift with the Scots suggested to his cynical mind a
weakening of the king's resolution towards their precontracted
enterprise.

Scotland the emperor felt would ruin everything,

if Henry was in fact intent upon having it.
not.

But the king was

For the sake of honor besmirched by the broken treaties

of Greenwich and for the security of the northern frontier,
the border wars might continue; however, the greater glory
was to be had in France.

Therefore, when Don Ferrante ap

peared at Hampton Court about Christmas it took less than a
week to dispel the e mperor's doubts and devise a new compact
by which France might best be undone.
By the articles signed on the last day of the year, Henry
and Charles pledged to commence their war against the common
enemy no later than June 20 with separate armies increased in
strength from their original twenty-nine thousand to forty-two
thousand, including on the English side the Imperial auxilia
ries promised in February and as many mercenaries from the

32Ibid., Nos. 457, 485.
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emperor's territories as Henry chose to hire.

33

But as for

objectives, other than the defeat of Prance none were clearly
stated.

Both princes were to strike in the general direction

of Paris, the emperor through Champagne and the English by
such passage across Picardy as seemed least defensible.

How

ever, each commander reserved the right, on Henry's insistance,
to alter his course as strategy, availability of supplies,
and the disposition of the enemy dictated.

At face value

this could be taken as an indication of prudent generalship,
but unfortunately, as events would prove, it was nothing less
than another demonstration of the gargantuan monarch's wilful
appetite.

Henry would have his few yards of France at mini

mum risk to himself and his army.

For by voting himself a

free hand at a time when he knew his ally must pursue a fight
already begun, he had arrogated unto himself the right of de
ciding his own objectives, and these in all likelihood never
included Paris.

The throne of France, more so than the crown

of Scotland, was beyond his reach.

Of this reality Henry was

doubtless aware, so that when it came to the point, as a man
who "attempted nothing which he did not bring to a successful
conclusion," he would settle for much less, leaving Charles
to shift for himself, but employing Imperial soldiers to at
tain his end.

3^Ibid., No. 526.

See also No. 525 (1),

(3). See p. 154.
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What Henry would eventually settle for was a minor ex
tension of his Pale in France.

The fortified town of Boulogne,

a fishing port located a mere twenty-two miles from Calais,
was his goal, though for fear the emperor would withdraw his
support if the truth were out that objective remained the se
cret of the king alone until the very eve of his departure
for the campaign.

In the interim,every effort was made to

give the Imperialists no cause for reproach.

Plans for carry

ing through the invasion were implemented immediately, begin
ning at the first of the year with an attempt to assess costs.
The sum of £250,000 was the figure arrived at, but as Henry
could lay his hands on barely half that amount and was not
prepared at present to "molest his loving subjects for money
unless thereto coacted," commissions were issued in March and
April authorizing the sale of various royal properties in Eng
land and I r e l a n d . A s

provisions, guns, ships, and munitions

were collected, other extra-Parliamentary means were resorted
to, as for example the sale of wards and manumission for bond
men, and loans were also required because of the added expense
of outfitting Hertford's expedition against the Scots.

In mid-

May, about the time of the earl's triumphal return to Berwick,
Stephen Vaughan, one of Henry's principal factors in the Low
Countries, was commissioned to negotiate for £20,000 a month

34L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 278 (4), (5),

(67), 443 (7).

255
with the German and Italian bankers of Antwerp.

35

As to the raising of the English forces which Henry
would lead into France, it had long been decided that the bulk
of the troops were to be provided not by the militia, which
was to be held in readiness for the defence of the realm, but
by the private retinues of E n g l a n d 1s lords and gentlemen.
Og
"Special” musters
had been ordered in the spring of 1543
following the successful negotiation of the preliminary treaty
with the emperor.

37

The crown was therefore possessed of con

siderable information about the military power of its magnates
and knew precisely which could serve and how many retainers
each could provide.

In the muster rolls prepared from the cer'

tificates returned in 1543, the exact number of English effec
tives drafted for "voyage into France" was 32,389:
the vanguard under Norfolk;

9,978 for

12,847 for the middle or king's

ward; and 9,564 for the rearguard under the Lord Privy Seal,

3 W a l t e r C. Richardson, Stephen V a u g h a n , Financial Agent
of Henry VIII {Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press,
1953), pp. 47-48.
36

"General" musters and "special"musters were the normal
means in early Tudor England by which the government inquired
into the military preparedness of the kingdom.
"By means of
the former . . . the crown attempted to ascertain the strength
of the militia in every shire; by means of the latter it at
tempted to ascertain the 'power' of every gentlemen of stand
ing in the land.11 Goring, "The Military Obligations of the
English People, 1511-1558," pp. 85, 268.

37L. & P . ,

XVIII, pt. 1, NOS. 53, 342.
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Sir John Russell.

38

Allowing for a few last-minute withdraw

als because of sickness, death, or changes in assignments,
Henry was under obligation to find six thousand mercenaries.
That sum combined with the amount of the English effectives
and the auxiliaries volunteered by Charles would raise the
army royal to the treaty strength of forty-two thousand.
The quest for mercenaries had begun in earnest the past
November in the emperor's camp at Landrecies.

Wallop had sup

plied many names, but it was apparent from the first that
there would be difficulties in recruiting.

The Italians were

felt to be untrustworthy; others, presumably like the Saxon
Count of Mansfeld, were "too distant;" while the few free
lances willing to bargain could not be made to accept the
terms.

Typical of the latter was one Gymynck, the master of

Gymnyhe Castle near Cologne.

Advanced a pension of 200

crowns on the expectation he would raise a thousand horse,

38Ibid., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 274 (p. 159), 275 (2), 276.
These figures do not include the hordes of brewers, bakers,
millers, carters, masons, smiths, tentmakers and other such
workmen necessary for military provisioning and maintenance.
One estimate of the number of non-combatants alone required
for the victualling of the king's battle listed two chief
masters of victuals, two clerks, eight sellers of bread, six
teen sellers of drink, sixteen butchers, thirty conductors
and "watchers" of victuals, sixteen herdsmen and drovers of
cattle, 480 carters for 240 wagons, three coopers, three cartwrights, three smiths, and twenty common laborers, not to
mention one hundred millers, one hundred brewers, and one
hundred bakers, plus their various helpers, totalling in all
1,372 persons.
Another estimate gives as the number of Eng
lish non-combatants attached to the whole army 2,328. (P. R.
O.) S. P. 1/184, ff. 56-62.
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he absconded with the money and refused to serve.

39

A more flagrant case of larceny involved the landsknecht
leader, Christopher von Landenberg, described in one of his
fulsome missives to the English government as "from the side
of Landenberg near Schramberg" in Baden.4^

Commended to

Henry by the emperor himself, he received from the king's
own hand the commission of "colonel" with authority to pro
vide a thousand cavalrymen for the main battle and four thou
sand infantrymen to be divided between the van and the rear.4^
The colonel's letter of articles stipulated that his forces
be ready at Maastricht by May 26.

Consequently, well in ad

vance of that date Henry appointed as special commissaries
Stephen Vaughan and Thomas Chamberlain,42 two skilled media
tors and experts in finance, to oversee their muster and ex
pedite their rapid transit through the Low Countries.
The commissioners left England on March 12, arriving

39L. & P ., XVIII, pt. 2, No. 385; XIX, pt. 1, No. 188.
4 0 (P. R. 0.)

S. P. 1/185, f. 187.

41L. & P ., XVIII, pt. 2, NOS. 479-80, 488; XIX, pt. 1,
No. 653. Chapuys in the Spanish Calendar, VI, pt. 2, No.
267, describes the composition of the horsemen as follows:
two hundred men-at-arms, three hundred arquebusiers, and
five hundred lancers.
420n the careers of these two prominent public servants
consult Richardson, Stephen Vaughan, Financial Agent of
Henry VI I I , C h a p ,- V and p a s s i m .
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with layovers at Bruges and La Noye at Antwerp on the twentythird.

Here they parted company.

Chamberlain remained b e 

hind to arrange for supplies and the exchange of English cur
rency for additional foreign troops, while Vaughan rode off
to Speyer where Landenberg awaited receipt of the conduct
money his recruits would demand before setting out for
Calais.

43

Vaughan had been warned to expect the worse, La n 

denberg having "failed the emperor six weeks the last summer"
in Juliers, so that what transpired was not totally unexpected.
The trip to Speyer was completed on the last day of
March.

A t the interview held on April 1 with the colonel's

interpreter present to explain the meaning, the condottiere
balked during the review of the articles contained in his
contract.

He had, he asserted, been deceived as regards the

valuation of the florin

44

which at 20 stuivers of Brabant or

2s. 6d. sterling "was less than the emperor gave in these
presents to his own subjects."

To be well served the English

must pay no less than the emperor which by the month for

43L.

& P ., XIX, pt. 1, NOS.

245-46.

44This was not the English florin of the value of 2s.
but the Flemish florin or philipus guilder which brought at
the rate of exchange current in March, 1544, about 3s. 1 l/2d.
sterling.
State P a p e r s , IX, 621.
Six months or so later the
philip or guilder, as the Flemish florin is variously desig
nated in English documents, had risen in value to 3s. 2d.
It
is cited as having the same value on April 21, 1546.
C f . (B.
M . ) Add. MS . 5753, ff. 179b, 190, 191.
It was the normal
money of account on which soldiers' rates of pay were calcu
lated.
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footman was four florins or 25 stuivers of 12s. 6d. s t e r l i n g . ^
The price of hiring four-horse wagons proved another sticking
point.

These carriages, one assigned to every twelve cavalry

m e n for the conveyance of their baggage and implements of war,
h a d been promised at a charge of 24 kreutzers or Is. a day.
B u t Landenberg,

"because he understood not the French tongue"

and claimed ignorance "in the things he did in England," de
manded again the emperor's price which in this case was 2s.
6d. the day.
To Vaughan's further discomfiture a final argument was
raised.

When read the article specifying the mustering place,

the colonel begged to be excused, as Charles had ordered him
to collect his men at Cologne and would in no wise permit any
m uster to be made around Maastricht.

The Englishmen could

only marvel at these variances and upbraided the officer for
having no better weighed his obligations before concluding the
bargain; but as nothing was likely to be gained by recrimina
tions, Landenberg was excused with a request to reconsider
and to let Vaughan know his mind within the next day or two.
At their next meeting on April 3 things were somewhat

^ T h i s rate had been verified by Dr. Nicholas Wotton,
Henry's regular ambassador in Germany, on March 19, almost
two weeks before V a u g h a n 's arrival in Speyer. See State
Papers, IX, 621.
^^Vaughan's first contact with Landenberg is described
in full in (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/185, ff. 182-83.

46

better resolved.

The English Council, in advance of Vaughan's

departure from Antwerp, had been advertised of the likelihood
of trouble by Henry's resident ambassador in Germany, Dr.
Nicholas Wotton, and authorization had been posted to Speyer
that if Landenberg would not be content with the florin of 20
stuivers he should have what the emperor paid.

While Vaughan

had been in possession of this information at the previous con
ference, like the faithful steward he was, he had tried to
safeguard his sovereign's treasure by holding to the colonel's
original engagement.

However, as the mercenary was set upon

the higher wages, it was agreed with a certain amount of re
lief on both sides that he should have them, Landenberg re
ceiving shortly thereafter on Easter Sunday in Frankfurt
16,000 florins in conduct money for his soldiers and the em
peror's permission to gather his men at Aachen before pro
ceeding to Aire in Artois where Henry planned a general musA

*7

ter of the bulk of his free lances on June 20.
The matter it seemed was settled, though in truth the
problem of satisfying that imperious war-lord had just begun.
Landenberg kept tryst at Aachen, bringing his companies thence
on May 24, though the arrival of Ralph Vane and Richard Wyndebank, the two commissioners sent to deal with him on this

^ ( P . R. O.) S. P. 1/185, f. 187 contains Landenberg's
acknowledgement of the receipt of this money.
See also L.
& P . , XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 328. (p. 216), 349.
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occasion, was delayed by rain until the twenty-ninth.

The

Englishmen found him intractable, promising his adherents
"mountains of gold" and demanding, besides a full m o n t h ’s
wages, entertainment for an additional four hundred horsemen
48
that had followed him out of High Germany.
Henry was in
censed as well could be expected.

Landenberg's band repre

sented almost one-eighth of his invasion force, the forward
elements of which were already in Calais, and the date fixed
for the start of the campaign was three weeks away; but in
these straits there seemed no other recourse but to compro
mise.
Vane and Wyndebank were accordingly charged by the Coun
cil to humor the troublemaker and in a gesture of goodwill
retain half of the excess horsemen.
cession brought new demands.

But regrettably each con

Landenberg had gone beyond his

bargain once and intended the same again, as on June 12 four
of his captains were sent to England to discuss certain
"weighty matters," including immediate disbursement of the
first month's wages and allowance for seventeen hundred "deadpays" over and above the one thousand granted by the second
compact.

49

It was a calculated move on the part of an

48L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 618, 623.
4^The term "dead-pay," more familiar in Elizabeth's
reign than in the early Tudor period, had several meanings.
It could be a legitimate pension awarded to a retired or
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experienced extortioner, for even as his paladins embarked in
England, before Henry had a chance to study the remedy,, further
pecuniary difficulties were being raised in Aachen concerning
men-at-arms, wagons, and messengers.
journey."

It was another "evil

Amid these wild men Vane and Wyndebank feared for

their very lives, while Landenberg flaunted his power, boast
ing that "he had been bold in his days to displease an emperor
and a king of the Romans" and now would not hesitate . to do
the same to a king of E n g l a n d . ^
Such outrageous talk was hardly tempered to suit a man
of Henry's violent capacity, and as it reached his ears be
fore the leave-taking of the colonel's emissaries from London,
the king resolved to wash his hands of him; but to show the
world that the fault was not his own he agreed that at Landen
berg 's release his band should have an extra month's pay "at

disabled veteran,
or an illegal pay drawn in the name ofa
dead man, usually
by the deceased's commanding officer. In
this case,however, "dead-pay" is synonymous with "double-pay,"
as in the German sense of "doppelsoldner," "arquebusier" in
modern translation, but in origin a "soldier who received
double-pay" either because of his rank or experience.
Such
double-pays were offered b y recruiting officers to attract
at lease a core of the m o s t experienced fighters. Landen
berg' s first articles had provided for sixty dead-pays per
ensign, but in consideration of the colonel's reputation,
"and to have picked men," Henry in the second compact "con
descended to raise from sixty to one hundred dead-pays . . .
which is the largest entertainment that the emperor now gives."
L. & P., XIX, pt.
1, Nos. 623, 689, 728-29.

50Ibid., No. 648.
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the emperor's rate of one hundred dead-pays in an ensign."

51

This verdict was announced to the landsknecht envoys by
the Council on June 18 and forthwith relayed to the commis
sioners in the camp of the Germans, who two days earlier,
having eaten up the countryside around Aachen, suddenly re
moved to Liege where such was their spoliation and thievery
that in the judgement of the Queen of Hungary the occupation
of the neighborhood by an invading army would have been infi52
nitely more desirable.
Moreover, the plight of Vane and
Wyndeband was desperate.

Threats and abuse were daily show

ered upon them for their alleged illiberality.

For fear they

would be waylaid and their money taken from them, the English
men refused to accompany Landenberg to Liege and instead
sought safety in nearby Maastricht where the king's instruc
tions regarding the acquittance of the mercenaries reached
them.
In pursuance of their orders a gentleman of Liege was
sent to the German leader to inform him of his discharge,
while on the twenty-first with an armed guard begged from the
magistrates of Maastricht in the small hours of the morning
they fled to Diest in Brabant.

From thence a short time

later, Vane travelling in advance to report their proceedings

51Ibid., No. 728.

52

Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 128.
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to the regent in Brussels, both, made their escape to Antwerp
by the end of the month.

In all they had paid out 29,000

crowns on Landenberg which sum, if added to the 16,000 florins
53
advanced him in Speyer, came to £9,266.
But for what? Not
a single day's service had been performed, whereas at Brus
sels and the Imperial court the claims of the plundered inhab
itants of Liege for compensation for their ravaged goods
created ill-feeling towards the English allies for several
months to come:

"no affair," complained the queen regent,

"had given us so much trouble as this one of Landenberg's
men."

54

Though unwilling "to inculpate any of the parties,"

there being faults on both sides, the present trouble sprang,
she felt, "from some misunderstanding or other on the part
of

[Henry's] commissaries, owing no doubt to their being in

sufficiently acquainted with the manner of dealing with re
cruits from Upper Germany, who are in the habit of asking
first unreasonable prices for their services and, if they
find that the contractors are inexperienced in affairs of
that sort, making most excessive and preposterous demands."
Much could be said for the regent's point of view,

53

The crowns here in question were Flemish crowns valued
in February, 1546, at 38 stuivers or 4s 8d sterling.
See
L. &. P . , XXI, pt. 1, No. 254.
For the satisfaction of the
second month's pay and the remainder of the first, Vane and
Wyndebank estimated on July 16 that Landenberg was owed an
additional 41,426 crowns.
Ibid., XIX, pt. 1, No. 926.

^Spanish Calendar, VII, Nos. 143, 159.
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except that the Imperialist authorities were only minimally
better equipped for dealing with such brigands.

The last

act in this sordid d r a m a was staged in the first weeks of
July when already the English army,

in a masking movement

preparatory to its a s s a ult on Boulogne, was beseiging Montreuil.

On the fifth,

in a letter to Chapuys, Charles admit

ted that since every effort had failed to induce Henry to re
tain Landenberg there w as no other cure but that his d e l i n 
quent vassal be taken into his own service.

Otherwise there

would be no end to the c o l o n e l 's mischief in the Low C o u n t r i e s ,
or worse, being disappointed of a liberal paymaster he would
cross over to the French.

55

This latter course which m ight

well have b e e n contemplated was eventually prevented,

as on

August 11, Landenberg appeared in the emperor's camp at
S a int Dizier at the h e a d of 2,492 High German foot.

56

Perfidy it seemed had its own rewards, but the case of
the predaceous colonel was scarcely an isolated one.

On March

6 , 1544, contemporaneous with the appointments of Chamberlain
and Vaughan as commissioners of the musters, Nicholas Wotton,
the ambassador with the emperor, was engaged to retain a

55I b i d . , No. 144.
C£

t

^

t

Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees F r a n c a i s e s ,
p. 99.
The Itinerary of the Emperor Charles V, p. 547,
though it does not m e n t i o n Landenberg, states that "On the
eleventh the Imperial camp was reinforced by the arrival of
six thousand Germans."
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thousand horse to replace the h a n d withheld by Gymynck.

57

Resident at the time in Speyer where the Imperial Diet was
considering what military aid,

if any, should be granted the

emperor, Wotton was required to inaugurate his search by mak
ing inquiry of Baron Heideck, the same who had been approached
58
by Sir Thomas Seymour on a similar errand in 1542.
Heideck,
however, had other commitments.

As a lord from the Imperial

electorate of Brandenburg, he would h a v e to fight for the em
peror,

so Wotton, as a last resort and in compliance with his
59
directives, was obliged to apply directly to Charles.
The business was quickly concluded.

On April 4 the sub

ject was broached to the Imperial minister, Nicholas Perrenot,
Sieur de Granvelle,

and on the seventh word was brought that

the emperor had nominated one of his own pensioners, Hans von
Sickingen,

son of the famous Franz von Sickingen,

late friend

of Martin Luther and scourge of every paymaster along the
60
Rhine until his death in 1523.
With Jean de Lyere, Charles'
muster-master,

acting as interpreter a preliminary meeting

was held that same evening at Wotton*s lodgings to discuss

No.

57Above, pp.
188.

256-57; also p.‘ 266,*' L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1,:

co

Above, p. 232.
59L. & P., XIX, pt.

1, Nos.

168, 392

(p. 258).

^9 I b i d ., No. 312.
For notices on the elder Sickingen,
one of the m o s t legendary of the landsknecht commanders, con
sult Blau, Die deutschen Landsknechts, pp. 95-97 and' passim.
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what amounted to Sickingen's impositions which he had care
fully drawn up in advance.
Since he would act as colonel and would be chiefly re
sponsible for the recruitment of the horsemen, he demanded as
*

his retainer 10,000 guilders on the spot, a salary of 200
guilders a month for his lieutenant, which was exactly double
the rate allowed in the Imperial army, and 500 guilders for
himself, a mere quarter more than was normally issued to
ordinary colonels.

Further, as special warranty against the

defalcation of these extortionate sums, he demanded to have
an Imperial city or one of the German banking houses bound
in surety by the English for the payment of his men.

6X

Wot

ton was mortified, answering that if Sickingen "had any good
knowledge of his master, Henry,” he would not ask for so u n 
reasonable a pledge.

It was unfortunate, but, countered the

war chief, the Sickingens were well acquainted with potentates.
At his father's death he and his brother had been cheated of
certain monies owed by princes whom their father had served,
and for this reason no Sickingen served any lord,
the Palsgrave

62

"not even

whose subject he was, without such

®^The Imperial cities of Nuremberg, Ulm, Augsburg, Frank
furt, and Cologne were specifically mentioned, along with the
South German mercantile empires of the Fuggers and Welsers
whose principal and original seat of power was Augsburg.

62Frederick II, Elector-Palatine of the Rhine.
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assurance."

63

A t this point the dragoman, De Lyere, inter

rupted to ask what town or company had been given as security
when he served the French king, to which Sickingen in a reply
hardly geared to endear him to the proud Tudor in London re
torted that Francis "did ever pay truly."
As the colonel refused to moderate his conditions, the
conversation was broken off, Wotton promising to forward his
articles and the discussion on them to Henry.

The ambassador

plainly disliked the man whose face he described as "so red
and fiery and garnished with rubies as it may well appear
that his mother never taught him to water his wine."

His in

tention was to find another captain, one who would "serve
without this assurance of towns," particularly since "to p re
vent grudging" the emperor aimed to have his m e n and Henry's
foreigners at the same wages.

Albeit, before he could act he

was hopelessly compromised by Charles.

On his own authority,

but in Henry's name, the emperor pledged the securities that
Sickingen desired with the Welsers, Fuggers, and various m e r 
chants to the effect that the colonel's horsemen would "be
regularly paid from their arrival until they quit the English
service."

Charles excused his impolitic presumption on the

grounds of expediency.

If his dear uncle did not act immedi

ately, he reasoned, then either the best gentlemen would be

« L . & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 312 (pp. 197-99) contains
Wotton's full account of his deliberations with Sickingen.

269
taken up or Henry entirely deprived of much, needed cavalry.
The king and his Council thought otherwise.

64

There were,

as Henry told Chapuys on April 21, plenty of other German cap
tains willing to serve if only the emperor would permit them,
and one who had been contracted was even then on his way to
enlist 450 horsemen in Maastricht.

As for Sickingen, in

Henry's humble opinion it was he and not the colonel who
needed assurances.

There were reports which had reached the

Council that that officer had been deliberately overlooked by
Charles' recruiters in March because he was not the expert^
enced soldier he pretended to be.

Moreover, Henry complained,

Sickingen had once served King Francis "and done other unrea
sonable acts."

Chapuys was to inform the emperor that he

would not employ his colonel, adding between his teeth "and
with evident signs of resentment" that he would rather for
feit what had already been paid on account than continue the
negotiations further.66
The amount involved was considerable, 10,000 florins or
£1564 10s Od.

It had been wrung from the reluctant Wotton

by Charles, who subsequent to the minister's consultation

fi4

Spanish calendar, VII, No. 64.

The captain here in question was Thomas Lightmaker,
a merchant-turned-mercenary.
See below, pp. 271-74. Also
p. 269.

^Spanish Calendar, VII, Nos. 72-73; L. & P., XIX, pt.
1, No. 360.
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with Sickingen had applied such pressure that the hapless am
bassador had gone through with the man.

The sum represented

a retainer which if not backed by the required pledges guar
anteeing regular pay was to remain in Sickingen*s possession
"and to his profit without his being obliged to do any service
at all."67
It was hardly an equitable arrangement, and the Council
lost no time in berating Wotton for his lapse in judgement.
The wretched man was enjoined to ask that the money be re
turned, but naturally on making inquiry his answer was that
it had already been spent.

Afraid,therefore, that it might

fall personally upon him to make restitution he wailed out
his plea for forgiveness:

while he would not excuse himself f

he had been importuned by the emperor and through inexperience
had been used for an evil purpose.

Nonetheless, "as God

hears no man's petition sooner than theirs who trust to his
goodness for mercy," so also would he trust Henry "(who in
his supreme dignity most resembles God in this wor l d ) ."

In

the face of so contrite and truckling an entreaty the king
was content to let the matter pass.

Wotton was absolved,

and the business of Sickingen, who like Landenberg was

67Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 64. The retainer was paid
in two installments of 2,000 and 8,000 florins, the last be
ing brought from Frankfurt to Speyer by Vaughan on April 16
and turned over to Sickingen on the day following.
Cf. Ibid,
and No. 66; L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 347.
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retained by the Imperialists, was forgotten.

68

It was obviously in Charles' best interests to try to
foist or even force upon the English those truculent free
lances whom he distrusted himself and who, if denied employ
ment on the one side, had no trouble in finding it on the
other.

However,from the perspective of the Council in London

it was daily becoming more obvious that the invasion schedule
worked out in March would not be met.

It was Henry's plan

that his foreign captains would have their men ready at Aire
by June 20 for an eastward march through Artois and into the
Pale, there to join the English van and rear which were to
await their coming at Guisnes or the French town of Licques
on the verge of the Boulonnais .^

Unhappily the misprision

of Sickingen and Landenberg had thrown everything into confu
sion.

April was now drawing to a close, but as six thousand

mercenaries still had to be found somewhere, and the emperor
in Henry's mind had been guilty of nonfeasance, the king be
gan immediately to seek out captains on his own.
Among the first approached was the Dutchman, Thomas
Lightmaker, who at the height of the Sickingen controversy
was retained to bring 450 horsemen out of Maastricht in

68*i-S
XIX, pt. 1, No. 555; pt. 2, No. 199.
gen was commissioned to raise five ensigns of foot.

69Ibid., pt. 1, Nos. 271 (4), 349, 380, 399, 690.

Sickin
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Limburg.

Little is known of him except that he had been a

merchant, a London-based agent of the German financial house
of Stillar, who on the bankruptcy of his employers turned to
trafficking in mercenaries.

70

The saga of what might very

well have been his first commission is one of the most tortu
ous and revealing of the war in that it demonstrates that the
dilemmas encountered in obtaining troops were not always faced
by those rulers for whose armies they were recruited.
Lightmaker must have left England shortly before the ar
rival from Speyer of Wotton's letter of April 9 in which the
diplomatist informed Henry that for the mustering of free
lances the Imperialists had declared Maastricht off-limits,
the reason being that, as it lay close to Juliers within the
late territories of the Duke of Cleves, it had already "been
too much oppressed with soldiers" in the fighting in 1543.

71

How or when the apprentice-captain learned of this ban is not
known, for he is next heard of in a note composed on June 12
in Brussels and sent to the Duke of Norfolk, commander of the
foreward in the Pale.

Its authors were Thomas Palmer, Edward

Vaughan, and Thomas Chamberlain, the three commissaries

7 ^Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 147.
L. £ P ., XIX, pt. 1,
No. 866 (p. 540) renders a somewhat different translation of
this letter from Chapuys to Charles V. Lightmaker is called
"a merchant of the Stillars here, who since his bankruptcy
has meddled in w a r ."

71L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 312.

appointed in May to enroll the Dutchman's band.

From its

contents one can gather that Lightmaker had just failed in
his appointment to bring his men to Utrecht and was not likely
to make the muster at Aire on the twentieth.

But why he had

failed to rendezvous is made painfully clear in a series of
communiques exchanged between him, the commissioners, and the
Council.

73

He had ranged far in his search for men through the Bish
opric of Utrecht and the North German territories of the
Schmalkaldic League, both of which areas were in a high state
of religious and political agitation.

In the former province,

his passage had been slowed by the Catholic authorities who
believed he had come to assist the "naughty sect" of A n a b a p 
tists entrenched there, while in the adjacent lands of the
Lutheran confederation the Protestant lords had closed the
gates of their towns against him, supposing him to be a p a r 
tisan of the Catholic duke, Henry of Brunswick-WolfenbUttel,

Ibid., No. 582 (2) contains the names of all "the com
missioners which take the musters of the Almains." This
author has been unable to further identify either Palmer or
Edward Vaughan.
The former may have been a relative of Sir
John Palmer (d. 1553), a native of Sussex wh o in a long c a 
reer as a soldier held many posts in the Calais Pale and who
in 1545 was made captain of the tower known as the "Old Man"
in Boulogne.
If there was a relationship between Edward
Vaughan and the more famous Stephen Vaughan, I have failed
to establish it.
^ I b i d . , Nos. 752-53, 823.
VII, No. 151 (p. 250).

See also Spanish Calendar,
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who was then levying war in an unsuccessful bid to win back
the duchy from which the League had driven him in 1542.

But

despite this nettlesome treatment Lightmaker did not fail in
his obligation to the English.

Though he. came late he

brought with him a sturdy band of five hundred " swart reiters,"
lancers and arquebusiers, among them Dutchmen like himself,
Westphalians, and D a n e s .74

They were at 1s Hertogenbosch in

northern Brabant on July 30, and within the next week in com
pliance with Lightmaker1s original orders they were prested in
haste to join the Duke of Suffolk, lieutenant-general with the
main battle, and the king before Boulogne.

75

By far the largest single contingent of free lances ob
tained by Henry after the failure of Landenberg and Sickingen
in 1544 was the nearly three thousand-man force brought by
Maximilian d'Ysselstein, Count of Buren.

His story is of par

ticular interest in that he alone of the score or more for
eigners who led troops for Henry in the first phase of the
French war enjoyed the distinction of being at one and the
same time both a mercenary and an auxiliary, an ambivalent
status that happily is quite easy to explain:

Buren, on the

one hand, was the general appointed at Henry's request to

74 L.

&. p ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 823 (p. 515), 925, 1018.

7 ^Ib i d ., No. 753.
For a transcription of Lightmaker1s
capitularies reproduced from (B. M . ) Lands. MSS. 155, ff.
356-58 see Appendix.
Also see below, pp. 284-85,
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command the four thousand auxiliaries pledged by the emperor;
on the other, by separate indentures negotiated at various
times, the count consented for the usual pecuniary consider
ations to furnish a supplemental force of mercenaries.
Henry's enthusiasm for Buren can positively be said to
have begun with Wallop's letters from Landrecies in 1543.

It

will be remembered that among the variety of exotic captains
approached by the English officer in the course of that affray, Buren had been the most encouraging.

76

He not only had

promised mercenaries in bountiful supply, but had himself expressed a desire to lead them.

77

It was therefore for these

reasons that Henry applied for his services as the leader of
the auxiliaries during Gonzaga's Christmas embassy to Hamp
ton Court.

The matter was quickly decided, the emperor al

lowing that for the speedier commencement of their common en
terprise, although he had anticipated using the lord of Buren
himself, he was content to give him with two thousand horse78
men and two thousand landsknechts to the king.

^ A b o v e , p;. 251.
77

L. _& P . , XIII, pt. 2, No. 384.

7ft

Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 22. When the question of
Buren's service was first broached in the Imperial court,
the emperor was advised to lend the general only on condi
tion that both he and his men be paid by Henry. Afraid how
ever that the English would ally themselves with France if
he failed in his obligations to the king, Charles refused
to press the point.
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It was a few weeks later in January/

1544, that Henry

through Wotton contacted Buren on the feasibility of adding
to his detachment two thousand mercenary foot whom the king
hoped could be raised from among the same bands that had
79
served him at L a n drecies.
Why the English sovereign felt
it necessary to hire these adscititious forces is a puzzle,
unless by some mysterious prescience he had divined the im
pending cozenage of Landenberg and Sickingen? or more likely,
to a monarch who "bet only on a sure thing," with an eye
perhaps already on Boulogne, Henry was simply seeking to set
by some extra i n s u r a n c e . ^

Regardless, for whatever reason

the king wanted the mercenaries, Buren was only too happy to
provide them, and in March, while Stephen Vaughan made his
way to seek out Landenberg in Speyer, Thomas Chamberlain
opened debate with the general in Antwerp on the subject of
81
wages.
On Henry's directions Chamberlain tried but failed to
set the same terms with Buren as those that were understood

7 9 L.

& P ., XIX, pt. 1, No. 89.

"smith,

Henry V I I I ,

The Mask of Ro y a l t y , p. 205.

®^(P. R. O.) S. P. 1/183, f. 205 is a corrected draft
of the king's instructions to his commissaries.
According
to the directives it was Chamberlain who should have gone
to Speyer and Vaughan who should have remained behind to
deal with Buren.
C f . Richardson, Stephen V a u g h a n , Financial
Agent of Henry V I I I , p. 47.
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to have b e e n fixed w i t h Landenberg.

The count agreed to be

bound like the German in every particular except as concerning
the valuation of the florin wherein he felt that Landenberg
w as abused.

It was impossible, he said, to hire good soldiers

for anything less than the emperor's rate or 4 florins of 25
stuivers a month.

Chamberlain demurred.

his superiors in London,
momentarily;

He had to consult

so the affair was arrested— but only

for on April 8 , barely two weeks after the sus

pension of the talks,

a contract was arbitrated in Brussels

by which Buren agreed to a lower computation of the florin on
condition that Landenberg would serve at the same price.
the German would not,

If

then B u r e n 1s two thousand infantrymen

were to have "4 philips per month at 25 pattars in Brabantine
currency for each philip" or such pay as the emperor would
allow the auxiliary foot which Buren would also have under
his l e a d i n g . ® 2
The Dutch commander's frank dealings and willingness to
serve pleased Henry to the extent that, even though in the
end Charles'

"solde" of 12s.

6 d.

the month had to be dis

bursed, a second contract was conferred upon Buren which,
issued in April for five hundred cavalrymen and modified in
June, eventually netted Henry 706 "fighting horse," 18

8 2 (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/185, art. 4.
The "articles and
agreement passed b e t ween the Count of Buren and Thomas
Chamberlain" are reproduced in full in Appendix F.
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officers,

37 messengers,

208 cart horses, and various wagons

at a monthly rate of £1,774 13s.

9 d . 8^

The me n were mainly

Burgundians recruited in the Netherlands to make up in part
the critical loss of cavalry caused by the defections of
Sickingen and Landenberg.

They proved somewhat of a disap

pointment in that not all were men-at-arms.
equipped as demilancers and others,
ular m

Germany, as pistoleers.

84

Many came

in the fashion then popBut all w e r e taken, and

in the second week of July, having arrived too late for the
O C

general muster at Aire,

they were reviewed by the English

(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/191, ff. 34-35, gives the total
number of horse and foot which served under Ysselstein "at
the king's majesty*s s o l d e .11 Wages were computed in karolus
guilders, silver coins struck for the Netherlands by Char
les V about 1540 at the rate of 2s. 6 d. sterling per karolus.
Every "fighting" horseman was p a i d 15 guilders per month,
while messengers and cart horses were alloted 7.
For refer
ences to the second contract and its ammendations see L. £
P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 399, 410, 580, 667, 752, 811.
8 4 L.

& P . , XIX, pt. 1, No.

667.

85It is not clear if this assembly was ever held.
To
ease the strain o n the Netherlands government Buren*s force,
which numbered near seven thousand mercenaries and auxilia
ries of all arms, was collected in widely separated areas.
The infantry was gathered in the Lordship of Mechlin, the
cavalry in extreme northern Brabant around *s Hertogenbosch
and Grave.
On June 3 Sir Thomas Palmer, muster-master to
the foreigners in Henry's pay, reported that at a recent
view of the footmen furnished at both the king and the em
peror's charge "above a thousand men" were lacking, and it
was n o t until the fifteenth that these vacancies were filled.
The m a j o r part of the concourse had now descended upon Saint
Omer with i n ten miles of Aire, but here it m a y have remained
another six or eight days awaiting the non-arrival of Buren's
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commissaries at Saint Qmer and marched off immediately to join
the mercenary foot and the Imperial auxiliaries wh o in their
blue and red livery had preceded them to Montreuil on July 4.
A quick check of the mercenaries so far accounted for
yields the sum of 3,224.

These in brief were the five hun

dred Danish, Westphalian, and Dutch Reiters of Thomas Light
maker, the 724 Burgundian cavalrymen and officers of Maximil
ian d* Ysselstein, and the latter*s two thousand landsknecht
86
footmen,
roughly half of the number of free lances that
w ould eventually participate in the taking of Boulogne and
the unavailing siege of Montreuil.
-in round figures,

The remaining mercenaries-

three thousand— w e r e acquired from divers

sources in the frenetic months of July, August, and September

Burgundian mercenaries, who did not appear in Saint Omer un
til sometime after July 2.
Ibid., Nos. 610, 687, 710, 830.
Qg
It is difficult to determine the origin of this band,
but probably it contained a high percentage of veterans from
the Dutch provinces of Friesland, Groningen, and Overyssel,
and the adjacent district of Westphalia.
Buren was governor
of the provinces and was accustomed to leading troops from
that region.
By his own admission he distrusted Germans,
being loath, as he said, to serve among men he did not know.
To prove the point, in March when he was informed by the
queen regent that the auxiliary foot he was to conduct for
the king of England were to be provided him out of Germany,
he successfully petitioned the emperor that he be allowed to
recruit them himself from among the Dutch and Westphalian
retinues which had served him at L a n d r e c i e s . Bu t whatever
the origin of the mercenaries they w e r e preponderantly pike—
m e n and made a brave show when paraded in Mechlin before
Sir Thomas Palmer on June 1.
L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 245,
308 (p. 195), 392, 465.
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at the very height of operations,: some entering service within
mere days of the surrender of Boulogne.

Their eleventh-hour

conscription can in most cases be tied directly to the be
lated rescission of Landenberg's contract in the final days
of July when, with the French and Imperialists still recruit
ing, choice soldiers were hard to find.
On the default of the Badener colonel's forces, Henry's
first impulse was to cover the loss with Englishmen,

Sickin

gen 's dereliction had already cost him valuable time, and it
was the opinion of his advisers that it was too late "for re
cruiting elsewhere."
self.

Wisely, however, the king overruled him

His subjects had not been keeping abreast of military

developments, and his army of bows and bills was not likely
to impress the French.

What he needed most was men-at-arms,

pikemen, and arquebusiers.

Unable to secure them in suffi

cient quantity in England he turned once again to find them
on the Continent, knowing full well his quest meant further
delay

87

87

and that upon their acceptance or rejection of his

Both the English and the Imperialist armies were sup
posed to be fully mustered and ready for action in France
by June 20. Howevei; in discussion with Chapuys on June 16
concerning the Landenberg debacle Henry intimated that he
could not cross to Calais until July 8 . Spanish Calendar,
VII, No. 124. The king in fact embarked for that port on
July 14.
It is obvious to this writer that the pettifoggery
and naked avarice of both Landenberg and Sickingen, who be
tween them had they been less obstreperous could have en
joyed a near monopoly of the English monarch's patronage of
mercenaries, played the major part in Henry's late depar
ture for the war.
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offers hung possibly the difference between victory and de
feat.
Henry's immediate concern was for the main-battle of
his army royal.

This was the division from which he would

personally command; yet except for the five hundred foreign
horsemen of Thomas Lightmaker every mercenary thus far re
tained was assigned to the van and the rear.
was called for.

Drastic action

The Imperialists had been campaigning in
Q Q

Luxemburg since May,

and with a foreknowledge born of bit

ter experience Henry knew that he must strike soon if he were
to achieve his moment of glory.

For if Charles were defeated

or decided on peace before his forces could gain a lead on
the preoccupied French his chances of success were slight.
In a volte-face made necessary by the exigencies of the
hour, a conciliatory approach was made in the last week of
June to Landerberg's horsemen, who still lingered near Liege
with the colonel's infantry, claiming full remittance for
the months of May and June plus, as was customary in conti
nental armies, their Abzug or "severance pay," a sum designed
to cover expenses on their return home.

89

Henry had no

S^Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran^aises, pp. 88-91.
89

In the war of 1544-46 infantrymen and virtually all
light cavalry troops were allowed an Abzug of two weeks pay,
while men-at-arms and demilancers received a full month's
severance.
Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 131.
Note (P. R. 0.)
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thought of rehiring Landenberg, who at any rate with his
landsknechts had been offered employment by the emperor.
That man, said the king in conversation with Chapuys, had
been insolent and had openly defied his commissioners, intro
ducing thereby "such bad custom" as might be followed in the
future.

The horsemen on the other hand, albeit certain had

pursued Vane as far as Brussels, and Wyndebank had to be res
cued from forty or fifty in Diest, had ever shown themselves
more conformable and "affectionate."

These,therefore^would

be accorded every consideration and paid their arrears if
they would ride immediately to aid the king and his middleward "in the present wars with France."

90

It took four weeks of deliberations and the good of
fices.

of Mary of Hungary, who volunteered Hugo de Souastre,

chief lieutenant of her guard of archers, as mediator; but
eventually on or about July 13 an understanding was reached
and five companies of High German heavy cavalry decamped
from Liege and by leisurely degrees arrived at Boulogne,
where at Henry's headquarters on the north side of the town
they were mustered with two other German squadrons and an

S. P. 1/185, art. 16, for Buren's two thousand mercenary
foot, and ibid., 1/203, f. 16, for the fifteen hundred menat-arms recruited by Reiffenberg in 1545.
9°L. & p ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 776 (p. 475), 788, 793,
934; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 128 (p. 210).
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ensign of mounted arquebusiers on Thursday,. August 21.

91

Positive identification of the captains and the respec
tive strength of at least seven of these eight bands can be
fixed by careful collation of certain folios in Additional
Manuscript 5753 with various entries in the official diary of
the Boulogne expedition and the Letters and Papers.

The five

High German captains and their numbers tell off as follows:'
Ittelwolf van Goetenberg, Lord of Itter,

92

470; Hillemar van

Quernem, 127; Christopher van Pressburg, 415; Otto, Count of
Ritberg, 41; and Hans van Winsigenroot, whose surname sounds
suspiciously Dutch, 321.

93

As regards the other German units,

they were under the pilotage of Albert Bischof, one of the
countless foreign "servants” of the king, and Philip van
Heurde, a Westphalian inebriate whose genial dipsomania so
moved Stephen Vaughan, whom the captain approached in Antwerp,

91 L. &.P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 831, 833, 838-39, 887, 896,
922, 926; Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120; (B. M . ) Add. MS.
5753, ff. 170-80, which consist of a series of receipts re
ceived of the German horse soldiers who served the king at
Boulogne.
The diary, reproduced in Rymer, op. cit., states
that the High German cavalry, although not mustered until
August 21, came to the English camp on Tuesday, the nine
teenth.
92
There was a castle by this name in the Austrian Tyrol.
93 L.

& P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 401.

284
that the English agent had recommended him to the king.
Neither of the latter bands were large.

94

Bischof's showed

eighty-six "combatants on horseback" and two cuirassiers,
"Junker" Philip's, fifty.

But, saving the two cuirassiers,

every trooper was a man-at-arms. 95
The identity of the mounted arquebusiers is more proble
matic, though it seems a safe assumption to presume them to
be the five hundred "swart Reiters" of Thomas Lightmaker.
The diary of the campaign refers to them as "gunners" of
w hich Lightmaker*s ensign contained a high percentage.

Also,

they are specifically said to have arrived in camp with
Bischof and Heurde's contingents on August 13, thus signify
ing , if they were Lightmaker's tro o p s , that they had the bet
ter, part of two weeks to cover the roughly 170 miles between
their staging-area at *s Hertogenbosch and Boulogne.

Finally,

though the "gunners" are referred to as "Almains" in the diary,
they are excluded from the inventory of "the king's German
soldiers," indicating perhaps the large concentration of Danes
96
and Dutchmen among them.
Whoever they were and from

9 4 0n Bischof's original offer to bring three hundred
m en to the king's service see (B. M.) Harl. MS. 283, ff.
375-76.
For Heurde's love of drink and his interview with
Vaughan see L. ^ P ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 1006-7.

95

Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.

96Above, p. 274-
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wherever they had come they were mustered along with the
other seven units, and together these bands functioned as a
bodyguard until the king's return to England on September 30
and as a corps'-d* elite until the demobilization of the Ger97
mans at Calais on October 10.
i

*

*

f

*

K

l

i,

«, ■

1

'I, Il'S

Excluding Buren's four thousand auxiliaries, the number
of foreigners now stands at 4,736, but other free lances can
be discerned, including for the first time a fair number of
Latins, mainly arquebusiers on foot, among whom were the
eighty-eight Italians of Giovanni de Salerno and the three
Spanish companies of captains Alonzo Salablanca, Antonio
Pompeo, and Alejandro Moreno.
Of these battle-hardened warriors the most interesting
was Salerno.

A professional soldier for twenty-four years,

he had first offered himself to Henry in 1543, but as there
was then “no occasion for war" he had been dismissed "with
100 crowns reward" and license to cross to Flanders, intend
ing, as he said, to return to Italy.

He had, however, been

arrested with his "base son" at Vilforde, between Mechlin
and Brussels, and was detained there for fourteen months for
fear he would go to King Francis whom the elder Salerno had

97

Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120? L, £
, XIX, pt, 2,
No. 105.
The date and place of the demohiXization can be
gathered from the copies of the pay receipts retained by
the English paymasters.
CB, M.) Add. MSS, 5753, ff. 170,
173, 174, 176, 193, 195, 197.
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98
served in the past.

It was while in ward to the provost

of Vilforde that the captain's plight became known to Stephen
Vaughan, who had made his acquaintance in London and had
heard him boast of his familiarity with the fortifications
99
of both Montreuil and Boulogne.
Vaughan visited the prisoner in mid-August with a view
towards ascertaining the depth of his knowledge.
markably profound.

It was re

Salerno "could not tell how Boulogne was

now fortified, but when he was last there it was very strong'
and only 'saultable between the Calais Gate and a bulwark on
the right of that gate as one goes towards Calais."
Montreuil, when last there,

As for

"being brought by Monsieur de

Vend 6 me^0^ to view the strength thereof," Salerno had
"pointed out that the great bulwark beside the Abbeville Gate
which looked wonderfully strong was really the weakest part
of the town; but he knew not if it had been mended since."
The captain further advised of the danger to the king's army
from "Therouanne, Ardres, and other towns."

For the escort

of supplies which came mainly from Calais and St. Omer he
suggested mounted hackbutters, but not Germans, since in his

QQ
£l-

XIX'

2 ' No- 97■

99

Ibid., and No. 67. Vaughan was by this time engaged
almost completely as a financial factor, attempting to raise
Henry's credit in the Antwerp bourse.
10®Anthony de Bourbon, Duke of VendSme, was Lieutenant
of Picardy and also father of the future king of France,
Henry IV.
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opinion "their great and heavy horses" were of small worth
except in set battles.
Having heard such tantalizing tidbits, Vaughan hastened
the information to Henry on August 16 with Salerno's offer of
service and an entreaty that the king intercede with the Neth
erlands government on his b e h a l f . T h e

Italian's release

was secured on September 2, twelve days before the fall of
102
Boulogne.
Whether the captaxn was present at the capture
of the town is sadly impossible to determine, but the fort
ress was breached by mining at precisely the point he had in
dicated it could be, that is at "the northeast corner of the
upper town," between the Porte de Calars and the castle.

103

The chances are good that Salerno was not present since on
his liberation from Vilforde he would have been faced immed
iately with the task of recruiting his men.

However, shortly

after the occupation of Boulogne which began on the fourteenth

1 0 1 L.

&P-,

XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 96-97.

1 Q 2 Ibid., No.

177.

R. Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military Engineer
(Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 64-65. Mining opera
tions and other engineering aspects of the sieges of Bou
logne and Montreuil were directed by another Italian, Giro
lamo da Treviso [above, p. 31]. Assisted by Cornish sappers
Girolamo exploded his mine under Boulogne Castle on Septem
ber 1 1 , but he was killed the same afternoon during an un
successful attack against the broken wall.
L. & P ., XIX,
pt. 2, No. 216.
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he was attached to the permanent garrison and was still serv
ing there in February, 1546, but with the elevated rank of
104
colonel.
Considerably less can be discerned about the Spanish
captains, Salablanca, Pompeo, and Moreno.

It is possible

that they were sponsored by Beltran de la Cueva, Duke of
Albuquerque, the "ceremonious" grandee assigned by the emperor to Henry's general staff:

105

but there is no question

that they preceded the duke to France and had seen several
weeks of action before the main-battle and Albuquerque were
properly entrenched before Boulogne.

One of the captains,

in all probability Salablanca, was transferred with his com
pany of one hundred gunners to the main-battle on August 11,
and ultimately on the collapse of the siege of Montreuil on
August 26 all of the Spaniards came to Boulogne and joined
Salerno's Italians as part of the regular garrison.

104
f. 177.
105

L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 799;

106

(P. R. O.) S. P. 1/214

Bowles, Henry V I I I , p. 270.
For additional refer
ence to the life of Albuquerque see Manuel Fernandez Alvarez,
La Espana del Emperador Carlos V (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe,
1966), pp. 446, 524, 535, 839, 840, where he is variously
mentioned as Viceroy of Aragon (1528), Viceroy of Navarre
(1553), and Captain-General of Navarre.
He died in 1559.
106
Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
In an "Estimate of
wages due at Boulogne," drawn up in December, 1544, Salerno
and his eighty-eight men are listed as "within the high town
and castle" which were then in the keeping of Henry*s
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Of the mercenaries still to be uncovered three bands
alone remain, two of which converged on the king's camp in
the Boulonnais on Tuesday, August 12.

The smaller of these

was a one hundred-man company of Clevelander horse led by
none other than Thomas Lightmaker, who for persevering in
the fulfillment of his earlier assignment appears to have
been rewarded with a second contract about the time of the
departure of his swart reiters from 's Hertogenbosch.

107

The larger contingent was that of Stephen and Nicholas Taphoren, a father and son team, and consisted of between four
and five hundred infantry arquebusiers.

1 08

Paid at the nor

mal rate of four philips a month they were mustered by John
Dymock, another of the English agents in the Low Countries,
at Eekloo near Bruges on August 5 and sent soon thereafter

lieutenant, Viscount,
lower town.
Moreno's
and Salablanca*s, 97,
the French.
L.
P.,

Lisle.
The Spaniards were in the
company numbered 176; Pompeo's, 125;
he himself being "yet prisoner" of
XIX, pt. 2, No. 799 (1), (2).

■^^Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
108

Ibid., places their number at five hundred and iden
tifies them as Flemings, but the elder Taphoren's letter of
retainer cites the figure 406 and speaks of the men as Low
Germans, that is to say, inhabitants of North Germany. L.
£ P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 1008 (1). One interesting detail
about Nicholas, the son:
he was already Clerk of the Mu s 
ters of the High German cavalry.
Rymer, oja. cit., pt. 2,
123-24.
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to the army at Boulogne.

109

The last contingent of mercenaries retained for the
first round of fighting was that belonging to Jacques Dittre,
110
Sieur de Neville,
w h o received £200 in prest for his five
hundred Burgundian landsknechts from Sir Richard Southwell,
Vice-treasurer of the M i ddle-ward, on September 7.

D i t t r e 1s

ensign was dispatched to Montreuil where it was active in
operations until disbanded in October.

At that time its cap

tain turned to espionage, arranging espials on the French for
the English high command at Calais.

111

1 0 9 L. & p., XIX, pt. 1, No. 1008 (1); pt. 2, No. 30.
The band was allowed 159 extra pays, that is to say that for
406 men the captain drew 565 pays per month.

l-*-®Perhaps this surname should be rendered Neuville, as
in Neuville-Saint-Vaast, a settlement located four miles
north of Arras in Artois.
1 1 :L(B. M.) Add. MSS.
Nos. 259, 381.

5357, f. 172; L. & P., XIX, pt. 2

CHAPTER IX
THE ENTERPRISE O F BOULOGNE
So it was that God would not suffer these princes to
agree . . .; and I have often heard . , . that when
two princes jointly undertake the conquest of a king
dom they never agree; for. each of them is always sus
picious of being over-reached by his companion and
evermore jealous of one another . . . .
For m y part,
I should more apprehend one great single enemy than
two who would divide the cake between them . . . two
nations do not easily agree, as you see here.
Montluc, Commentaries, p. 76.
At the very least, from June to October, 1544, 6,228
free lances
French war.

1

fought for Henry VIII at the opening of the
This power, if combined with the strength of the

Imperial auxiliaries and the numerical might of the English
conscripts, gave Henry an army in excess of 42,500 effectives
of which roughly one-quarter were foreigners.

It was an im

pressive array, the most formidable force ever gathered under
the aegis of the old English monarchy.
By prior agreement with the emperor, Henry's native con
tingents should have been in France by May; yet it was not un
til that month that the first retinues, gathered in the south
ern and central shires, began to move towards their ports of

Two thousand eight hundred thirty-six m en-at-arms,
mounted pistoleers, and light cavalry, plus 3,392 lands
knechts, arquebusiers, and assorted infantrymen.
Adding the
auxiliary forces, Henry had 4,836 foreign horsemen and 5,392
foreign infantrymen.
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embarkation.

Most converged on Dover, the nearest gateway to

the Continent, but every haven from Harwich in Essex to Winchelsea in Sussex was utilized in a massive transport opera
tion which lasted from early June through mid-July.

Norfolk

and the forward component of his "vaward" sailed from Dover
on June 6 , Lord Russell and the rearguard between the eight
eenth and the twentieth.

Henry meanwhile delayed his depar

ture until July 14, though the main body of the middle-ward,
2
including the Duke of Suffolk passed to Calais by July 3.
The king's somniferous pace was unquestionably predi
cated, in part at least, upon concern for his safety and com
fort.

Henry was fifty-three years old, grossly overweight,

prone to fevers and headaches, and suffered continuous and
3
excruciating pain from varicose ulcers on both legs.
But
even without these maladies a prince, even one of "royal cour
age," was not expected to make undue haste; nor was he ex
pected to risk his life:

it was not until the end of June

that the major part of Buren's force left Saint Omer for Mo n 
treuil, and it was the second week in July before his Burgun
dians put in their appearance.

2

By the same token Lightmaker's

Goring, "The Military Obligations of the English People,
1511-1558," p. 269; Oman, The Art' of War in the Sixteenth Cen
tury, p. 339; L. &. P ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 654, 819; Rymer,
Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 119.
3
Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp. 484-86.
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horsemen were known to be behind schedule; negotiations were
still in progress with the High Germans at Liege; and Bischof,
Heurde, and the Taphorensr all of them captains assigned to
the king's battle, were at this juncture struggling to re
cruit their units and bring them through to Boulogne.
As for Henry's comfort, despite the careful planning
and fantastic expenditure the commissariat had failed to live
up to expectations.

The Imperialists also had failed to keep

their word as regards supplying the English with transport
and victuals.

"Plain writing" had begun on Norfolk's land

ing at Calais, for it was clear there was "marvellous scar
city" of nearly everything on which the army would run.
There was no fodder for animals nor carriages for ordnance.
Dray horses were either too few or too weak.

Flemish sutlers

were selling bread, the smallest loaves, at 6 d., and beer,
which with bread formed the chief staple of the sixteenthcentury soldier's diet, fetched 1 1 s. a barrel, and that "two
or three gallons short," barely "better than beer at three
4

farthings the gallon in London."
In the interval, while the generals awaited the arrival
of their foreign allies and the advent of their king, there
was another and more important problem to be wrestled with:

4 L. & P . , XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 654, 694, 709, 741, 746
(P. 456), 763, 795; Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Boulogne
and Paris," pp. 53, 67.
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no one, not even Suffolk, Henry's second-in-command, was cer
tain of how to proceed. . The main objective was still unde
fined, and when Norfolk made inquiry on June 16 on how he
should employ himself till Henry's coming his disconcerting
answer was that he could occupy himself as he pleased either
in besieging Montreuil, or if, for lack of Buren's horsemen,
that was "not convenient," he could use his time "in assaying
it upon Ardres."

5

This reply was received on the twentieth on which date
Russell's rearward completed its detrainment in Calais and
marched out to join Norfolk at Beaulieu just south of Guisnes
in the Boulonnais.

Henry now had more than twenty thousand

troops in France; but without a plan or the chaperonage of
their mercenary and auxiliary allies his subordinates wisely
hung back, refusing to commit themselves unilaterally to a
course for which if miscarried they would be held accountable.
Instead, they opened discussion with Adrien de Croy and Buren,
who both rode down with a small company of Imperialists from
Saint Omer to Alembon on June 26, and there, now that the
guilt could be shared, Norfolk and Russell agreed to besiege
6
Montreuil.
This objective having been resolved Buren

5 (B. M.)
6

Harl. MSS.

6,989, ff. 121-22.

L. & P ., ..XIX, pt. 1, No.- 786.
De Croy, Grand Master of
Flanders (above, p. 148), acted as chief liaison officer be
tween the English army and the Imperial court in Brussels.
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returned to Saint Qmer to collect the Dutch, Belgian and Ger
man force which he would personally lead as a separate command
during operations, bringing them forward to link with the Eng7
lish army before Montreuil on July 4.
The town, sitting on a high plateau on the south bank of
the River Canche, was troublesome to approach and strongly gar
risoned.

Prom intelligence gathered by their own scouts and

from De Croy the English generals learned that its governor,
Oudart de Biez, Deputy-Lieutenant of Picardy and a Marshal of
France, had thrown his field army of "Bolognians, Italians,
and Picards" inside, so that its compliment of defenders was
g

at least six thousand.

De Biez had also been fortifying for

weeks, and up-river around Hesdin the Duke of Vend 6 me was be
lieved to be lurking with five hundred lances and ten thousand
infantry, preparing to move either in support of the belea
guered marshal or to contest the main-battle1s advance on Bou
logne.

In any event Montreuil would be hard to get, in fact,

as it proved, impossible; for the upwards of twenty-eight thou
sand men who were committed to its taking proved incapable of
laying more than a half-siege, the allied commanders settling
down before the south and east quarters of the town.

It was,

as Norfolk and Russell both lamented, a strange investiture:

7 L.
g

& P . , XIX, pt. 1, No. 836.

Ibid.; Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century,
p. 340.

"Two gates are left open and a third might be used by night?"
or again,

"the town cannot be won, for men and victuals go at

pleasure."

9

No satisfactory reason for this totally unorthodox be
havior can be extracted from official accounts.

The Imperi

alists remained silent on the subject, while Norfolk and Rus
sell, in all likelihood eager to protect their own hides, laid
everything at their allies' doorstep.

It was on De Croy and

Buren's advice that Montreuil had been invested so; neither
one nor the other of those captains would "consent to divide
the siege?" nor could the gates be blockaded since the for
eigners would "in no wise lie in any quarter but near unto us."
Somehow these excuses ring hollow.

What they do not in

dicate is that Buren and De Croy, though concurring in the de
cision to attack Montreuil, had done so only because neither
Norfolk nor Russell had shown any enthusiasm for their plan
which was to march directly towards Paris and juncture with
the emperor.

Buren's feeling was that if five or six thou

sand defenders were put into Montreuil, as they were by De
Biez, it would be difficult to take;

De Croy argued that the

place should have been by-passed; and both Imperialists

9 L.

&. P. , XIX, pt.

1 0 Ibid.,

1, Nos. 909, 1005.

Nos. 795, 909.
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agreed that "it was a pity to delay going over the Somme."

11

In addition, what neither Norfolk nor Russell admit was the
intense rivalry between them, the desire of Russell to lead
the van and the duke's concern lest the Privy Seal out-gen
eral him.

These things are learned from Elis Gruffyd, the

garrulous Welsh veteran of the campaign and a non-commissioned officer in Norfolk's ward.

12

Twice on the march from

Beaulieu there were heated words because Lord Russell pre
sumed to pitch his tents "in front of the duke," and at the
commencement of the bombardment of Montreuil each claimed
1 O

the honor of the opening barrage for his own artillery.
But a further and more apposite consideration was that while
Norfolk made no attempt to encircle the town with his own
substantial forces, when Russell volunteered to do the job
himself his superior forbade him on the grounds that it was
Htoo dangerous ."14
Clearly, there is more to be considered here than the im
puted faint-heartedness of the mercenaries and auxiliaries.
Gruffyd, who rarely hides his dislike of foreigners, no
where suggests in his account of the siege that Buren's

1 LI b i d ., Nos.

12

Gruffyd,

700, 758, 806.

"The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"

p. 47.
1 3 Ibid., pp.

52, 53-54.

14L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 919.
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contingents acted dishonorably.

On the contrary, he reserves

his barbs for the unsoldierly conduct of the English, whose
officers permitted black marketeering in food and drink and
whose camp discipline was so lax that "the guts of every kind
of animal" slaughtered by the butchers of "which daily died"
were left within the host to putrify "for want of anyone to
bury t h e m . " ^
Touching the lackadaisical envelopment of Montreuil,
Gruffyd tenders the opinion tha!t sixty thousand men were not
sufficient to surround it.

"This," he says, "was partly be

cause of the shortage of bread and drink," every morsel of
which during the first month of the siege was regularly con
veyed out of Saint Omer, more than twenty miles to the north.
Such sorties took several days, and the presence of the French
at Therouanne, between Montreuil and Saint Omer, necessitated
the consignment of tens of hundreds of men, who might other
wise have been employed in the siege, to the escort of the
16
victuallers.

^ Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
pp. 56, 59, 94-95.
•I C
Ibid., pp. 53, 58.
The danger from Therouanne was
originally believed to have been circumvented by the con
struction in England of portable ovens and breweries, but
these, built on special wagons, made it only as far as Beau
lieu before shaking apart.
L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1, No. 654.
According to Gruffyd, they were returned to Guisnes for re
pair and from thence transported up the River Aa to Saint
Omer.

This too would sound like rationalization if it did not
come from Gruffyd.

The Welshman agreed with Russell:

it was

a "wild war" much to the king's dishonor and no t likely to wi n
him "one foot more than he had forty years p a s t . " ^

It was

July 7, while Suffolk and the main-battle lay encamped at M a r 
quise, before Henry divulged his real intention to his subor
dinates.

Boulogne, w h ich as he later remarked to Chapuys was

worth "ten Parises," was to be his target, though for the m o 
ment, and for the benefit of. the Imperialists, he insisted
18
that his confidants keep that information secret.
Buren
and Be Croy, considering the rejection of their earlier ad
vice, had probably long since guessed at the decision.
theless, to paraphrase Gruffyd,

Never

"to put a good face on the

matter," notwithstanding that the king did not intend them
to capture Montreuil, he would keep them at the task so that
he and his host might have their leisure "and sleep more eas19
ily in their beds in the camp round Boulogne."
20
As Professor Lacey Balwin Smith has been quick to note,
it is one of the more unfathomable puzzles of the war as to
precisely w h y Henry marked out Boulogne as his primary
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I b i d ., No. 863; pt. 2, No. 355.
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Gruffyd,

"The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"

p. 69.
9ft

Smith, Henry V I I I , the Mask of Royalty, p. 205.

objective..

The standard argument,, that the capture of Bou

logne "would rob Prance of her nearest port to Scotland and
strengthen England's grip on the Straits of Dover,"
tally untenable.

21

is to

For one thing,, as a port Boulogne was in

ferior to Etaples, ten miles further to the south on the broad
estuary of the Canche; and as for strengthening England's hand
in Scotland, French supplies and troops could be as commodiously ferried by the western route from Norman and Breton
ports like Cherbourg, Brest, and Le Harve to Scottish ports
like Ayr and Dumbarton.

22

From the standpoxnt of strategy,

Boulogne was a second-rate objective compared to Montreuil.
The latter place was by far the more important since it served
as the chief marshaling ground for western Picardy, and if
captured would have placed in serious jeopardy the entire
French defence system from the Calais Pale to the Canche, in
cluding those perennial thorns in Calesians*

sides, Ardres,

Therouanne, and Hesdin, as well as Boulogne.
Though the "why" of Henry's strategy was never explained
it can by hypothesized.
able to him.

Boulogne was the safest trophy avail

Less heavily defended than Montreuil, with

^ W e r n h a m , Before the A r m a d a , p. 153.
22

The eventual occupation of Boulogne had no effect in
cutting off French aid to Scotland.
As Smith, Henry V I I I ,
the Mask of R o y a l t y , p. 205, says, the amount of French as
sistance to the Scots "increased during the period of Eng
lish control (1544-50), and in the end [England's] defeat in
Scotland led to her withdrawal from Boulogne."
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alternate routes of retreat, either overland to Calais or by
ship to England, it was in fact the perfect prize for a bully
ing king whose legs were so inflamed he was often carried
about indoors in a sedan, who was so fat he was hoisted up
stairs by machines, and whose abundance of wives and lack of
sons made him feel he was "not a man like others."
over, costs had gotten seriously out of hand.

23

More

The price tag

of £250,000 which the Lord Chancellor, Sir Thomas Wriothesley,
and the secretary of State, Sir William Paget, had placed on
the campaign had been sorely underestimated, and in June, as
Chapuys prepared to leave England with the king, the ambassa
dor could report that "at present" Henry did not have "too
much money to dispose of."

24

Boulogne therefore, in addition

to being safer, would be cheaper to assay than Montreuil.
The royal debouchment for France began on the north bank
of the Thames on Friday, June 11.

Amid much pomp and circum

stance Henry boarded his barge at Westminster Dock, travelled
in state to Erith in Kent, and spent the night before contin
uing to Gravesend.

Here he left the river and took horse to

^ S c a r i s b r i c k , Henry V I I I , p. 486; Spanish Calendar, IV,
pt. 2, No. 1061 (p. 638).
^ A b o v e , p. 254; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 144.
The
complicated business of financing the French war is treated
in Dietz, English Government Finance, 1485-1558, Chap. XII
and passing and in Richardson, Stephen V a u g h a n , Financial
Agent of Henry V I I I , Chaps. V and VI.
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Faversham.

On the thirteenth he progressed to Forde, a coun

try residence of the Archbishop of Canterbury.

There he

dined before proceeding to Dover, from whence on the fourteenth
with the flag of Saint George at the masthead he passed to
Calais, landing at nine at night with his host in "liveries of
25
red and yellow in the gallantest fashion could be."
All this while Suffolk,

the king's lieutenant, having

made things ready for Henry's reception, lay ensconced with
the larger part of the main-battle at Marquise, nine miles
down the Calais road towards Boulogne.
Sir Anthony Browne,

On July 15 the duke,

"and other noblemen" visited Henry and

remained with him three days, inspecting the defences of
Calais and checking equipment before marching forward.
was amiss.

Much

Sterling money, which was the tender expected by

English troops, was in high demand and short supply;
m e a t ” was equally scarce;

the "limoniers"

2 f!

"horse-

brought from Eng

land were too lean; and the wagons provided out of Flanders,
"Instead of carrying the 3 0 cwt. or 40 cwt. apiece as had pre
viously been agreed,

. . . could scarcely carry 2 0 cwt.," and

a much greater number was required.

25

27

Add to these complaints

Rymer, F o e dera, VI, pt, 3, 119; Gruffyd,
prises' of Paris and Boulogne," p. 56.

"The 'Enter

^ S h a f t horses.
2 7 L. & P ., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 654, 911, 922.
The contro
versies with the Netherlands government over carts, draft
animals, and victuals were endless.
Queen Mary, in an
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the want of mercenary handgunners, pikemen, and heavy cavalry
and Henry should have been beside himself; but he was not.
The king had geared himself up to win "a notable victory."
Vaughan would find cash aplenty in Antwerp; a few more carts
and shaft animals would be wheedled out of Mary; pasturage,
if unavailable around Calais, would be found in the Boulonnais;
mercenaries were bound to appear; and as long as the besiegers
of Montreuil sustained their attack, no main French army was
likely to impede his progress to Boulogne.

Quite simply, by

no lucky chance Henry had wagered on a relative ceftainty,
and for that reason he was ebullient.
him.

Camp life agreed with

He was up late and rose early, in better health appar

ently than he had been for years.

Still, it paid to be care

ful.
The king was in no rush to meet the enemy.
lodged in the Exchequer of the Merchants Staple,

Comfortably
28

Henry re

mained in Calais until July 25 and did not actually put in

interview with Sir Edward Carne, Henry's resident envoy in
Brussels, expostulated that she had already supplied "nigh
two thousand" carriages for the English, "four times as many
as the emperor had." As for foodstuffs, during the past two
years fifty thousand men had lived off her country "which is
so w asted that provision must now be made from Holland and
Friesland."
2 8 0ne of the oldest of the English trading companies, the
Merchants of the Staple dealt in raw wool, woolfells, and
hides.
Their chief mart or staple was fixed at Calais in
1363.
It was here that all buyers from North Europe were
obliged to make their purchases.
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an appearance at Boulogne until the twenty-sixth..

Suffolk

meanwhile made first contact with the foe while reconnoitering on the eighteenth.

A party of Frenchmen, hoping to dis

courage him from coming too close to the town, sallied out to
meet him but were repulsed,
places for attack.

leaving him free to note the best

The duke completed his survey that after

noon, returning to report to Henry that there was sufficient
soil for mining, welcome news, as Suffolk had believed the
29
m a i n works stood on solid rock.
The siege was inaugurated
the following day when the duke's pioneers began tunneling
their trenches towards the castle.
Boulogne was by all accounts a sturdy stronghold.

Oc

cupying the summit and slopes of a ridge of hills which
skirted the north bank of the Liane, it was actually two
towns, the Haute Ville to the east on the highest eminence,
and beneath it to the west the Basse Ville adjacent to the
harbor.

Both, connected by thick curtain walls of thirteenth-

century construction and protected by an outer f aus'se-braye
or lower earthen rampart, were
was the smaller high

strongly bastioned; but it

town with its dominant castle and

steep sloping sides on the southeastern, southern, and west
ern approaches w hich

commanded the area and would have to be

won if Boulogne were

to become English, The only practical
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Rymer,' Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 119;' L, &'P,, XIX, pt, 1,
863, 9Q3,
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line of assault against the Haute Ville was therefore from
the northeast "where the ground is more or less on a level
Ofl
with the walls.,,J
For the time being, however, the high town
was safe.

Trenching was slow business, and the fausse-braye

in front of the castle would have to be taken if, as had been
decided, entrance was to be forced by mining.

For the moment

Suffolk focused his attention on the more superable Basse
Ville with its lower walls and less precipitous gradient, and
on Monday morning, July 21, after an artillery barrage along
the eastern flank beyond the harbor, the place was taken by
31
direct assault.
The exercise was strategically sound; it was likewise
efficiently executed.

But it was hardly an equal contest, as

in all of Boulogne there were less than three thousand sol
diers, among them a hundred men-at-arms, a thousand Picards,
and a single company of Italian hackbuteers, the aggregate
under a young and inexperienced officer, Jacques de Cousy,
Sieur de Vervins.

32

Against them Suffolk had at least ten

thousand, a number which at the coming of Henry and the

30

Oman, The A r t of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 342.

31

Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,”
p. 57; L.
P . , XIX, pt. 2, No. 424; Preface, xvii.

JALot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran^aises, p. 116; Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century,
p. 343. Vervins was the son-in-law of Marshal de Biez.

mercenaries would swell to over fourteen thousand.
On Tuesday, once the lower town had been cleared and suf
ficient troops appointed to prevent a counter-stroke,

Suffolk

moved to the west upon the citadel's only outlying defence,
"the Old Man," an ancient watchtower that stood a quarter of
a mile from the Basse Ville near the sea on the cliff which
formed the north bank of the Liane.

Reputedly of Roman ori

gin, it commanded the mouth of the river as well as the area
to the north along the coast which Suffolk had marked out for
Henry's camp.

33

Its garrison of fifteen had held off several

minor thrusts on the twenty-first, but they surrendered meekly
when the duke dragged his first gun into place to batter them.
Henry was now chafing at the bit.

The larger part of

Boulogne had been taken without him, while within the crowded
confines of Calais "the sickness," probably plague and dysen
tery, was beginning to take its toll.

He was anxious for the

"good air" of which Suffolk had written him from the royal
camp at Boulogne, air which would be that much more salubrious
since it bl e w from a quarter well out of range of cannon

33

LE.'* XIX, pt. 1, No. 964. Caligula and Julius
Caesar have variously been given credit for building the Old
Man or the "Tour de 1'Ordre," as the French knew i t .
^ R y m e r , Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 119. The guns of the Old
Man were also feared to command "the Advocate's House," the
residence within Boulogne which Suffolk proposed to assign
Henry on his later entry of state.
L. & P . , XIX, pt. 1,
No. 946.
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fire.

35

The pusillanimous king would have bolted Calais on

the twenty-first, but as brave old Suffolk was too busy in
the Basse Ville which its -defenders had tried to burn before
escaping to the high town, Henry's field headquarters were
not made ready thereby delaying the princely evacuation un36
til the twenty-fifth.
And when the exodus from the Pale
was made, though regal and grand, it was hardly befitting a
conquering hero; for Henry rode not at the head of his troops
but tamely in their midst, being met by horsemen "all the
ways" until his camp itself was reached on Saturday, the
•
37
twenty-sixth.
At Boulogne Suffolk had done well, though no impression
had yet been made on the Haute Ville.

A mound for artillery

had been raised to the level of the walls beyond the faussebraye at the northeast corner beside the castle, and two
other batteries were ordered thrown up on each flank of the
mound, one along the eastern side near the Porte de Montreuil,
another towards the west and the Porte de Calais.

35

It was

In pitching the king's camp Suffolk was instructed to
first secure or destroy the Old Man and to note "how far the
shot of the town may reach." L. £ P., XIX, pt. 1, Nos. 946,
964.
36
Ibid., pt. 2, Preface, xvi.
Henry VIII had a morbid
and excessive fear of the plague.
See Smith, Henry V I I I ,
the Mask of Royalty, p. 229.
37

Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
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dangerous work, and it took its toll in lives, particularly
among the sappers, ma n y of them Cornish and Devonshire men
brought from Montreuil where they had been unsuccessfully try38
ing to mine for weeks.
But Suffolk kept them at the task,
while Henry, again well out of h a r m ’s way, hovered to the
south in the least exposed position "well furnished for the
39
relief of all and prevention of rescues" by the enemy.
Emplacements for the guns were completed by August 2,
and on Sunday, the third, the artillery, part of a siegetrain of over 250 pieces, began its barrage of the Haute
Ville in earnest.

Huge "plums" of round shot, some weighing

in excess of sixty pounds, were directed at the curtain
around the castle, while incendiary "apples" fired from mor
tars rained death on the town and its terrified citizenry.
These latter were shells, the first ever employed by an Eng
lish army, and were the invention of two of Henry's foreign
armaments-makers, Peter Baude ^ 0 and Peter of Cologne, whom
the king had lured from the emperor's service in 154 3.

3 3 Gruffyd,

"The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"

P. 58.
39

L. £ P ., XIX, pt. 1, No. 1003.
Suffolk, the most
revered of Henry's commanders after Norfolk, was then enter
ing his sixtieth year.
In the field, according to the Lord
Admiral, Viscount Lisle, he demonstrated remarkable energy
and courage, enforcing all "to be hardy" and going as far in
the trenches "as any gunner."
Ibid., No. 949.

40

Above, p. 31.
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Hollow shot of cast iron filled with explosives which were
detonated by burning match, many were fired from Suffolk's
own battery in which the chief mortarman was a Frenchman,
.
41
B e r n a r d m e de Valois.
For two weeks a furious bombardment was maintained, but
though the curtain was weakened no actual breach was made,
and the fausse-braye outside the ramparts was still in enemy
hands.

Henry was sorely displeased, for as the Council with
42
the king had written his queen
he had anticipated in the
face of Buren's warnings a rapid conquest.

Nevertheless, on

the eighteenth he ordered that another battery be prepared,
at the same time sending into England for additional men and
43
guns.
It was during the second week of the bombardment and the

41

Pope, G u n s , p. 6 8 ; Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120;
Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," p. 57;
Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 351; L. £
P., XIX pt. 2, No. 526 (f. 26). The hiring of alien gunners
was relatively common in the early Tudor period.
There were
eleven German gunners at Newcastle in 1514 and upwards of
thirty foreigners employed in the Tower in 1536.
Wyatt,
"Aliens," pp. 139-40.
42
Catherine Parr, Regent of England in her husband's
absence, was the sixth and last of Henry's wives.
Thirty-one
and twice widowed at the time of her marriage to the king in
July, 1543, she outlived Henry and took as her fourth spouse
Thomas Seymour, Baron of Sudeley.
She died in September, 1548,
shortly after the birth of a daughter, her only child.

43L. & P . , XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 35, 105.
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relative lull which followed that the larger part of the free
lances meant for the main-battle appeared, beginning on Tues
day, August 12, with the Taphorens* five hundred "voetknechten
busschutten" and Lightmaker's "Clevoit" cavalry.
next week they drifted in:

Over the

the "three ensigns of Almains

well horsed," "the captain of the Spaniards," and finally on
the nineteenth the High Germans from Liege, who with the other
German horse "were well allowed" and personally mustered by
44
the king on Thursday, August 21.
As is noted in the Introduction of this study, one of
the sad misfortunes is that among the extensive collections
of military papers for the sixteenth century there is no ac
count of how the foreigners performed for the Tudors either
at Boulogne or in any other engagements.
always left to speculate.

The historian is

Henry, in a letter written to

Queen Catherine shortly after his mercenaries had had their
baptism of fire, speaks harshly of them:

such as he sent

against the ditch between the fau s se-braye and the castle
did "no good where any danger is," the Frenchmen being "much
45
manfuller" than either Burgundians of Flemings.
Still, here
is proof that the free lances fought where the action was hot
test, and it is perchance suggestive of their value that the

4 4 Rymer,

Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.

4 5 Ibid., pt.

2, 199.
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first meaningful headway against the Haute Ville was made
after their arrival.
On September 1 "without any loss of men" an assault
swept the French from a long section of the f aus'se-braye from
behind which the besiegers began to cut several mines towards
the castle, the ramparts beside it, and a salient to the southeast called the Fleming's Tower.

46

The army was now so close

to the walls that there was as m u c h danger from flying stone
as from the ordnance within, though on September 2 a frontal
attack on the castle and the curtain below was driven back
with heavy casualties.

The "men in the' braye broke open cer

tain doors but found much resistance of men, hailshot, and
ramparts within of stone and earth, so that they could not
enter, and at the breach of the castle the enemy cast down
great abundance of fire and stones, so that our men were fain
to recoil, many of them burnt and hurt at both places."

47

September 4 brought further disappointment, for though
the mine under the Fleming's Tower was-sprung,
tearing" the bastion, it failed to go down.

"scaking and

The charges be

neath the castle were ;exploded w i t h better results a week
later.

A sizeable gap was torn in the curtain, but three

separate assaults miscarried in one of which Girolamo, the

4 6 Xbrid. , pt.

3, 12Qt21.

4 7 1-bid., pt.

3, 121.
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Italian engineer, was slain.

A few lodgements, probably man48
ned by the Spanish and German arguebusiers,
were established
in the broken wall, but no access to the Haute Ville could be
secured.
Up to this moment the high town had held out for fiftyfive days with no relief of any kind and no hope of deliver
ance.

Picardy and the Boulonnais, save for VendSme's force

concentrated now around Therouanne to prevent the free pass
age of supplies to Montreuil, was virtually devoid of French
men of war since King Francis had assembled his troops beyond
Paris to confront the greater threat of the emperor's army in
Champagne.

Meanwhile,within the high town of Boulogne not a

house was left whole; munition was near depletion, and with
the most experienced officer, Philip Corse, captain of the
Italian hackbuteers, dead, slain on the eleventh by a burst
of artillery, Vervins, the governor, decided to capitulate.

49

Against the wishes of the civilian population which was
perhaps fearful of abuse at the hands of the victors, two
French officers, the Lords of Saint-Blimont and Freumeselles,

AR

Arquebusiers, particularly those from southern Europe,
were unexcelled in fighting from covered positions.
^ G a b r i e l Daniel, The History of France from the Time
the French Monarchy was Established in Gaul~ t o the Death of
Lewis the Fourteenth (5 vols., London: G. Strahan, 1726),
III, 376.
Hereinafter cited as The History o f France.
Gabriel makes the claim that the management o f the defence
of Boulogne had been placed in Corse's hands.
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w e r e sent to Henry to treat for terms on the afternoon of the
twelfth.

The king pr o ved magnanimous as he was anxious to

take possession.

All within the Haute Ville were guaranteed

their lives and could depart peaceably if they would deliver
up the citadel with its artillery and supplies.

Everything

wa s arranged on the thirteenth, and on the day following, the
king providing wagons and. an escort to transport the baggage
of the vanquished c h i e f s , the survivors of the siege evacuated
50
the upper town for Abbeville.
The downcast soldiers led the
retreat, preceding the nearly two thousand civilians "who were
in great sadness, anger, and affliction" and of w h o m many were
to die of exposure in the cold and damp which accompanied them
in the.ir journey.

51

B ut a sadder end was reserved for Vervins,

the young commander of Boulogne.

Having endured for eight

weeks a siege which ev en the king of France had expected to
last no m o r e than six, and having withstood an almost constant

^ G r u f f y d , "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
p. 75; L. & P ., XIX, pt. 2, No. 236.
^ H a l l ’s C h r o n i c l e , p. 862, gives the number of the g a r 
rison to m a r c h out of Boulogne as follows:
67 horse, 1,563
footmen, 800 a r q u e b u s i e r s , and 87 wounded.
Ignoring civilian
casualties, several hundred of the defenders m u s t have been
killed, but Philip the Corsican is the only one of note to be
recorded.
No estimate of the English dead is given, but the
number if anything m u s t have been greater.
Of the foreigners
o n Henry's side who m e t violent ends, besides Girolamo, only
two are mentioned, b o t h Spaniards who were hanged for leav
ing their posts at Montreuil to hunt for treasure around
Boulogne.
Rymer, Foedera, VI, pt. 3, 120.
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cannonade in which it is estimated that over one hundred thou
sand rounds of heavy shot were fired against his encircled
faubourg, he was arrested almost as soon as he reached his
own lines, tried for cowardice, and eventually beheaded in
52
the reign of Henry II.
Now that the English king had his trophy and had proven
himself "a noble and valiant conqueror," he made haste to
establish ownership of his prize.

Physical control of Bou

logne had of late been much on his mind, his anxiety prompted
by the knowledge that for weeks Imperialist mediators had been
talking of peace with the king of France.

53

Possession being

nine-tenths of the law it was to Henry's advantage that his
forces assume occupancy before the emperor agreed to terms.
Otherwise,

if they did not and Charles drew off his substan

tial assistance in men and provisions, Vervins might be en
couraged to fight on in the hope of relief which was almost

Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran
chises, p. 117. An informant with Francis wrote that Vervins,
whose good name was restored by Henry III in 1575, fired
140,000 rounds from his artillery.
53

Peace feelers had been sent out by Francis to both the
English and the Imperialist camps in an almost constant
stream.
For three weeks or more Henry's Council had been en
tertaining a French delegation at Hardelot Castle and has re
jected the offer of Ardres and an indemnity for raising the
siege.
Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
p. 72.
The emperor meanwhile had begun to seriously consider
a different set of French proposals on August 29 after a fourhour conference with Claude d'Annebaut, Admiral of France, at
Saint Venay in Champagne.
The Itinerary of the Emperor Char
les V, p. 547.
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sure to come.

Therefore, on September 14 Suffolk was sent in

to Boulogne to receive its keys and set up English polity be54
fore Vervins withdrew.
Somewhat ironically Henry postponed
his own entry into the town until the eighteenth, the day on
which, unknown to him, the emperor signed the Peace of Crepy.
The war had been an immense disappointment for Charles.
Though a force under his general, Ferrante Gonzaga, had
starved the French out of Luxemburg in May, invaded Champagne,
and began the preliminary investiture of Saint Dizier on June
7, it was not until July 6 that the emperor himself took to
the field.

As with Henry, there were difficulties in.finding

troops, the more so as Buren, Landenberg, and the Prince of
55
Orange recruited in too close proximity.
In June, Landen
berg caused near mutiny in Orange1s camp by spreading abroad
the false report that Henry paid more than Charles, while
around Strasburg, French agents lured away landsknechts about
56
as fast as the Imperial commissioners enrolled them.
Re
cruitment however was the least vexing of the emperor's pro
blems.

The quotas fixed by the treaty with England were

^ H a l l ' s Chronicle, p. 862.

/
Lot, Recherches sur les Effectxfs des Armees Frantjaises, p. 89.
55

56Ibid., pp. 89-90; L. & P . , XIX, pt. 1, No. 682.
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finally met and probably exceeded;

57

but a lack-lustre cam

paign, an insufficient commissariat, and the stubborn defence
of Saint Dizier were quandaries that could not be coped with.
When Charles left Metz on July 6 he had hopes of a rapid
triumph.

In accord with his commitment to Henry he marched

straight on the Marne, intending to follow its valley to
Paris, but Champagne which had been burned and cleared of
everything of value proved incapable of maintaining his army.

5

This necessitated the capture of some strongholds to secure
the supply trains which followed, and as Gonzaga was already
before Saint Dizier, Charles determined the place should be
taken:

it was a repeat of Henry VIII's Boulogne Campaign.

No better garrisoned or provided than the object of
Henry's desire, the town held out for sixty days, during which

S^Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Francaises, p. 1 0 0 , makes the claim that the Imperial array con
tained only thirty-five thousand.
However, the sources he
accepts in arriving at that figure are no more reliable than
those he rejects.
On June 29, Chapuys, in trying to persuade
Henry to rehire Landenberg, used the argument that, while
Charles was willing to take the colonel into his service, the
emperor "already had too many men," more in fact than he
wanted.
Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 138.
If this was the
case, Charles then, like Henry, invaded France with more than
forty-two thousand.
58

Prudencio de Sandoval, The History of Charles the V t h ,
Emperor and King of S pain,- trans. Captain John Stevens (Lon
don:
Printed for R. Smith, 1703), p. 369.

317
period well over a thousand attackers were slain.

59

Equally

depressing was the fact that its capture accomplished nothing,
for having taken and reinforced it Charles found his rear
blocked and no way to get either provisions or money by the
60
road he had opened up from Metz.
Unable to retreat from
fear of famine he pushed on down the Marne, scouring fields
and attacking towns, not for military advantage, but to se
cure food, his men a horde rather than an army, "inobedient
61
and mutinous from lack of victuals and payment.”
Only the
least defensible places were attempted.

Jalons and Chalons

because of their strong detachments were avoided; Epernay
with its full granaries was surprised; Chateau-Thierry made
no resistance; but on siezing La Ferte-sous-Jouarre on Sep
tember 8 Charles turned north on Soissons, arriving there on

The siege began in earnest on June 19, the garrison
surrendering on August 17.
As at Boulogne, the walls of Saint
Dizier were breached, but no forcible entry was made. Among
the Imperial casualties was the Prince of Orange, mortally
wounded on July 14, and in a later assault into the breach
over seven hundred of the besiegers died.
Ibid.; Lot,
Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees F r a n c i s e s , p. 93.
^^Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Frangaises, p. 1 0 1 .
^•*~Ibid., pp. 109-10.
Charles owed his soldiers a month's
wages, but because of the effective guerilla tactics of the
French light horse and exceptionally wet weather it was im
possible to bring through the pay wagons from Lorraine.
See
Wotton's despatches to Henry VIII, L. & P ., XIX, pt. 2, Nos.
267-68.
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September 10.

62

With Paris less than two days away the em

peror had taken the road to the Low Countries, forsaking the
French capital because peace talks had begun with Francis,
Charles' decision to cut his losses and run is perfectly
understandable.

The overlong siege of Saint Dizier, the in

effectuality of the logistical experts, and indiscipline had
broken his army's morale, and should it have come to a pitched
63
battle the odds, it was feared, favored the French.
:in in
forming Henry that the Treaty of Crepy had been signed the
emperor's excuse was that he had been constrained to make
peace because his ally, so far from joining in the descent on
Paris, had hung back in Picardy content to besiege two fortres
ses only a few miles from Calais.

It was a true enough accu

sation, but in Henry's defence hardly fair, since every step
of Charles' advance from Saint Dizier was in reality a re
treat, a frantic series of forced marches designed to carry
him into the Low Countries via the path of least resistance.
The English king had been inconsiderate and barely helpful in
choosing to sit down before Boulogne, but the "enterprise of
Paris" failed as much because the emperor undertook the .

/
Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Frany a i s e s , p. 106.
62

®^Morale on the French side was perhaps only marginally
better.
Paris was in a panic, and Francis was as careful to
avoid an all-out encounter as Charles.
Ibid., pp. 102, 104,
106.
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reduction of Saint Dizier.
Henry took the news of the Treaty of Crepy calmly, even
64
"benignly," with no outward show of emotion.
Charles, as
part of a general pacification, endeavored to comprehend him
in the treaty, the French offering large sums of money by way
of pensions, arrears, and indemnity for the return of Boulogne;
but Henry would not be included.

Any other pretensions he

would willingly give up— the throne of France,

Ardres, the

County of Guisnes— everything that is except the recently ac
quired proof of his manliness, the concrete evidence that in
the noble art of making war he had outmatched his compeers,
the king of France and the Holy Roman emperor, neither of
whom won anything but peace.

65

But Henry's initial coolness

& P . , XIX, pt. 2, No. 281; Spanish Calendar, VII,
No. 215.
®^This was not exactly the case.
By the Treaty of Crepy,
Charles and Francis agreed to return all conquests made since
the Truce of Nice of 1538.
The emperor renounced all claims
on Burgundy, while Francis on his part relinquished his to
Naples, Flanders, and Artois.
Charles also assented to the
marriage of Francis' second son, the Duke of Orleans, to
either his daughter with the Netherlands, or one of his
neices with the Duchy of Milan, the emperor reserving the
right of deciding which of these unions should take place.
More dangerously, by a secret signed at Meudon on September
19, Francis agreed to "declare himself the enemy of the king
of England" should Henry "wish to quarrel or make war upon
the emperor" and "to aid in the reformation of schism in the
Church."
L. & P ., XIX, pt. 2, No. 260.
The duke of Orleans
died before either marriage could take place, and fortunately
for Henry's peace of mind the "secret Treaty of Crepy" was
never divulged.
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soon evaporated, as word arrived by way of Chapuys and the
departing French negotiators at Hardelot, that the dauphin
and an army braced with mercenaries dismissed from Charles'
66
service was moving on the Boulonnais.
On the English side the military outlook was grim.

Their

forces were divided, and the larger part, still covering Henry
from Montreuil, were in dreadful condition, their camp a pest
hole of filth and carrion.

No trenches could be dug for lack

of tools or guns fired for lack of powder; there was no bread,
or beer, or forage; men ate horseflesh and much worse; while
in every billet dysentery reaped a deadly toll, more than
seven hundred of Buren's horsemen alone dying from that cause.
But Henry's worry was neither Montreuil nor its pathetic as
sailants; it was his own safety and that of Boulogne which
troubled him.

His Germans and Netherlanders were under no

obligation to serve him beyond Saint Michael's day, Septem
ber 29, and technically all of his foreigners if subjects of
the emperor could retire at any time since, as their master
was at peace with France, they could no longer legally bear
67
arms against her.

^ Spanish Calendar, VII, No, 213.
67 L. & P., XIX, pt. 2 f Nos. 178, 237,, 244, 248, 259;
Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs' des Armees Frangaises, pp.
107-08.
Buren's m e n were reported on September 17 to be
dying at the average rate of more than twenty per day^.
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Henry's first impulse was to run; yet, though his depar
ture had been planned for some time, summary escape was impos
sible.

The flotilla scheduled to escort him to England was

late in arriving, and the way to Calais was blocked by plague,
a far less discriminating opponent than the dauphin.

Under

the circumstances the only option was to call in reinforce
ments; so to that effect the van and rear of Norfolk and Rus
sell were ordered on the twenty-fifth to fall back at once on
68
Boulogne.
The resulting retiral from Montreuil was a harrowing af
fair, made more so by the emperor's punctillious reminder to
Buren that his mercenaries and auxiliaries could remain in
Tudor service no longer than the twenty-ninth.

This gave the

English four days in which to utilize the foreigners in their
retreat, and the precipitate speed with which the camp was
struck gives a fair indication of how afraid the English com
manders were of making the eighteen-mile trek to Henry's camp
without them.

To reduce the baggage train and have beasts

enough to draw the artillery, mills, bakehouses, tents, and
pavilionsi

some worth £ 1 0 0 , were burned where they stood;

the untransportable wounded, the sick, and infirm were aban
doned to the French; and in an unreasoned outburst of anger

68spanish Calendar, VII, No. 211 (pp. 270-71); L. & P.,
XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 258-59, 307.
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the Duke of Norfolk in his impotence and frustration lashed
out at Buren and the Imperialists as the sole authors of his
discomfiture.

It was the emperor, the count was told, who

r,had betrayed and sold the men of England," the duke's impli
cation clearly being that he fully expected Buren to leave
him to face the dauphin alone.

It was a strained moment,

but the Netherlands general let it pass;

he could not, he

replied, hinder his master from making treaties any more than
Norfolk could hinder Henry from doing the same; but as for
himself and the men at his command, they would maintain Eng
land's quarrel with France until Norfolk's divisons reached
69
the safety of their own lines.
This was a magnificent ges
ture, more typical perhaps of a Dutch gentleman than a mercen
ary.

Nonetheless, the promise was kept, and with Buren's men

in support the siege of Montreuil was lifted on the morning
of September 28.

A path was beaten to Etaples where the host

spent the night before firing the town and next day continued
to Neufchitel, some three French leagues from Boulogne.

Here,

with an English column marching in relief, Buren took his
leave, striking off to the north and east towards Artois, his
honor intact but doubtless feeling that his martial efforts
had been poorly expended in a useless exercise, the which had

69Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
pp. 81-82.
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never been meant to succeed.
Back in Boulogne, Henry's earlier unease had subsided.
The dauphin's advance was not as rapid as anticipated; the
Imperial mercenaries within his own command gave every indi
cation of remaining in service; and "the agreeable intelli
gence," that Norfolk, "unmolested," had effected his retreat
and was already close by revived the king's confidence.
Equally comforting to the timorous monarch was the presence
outside the harbor of the squadron of warships that would
take him home.

71

The vessels, among them at least three pro

vided by the Netherlands, had begun arriving on the twentyseventh; but by then Henry felt brave enough to postpone his
sailing until the thirtieth when, after the troops had come
up from Montreuil and Suffolk, Norfolk, and Russell had been
instructed in how to defend the king's "pieces and country"
in France, he was rowed to his flagship and carried to Dover

^ See the letter of September 3 to Charles, L. & P . , XIX,
pt. 2, No. 181 (p. 99), in which the Imperial agents at Bou
logne express the view that Henry, as he had told them in the
past, "has no other intention . . . than to win [Boulogne]
which . . . is much more important to him than Paris."
The
king was not averse to siezing Montreuil, but only if it
could be taken easily.
However, even if Montreuil did fall,
Chapuys was convinced that Henry would never try to keep it.
Rather he would use it "to make better conditions" at the
peace which was then in the offing.
^ L o t , Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran
chises, p. 118; Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 218.
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the same afternoon.
Henry's direct participation in the war was at an end;
after his own fashion the bluff Tudor had waged his last cam
paign.

He had been in Prance, including his layover in Calais,

for precisely seventy-nine days and at the fighting front for
sixty-seven.

During that period he was probably never once

within gunshot of the enemy lines or ever remotely in danger.
Now as the dauphin approached, with a real opportunity to de
monstrate that his prowess in battle ranked as high as his
other accomplishments,

"he took his way from his tents to

the sea shore," persuaded that he could make away with honor
in that he had gained his "enterprise of Boulogne" and that
73
Francis "was not coming m person" to reclaim it.
Suffolk,
Norfolk, and Russell were left behind as surrogates to defend
Boulogne and the Pale against a reported fifty thousand en
emy horse and foot with an army much thinned by casualties,
sickness, and the recall of Buren's mercenaries and auxilia
ries.

It had been neatly arranged:

the English lords would

^2Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 213; Gruffyd, "The 'Enter
prises' of Paris and Boulogne," p. 77.
That Henry's naval
escort anchored off Boulogne and not in the haven was due to
the fact that the harbor was unusable by ocean going vessels
except at high tide.
*7 "l

Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
p. 77; L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, No. 318.
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receive full blame for any disasters that might befall,

their

king the lion's share of the glory if the dauphin were turned
back.

CHAPTER X
IN THE MIDST OF L IONS;
THE SEARCH FOR MERCENARIES AND THE RETURN TO WAR
They are now in the hands of no reasonable men, but in
the cruel handling of a most cruel and wicked sort; God,
which helped Daniel in the midst of lions, deliver them
out of the hands of so wicked a people.
Vaughan to the Council, Nov. 8 , 1545.
pt. 2, No. 756.

L. 1* P . , XX,

Though Henry's removal to England was rapid, it was not
so hasty as to prevent him from devising a plan which hope
fully would avert the recapture of Boulogne.

It was simple

enough, requiring little more than the concentration of all
available forces in and around the occupied city to resist
the expected onslaught of the French.
Precisely how large the English army was is not known,
but even in its weakened state it was considerable, well in
excess of twenty thousand.

Within Boulogne itself Henry had

placed John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, as governor of the town
and seneschal of the Boulonnais.^

Under him was a garrison

of better than two thousand effectives and several hundred
pioneers, these drawn in the main from the original occupying
force of Suffolk, who with the residue of the middle ward

■^The full roster of Henry's military and civilian ap
pointments can be found in (B. M . ) Harl. MS. 283, f. 269.
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held the king's former camp by the sea.

South of the town

across the Liane lay the camps of Russell and Norfolk, the
former at Outreau, a hamlet on the left bank just east of
Boulogne haven, the latter at Le Portel, a village by the
sea.

Between them, the unsuccessful assailants of Montreuil

could muster nearly thirteen thousand, though plague and dys2
entery reduced their ranks daily.
Of the numbers of foreigners left in Tudor service, it
is impossible to be exact.

There were of course no auxilia

ries, these having marched out of the war with Buren and his
mercenaries at Neuf chattel on September 29; but in spite of
those losses there was as yet a large body of free lances
left.

In fact, as best as can be determined, when Henry

sailed for home every foreign unit which had been present at
the surrender of Boulogne was still in wages, and, the emper
or's ban to the contary, each was being urged to extend its
enlistment.

What inducements were offered have not been re

corded, but it is abundantly clear that the king took his
leave in the full expectation that his terms would be ac
cepted.

Unfortunately, in this presumption Henry was sorely

disappointed, for within a week of his landfall at Dover,
as he carefully picked his way through Kent to avoid the

2

Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,’1
p. 84? L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, NO. 297.
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contagion w hich had preceded him from France, the stunning
news arrived that the bulk of his free lances had abandoned
him, and that unnerved by their exodus his own commanders
had disobeyed orders by leading the greater part of his army
away from Boulogne to Calais.

3

What triggered the withdrawal of Henry's soldiers of
fortune is not specifically mentioned, but it was certainly
not the Imperial edict forbidding the bearing of arms against
France.

Such bans were ineffective, as Charles indirectly

admitted in conversation with Wotton at Cambray on September
24:

no subject of his, he assured the ambassador, would be

allowed to take service in France; those who did would be
4
punished as rebels.
Obviously, there would have been no
need for a penalty if it were not expected that there would
be violators of the law, as in fact there were,
lets," to use the emperor's words,

"a few var-

"that could not be stop

ped. "
H e n r y 's mercenaries it seems left the Boulonnais for
considerations more basic than fear of Imperial retribution.
In brief, their living conditions had become intolerable,
due mainly to the fact that the campaign in which they had

3 L. ji P ., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 347, 352-54.
For mention of
the plague which forced the evacuation of Queen Katherine
Parr from London, see ibid., Nos. 246, 258.

4Ibid., No. 374.
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fought was one of the wettest on record.

From beginning to

end, the struggle had been punctuated by tempestuous storms
and driving rains which had brought in their wake pestilence
and death.

As at Montreuil, the mortality rate at Boulogne

was staggering, not only among the free lances, most of whom
were cavalrymen, but among their precious mounts as well.
Gruffyd, who came to Boulogne with Norfolk, paints a grim
picture of a sodden, barren land devoid of shelter, an almost
grassless sea of m u d in which there was nothing to feed the
horses except a little mouldering pulse which the animals refused and therefore died from lack of nourishment.

5

There had been since before H e n r y ’s departure some indi
cation of mercenary discontentment, but nothing to suggest an
imminent pull-out.

In the week following the surrender of

Boulogne, one German in a fit of ill-humor had wounded an
Englishman in the throat, and another in a fray with certain
Irishmen had run his opponent through the breast with a boar
spear.

Such incidents, though serious, were normal and even

expected in armies as heterogeneous as H e n r y ’s.

Tempers were

bound to flare on occasion when warlike men of divers nations
were thrown together, and when the English captain on the
spot demanded and received amends from his German

5

p. 85.

Gruffyd,

"The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
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counterparts ,6 the matter was dropped in consideration, no
doubt, of the genuine hope that the mercenaries, however
irascible, would heed the king's plea to remain.

That hope

was dashed on October 1 when, in the wake of a successful
action fought against the advanced guard of the dauphin's
army, morale among the Germans and Netherlanders collapsed
completely.
To get at the enemy w h o suddenly appeared between
Outreau and Le Portel, the mercenaries and Suffolk's English
forces had forded the Liane.

Soaked to the skin and exposed

to a freezing wind, they ha d kept to the field all afternoon,
recrossing the river only after Norfolk and Russell had re
located their camps on the north bank round the Old Man.
Once back at Boulogne, "through extreme cold and wading the
water," many fell sick, and when pressed to remain to defend
the threatened city the foreigners "waxed very forward," de
manded their release, and retired to Calais where on the
tenth of the month most drew their final weeks' wages before
7

passing on to the Low Countries and home.
The tergiversation of the free lances sent a shock wave
through the entire Tudor military establishment, and some
thing close to panic gripped the high command.

6L. & P . , XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 263, 296.
7
Ibid., Nos. 353, 402.

On Friday
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morning, October 3, the very day on w h i c h the Germans and
Netherlanders appear to have initiated their walk^out, Suf
folk, Norfolk, and Russell ordered their forces to fall back
on Calais, leaving behind what under the circumstances was
a meager garrison of thirty-three hundred effectives to face
an almost certain French attack on the torn walls and unre8
paired breaches of battered Boulogne.
The withdrawal from the Boulonnais was a chaotic flight.
Each man set his own pace, no one keeping order or posting
scouts to guard the way.

Near Wimille, between Boulogne and

Marquise, a party of English gunners who strayed from the
main body were set upon and mauled by a roving band of French
horsemen.

Once past Marquise, with three or four miles of

potentially hostile territory still to be negotiated, the
chiefs of staff fled with the artillery, and on reaching
Calais shut the gates of the town against the rest, so that
from lack of warmth and medical attention many of the common
9
soldiers died.
It was a thoroughly disgraceful episode, totally ignored
in the official reports of Norfolk and the other generals.
In their letters to the king they employed the most incrediable
logic to justify their withdrawal from Boulogne.

8 rbid.-, No.

All agreed

353.

9
Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
pp. 85-86.
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that in their present state the Basse Ville and the adjacent
harbor were indefensible and were likely to be burned in any
assault.

Defence-works, which Henry had ordered, were needed

to strengthen these places, but in the considered opinion of
the English leaders it was not the season to build.

Winter

was upon them, and fearing "great destruction of people" from
the cold and damp, and professing to have intelligence of an
attempt upon the Pale, they resolved to "leave Boulogne the
better furnished" by retiring with the whole army to Calais.

10

How the threatened fortress could be "the better fur
nished” by depriving it of the troops who were to have served
as its main line of defence is difficult to comprehend.

Nor

folk argued that the retreat had conserved on victuals, that
left on its own the Boulogne garrison had provisions enough
to last four thousand men three months, whereas had the army
remained it would have consumed in a single day as much as
would otherwise have sufficed for s e v e n . ^

Xt was a point

well taken, except that it ignored the important fact that
most of the garrison1s supplies, including munitions, had
been stored in the weaker lower town which by his own admis
sion was likely to be overwhelmed if attacked.
Henry was in no mood for excuses invalid or otherwise.

10L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, NO. 353.
X1Ibid.
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and ignoring his own late shortcomings in the field, he
roundly lambasted his commanders for their rank ineptitude
and unsoldierly conduct.

His affairs, as he berated them

through his Council, w e re being "very loosely handled many
ways."

By their "light coming away from Boulogne" they had

demonstrated that they were "too well minded to come home
ward," while their "bolstering and unapparent reasons . . .
inculk[ed]

a feigned necessity to cloak and maintain faults

too much apparent to indifferent eyes."

To Norfolk, Suffolk,

and Russell the king wrote a blistering reprimand on October
8.

Their "ill-favored retreat," he lectured them, had

touched his honor, and to make restitution they must return
to Boulogne.

12

It was a plain enough directive, but impos

sible to execute, for by this time the dauphin had blocked
the roads south with thirty thousand men.

Moreover, as

Henry's discomfitted generals ruefully explained, without
the support of their n o w departed German and Netherlands
horse there was no hope of fighting their way through, par
ticularly since among the English disease had so debilitated
the ranks that the sick and dying lay untended in the
streets.^
In the meantime, as Henry raged and his army languished

12Ibid., Nos. 374, 383.
13Ibid., No. 402.
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in its impotence w i t h i n the Pale,

the dauphin, after d iver

sionary thrusts towards Haittmes an d Guisnes, essayed the great
undertaking of the winter, the ill-starred "Caraisade of Bou
logne," ^

whose failure saved not only the city, but perhaps

as well the careers of those noble lords at Calais to whom
had be e n entrusted its protection.

The onslaught, when it

came, was made by twenty-three companies of French and Ital
ian infantry who attacked near midnight on October 9.

Aided

by the negligence of the English pickets and b y what Gruffyd
termed the "prodigious dark," the French, w i t h the Italians
in support, poured into the lower town from the west side
through no fewer than four breaches, the lead units wearing
white shirts over their battle dress to distinguish them
from the foe.

Superior in strength to the defenders, the

assailants carried the Basse V i l l e in a rout.

Hundreds of

Englishmen were slain as they ran to, arms, and many in the
garrison were made prisoners, among them perhaps Alonzo
Salablanca, the captain of a Spanish company in the Old Man,

14

The best accounts of the "camisade" or night attack
were w r i t t e n on the French side b y Blaize de Montluc, The
Commentaries of Messire Blaize de Montluc, trans. Charles
Cotton (London, 1674) , pp. 80-82 (hereinafter cited as
Commentaries) , and Martin du Bellay, Memoires de Messire
Martin du Bellay, Seigneur de Langey in Collection Universelle des Memoires Particullers Relatifs ik l'Histoire de
France (66 vols.; London, 1785-91), XXI, 204-05 (hereinafter
cited as Memoires) . On the English side, see Gruffyd, "The
’Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne," pp. 88-92.
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who in December, though still carried in the musters, was
listed as being yet a captive of the French.

15

There were on the occasion of the ''camisade11 fewer than
five hundred mercenaries on the English side at Boulogne; and
these, excepting a single band of 120 Netherlands horse retained at Calais,

16

represented the only foreigners to con

tinue in Tudor service following the walkout of the week pre
ceding.

Why these should have remained is a mystery, but to

a man the Boulogne free lances were Latins, the Italian

and

Spanish arquebusiers of Salerno, Salablanca, Pompeo, and
Moreno.
Of the companies which they formed, the smallest was the
Italian.

Posted within the main citadel that was the Haute

Ville, its eighty-eight men escaped completely any direct con
frontation with the French, whose depredations
entirely to the lower town.

were confined

It was the larger Spanish units

under Moreno in the Basse Ville and Salablanca and Pompeo in

1 5 L. 6i P., XIX, pt. 2,
No. 799 (2, iii) . How and when
Salablanca was released is unknown, but by the end of the
summer of 1545 he was in Essex.
In the beginning of Septem
ber he was ordered to Calais as part of an army destined for
the relief of Boulogne, the city having been subjected to
steady French pressure since July.
Ibid., XX, pt. 2, Nos.
271, 272, 345.
1 6 Ibid., XIX, pt. 2, No. 402.
These cavalrymen were
seemingly under the command of the resourceful Thomas Lightmaker.
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the Old Man that were exposed to the gravest danger, but save
for the captured Salablanca no other mercenary victims of the
"camisade" can be found.
As regards the Spaniards' role in resisting the enemy,
they appear to have been as ineffective as their English com
rades-in-arms.

Being hackbutteers whose forte was fighting

from the defensive behind obstructions, it seems natural to
assume that they would have been stationed on the walls or
even in the trenches beyond them.

This would explain the

seizure of Salablanca, for the Old Man, though subjected to
assault, was never entered.

In all likelihood, it was the

Spaniards along with the English watch who were hurled aside
in the initial rush; but in defence of the free lances, as
can be verified in written accounts on both sides, the rain
fell in such torrents throughout the night that along the
front where the French attacked no gun of any kind could be
^ 17
fired.
Given the ease with which entry was made into the lower
town and the unpreparedness of its guardians, the "camisade"
should have spelled total disaster for the English.

However,

on the brink of success the French through greed allowed
victory to escape them.

Confronted with the piles of

■^Gruffyd, "The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne,"
p. 91; Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI, 204-05.
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provisions left by the Tudor army on its retreat to Calais,
they b e gan to pillage,

ignoring the danger from the Haute

Ville w h ere the ma i n English garrison prepared a counter
attack.

The French standards w h i c h were planted here and

there about the lower town had not, according to one eye
witness, as many as twenty men around them.

Worse, the of

ficers lost complete control over their soldiers, so that
when the English charged down upon them the plunderers, with
losses of upwards of six hundred, were forced out of the
Basse V i l l e in less time than it had taken them to win it.

18

For the dauphin, who throughout the proceedings had re
mained inactive in the hills beyond the Old Man with a re
serve of six thousand Swiss, the sight of his stricken van
as it struggled back to camp was unsettling.
among his key personnel were critical:

Casualties

Jean de Tais, chief

captain of the raiders, was badly wounded, while the Sieur
de Fouquerolles,

leader of the French contingents, was dead.

Nonetheless, had the prince had his way, the affair would
have b e e n recommenced, but for once conditions favored the
English.

Continued rains, low morale, and short rations

forced a French retreat.

Boulogne,

for the time being, was

left to its defenders, and the dauphin, after a weak feint
towards Guisnes, fell back on Montreuil, from whence, after

1 fl

Montluc, Commentaries, pp. 81-82.
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disbanding his army, he retired for the winter to Paris.

19

If Henry VIII took comfort in his good fortune, the les
son of the "camisade" was not lost upon him.

The lower town

in its ruined state was indefensible, so on October 14, with
the French still probing the Pale perimeter, emphatic instruc
tions were issued from Westminster for the immediate rein
forcement of his prize.

Two thousand men were ordered to

Boulogne from Calais, and the recruitment of mercenaries, in
particular any willing to forsake French wages, was encouraged,
with the obvious view of learning the enemy's intention.

20

How many deserted for Henry's gold cannot be accuragely gaged,
but by the end of October several hundred, mainly Italians,
succumbed to his overtures.

21

Even counting the free lances already in service, com
pared to the multitudes hired for the summer fighting at Montreuil and Boulogne, the numbers retained in the winter of
1544 were miniscule indeed.

Perhaps, all told, by the end of

the year Henry had a thousand mercenaries under arms, and it

19

^

Lot, Recherches sur les Effectifs des Armees Fran^aises, p. 119.
20
21

L. & P . , XIX, pt. 2, No, 436.

Ibid., Nos. 434, 454, 497.
The only captain who can
be identified was the Piedmontese condottiere, Bartholomew
de C&res, a renegade from the dauphin's host, who volun
teered himself, forty mounted arquebusiers, and three hun
dred footmen "of the bravest of all the French army."
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is obvious, as well it should have been, that the dearth of
foreign levies was cause for the gravest concern.
sade" of Boulogne had been a close run thing.

The "carai-

More to the

point, with that city and the entire Pale bidding fair to be
subjected to further French aggression in the spring, the sea
son was ripe, as Chancellor Wriothesley noted in a communique
to Secretary Paget, "to meet the practices of the world in
time." 22
Winter, then, while it brought in its wake the usual
lull in hostilities, was a time of frenetic activity, espe
cially on the diplomatic front, as the Henrician government,
devoid of allies and naked to its enemy, strove to find new
confederates and mercenaries in whatever quarters seemed most
likely to produce them.

In November serious consideration

was given to the opening of negotiations with the Lutheran
princes of Germany, with the Hanse towns along the Baltic,
and with the kingdom of Denmark.

It was, or so it momentar

ily seemed, 1539 all over again.

Protestant fears, no less

than Henry's, had been revived by the Treaty of Crepy, whose
subscribers even at this moment were being exhorted by the
common enemy, Rome, to unite in holy war against schismatics
23
on both sides of the Channel.
There were reports that

22Ibid., No. 614.
23Ibid., Nos. 677, 679, 700.
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certain of the Hanse towns had expressed a willingness to
serve the English king on the sea; talk was heard of an al
liance with the Schmalkaldic League; and two of the foremost
Protestants, Frederick, the Elector-Palatine of the Rhine,
and Maurice, Duke of Saxony, went as far as to send servants
24
offering troops for the war against France.
Such overtures
Henry found pleasing in the extreme, but the promise they
held forth of unlimited quantities of mercenaries and auxil
iaries evaporated with the spring.

Fear of the emperor,

internal jealousies, and personal ambition had weakened the
Germans' resolve.

The Hanse, as it transpired, provided

neither men nor ships; the Saxon Elector, John Frederick, who
25
had succeeded his father
as one of the joint commanders-in
chief of the forces of the Schmalkaldic League, would not
deign to meet with Henry's envoys; while the Elector-Palatine
and the Saxon duke were bribed into happy neutrality.

26

In retrospect, the loss of the Protestant alliance was

2 4 Ibid. , Nos.
2 ^John,

508, 699, 746; XX, pt. 1, No. 90.

Elector of Saxony (d. 1532).

2 6 L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 212; pt. 2, Nos. 67-69; A. H.
Johnson, Europe in the Sixteenth Century, 1494-1598 (London:
Rivingtons, 1898), pp. 222-23. Frederick the Elector-Pala
tine was supported by Charles V in an unsuccessful bid to
gain the throne of Denmark.
On the other hand, Maurice of
Saxony was lured into an alliance with the emperor in the
hope of gaining electoral Saxony from his cousin, John Fre
derick.
The Electorate was in fact bestowed upon Maurice on
the outbreak of the Schmalkaldic War in 1546.
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fortunate indeed.

At best it only could have served to ir

ritate the emperor, who far from craving a quarrel with Eng4

land desired most to isolate the Lutherans that he might the
better chastise them.

Likewise, such a compact would have

been useful to Henry solely in the event of an actual break
with Charles, but that was to be avoided.

For sure, there

came a moment early in 1545 when rupture seemed imminent.

An

awkward dispute arose concerning the impounding of certain
Flemish ships which had been caught trading with France, but
the matter was amicably composed on April 6 .

27

Meanwhile, a

scant week earlier, in answer to the Lutheran Landgrave of
Hesse, regarding his offer of ten thousand landsknechts and
two thousand horse, the Privy Council informed him that the
king intended to satisfy his requirements elsewhere, having
more supplicants daily than he would need.

28

It was an exaggerated claim calculated to assuage Impe
rial Catholic tempers, as with the Elector, John Frederick of
Saxony, Landgrave Philip stood highest in authority among the
princes of the Augsburg Confession.

Henry did not have the

mercenaries he needed, though by April his deficiency in that
area was less keenly felt.

Throughout the winter there had

2^Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 2; L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos.
8-10, 494; {B. M.) Add. MS. 28,594, ff. 66-67b.
28

State Papers, X, 239, 338, 379.
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been hirings.

Most were nameless recruits, campaigners and

deserters from the war of 1544.

Many who can be identified

were acquired in the Low Countries through contacts like the
resident English factor, Stephen Vaughan, who secured employ
ment in December for two adventurers, an Italian, Angelo
Mariano of Cremona, and a Spaniard, Antonio de Mora, veteran
29
of the expeditionary force which had beseiged Montreuil.
Another captain with previous English experience was Ytellwolf von Gudenberg, the same Lord of Itter who had served
Henry at the capture of Boulogne.

He and a fellow German,

Gottfried von Bocholt, were commissioned in January, each
entrusted with the raising of five hundred men-at-arms for
30
the wars.
January was an auspicious month for recruiting as it was
a time of mass disbandments of the emperor's Spaniards in the
Netherlands.

Having been engaged for the defence of the Low

Countries in 1544, they were at their discharge provided
nine transports to convey them back to Spain.

All of the

vessels carrying several thousand of these men briefly put
in at Rye where an offer of their services was sent to the
king.

The masters of the ships would not, however, wait upon

an answer, but on making a second landfall at Falmouth six

29L. & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos. 715, 781, 787.
30
Ibid., XX, pt. 1, No. 88 and below, p. 371.
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hundred came ashore and were placed under contract by one of
31
the king's gentlemen ushers, Sir Philip Hoby.
It was one
of the largest, fastest, and apparently most amicable of
such signings during the entire war.
The majority of the free lances obtained in 1545 and
thereafter were not, however, so easily come by, for the Hapsburg emperor took his new found neutrality seriously.

With

the conclusion of the Treaty of Crepy, Charles made it a
capital offence for any of his men of war to take employment
with foreign princes, and in January of the new year he added
some teeth to the measure by positively refusing safe-conducts
through his lands for mercenaries Henry planned to recruit in
Germany and in Italy.

It was, as the Imperial Secretary,

Granvelle, told Wotton, an importune season to ask for Ger
mans, since the Grand Turk, Suleiman, was expected momentar
ily to descend on Hungary, whereas Italians, with or without
safe-conducts, were certain to be set upon by the Germans and
would only infect Englishmen "with their adominable v i c e . ”

32

Such logic appeared fatuous to the Tudor king, w ho com
plained loudly of the emperor's "discourtesies" and "inhuman
ities."

Germany, whether at war with the Infidel or not, had

troops enough for many armies, while the morals of Italians

31L. &

p

., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 59, 106, 326.

^ State Papers, X, 291.
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were of no consequence whatever given the fact that Henry had
already commissioned four

.including Angelo Mariano r to raise

thirty companies— some foot and some horse— in the territories
of the Venetians.
sive trio.

The remaining, condottieri made an impres

One was a count, Bernardo di San Bonifacio of

Verona, whom Henry through his intercession with the Imperial
ists had saved from possible execution of 1543,

Taken pris

oner that year in Luxemberg while alledgedly "wearing sec
retly" a French uniform, he had been incarcerated at Rippemonde in the L o w Countries until his release towards the end
of August, 1544.

After that date nothing else is heard of

him until January, 1545, when he was cited by Chapuys as hav
ing been recently retained to find troops for the English in
33
Venice.
The third captain involved in the Italian venture was
Filippo Pini of Lucca, erroneously identified in a letter to
the emperor as the "Prince of Bucharest,"

34

while the fourth

member of the quartet was Ludovico da l'Armi, whose misdeeds
both in and out of English service make some of the most lu
rid reading in all the annals of mercenary warfare.

Born

into the petty aristocracy of Bologna, the product of the

3^L. & P . , XVIII, pt, 2, No. 225; Spanish' 'Calendar,
VII, Nos. 198, 109; VIII, No. 2,
34

Spanish Calendar, VXII, N o 2,
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marriage of Lord Gasparo da l'Armi and Lady Aurelia Campeggio,
he had chosen the condottiere*s life after being outlawed
from his native city for a homicide committed in his youth.
His first employment had been in France, where he became the
familiar of the dauphin, who in 1541 had accorded him the
honor of engineering the overthrow of the Imperialist-control
led government of Sienna.

However, Ludovico's intrigues were

uncovered, and when he himself was apprehended while fleeing
through the Florentine territories of the emperor's ally,
Duke Cosimo de' Medici, he volunteered such information as
saved his life and assured the rout of the French party in
35
Sienna.
In the wake of his arrest, all trace of Da l'Armi is
lost for three years.
many, where in June,

When next he is found it was in Ger
1544, on the eve of the Boulogne cam

paign, he was commended to Henry through the troublesome
Badener, Landenberg, by the bishops of Augusburg and Trent.

36

In August he was a brief visitor at the siege of Boulogne,
where by his disparaging remarks and pro-French bias he in
curred the wrath of many an Englishman, including Sir William

35

John Addington Symonds,' renaissance In Italy (2 vols. :
N e w York:
The Modern Library, h, d . ) , ii', 708;: Venetian
Calendar, V, xxx.

36L.‘
- & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 713 Cp. 442).

346
Paget, who considered him an upstart and more likely a spy.

37

But if Henry ever doubted the man, the feeling soon passed.
By the end of the year he had secured Da l ’Armi with his
gold, accrediting him to the Venetian Republic as his colo
nel at fifty crowns a month, with orders to recruit eight
captains who themselves were exhorted to entertain the most
38
select men that they could find.
Surely, as that illustrious Victorian, Froude, pointed
out over a century ago, there was no stranger phenomenon of
the times than the high esteem of Henry VIII among younger
Italians.

39

Their response to his call to arms was so over

whelming that Edmund Harvel, the resident Tudor envoy in
Venice, was kept hopping for months by the flood of suppli
cants begging employment.

Captains, he reported to Henry on

March 1, resorted to him daily "as though all Italy were
under your Majesty's empire and at [your] commandmant."^0
There is no certain explanation for this attraction aside
from the obvious reason that both king and condottieri had
mutually supportive needs, Henry for fighting men, the free

3 7 Ibid., pt.

2, Nos. 93, 117,

3 ^lbid., XX, pt.

1, No. 650 (1).

39

James Anthone Froude,' History of England from' the
Fall' of Wolsey to the Death of Elizabeth (12 vols. j New York:
Scribner, 1870), IV, 415.
40

L.- & P., XX, pt. 1, No, 292.
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lances for work.

Yet, perhaps there was something which the

Italians found more alluring than English gold.

It is just

possible that among those who flocked to Henry's standard
many were attracted by that monarch's hatred of Rome; for
though it is hardly proof of their religious predilection a
suspiciously high percentage of officers taken into wages
came from noted hotbeds of Italian Protestantism.

Cremona,

the city in the Milanese which produced Angelo Mariano, was
a center of Lutheran and Calvinist activity; Verona, on the
Venetian mainland, from which sprang San Bonifacio, lay
close to Vicenza which sheltered a large Anabaptist commun
ity; while Plippo Pini's Lucca and Da l'Armi's Bologna har
bored Protestants of many persuasions.

All told, of the

thirty captains hired by that foursome, nine can be posi
tively identified as citizens of towns in which the reformed
41
faith flourished;
and it is perhaps only coincidental that
one of the men most vigorously occupied in the enrollment of
this force was Harvel's secretary, Baldassare Altieri, a

^ B a r t h o l o m e o Moreni, Modena; Ludovico de Monte and
Count Antonio Benilacgua, Verona; Bambino de Carpi, Ferrara;
Battista Oliva, Mantua; Count Bonifacio Tresino, Vicenza;
Lorenzo Carli,and a captain Ventura, Lucca; and one Captain
Gramegna, Bologna.
The names of all thirty captains can be
gleaned from the following documents:
Ibid., Nos. 650 (2),
751 (2). On the impact of the Reformation in Italy, consult
Elton, ed., The Reformation, 1520-1559, Chap. VIII.

native of the Abruzzi and vociferous champion of Lutheranism.
For whatever reasons, recruitment in the Venetian Repub
lic was a huge success.

The four senior officers were al

lowed three m o n t h s 1 wages in advance and commenced the en
listment of troops in April, Da l'Armi establishing his head
quarters in Venice,

the others concentrating on the mainland
M

A

towns of Verona and Vicenza.

How many rank and file were
44
actually mustered has gone unmentzoned,
but signings were
heavy enough to alarm Francis I and his ally, Pope Paul III,
both of whom feared an invasion of French-controlled Pied
mont and the disruption of the Council of Trent, that chief
instrument of the Catholic Reformation which the pontiff had
45
decreed should open that spring.

4 ^Elton,

e d . , The Reformation, 1520-1559, pp. 262-63.

^ V e n e t i a n C a lendar, Nos. 334, 337-38.
44One of Da l'Armi*s captains, Ludovico de Monte, writ
ing to an agent of the Venetian government on July 29, 1545,
projected that ten thousand foot and six hundred horse were
to be raised by Henry and given to Charles II, the dispos
sessed Duke of Savoy, for the recovery of "his territory of
Piedmont."
I b i d ., No. 343. If such a course was actually
planned, nothing came of it.
45

The Council of Trent, after long delays, officially
convened in December, 1545.
In three great sessions last
ing until 1563, it touched upon all aspects of religious
life.
It corrected many of the abuses in the Roman Church
which had brought on the Reformation, clarified Catholic
doctrine, and set the pattern for modern Catholicism.
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Paul, indeed, had immediate cause for concern, since
Trent, on the Italian side of the Alps, lay within easy
reach of every center w here H enry1s condottieri were gather46
ing.
Moreover, Da l'Armi was his rebel,
and in the pope's
view that desperado had been hired specifically to ensnare
none other than the English cardinal, Reginald Pole, who
w i t h two fellow legates, Marcello Cervini and Giovanni de
Monte, had been ordered from Rome to convene the council in
47
March.
There is scant evidence on the English side, but enough
from other sources, to suggest that Pole's life was in truth
in danger.

He alone of the legates arrived late in Trent,

reaching the city by a circuitous route in April, more than
a month behind his colleagues who were there at the appointed
time.

48

In the interim,

the pope applied to Da l'Armi for a

safe-conduct, so that his hunted prelate could pass through
Romagna in safety; but the document was refused, despite the
arrest of Da l'Armi's father, who was briefly detained in

Bologna, from w h i c h Da l'Armi eminated, lay within the
boundaries of the papal state of Romagna.
^ L . & P., XIX, pt. 2, Nos, 6 8 6 , 743, 751.
Its opening
was delayecT By the Imperial Diet of Worms (December, 1544, to
July, 1545) in which the emperor, for a final time before the
outbreak of the Schmalkaldic War, sought to comprise his re
ligious differences w i t h the Lutherans.
:O
■ Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 33
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Rome and later sent to Venice to urge his son to remove himself from Tudor service.

49

Pole ultimately arrived in Trent

without incident, yet only after hiring his own band of cut
throats in Bologna, wherein, he reported, men were continually
50
kept by Ludovico.
That Henry in this instance had ordered the elimination
of the ecclesiarch is certainly within the realm of possibil
ity.

Like Da l'Armi, Pole too was a traitor and an outcast,

having been attained by the English Parliament in 1539 for a
multitude of offenses, not the least of which was his author
ship of that violent assault on Henry's sensibilities, Pro
Ecclesiasticae Unitatis Defensione.

The cardinal, who in

that manuscript compared his sovereign to the despots, Nero
and Domitian, was dearly hated, and a number of attempts had
previously been made to assassinate him.

842.

That he had escaped

Ibid.; L. s P . , XX, pt. 1, Nos. 417, 425 (pp. 188-89),
See also Venetian Calendar, V, Nos. 334-35.
5 0 L.

51

& P . , XX, pt. 1, No. 602.

This polemic, completed in Venice in 1536, had been in
tended to turn the king's course from religious revolution to
reconciliation with Rome, but its effect had been otherwise.
Unsparing in its abuse and threatening in the extreme, it
inveighed against H e nry’s persecution of the Catholic faith
ful and denounced him as a plunderer of his subjects.
Its
end result was to hasten the destruction of Pole's brother,
Lord Montague, and his mother, the Countess of Salisbury, who
were respectively executed in 1538 and 1541.
Mackie, The
Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558, pp. 396, 547-48.
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death at the hands of Henry's agents in the Netherlands in
52
1536, in Venice in 1538, and in Viterbo in 1540
is reason
enough to suspect that Da l'Armi had been specially commis
sioned to murder him; yet, by the same token it is abundantly
clear that Henry’s main object in Italy was not the liquida
tion of Pole but the acquisition of mercenaries for his on
going war in the north.

He had hired the captains, and by

all accounts they could deliver the men.

What remained to

be done, but could not be accomplished, was the transmission
of the troops to the English front.
As from the first, the chief impediment to the movement
of the Italian free lances remained the lack of passports.
The logical path for them to have followed would have been
overland through the Empire to the Netherlands and Calais,
except that, as has been noted, the emperor would grant no
license through his dominions to any soldiers whom it was the
English government's plan to engage.

Memories of Lander-

berg's depredations around Liege still rankled in Imperialist
minds from the previous year, and the best that Charles
could suggest regarding the Italians in the Venetian terri
tories was that Henry bring them by sea from the Mediterranean.

53

It seemed on the surface a reasonable alternative,

^ J a m e s Gairdner,

"Reginald Pole," D. N. B . , XVI, 37-39.

^3Spanish Calendar, VIII, Nos.

8 , 15.
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but it was not.

Henry did not have the ships,

54

and even if

he had, the journey through the great inland sea, alive as it
was with French galleys and Turkish corsairs was too hazardous
to risk.

The mercenaries from Venice were lost to him.

Of

the thousands that might have been activated, barely two hun
dred were called to duty, Da l'Armi sending two companies of
light horse, one to England and another to Guisnes, in July.

55

All the while, hope was held out that the emperor would change
his mind about the passports.

But as he did not, with the

year far spent, Harvel was ordered in September to come to an
understanding with the principal officers:

Da l'Armi, San

Bonifacio, Pini, and Mariano would continue to function as
English agents; their captains, however, were to be discharged
with the promise that next year, if needed, Henry would not
refuse their services.

56

As will later appear, the English failure to bring the
Italian companies from Venice was keenly felt, for militarily
1545 was a busy year.

Nonetheless, everything considered,

5 4 Henry's navy,

comprised of about fifty vessels, was
needed in home waters to protect and supply Boulogne, to
harass the Scots, and to defend against that constant danger,
invasion from France.
On the size of the navy, see William
son, The Tudor Age, p. 447.
See also, L. & P., XX, pt. 1,
No. lST"(p. 50).
55Venetian Calendar, V, No. 343; L. & P., XX, pt. 2,
Nos. 196, 997.

56L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 704.
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Henry had good luck in finding mercenaries.

The build-up

t

through the spring, though slow, was constant.

Free lances,

individually and in small bands, inobtrusively materialized,
most, -it would seem, at Calais, where in the last days of
February Secretary Paget reported so many had gathered that
they were beginning to cause the civic authorities there con57
cern.
Musters were supervised by Sir George Broke, Lord
Cobham, who as Deputy of Calais, and the king*s chief officer
in the town had general responsibility for the issuance of
contracts, the administration of loyalty oaths to individual
58
foreign captains,
and the maintenance of discipline among
the latters' men.

59

^ I b i d . , pt. 1, No.
58

257.

See above, p. 97, n. 25,

^ T h e disciplinary ordinances for mercenaries then in
force in Calais and its immediate environs required:
"That the captain of a band will neither attempt
nor practice in any way to fill or supply his band
of soldiers with others having office under the King,
our Lord, nor receive any soldier to be enrolled in
his said band, without first having informed my
Lord, the deputy . . ., under pain of [blank}.
That when musters are taken, no soldier answers for
or in the name of another on pain of [blank].
That no Captain practices to supply his band at the
musters with other soldiers who are not his own, in
order to deceive the Commissioners [of the Musters]
and for his own profit under pain of [blank].
The said soldiers will not fight with one another
under pain of [blank].
The said soldiers will not sow any mutiny or fac
tion among the band on pain of [blank].
No one will leave the outskirts of the camp for
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No accurate count of the mercenaries retained by Cobham
in early 1545 can be provided for lack of particular informa
tion.

Nevertheless, some idea of their strength can be gath

ered from the large numbers trans-shipped to England, where
as winter ended another alarum had been sounded along the
northern frontier.

On February 27, an English force of five

thousand returning from a raid in Teviotdale was ambushed by
the Scots on Ancrum Moor.

Fourteen hundred English soldiers

were killed or captured, and their leaders, Sir Ralph Evers,
Warden of the Middle Marches, and Sir Brian Layton, Captain
60
of Norham Castle, left dead on the field.
The defeat in it
self was serious enough, but compounding the disaster, and

the place where the band will be ordered to stay
and serve, without having leave of the Captain.
No one will sound the alarm without the order of
the Captain on pain of [blank].
When the band or some number thereof will be
ordered to do some exploit or strike the enemy,
they will do it without any contradiction or
difficulty on pain of [blank].
That in all things convenient and lawful they be
obedient to the commands of the Captain, without
running counter thereto on pain of [blank].
That none leave or embrace practices with the
enemy without the knowledge and command of those
who will have oversight on pain of [blank]."
The preceding ordinances can be found in (P. R. O.) S. P.
1/198, f. 50b.
**®A somewhat romanticized, but useful, account of this
action is provided by Colin J. M. Martin, "Ancrum Moor:
A
Day of Reckoning," The Scots M a g azine, n. s. LXXXIII, No. 2
(May 1965), 146-52.
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thereby prompting the transfer of mercenaries from Calais, was
the intelligence that six thousand French auxiliaries might
be expected in Scotland in March, the vanguard of an army of
forty thousand w h ich under the Duke of Guise would attempt
a landing on the northeast coast. ^
Though the French attack would be postponed until the
summer and would be launched against the south coast, there
were no sages to divine the future at Westminster.

Instead,

at the beginning of March the Council had to grapple with
the necessity of laying strong garrisons along the borders,
of hastening the completion of coastal fortifications, and
of providing an army for the defence of the northland.

A

general levy of the northern counties produced a respectable
62
array of 27,500 men,
good troops with experience in border
warfare.

But, as it was Frenchmen as well as Scots that they

were expected to repel, Henry made the decision to reinforce
them w i t h mercenaries.
The movement of free lances from Calais was begun in
March, the first to be deployed being Spanish arquebusiers.
Thirteen hundred under their colonel, Pedro de Gamboa, were

61State P a p e r s , V, 412.
62

T h e "schedule of the numbers appointed in every shire"
is outlined in L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 555 (2).
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collected at Dover and conveyed by sea to Newcastle,

63

There

after followed smaller bands, mainly cavalry, to the tune of
nearly two thousand, German men-at-arms, Italian "hacquebutiers of horseback," and Albanian stradiots, the first com64
panies of which had been enlisted by Cobham in February.
All told, therefore, Henry's army to withstand the Frenchmen
and the Scots showed a strength of thirty thousand, onetenth of which, and that the strongest part, was comprised
of foreigners.
Without doubt, the incorporation of these mercenaries
into the army in the north represented something of an inno
vation for Henry.

His subjects had not seen the like since

his father's reign, the last time free lances had tramped
the roads of England in such numbers.

Henry's use of them

to defend the realm sprang certainly from his fear of the
French.

However, there existed another reason for their

employment in England, namely the need to keep them active;
for in France, where the war had temporarily wound down,
boredom had so undermined their morale that they had taken
to deserting and fighting among themselves.

6 ^Ibid., No.

435; State Papers, V, 439.

6 4 (P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/198, f. 48; L. & P ., XX, pt. 1, No.
513.
Henry also contemplated sending four thousand lands
knechts into the north of England, but he was unable to get
them out of Germany.
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In Calais r in March, killings and woundings occurred on
an almost daily basis, the market place being a favorite
battleground of the mercenaries.

Spaniards and Italians sur-

passed all other nationals in mayhem, and as is confirmed by
Gruffyd, it was the former who most inclined towards desertion.
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Two Spanish captains, De Mora and Arze, fled into

France with a hundred men and sixty new handguns on April 11;
another, Juan de Haro, and twenty-five of his company was
killed in a similar attempt; while mistrust of Spaniards at
Boulogne caused the eventual transfer of three hundred to
Tilbury and D o v e r . ^
If there was a lesson to be learned from the trouble
some behavior of these men of war, it was simply that idle
ness among mercenaries bred mischief.

New outlets were

needed for their violent energy, but lamentably these were
not presently available in the English north country, where,
as the accretion of free lances continued, the immediate
threat of invasion receded.

French succours in Scotland did

not arrive as early as anticipated, nor in the strength ex
pected, and

the projected

6 ^Gruffyd,
pp. 15-18,

"Boulogne

landing of the Duke of Guise was

and Calais from 1545 to 1550,"

6 6 L. & P . ,XX, pt. 1,
Nos, 521, 532, 1024, 1071.
De Mora had been acquired by Stephen Vaughan in December,
1544.
Above, p. 342.
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shelved in favor of a larger demonstration in the Channel.
But that, too, would be delayed until July, so that once
again Henry's "soldiers strangers" were provided time to
amuse themselves with not always salubrious results.
Most of the free lances removed from Calais were posted
to Northumberland, the majority being retained in small
bands along the seaboard between the Tyne estuary and Ber
wick.

Problems with the commissariat forced many to live off

the land, and in Newcastle, where the Spaniards were depos
ited en masse on an unwilling citizenry, trouble brewed in
stantly.

On May 21, Robert Lewen, the mayor of the town,

catalogued his complaints in a letter to Cuthbert Tunstall,
Bishop of Durham.
for nothing.

fi8

The Spaniards were rapacious; they paid

Lodgings, fuel, candles, salt, and victuals

were gorged from their h osts, who quartered them in their
own homes, without charge.

Every creature comfort was de

manded, including laundry service, so that the citizens on
the verge of penury were fain to leave their houses.

Only

an emergency advance on the Spaniards' wages saved the situ
ation.

On May 26, Tunstall and his colleague, Sir Ralph Sad

ler, High Treasurer of the Wars Against Scotland, paid out

6 ?Ib i d ., Nos. 767, 867, 906, 909; Spanish Calendar,
VIII, No. 49.

68L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 787.
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to Gamboa 1000 marks in prest

"to avoid inconvenience be

twixt the inhabitants and them which agree not the best."®®
It was a mild understatement, considering that in the streets
of Newcastle two of the king's subjects had already been
butchered by Spanish hands.
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Anarchism among the mercenaries in England never attained
the heights that had been reached in Calais.

Still, the

events related above were no isolated incidents.

A troop of

Clevelander horsemen, on their way north in June, touched off
a riot in Islington in Middlesex in which a member of the
town watch was killed; the same month, French spies were said
to be actively enticing the foreigners in Northumberland to
join with the Scots; and in July, in Newcastle, a "camp" or
duel between two Spaniards, one of whom in a quarrel had
struck the other in the face, was authorized by the Privy
Council to prevent even greater bloodshed among the partisans
71
of each who had taken sides.
The moral again was clear:
no employer of mercenaries could afford them the luxury of in
action.

Peace, like nothing else, exposed their wickedness,

and in war alone lay their redemption.
Where Henry's free lances were concerned, their salvation

6 9 Ibid., No.

815.

7 QIbid., No.

811.

7 1 Ibid., Nos.

749, 770, 1000, 1068, 1085, 1315.
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lay with France.

Against that nation they had been hired to

fight in defence of Boulogne and the frontier against Scot
land, but throughout the spring, after the unsettling fright
on Ancrum Moor, no serious danger arose on either front.

Of

the war in France during the first five months of this year,
little can be said.

The marshal, Du Biez, and twelve thou

sand men, while attempting to raise a bailey to command the
mouth of the Liane, were surprised by Hertford near Le Portel
and driven back on Montreuil.

A short while later, the Eng

lish garrisons at Guisnes and Hammes, raiding in the vicinity
of Ardres, took the tower of Outings,

72

and in May, Sir

Thomas Poynings, Lisle's replacement as Governor of Boulogne,
73
occupied the castle of Hardelot.
Of the Scottish war during the same period, there is
much less to relate.

There were no exploits of which to tell.

Not even the discovery that the French auxiliaries had landed
at Dumbarton on May 31

74

caused Henry to stir, though Hertford,

79

' T h e only full record of the siezure of Outings and the
overthrow of Du Biez from the English side is provided by
Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," pp. 2-4.
The information presented compares favorably with the French
account supplied in Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI, 206.
73Poynings assumed his duties on January 31, at which
time Lisle returned to England to resume his post as Lord
Admiral.
L. & P . , XX, pt. 1, Nos. 121, 125 (30).
^ State Papers, V, 458, cites the number of Frenchmen
at thirty-six hundred.
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then in Newcastle in his capacity as Lieutenant and Captain75
General of the North,
proposed the capture of Kelso to im
pede any Scots advance on the borders.
alized,

Had the plan m a t e r i 

the mercenaries in Northumberland would have seen

their first action,

in anticipation of which Hertford held a

view of his Spaniards in Newcastle and hurried off a request
to London for the horsemen of Cleves, detained by their trouble in Islington.

76

Kelso, however, was spared.

For short

age of victuals, the enterprise was forborne, and the earl
contented himself in the hope of carrying through an earlier
plan, that of invading Scotland in August when the harvest
77
had b e e n collected and was ripe for destruction.
Meanwhile, the true objective of French strategy had
finally revealed itself.

Francis I, having moved Henry to

commit the larger portion of his mercenary strength to the
defence of England, had resolved to isolate Boulogne.

To do

so, Francis proposed to gather a fleet powerful enough to com
mand the Channel, blockade the southern ports, and detain
Henry's troops in England.

Towards these ends, he began to

assemble his flotilla in March.

Vessels and seamen were

7 5 L. ji P., XX, pt. 1, No. 846 (2) . Hertford, who re
placed Suffolk, Norfolk, and Russell in Calais at the b egin
ning of the year, was recalled to England in April.
7 6 I b i d . , Nos.

883, 890.

77State Papers, V, 451.
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pressed into service from Bordeaux to Brest.

Six ships were

sent from Scotland, but the larger part of the armada, includ
ing carracks from Genoa and galleys Rome, was convoyed in May
78
from the Mediterranean port of Marseilles.
The whole, con
sisting of 150 great sailing ships, twenty-five galleys, and
sixty transports, was collected in July in the Norman havens
of Havre de Grace, Eure, Harfleur, Hanfleur, and Dieppe with
ten thousand men to destroy Lisle's squadrons in Portsmouth
79
and close the harbor of Boulogne.
Such specifics of French intentions, however, were not
available to Henry, who had little to rely on but hearsay
gathered from every diplomatic pouch and newsmonger he chose
to credit.

The king could be certain that Francis meant to

recover Boulogne:

Du Bie:z, after his earlier overthrow at

Le Portel, had returned with an army to the Liane to build
80
an even larger fort.
Bu t , to the Tudor s greater conster
nation, what could not be plumbed was the target of the expe
dition into England.
land, Kent,

Rumor pointed alternatively to Scot

the western counties, and Sussex as the likeliest

places for the French diversion, so that as summer began, to

78Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 49; L. & P., XX, pt. 1,
No. 1073.
7 9 Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI,

80

213-14.

Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," p. 8.
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discourage a landing Henry was forced to mobilize the whole
power of the counties.

Hertford, with his thirty thousand,

remained in Northumberland; the Duke of Norfolk and Lord
Russell, with equal forces, stood guard respectively in the
East and West; while the Duke of Suffolk, "with some horses
out of Almain," mustered a fourth army in Sussex, Kent, and
81
Hampshire.
Speculation regarding French purposes ended on July 18
when their fleet entered the Solent.

An attack by their gal

leys on Portsmouth harbor in a calm sea on the nineteenth
momentarily threatened disaster, and only the sudden rising
of a seaward breeze averted the sinking of the English sailpowered squadrons within.

With the wind against them, the

French retired to the Isle of Wight where their landing par82
ties were rudely welcomed by its defenders.
Three days of
aimless skirmishing failed to establish a stable beachhead,
and on the twenty-fourth Admiral Claude d'Annebaut, comman
der of the invaders, drew his fleet off into the Channel,
depositing on the French side on the last day of the month
three thousand pioneers and four thousand soldiers to assist

8 1 L.

&. P . , XX, pt. 1, No. 1078: State Papers, X, 468.

s^The fullest account of French operations is presented
by Froude, History of England, IV, 389-400.
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Du Biez m

shaping the land siege of Boulogne.

Two m o r e weeks of naval demonstrations,

83

including an

indecisive action off Shoreham in Sussex, accomplished n o 
thing further.

The great effort w h i c h was to have rendered

Boulogne indefensible by paralysing England ended ignominiously on the night of August 15 when, under cover of dark
ness, on the eve of the morrow on which Lisle intended to re84
engage, D'Annebaut w i t hdrew under full sail for France.
Never, reported Lisle from his flagship, was there a journey
"so costly to France as this has been for so short a voyage,
nor mo r e shame spoken of amongst themselves."
land too had paid a price.

35

Yet, Eng

D'Annebaut's month of desultory

sailing had sufficiently distracted Henry as to allow Francis
to reinforce his army before Boulogne.

Word of the French

build-up in the Boulonnais was sent to Henry on July 6 by
Poynings, whose staff,

in a report prepared for the Council

in London, recited the garrison's troubles.
bloody flux,

Plague and the

stemming from rotted herring supplied during

Lent and the "corrupt loathsomeness of m u c h barrelled beef,"

8 3 L.

& P., XX, pt.

1, NOS.

84

1263

(p. 628), 1332.

It was disease, however, and not Lisle's cannon from
which the French so precipitously ran.
At sea a month, with
foul water and rancid stores, plague had broken out in the
quarters b e low decks.
See Froude, History of England, IV,
399-400.

8^State Papers, I, 820.
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had reduced its numbers by almost three hundred.

Men, there

fore, were in short stock as were munitions, money, and
fresh provisions.

86

Of equal concern was the attitude of the

Italians in the high town, many of whom had taken offence at
87
the appointment of Salerno to be their colonel.
In the
end, to ease tensions, some, like the Spaniards, were sent
88
from Boulogne into England to guard the south coast.
As if these problems were not enough, the French began
the construction of their fort at Outreau on July 7, and on
the thirteenth, from a vantage point nearer the harbor, their
gunners sunk a supply ship and drove away others which accompanied her.

89

Poynings was hard pressed to retaliate.

Vig

orous sorties by his light horsemen enabled him to keep the
enemy off balance, but the sickness among his troops

and the

dispersal of his mercenaries prevented him from attempting
to oust the French from Outreau.

There, by July 24, construc

tion of the fort was so well in hand that the English com
mander felt compelled to ask for reinforcements, five thou
sand foot and two or three hundred horse, with which to

8 6 L.

& P., XX, pt. 1, Nos. 1122-23.

8 7 Ibid., No.
88 Above,

796.

pp. 356-57.

88L. & P., XX, pt. 1, No. 1130; Spanish Calendar, VIII,
No. 95.
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drive them off completely.

90

Had D 1Annebaut not held the Narrow S e a , P o y n i n g s ' r e 
quest would have been honored immediately.

The Privy Coun

cil, sitting in Portsmouth on July 30, commissioned Norfolk's
son, the Earl of Surrey, to lead five thousand infantrymen
91
to Boulogne's relief.
However, with the French fleet in
the Dover Straits, the order was rescinded in favor of a
more ambitious undertaking.

Surrey's orders w e r e counter

manded on August 13, and word was sent to the Duke of Suf
folk to prepare to cross the Channel with an army, the troops
to be drawn from the thirty-two thousand he commanded as
Henry's lieutenant of the southern counties.

92

The aim was to implement the plan as soon as Lisle
cleared the seas,
for haste.

for news from Boulogne indicated a need

On the fifteenth, the day of the seafight at

Shoreham, Poynings wrote that the French camp around Outreau
now numbered twenty-one thousand effectives and twelve thou
sand pioneers, adding that Francis in person wa s daily ex
pected out of Abbeville or Montreuil with a supplementary
force of landsknechts.

Further information that for three

9 0 L. & P., XX, pt. 1, Nos.
1200, 1264.

91

1146,

1160, 1179,

1187, 1197

I b i d .-, No. 1311.

92Ibid., Nos. 1078, 1081 (33); pt. 2, No. 117.
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days past Poynings had heen forced to. bed with the bloody
flux was almost as discomforting.

The governor trusted to

recover but did not; he died on August 18, leaving orders
for the management of Boulogne until his replacement could
93
be had out of England.
The demise of Poynings, if it was a bitter blow, was
nothing to the shock delivered to the Council on the twentysecond.

On the evening of that day, as it sat at Woking in

Surrey, word arrived that Suffolk had died in nearby Guil
ford, the victim most likely of plague or fever contracted
from infected crews in Portsmouth where earlier he had been
94
about the king's business.
The duke's army was stayed;
Surrey was appointed to Poynings' place at Boulogne, and for
the moment, the hope of disrupting French operations was pin
ned on a force of German mercenaries engaged to march through
France.95
The free lances in question were those of the knight,
Friedrich von Reiffenberg, a native of Sayn in the Westerwald

93

State Papers, X, 569, 570, 572,

94

L. & P ., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 238, 346, 368; XXI, pt. 1,
No. 131.
See also, Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545
to 1550," p. 25.
In Gruffyd's estimation, Suffolk, whom he
describes as "the flower of the captains of the realm," and
Poynings, referred to as "the best soldier under the king,"
were the most able commanders in Henry's army.

9-5Tbid. , Nos. 225, 496 (8).
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near Koblenz.

In June, having offered Henry twenty ensigns

of infantry and a thousand horse, he was summoned to England
for an interview,

for w h ich purpose Philip of Hesse, whose

vassal he was, provided him with letters of commendation and
the promise that the m e n to be raised might be gathered with97
in his principality.
Reiffenberg's audience with the king
was eminently successful.

He was commissioned as a colonel,

and the number of his horse was increased to fifteen hundred
on the understanding that the w h o l e body be mustered and
98
ready to m a r c h from Koblenz to Boulogne by August 20.
July
24 found Reiffenberg in Antwerp.

There, from the hands of

Henry's factor, Stephen Vaughan, the mercenary leader re99
ceived £5,500 Flemish
in conduct money, a "jocdal" or
Joachimsthaler for each of his eight thousand footmen, plus
the usual half-month's pay for his horsemen,

their wagons,

96

For the highlights of Reiffenberg's career, see
"Friedrich v o n Reiffenberg," Allgemeine Deutsche B i ographie,
ed. R. von Lilliencron, F. X. vo'n Wegele, and A. Bettleheim,
et a l . (56 vols.; Leipzig:
Duncker and Humbolt, 1875-1912),
XXVII, 687-89.
97
E *

9 8 (P.
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f

x x '

p fc*

R. 0.) S. P.

N o ‘

9 4 7

*

1/203, f. 138.

9 9 0n October 8 , 1545, by the rate of exchange then cur
rent the English pound sterling brought 24s. 6 d. on the A n t 
werp m oney market.
L. & P.-, XX, pt..' 2, No. 552.
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11and all other things."

100

After such a promising start, the operation soon disin
tegrated.

Ralph Vane, Thomas Chamberlain, Francis Hall, and

Thomas Avery, the English commissioners appointed to oversee
the musters of Reiffenberg's men, were delayed in Antwerp by
the late arrival of the king's instructions.

Problems in se

curing safe conveyance for the better than 620,000 to be dis
tributed among the Germans on the day of muster prevented
their leaving Antwerp until the end of August, so that it was
September 2 before they caught up with Reiffenberg in Cologne.
There, in a long interview lasting until the morning of the
third, the colonel agreed to march forward from "a place be
yond the Rhine" on the eleventh, though the commissioners
were doubtful that, as the contract stipulated, he could
reach Boulogne in a fortnight, the more so, as at the conclu
sion of their talk, Reiffenberg was summoned to consult with
the Landgrave in Hesse.

loa

The Englishmen's misgivings were soon realized.

From

Sayn, Reiffenberg reported as he rode into Hesse that three
hundred of his horsemen and nearly one thousand foot had de
serted, seduced by the Duke of Brunswick who had received

1 0 0 (P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, f. 203.
The Joachimsthaler,
the original "dollar," was valued at something slightly less
than 2s. 3d. sterling.

101L. &.P., XX, pt. 2, NO. 297.
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8,000 crowns from the French to "miscarry" the soldiers from
102
the king of England.
Hereafter, calamity followed calam
ity in rapid succession.

In mustering the landsknechts near

Andernach between September 14 and the twenty-sixth, the com
missioners found several ensigns under strength.
the soldiers lacked armor,
1,200

Many of

for w hich Reiffenberg borrowed

crowns and an additional 8 , 0 0 0 crowns to satisfy his

people and reimburse the country folk for damage done in
"gathering and eating their grap e s . " 1 0 3
sented problems of a different sort:

The horsemen pre

their captains had

over-recruited by several hundred, the which, to preserve
goodwill, the commissioners were compelled to enroll,

"a

page for every twelve horses, besides a baggager or messen104
ger as they had last year."
But the gravest difficulties
w e r e reserved for the m a r c h w hich began under changed orders
at Andernach on September 26.
The accumulation of French reserves in eastern Picardy
and an unreliable commissariat had persuaded the Privy C o u n 
cil that a passage to Boulogne could not be forced over so
long a distance without inviting Reiffenberg's destruction.
N e w instructions were therefore communicated to the

102Ibid., Nos. 299, 300.
103Ibid., No. 437.
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commissioners on September 19 to the effect that the Germans
should advance no further into France than Champagne, there
to annoy the countryside in the hope of drawing the French
from Outreau.

It was an easier assignment, free of the haz

ards .which the long journey across France would have entailed.
105
Reiffenberg, on leaving Andernach, seemed pleased,
but by
this time, from what unfolded in the days ahead, it is ques
tionable if he planned any honest exploit at all.
Though it had been decided to invade Champagne near
M^zieres, a garrison town on the western fringe of the Arden
nes, the commissioners were led off to the north and Aachen,
where Gottfried von Bocholt lay with seven hundred men-at106
arms and an ensign of foot.
On the way, Reiffenberg's
landsknecht companies were filled to the required eight thou107
sand, and two additional ensigns were allowed the colonel,
so that the whole number of free lances intended for the irrup108
tion into France exceeded thirteen thousand.
Following

1 0 5 Ibid., Nos.

403, 468.

1 0 6 Ibid., Nos.

437, 509.

107

These two ensigns were mustered with Bocholt1s foot
men in Aachen on October 3. Ibid., No. 527.
108

In a long letter written by the commissioners to the
Council on October 17, the German force is described as con
taining 2,809 horsemen and 10,400 footmen, the monthly charge
for the whole being 626,950 Flemish, "about 620,212 10s.
sterling."
Ibid., No. 605 (p. 279).
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Bocholt's musters on October 2 and third, the army proceeded
to Vis^, a village on the Meuse within the Bishopric of Liege
some four days' distance from the French frontier.

Here, al

most certainly with Reiffenberg's knowledge, the guides hired
to lead the expedition were bribed, probably, as Gruffyd sug
gests, by the gentry of Champagne, who, lacking sufficient
strength to guard their frontier, "raised a large sum in
109
crowns" to turn the Germans from their purpose.
For a week, after crossing the Meuse on the seventh, the
mercenaries wandered aimlessly through Liege, "being led out
of the straight way" to Florennes, a town below the Sambre
near Dinant in Luxemburg some thirty miles from Mezieres.
proved to be Reiffenberg’s last stop.

It

His men, having con

sumed their victuals, their pay, and several thousand pounds
in extra perquisites extorted from the hapless commissioners.

109Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,"
p. 37.
There is some question as to who the malefactors were.
The commissioners initially laid the blame on agents of the
Bishop of Liege, who anticipated a repeat of the destruction
caused by Landenberg in 1544.
Later letters throw suspicion
on the emperor and Philip of Hesse.
Charles naturally desired
to avoid giving offense to the French by allowing the mercen
aries to pass through his countries.
On the other hand, dur
ing Reiffenberg's march to the Meuse the Landgrave was at
tacked by the Duke of Brunswick and openly solicited the com
missioners for the men at Rheinbach, on the road to Aachen,
on September 28.
Reports that French agents had infiltrated
the ranks had, however, been circulating since September 4.
On the whole question, consult the following: L. £ P. , XX,
pt. 2, Nos. 299, 300, 468, .489, 679, 680 (1), 730, 954 (2),
and Appendix, No. 43 (26).
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refused to move further unless guaranteed an additional
month's wages.

When, on instructions from Henry, it was re

fused, the unfortunate Englishmen were threatened with irons,
menaced w i t h death, and finally dragged off in wagons, ob
taining their release at Ciney in Liege only on November 10
after full compliance with their jailers* d e m a n d s . A t

a

cost of over L80,000, the journey which was to have saved
Boulogne in August had accomplished nothing, while Reiffenberg, his pockets filled double with that which he had
squeezed from the English and accepted from the French, re
turned to Hesse and thei service of the Landgrave.
Never, as Thomas Chamberlain complained, had a king's
money been so evilly used, though Reiffenberg was not alone
in his nonfeasance.

Contemporaneous with Henry's efforts to

raise levies in the Rhineland, John Dymock, another of the
English factors in the Low Countries, was sent into North
Germany, his instructions, to muster and obtain shipping in
Bremen, Hamburg, or Lubeck for two thousand landsknechts re
cruited by Peter, the Bastard of Gelders .1 1 2

1 1 0 L. & P., XX, pt, 2, Nos, 587, 605, 636
756, 766, 785; CB, M . ) Add, MS, 5753, f, 55.
111

Dymock left

(1), 680

(1),

Lilliencron, Wegele, Bettleheim,' et a l , , eds.,
Ailgemeine Deutsche Biographie, XXVIII, 687.
112
I have been unable to positively identify this man,
who appears to have been a prominent leader of mercenaries.
.
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Antwerp in the first w e e k of July, but before he could reach
B remen the mercenaries,

impatient at his coming, dispersed.

Far worse was the decision of the city's governors.
could provide no ships,

They

for the emperor had sworn them to neu

trality, so that Dymock, being daily attended by a horde of
angry soldiers continually "crawing for money," made off to
113
Hamburg, the m e n of w a r in close pursuit.
The Englishman's reception in Hamburg was no better and
the clamor of the landsknechts no less loud.

At Lubeck which

Dymock reached on July 29, the truth revealed itself:
the
114
entire Hanse had pledged itself to the emperor.
No pas
sage for troops could be had by sea, and though consideration
was given to sending the men overland to muster with Reiffenberg's bands on the Rhine, that, too, proved impossible.

The

distance to be covered was great, and the whole country b e 
tween was alive with enemies,

soldiers of the fiercely Catho

lic Henry of Brunswick, who had initiated a war for the re
covery of his duchy from the hands of the Schmalkaldic

He m a y have been the son of Charles of Egmont, last Duke of
Gelderland, who on dying without legitimate issue in 1538
left his lands to the Duke of Cleves.
113

U4

L. &
Ibid.

xx'

2 r No* 69 (p. 34).
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League.
Dymock, whose mission for all good purpose ended in
Lubeck, returned to Hamburg.

He remained there for a month

on Paget's request, supplying intelligence and living by his
wits to escape assassination by the Bastard of Gelders, whose
ravenous landsknechts descended on the unhappy Duchy of West
phalia.

Twice Dymock was apprehended by certain of the sol

diers sent to solicit funds, and, as he wrote, had he not
"wrought wisely" would have remained a prisoner "or cost the
King 18,000 crowns for his release."

He would not, he con

fided in a letter to Ralph Vane, have another such assignment
for £5,000.

"I have been fain," he continued, "to ride with

forty, thirty, or twenty horsemen at the least, and at this
present hour the lords of Hamburg warn me that there is wait
laid for me in divers places."

1X6

Vane, having suffered simi

lar indignities at Landenberg's hands, could readily sympa
thize, being even then entered upon a new time of troubles
with Reiffenberg.

But of the correspondents, Dymock was the

•^•^Ibid., No. 342.
One of Brunswick's captains was
Christopher van Pressburg, the same who had fought for Henry
VIII at Boulogne.
This conflict, which cost the English
king the services of Peter van Gelders, ended with Brunswick's
capture by the Landgrave of Hesse in October, 1545.
For
particulars see Karl Brandi, The Emperor Charles V, trans.
C. V. Wedgewood (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1965), p. 538.

116L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 274.

luckier by far.

He was recalled from Hamburg in August;

117

Vane's travail, and that of his fellow commissioners, was pro
longed until November.

^ ^ I b i d . , No. 598.

Dymock left Hamburg on October 2.

CHAPTER XI
ALL NATIONS UNDER THE S U N :
THE DEFENCE OF BOULOGNE AND W A R IN SCOTLAND
. . . there were so many depraved, brutish soldiers
from all nations under the sun— Welsh, English,
Cornish, Irish, Manx, Scots, Spaniards, Gascons,
Portingals, Italians, Arbannoises, Greeks, Turks,
Tartars, Almains, Germans, Burgundians, Flemings,
who had come there . . . to have a good time under
the king of England, who by nature was too hospit
able to foreigners.
Elis Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 154 5
to 1550," pp. 14-15.
Thus far in 1545, circumstances had cheated Henry VIII
of the services of copious numbers of mercenaries.

The em

peror, because of his policy of non-involvement in the
Anglo-French war, had forced the demobilization of Da l'Armi's
Italians.

The same monarch's power over the Hanse and the

Duke of Brunswick's attempt to be revenged upon the Lutherans
cost the Tudor king the support of Peter van Gelders.

And

lastly, Reiffenberg's duplicity deprived Henry of the largest
single contingent of free lances it was ever his privilege to
raise.

In these miscarriages, by rough estimate as many as

twenty-six thousand mercenaries may have been involved.

The

Veronese, Ludovico da Monte, one of the eight captains in
Da l'Armi's personal following, had anticipated the conscrip
tion of 10,600 of his countrymen; Reiffenberg's command,
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excluding pioneers, at the time of its defection totalled
13,209; while the Bastard of Gelders' force was reputed at
one point to have contained as many as three thousand.^
Despite these enormous losses which were never made up,
Henry was hardly bereft of foreign troops, though, as his
contract with Reiffenberg stands witness, there were fewer at
Boulogne than he cared to admit.

Even so, and allowing for

the Spaniards and Italians who had been removed to England in
2
the spring,
over the summer the number of free lances within
the fortress noticeably increased.

The schedule of the sol

diers and laborers prepared in August for the Council on Poyn
ings ' death reveals that 737 of the 6,920 effectives were for3
eigners,
most of them deserters out of France, as were the
102 Albanian horsemen and the French company of one Byons,
"a Provencal born, who entered the King's service from being

,.4

a prisoner.'

Larger numbers of mercenaries lay within the Pale, for
which, unfortunately, no similar schedules are available; but

^Above, pp.

373 ff,

2
Above, pp.

357 r .365,

3 L.

& P . , pt. 2, No. 200 (3).

4 Ibid., No. 200 (1).
Byons, captain of a French galley
taken off Boulogne, died on August 26, a victim apparently
of the plague.
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the garrisons there, before D 'Annebaut's blockade, were at
the lowest fifteen thousand-

At Guisnes, Hammes, and Calais,

soldiers of all manner of nations had gathered.

Some, like

the Spanish light cavalryman, Alfonso Padillo, were sent out
of England, while others, the Albanian, George Moszia di
Napoli, and the Italian, Lodovico Morescotto, among them, came
from France or through the Low Countries.

5

To Guisnes in

August, once the French fleet had left the Channel, two hun
dred Germans and three hundred Spaniards were sent to join an
already considerable garrison of Englishmen, Albanians, and
6
Italians, some of the latter provided by Da l'Armi,
who de
spite the loss of his own command continued in his role as
Henry's envoy-extraordinaire in Venice.

Calais, in the same

season, was home to many foreign units whose officers, if
their tastes matched those of the English captains, lived
well.
The latter, by Gruffyd1s account,
rily as the heart of man could desire."

"took things as m e r 
They ate and drank

of the best, spent their leisure in cards and dice, "each
one with his oaths, blasphemous in the mouths of people who

5{B. M . ) Harl. MS. 2S3, ff. 246, 321; John Roche Dasent,
Acts of the Privy Council of England. Ne w Series. (32 v o ls.;
London:
H. M. Stationery Office, 1890-1907), 1, 169.
Here
inafter cited as Acts of the Privy C ouncil.
®(B. M . ) Harl. MS. 283, f. 313; Dasent, Acts of the
Privy Council, 1, 234.
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called themselves Christians, and plenty of shameless whores
on wh o m they spent all their own money."

Gruffyd's estimate

of all officers, English or otherwise, was low.
object was to return home wealthy,

Their only

"if by no other way, then

on the wages of their men," who "were compelled to lie in the
low country" outside the town "where there was great shortage
*7

of bread and drink."
In England, meanwhile,

the numbers of mercenaries had

swelled to proportions thus far unheard of in Henry's reign.
In May and June, the crush of free lances in the southern
and eastern ports was such that Henry was at a loss as to how
they might be employed.

"My lord," ran a typical letter pen

ned on the king's behalf to Cobham at Calais,

"after most

hearty commendations I have received your lordship's letter
in the commendation of John Baptista de Beni da Gobi, and m a r 
vel not a little forasmuch as you have been the occasion of
the sending hither of so many

[free lances]

as are already

come over, w i t h the w h ich we are here all wearied."

If any

more, the writer continues, are sent to England,

"we will not
g
fail hereafter to send as fast back to you again."
That letter of June 6 had its counterpart in another

sent to Cobham on July 12:

^Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550, p. 27.
8 (B. M . ) Harl.

MS.

283, f. 305.
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A f t e r my right hearty commendations . . . the
same shall understand that the King's Majesty, h a th
received my lordship's letters and advisements
which his Highness taketh in very thankful part.
And w h ere his Majesty perceiveth that my Lord Po yn
ings hath by his letters required you to stay
there such horsemen as shall arrive to serve his
Majesty, his highness being pleased therewith prays
your Lordship to do the same and with the advice of
my Lord Grey* and others of the council [at Calais]
to employ them in his Majesty's service there until
you shall be advertised when his Majesty shall fur
ther determine, and to place them for the time as
you shall think convenient, praying you to a d v e r 
tise the names of horsemen which be already arrived,
and likewise to continue
the same as they shall
from time to time arrive
accordingly. 10
The names of many of the mercenaries retained in England
appear in the financial account of Sir Thomas Chaloner,

a

Clerk of the Privy Council, employed in the summer of 1545
as a courier of funds to various persons,

"strangers and

others," engaged for Hertford's army in the north.
and June, he dispensed prests,

In May

conduct money, or wages to no

fewer than ten u n i t s , ^ Albanian, Clevelander, German,
ian, and Spanish.

Ital

Some consisted of no more than a captain

and two or three followers,

as, for example,

the

bands sup

p lied by the Italians, Nicholas Tooso and Antonio de Sancta

®Lord W i l l i a m Grey of Wilton, commander of Guisnes.
1 0 (B. M.)

Harl. MS. 283, f. 317.

^ T h a t is the number which, from the dates supplied in
the manuscript, can be positively identified as having come
into England in the late spring of early summer of 1545.
There were almost certainly others.
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Cecilia, each of whom were taken into wages on May 1 with
three horsemen a p i e c e . ^

A few soldiers, like the Spaniards,

Don Andreas Cacillo and Pedro Michaele, were enlisted individ
ually; but larger contingents, with full compliments of of
ficers, were not unusual, the most formidable being the three
companies of German lancers brought over from Calais by Captains Matthew Lightmaker,
Lughe.

13

Peter Hoen, and Vollard van der

Hoen's squadron, which on June 12 attained a strength

of nearly two hundred, had attached to it a lieutenant, a
standard-bearer, three file leaders, a musterclerk, a quarter14
master, two furriers, and a trumpeter.
Chaloner's entries reveal something of stradiot organi
zation.

In the two Albanian squadrons paid by him for the

period ending May 30, a primitive chain of command not unlike
that which existed in English companies can be detected.
Three officers are mentioned:

a captain; his assistant, a

( P . r. o.) E 351/43, mems. 4, 6.
This document, com
prised of thirteen menbranes, covers the period from May,
1545, until February, 1550, during which time Chaloner was
active in supplying mercenaries with funds.
It contains a
wealth of information and would of its own warrant a sepa
rate study.

13

Matthew Lightmaker was the brother of Thomas, who was
still in wages at Calais.
1 4 (P. R. 0.)

E 351/43, mem. 8 .

PLEASE NOTE:
Page 383 is lacking in number,
only.
UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS.
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"petty-captain" or lieutenant; and under him an ensign.

15

By way of contrast, the ultimate in military organization
was provided by the infantry company of the Italian captain,
16
Muscovito, whose 160-man unit showed a lieutenant, alfiere,
sergeant, seven caporalles, musterclerk, two quartermasters,
17
three drumers, and a fifer.
Altogether, that summer perhaps a thousand mercenaries
were financially serviced by Chaloner, whose funds, amounting
to thousands of pounds, were received from the hands of the
various Treasurers of the Augmentations, First Fruits and
Tenths, Exchequer, and Mint.

18

Henry, therefore, at this

juncture had in England between two and three thousand free
lances; for Hertford had at least an equal amount in North19
umberland,
and several hundred Italians and Spaniards lay

15

Ibid., mem. 7. These officers respectively were paid
at the rate of B15, £7 10s., and £6 6 s. per month.
The ordi
nary trooper received 50s.
The two captains were Theodore
Luchisi and Antonio Stesino, the latter being the first of
that nation recorded in English service.
(P. R. 0.) S. P.
1/198, f. 48. Both had come from Calais, Luchisi with
forty-seven horsemen, Stesino with fifty-two.
16
An ensign or standard-bearer.
1 7 (P. R. 0.)

E 351/43, mem. 4.

18

On the functions of these insitutions, the principal
governmental agencies in Henry's reign for the collection
and administration of royal revenues, see Glossary.
19

Gamboa's Spanish "regiment" contained about eight hun
dred men.
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in garrisons in Essex and Kent.
The campaign in southern Scotland, as always, was brief
and bloody.

In two weeks of raiding and burning, the dis

honor of Ancrum Moor was expunged with a vengence.

Having

drawn his "strangers" towards the border, Hertford advanced
through Roxburgh on Kelso, which town was reached in Septem
ber 9.

His Spanish arquebusiers drew his praise for their

assault upon the abbey which, with the rest of the town,
was taken after a bitterly contested fire-fight on the tenth.
In the days following, Melrose, Dryburgh, their abbeys, and
near a score of lesser settlements were incinerated, so that
Hertford could write that, excepting his own late journey to
Edinburgh, as much hurt had not been done in Scotland for a
20
hundred years.
From Kelso, the army moved unopposed on Jedburgh.

On

the sixteenth, while Hertford razed that town and the country
around, fifteen hundred light horsemen, the Albanian contin
gents assuredly among them, carried the conflagration six or
seven miles further.

That same afternoon, with their supplies

dwindling, the raiders turned back towards Northumberland,
21
burning their way through the Merse
until they came to

20 L.\& P.,

XX, pt. 2,. Nos. 169, 205, 216, 308, 317, 359.

2-*-The Merse was the "march" or southern borderland of
the Scottish county of Berwick.

•t
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Norham.

There, on English ground, on September 23, the army

was dissolved.

The damage that had been inflicted on the

Scots was now, in Hertford's judgement, twice that which had
been accomplished in 1544; for as the conquering earl had an
ticipated, his attack had coincided with the end of the Scot
tish harvest.

Assuredly, he informed London, "there is burnt

a wonderful deal of corn . . . for they had done much of
their harvest" which his soldiers had found "in stacks about
their houses or had it lying in shocks in the field."

Scot

land's eastern marches, he was sure, had been wasted; the
22
nation was powerless to molest England.
It only remained to cement the victory by making some
"good exploit" in the Scottish west marches, through which
Henry felt his beaten foe might seek to enter England.

Ac

cordingly, Hertford arranged the siezure of Carlaverock Cas
tle, property of Lord Robert Maxwell, prisoner in England
since his capture at Solway Moss in 1542.

The fortress,

which stood at the mouth of the River Nith, was within easy
reach of Dumfries, the likeliest stronghold from which any
Scottish offensive might originate.

Though there are no re

cords of the enterprise, Carlaverock was taken, delivered,

2 2 L. & P ., XX, pt. 2,. Nos. 323,-328, 400.
Hertford, in
his dispatches to the Council, boasted of destroying no
fewer than seven monasteries and over 240 villages and towns.
His record of the places "brent, razed, and cast down" is
calendared in Ibid., No. 456.
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it would seem, to Lord Maxwell/ who for the purpose was re23
leased on bond from his cell in Pomfret.
Once in this assured Scot's hands, an English garrison
was almost certainly placed within Carlaverock, and immedi
ately the castle was besieged.

From this result, some thought

was given to raising an expedition for its relief.

Gamboa,

who with his Spaniards had returned to Newcastle, was peti
tioned to provide two hundred mounted hackbutters; but as the
weather turned foul, and the castle stood "in a great strength
of creeks and moss," the whole idea was discarded, and Car24
laverock was retaken on November 2.
Another plan involving Hertford's free lances was devised
soon after by Sir Thomas Wharton,
marches.

25

Warden of Henry's western

About this enterprise nothing is known, except that

for an exploit to be done in Scotland a thousand northern
"prickers" and Gamboa's two hundred cavalrymen were ordered
to be in Carlisle by November 20.

Besides the Spanish horse

soldiers, Gamboa was asked as well for the whole power of his
infantry which had increased to over one thousand, while at
the Privy Council's request, Bishop Tunstall was instructed
to send back to the borders the Clevelander and German

2 ^Ibid., Preface, xxii-iii.

24Ibid.# xiii-iv; Nos.
25

685, 700.

Wharton, in the same capacity, had commanded the Eng
lish borderers at Solway Moss.
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men-at-arms, who w e r e to have been lodged for the winter in
. , 26
York.
Perhaps,

like the aborted march on Carlaverock, Wharton's

mission was set aside; but if some feat was attempted,

it was

accomplished by December, at the beginning of which month,
with the onset of winter, the mercenaries were placed in gar
risons, three hundred Clevelanders at Norham and Wark, the
bulk of the Spaniards at Berwick and Carlisle, with some few
at Alnwick, Workworth,

Bamburgh, and the "villages abowtes."

However, not all the free lances remained in the north.

27

Some

like the Albanians and certain other horsemen, were dispatched
"homeward" after Hertford's return from the Merse.

This, too,

was the fate of the Italian companies of Muscovito and Morgante Mansron, who "for the avoiding of his further clamors,"
was advanced £25 by Chaloner in partial payment of a greater
sum he claimed as due.

28

By this late date, as well from the changed situation in
France as from Hertford's disbandments, mercenary strength in
England had fallen considerably.

^Dasent,

Boulogne, after some

Acts of the Privy Co u n c i l , I, 269-70.

9*7

‘I b i d . , 269-70.
The majority of the German men-at-arms
were likewise retained in the north, but precisely where I
have been unable to ascertain.
See ibid. , 298.
28Ibid., 262, 279; L. & P . , XX, pt. 2, Nos. 572, 621;
E 351/43, mem. 9.
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heart-stopping moments, had survived the French offensive
which had been sprung in earnest in September with a bold
attack upon the Terre d'Oye, the low and boggy plash-land
which, within the Pale, lay between Calais and Gravelines.
The object of the assault was three-fold:

to surprise

Guisnes, destroy whatever supplies lay stored in the Pale,
and prevent the reinforcement of Boulogne from Calais.
The raid, led by Du Biez, was meticulously planned.
Entering the land of Oye through the unprotected frontier
with the Netherlands, the French, with twenty thousand men,
broke suddenly into the Calesian parish of Olderwick, whose
English defenders in their confusion were slain almost to a
man.

Near the township of Oye, along the downs from Calais,

Lord Cobham offered battle, Du Biez having "pitched a strong
camp"

there on the twenty-first, his footmen flanked on

either side by cavalry, a hackbutter between each horseman
and a large body of Dutch curassiers "trained in the use of
guns and lances."

29

To oppose this array Cobham mustered

eight thousand Englishmen, among them "many callow boys" and
"senseless" captains, twenty-five hundred foreign horse

^ G r u f f y d , "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,"
pp. 29-31.
Gruffyd misdates this campaign, placing it a
month later in October.
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soldiers,

and more than six thousand mercenary footmen.

The fight, as described by Gruffyd, was opened by the
English, whose "prickers" rode out to skirmish and to attempt
to lure the enemy into breaking ranks; but as the tactic
failed, the English heavy cavalry were called upon to charge.
What happened next is dramatically told by Gruffydj
As soon as the English advanced and some of them
broke their lances they expected the foreign horse
men to support them, but they did not move a foot,
so the English had to retreat. As soon as the
footmen saw the horsemen doing nothing but stands
ing in order, although the light horsemen were
running back from the French, who were trampling
the earth and looking daggers at the footmen, they
began to move back, each one getting in the way of
the other, the horsemen pushing the footmen into
the ditches, and the footmen doing the same to the
horsemen.
By this time night was falling, and the
English army returned to Calais, leaving the French
to do what they would . . . .31
The battle of Oye, fought on September 21, showed Henry’s
mercenaries for yet another time in a bad light.

Nonetheless,

Gruffyd*s harshest criticisms were reserved for his English
superiors and the French, the former for their timidity in
refusing to counterattack, the latter for their caution in
failing to follow up their victory.

Had, in fact, the French

advanced on Calais, they would have found it defenceless;
for Cobham and his council had shut themselves safe within,

30ibid. , p. 31. Gruffyd identifies them as "Saxons,
Cleves, Almains, and Italians,"
31
Ibid.
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leaving his spiritless army spread in total disarray over
more than a mile o f ^ a l e s i a n countryside.

32

The French, mean

while, after a few more days of burning at their leisure, re
tired to Le Portel, soaked by rains which, by rendering their
cavalry useless, had deprived them of their major objective, .
Guisnes.
It was left to Cobham to report to Henry the damage done
in Oye.

By the governor's account, contrived at, says

Gruffyd, "by means of letters" to his friends on the Council,
he persuaded the king "that not more than a hundred English
men had been killed as against more than two hundred French,"
and that Du Biez "had not done more than a thousand marks
worth of damage.

This was one of the worse lies the Council

ever made the king believe," for the damage to the Pale was
extensive.

By Gruffyd's reckoning, which in general terms

bears close resemblence to the French version,

33

three

Calesian parishes had been razed, along with five hundred
dwellings, and "seven farms, the poorest of which was worth
&7,000."

In addition, the English had lost uncounted hun

dreds of dead, whose bodies, by the Welshman's grim report,
lay unburied "with dogs and wolves and birds gnawing them for

3 2 Ibid., pp.

32-33.

33 See Du Bellay, Memoires, pp. 252 ff.
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six weeks,-”
An interesting letter composed a week after the battle
at Oye seems to substantiate Gruffyd1s charges against Cobham,
Its authors were Italians, five captains whom the Deputy prevailed upon to write to the Council on his behalf, explaining
the reasons for his defeat and alluding to the little '‘hurt”
done by Du Biez.

35

The whole blame for the overthrow was

thrust by these correspondents, who themselves had partici—
pated in the fight, upon the Clevelanders, who, they alleged,
had triggered the retreat by fleeing to Calais when called
upon to succour Cobham's infantry.

It is a plausible story,

except that the writers themselves were cavalrymen, attached
to the company of gentlemen provided by Ludovico da l'Armi;
and it was the entire body of foreign horsemen which Gruffyd
accused of disobedience.

If the Welshman's evidence is ac

cepted at face value, what likely happened here was a double
cover-up, the Italians concealing Cobham's guilt which favor
was returned in kind.
That the deputy should have chosen men of that nation to
aid him in this subterfuge is, again, explained by Gruffyd.

34

Gruffyd,
pp. 30, 35—36.
35

"Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,"

L. & T ., XX, pt. 2, No. 464,
The names of the cap
tains were a F follows;
Hyppolito Pallavicino, Piacenza;
Bartholomew Morehi, Modena; Antonio Gramegna, Bologna; Jacomo
de Zabarelli; and Alisandro Marengo.
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Earlier in his chronicle, when reporting the wild doings of
the mercenaries in the spring, he flatly states that of all
the foreigners in Cobham's service none were more in favor
than the Italians.

36

If this, then, was the case, and if the

Clevelanders were not alone in their waywardness, it is not
too highly fetched to assume that to clear themselves of
wrongdoing, which they did in their letter, the Italians
would have been more than willing to retain their commander's
good will be writing in his defence.

Besides, as Gruffyd

further reveals, the Italians at Calais had additional incen
tive to protect their honor, since it had been one of their
nation, a certain Bartholomew, who had spied out the way for

. . entry into
.
Du Biez's
Oye. 37
Whatever the real cause of the disaster in the Pale, it
was the Clevelanders, or at least a part of them, who paid
for the defeat.

3 ®Gruffyd,

On October 8 , following an investigation by

"Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,"

p. 15.
3 7 Ib i d ., 25-27, 28-29.
The Bartholomew here in question
is almost certainly Bartholomew de Ceres (or Kers), a Pied
montese captain, who served at Guisnes during the winter of
1544 and was later, in the summer of 154 5, transferred to
some post within the March of Oye.
That he was under suspiciom by the Council at Calais and that he deserted to the
French can be gleaned from the following notices:
Dasent,
Acts of the Privy Council, I, 171-72, 198, 204-05, 216;
L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 296, 567. He was slain "to avenge
thei honor of the Italian soldiers" early in 1546 at Lyons by
four Florentine gentlemen who had lately served Henry in the
same theater.
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the Council at Calais, the Privy Council from Windsor ordered
the cashiering of Thomas Lightmaker and his band.

It proved

an easier injunction to issue than to execute, since there
erupted the inevitable dispute over severance pay.

Light38
maker, who had contracted for five hundred horsemen,
had
provided more, and the "overplusage" at their dismissal de
manded an Abzug of fifty days.

The amount was considered

exhorbidant by the English, whose answer to the Dutch cap
tain was that, even had his men come from the farthest corner
of Germany, they could return in much less time.

But the

Clevelanders stuck to their price until, during the second
week of November, the Privy Council authorized Cobham to
39
offer them forty days for their Abzug.
This was apparently
the sum agreed upon, as hereafter they are heard from no more.
At Boulogne, meanwhile, French plans which had held out
such promise for success in August had gone miserably awry.
Francis I had proposed a grand campaign:

it was to have been

he in person who led the attack on the Terre d ’Oye, he who
held the Calais marches in subjection, while a smaller force
from Outreau starved out the English in Boulogne.

*50

40

But bad

'*°0 ne hundred of these men-at-arms had been sent over to
Hertford in Northumberland.
3 9 (B. M.)

Harl. MS. 283, f. 332.

40Du Bellay, Mempires/ XXI, 210.
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luck and plague had forced the king to resign his command to
Du Biez, for at Forest Montier, a hunting lodge to which Fran
cis advanced to be nearer his army at Outreau, his son, the
Duke of Orleans, was siezed by a pestilential fever and died.
This young prince's death, which occurred on September
8 , rendered useless the main clauses of the Treaty of Crepy,

drove Francis from the field in grief and terror of conta
gion, and left Du Biez to carry on as best he could a war
which neither side, it was now apparent, was likely to win.
The marshal's success in the Terre d'Oye was easily offset
by the inadequacy of his arrangements at Outreau.

His fort,

built to the specifications of an Italian engineer, Antonio
Melloni, was so far distant from Boulogne that Paget, who
viewed it from the English lines in December, assured his
fellow Secretary of State, Sir William Petre, that it could
do "no hurt in the world."

The stronghold showed proudly,

wrote Paget, but from his vantage on the battlements of
Boulogne, he could scarcely determine a white horse from a
black, and Outreau's guns were "only troublesome for the
41
noise."
Fort d'Outreau suffered a graver disadvantage; it was
too small.

Intended to house a permanent garrison of b e 

tween three thousand and four thousand, it was when completed
_

_

L.: £ P., XX, pt. 2, No. 919.
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barely able to hold five hundred. Mellon! had paced off the
42
wrong measurements.
Still, Outreau could not entirely be
scoffed at.

Its gunners were not wholly ineffective, as is

proved by the rash of stone defence-works that were thrown up
around Boulogne to protect the harbor and the Basse Ville's
southern exposure which lay directly in the Frenchmen's line
of fire.

In July, Henry's engineer, John Rogers, began con

struction of the Citadel, a stone bulwark in the southwest
corner of the town to which was attached a pier to shield
43
ships in the haven.
On September 8 , just as Surrey entered
upon his brief tenure as Governor of Boulogne, resolution was
taken in the Council for the building of jetty or mole to
cover the above mentioned pier which, when finally completed
was described as sufficient even at high tide to "defend all
of the ships entering the port in such a way that the French
44
gunfire is unable to harm them."
Surrey's appointment, coinciding as it did with Du Biez's
preparations for his descent into the Terre d'Oye, was marked
by a sharp increase in hostile contact.

The young earl, a

soldier and a poet, did not lack courage, but he was "a

42Du Bellay, Memoires, XXI, 240-42.
4 3 L.

& P ., XX, pt. 1, No. 1160.

4 4 Ibid., pt. 2, No. 323; Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor
Military Engineer, pp. 70-71.
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dangerous neurotic," swollen with an over-high regard of. his
own martial abilities, a dangerous war-hawk who had gained
the king's ear only because wiser councils were at last ind i n i n g towards peace.

45

The cost of the war was stupendous.

"This year and last," lamented Wriothesley to the Council
on September 14, "the king has spent about £1,300,000, his
subsidy and benevolence ministering scant £300,000; and the
lands

[from the dissolution of the monasteries] being con

sumed and the plate of the realm molten and coined, I lament
the danger of the time to come."

A new loan had been made

in Flanders; the scarcity of corn had driven up wheat to 20s.
a quarter, and yet, bemoaned the Chancellor,

"you write to

me 'Still pay, pay, prepare for this and for that.*"

"1 am

at my wit's end," Wriothesley wrote again in November, "how
to shift for the next three months:"

£24,000 alone was

owed at Boulogne; £11,000 had been dispatched to the garrison
against Scotland; the Augmentations had not the wherewithal
to pay the Italian brokerage firm of Bonvisi; the coffers
of First Fruits and Tenths were nearly empty; the Exchequer
could not release any more funds until February; and the
Court of General Surveyors

46

was in such financial straits

45For a brief and lucid assessment of Surrey, see Smith,
Henry Vllly- the Mask of Royalty, pp. 243-45.

46Glossary.
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that when its creditors had been satisfied no more than
£5,000 or £6,000
Norfolk

was

and the

47
expected.
chiefs of the Council

peace, but were afraid to press for it.
Surrey were,

for the

turing king,

who lectured Chapuys'

were aching for

Hot-bloods like

moment, in vogue with

the

replacement

grossly pos
as Imperial

ambassador, Francis van der Delft, on the virtue of honor
among sovereigns, and bluntly informed the new envoy that
s ince he had won Boulogne at sword's point he meant to keep
it.

48

Norfolk, who knew too well from experience how quickly
I

his sovereign's favor might be lost, tried to caution his son.
Writing Surrey in late September, the old Duke rebuked the
earl for animating "the King too much for the keeping of
Boulogne," adding the warning that "who so doth at length
shall get small thank."

49

It was an omen which the younger

Howard in his pride ignored.

No amount of fatherly scolding

could turn Surrey from his purpose.

50

The bellicose earl

played Belisarius to Henry's Justinian, the aging monarch vi
cariously basking in the sometimes foolish feats of his

4 7 L. £ P . ,

XX, pt. 2, Nos. 366, 769.

4^Spanish calendar, VIII, No. 140 (p. 251).
4 ®Nott). The Works of Henry Howard, I, 178.
Van der
Delft, who had joined Chapuys at Boulogne during the siege in
1544, came :to England in January, 1545.

50

See L. & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 738.
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l i e ut e n a n t , ^ who delighted the king by inviting him to
Boulogne to see "the willingness of his men" and how easy it
was to set the French on the run.

52

A different face, however, was revealed in defeat.
Early in the new year, Surrey met with a reverse that was to
loom large in his fall from grace and eventual ruin.

On Jan

uary 7, 1546, a French convoy laden with provisions from Montreuil and escorted by five thousand landsknechts was set upon
by the earl and a smaller contingent as it approached Outreau.
The English horse, in a magnificent charge, drove the French
cavalry back on the carriages of which ninety were destroyed;
but the English and :italian foot, commanded by Surrey, pan
icked by the superior numbers or fire power of their adversar-.
ies, abandoned the field.

Strategically, the action was a

success in that the resupplying of Outreau had been prevented.
Yet, by the chivalric standards of the age, it was an utter
disaster:

twenty-two English gentlemen

53

died along with

four Italian captains, and a number of standards were taken.

^ S u r r e y was reported to the Council by an Italian cap
tain, Giovanni Thomaso, for recklessly exposing himself to
French gunfire, for which offence the ;earl was reprimanded
by the king. Ibid.
^ N o t t , The Works of Henry Howard, I, 181.
53

This is the figure given by Gruffyd, "Boulogne and
Calais from 1545 to 1550,". pp. 41-42.
L. & P., XXI, pt. 1,
No. 33, gives the smaller number of fourteen.

\
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In his agitation, Surrey called on his surviving officers
54
"to stick their swords through his guts" to end his shame,
though any feelings of personal responsibility soon passed.
That night, within the safety of Boulogne, courts-martial were
held, and next morning a captain and two or three of the rankand-file who had returned from the carnage were hanged, "more
for telling the truth . . . than .'for anything they had done
against the king."

It had been Surrey in his "unreasoning

bravery" who had caused the overthrow by attempting the impos
sible.

His footmen, many of them inexperienced recruits who

had been fed on stale rations and driven to the fight with
beatings and curses, had been outnumbered by the Germans
nearly three to one.

But rank had its privilege.

Unwilling

to admit to any fault, Surrey made the wretched common sol
diers his scapegoats:

"We assure your Majesty," he wrote

through his council to the king,

"there was no default in the

rulers, nor lack of courage to be given them, but a humor
that sometime reigneth in Englishmen."
While this excuse was momentarily accepted, news of the
reverse was not well received by Henry.

Paget could write,

as he did to Surrey on the eighteenth, that the king, his

54Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,"
p. 42.
55State Papers, XI, 3.'

majesty,

"like a prince of wisdom," knew that whosoever

played at games of chance "must sometimes lose."

56

Yet, such

was Henry's concern for the safety of Boulogne that, even be
fore the Principal Secretary's soothing words had been penned,
order had been taken to dispatch Hertford across the Channel
to assess the real extent of the damage and to send with him
certain of Gamboa's Spaniards to make up, at least in part,
57
for the casualties suffered on the seventh.
Surrey would
be superseded by Hertford in March; he was arrested for trea
son in December; and on January 19, 1547, having been found
guilty, he was executed.
Surrey did not die for his disgrace at Boulogne, but
rather for pride.

Specifically, he dared to quarter his own

arms with those of Edward the Confessor,

58

thereby flaunting

for all to see a claim to the throne equal, if not superior,
to that of the Tudors themselves.

This is not the place to

list the sins of the house of Howard; they are better examined
59
elsewhere.
But what had driven the unstable earl to such

56 L.

& P . , XXI, pt. 1, No. 81.

^ D a s e n t , Acts of the Privy Council, I, 314; Spanish
Calendar, VIII, No. 186.
^ A n g l o-Saxon king of England
Howards claimed descent.
59

(1042-1066)

from whom the

Froude, History of Erigland, IV, 465-7.7, gives...a de
tailed account.
See also, Smith, Henry' VIII, the Mask of
Royalty, pp. 442 f f .
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mad action was in part his unreasoned hatred of Hertford, with
whom he had been competing for some years for Henry's favor
and whom in addition he viewed as a parvenu, a commoner raised
to the nobility through the union of the king to his third
60
queen, Hertford's sister, Jane Seymour.
Jealous of his rival, Surrey returned to England in a
choler of spite and malice.

Unable and unwilling to curb his

tongue, he publicly slandered many about the court.

In an ef

fort to supplant Hertford in Henry's eyes, he stooped so low
as to suggest to his sister, the widowed Duchess of Richmond,
that she offer herself as royal concubine.

Harsh words and

open threats against Hertford netted him a few weeks of close
62
confinement in Windsor Castle in July,
but worst of all,
63
Surrey privately projected the death of the krng.
In con
versation with his friend, George Blagge, a gentlemen of the

Edward Seymour was created Viscount Beauchamp in June,
1536, a week after the royal marriage.
A year later, on the
birth of his nephew, the future Edward VI, he was made Earl
of Hertford.
^ M a r y Howard had been the wife of Henry Fitzroy, the
king's illegitamate son by his mistress, Elizabeth Blount.
Born in 1519, the boy had been vested with the Dukedom of
Richmond in 1525.
Nott,. The Works of Henry Howard, I, lxxxvii-viii.
®^To "imagine" the king's, death was in itself treason,
as defined in the act of 1534.
26 Henry VIII, c. 13;' Stat
utes of the Realm, III, 508-09.

SI
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Privy Chamber, the earl gave it as his considered opinion
that should Henry die Norfolk, his father, was the "meetest"
man to control the regency'.
It was the younger Howard's heraldic presumption, how
ever, which brought him to grief.

Unable to win back the

king's affection or wean the monarch from his growing depend
ence

upon Hertford, the artless Surrey in his pique resorted

to the childish act of emblazoning the escutcheons of his
palace with the leopards of England and the arms of the
saintly King Edward .65

Cast into the Tower on December 12,

he was tried at the Guildhall on January 13 and beheaded six
days later on Tower Hill.
In returning to the French war which by this late date
had officially ended some six months before, there is much to
relate, especially as effecting the employment of mercenaries.
The winter in France of 1545/6, except for Surrey's zealous
efforts to beat the enemy single-handed, had witnessed a number of "cassings,"

66

usual in armies of that age and in that

season when large-scale military operations were most diffi
cult to carry out.

Within the Pale, which after Du Biez's

For several of the more damaging depositions against
Surrey, see L. & P . , XXI, pt. 2, No. 555 (pp. 283-89).
6 5 Ibid., (7, i, ii).

^®The word used in the sense of "to pay off" or "cashier."
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escapade soon returned to normal, the cashierings began in
November with the dismissal of Lightmaker*s Clevelanders who,
as was noted above, would have been discharged earlier but
for the dispute over their last month's wages.

Certain of

the Italian's band provided out of the Venetian Republic by
Ludovico da I'Armi and stationed at Guisnes were released at
the same time, and on December 2 the Council in England au~
thorized the abrogation of the services of one "Joste Clautz,
Almain," and his ensign of four hundred landsknechts.

67

On the whole, however, the termination of contracts,
both within the Pale and at Boulogne, was kept to a minimum.
If anything, the numbers of foreigners under arms in the Eng
lish garrisons in France increased, for Du Biez's raid had
./

had a chastening effect.

Besides, as experience was begin

ning to teach, it was cheaper to keep mercenaries through
the winter than to release them and seek to hire replace
ments in the spring.
tion;

This, at any rate, was Paget's observa

if, he explained to the Council in December, "the King

will next year use no Italian horsemen, it were well to cass
them, which- cost B523 monthly? but, if he will use Italian
horsemen, it is to be considered that the enemies will begin
to stir in March, and the men must have one month-'s wages

6 7 CB, M.) Harl. MS. 283, f. 207; Dasent, Acts off the
Privy- Council, r, 279.

405
for their departure home and six weeks' wages for their return to service."
New recruits appeared everywhere, at Calais, in the Pale,
and at Boulogne, the latter establishment attracting Albanians
in such quantity that it was deemed necessary to appoint one
of their number, the "Cavalier" Thomaso Bua, as their colonel.
One hundred Spanish horsemen, recruited by Gamboa in Flanders,
were placed in Calais, while another company, under Gamboa.'s
subordinate, Carlos de Navarro, were allowed at Boulogne.
Italians, too, figured prominently in the hirings.

70

On Febru

ary 21, Amerigo Antenori received appointment "to serve above
Mark in the Marches of Calais" with two hundred of his country
men, and Surrey's Italian colonel, Giovanni de Salerno, was ■
permitted several new captains to make up, no doubt, for the
four who had fallen in the

68 L.

engagement on January 7.

71

& P . , XX, pt. 2, No. 997.

6Q
^
Bua, a stradiot emigre who resided in the Venetian
Republic, was possibly of Greek extraction.
He is mentioned
as being a colonel as early as January 20, 1547, though his
commission was not signed until sometime in February.
Dasent,
Acts of the Privy Council,
I, 318; L. & P . , XXI, pt. 1,No.
301 (45).
Sathas, Documents 1 inedits, IV, lix, gives him the
name of Thomas l'Argien, signifying the area of Greece from
which he supposedly eminated, and describes his as the leader
of "550 Peloponnesians."
7 0 Dasent, Acts of the Privy. Council, I, 326; L. & P.,
XXI, pt. 1, No. 205.

7Ispanlsh Calendar,: VIII, No. 184.

Most of the increase in France among Henry's free lances
came not, however, from new signings, but through transfers
from England.

The French and Scottish threats having been

effectively dealt with, and the Council's intelligence al72
ready pointing towards a spring attack on Boulogne,
the
larger part of those men of war shuttled into the kingdom
from Calais in 1545 were sent back, their reassignment timed
to coincide with Hertford's appointment as the king's Lieu
tenant and Commander-in-Chief of the army and armada sent in
March "in the parts beyond the sea . " 73

Hertford's main force

of five thousand or six thousand Englishmen crossed to Calais
on March 22.

Already, the general had been preceded by the

bulk of the mercenaries that had served under him in North
umberland.

Two Albanian captains, Antonio Stesino and Nicho

las Cresia, survivors of the winter "cassings" in England,
were admitted in January with fifty horsemen apiece to Bua's
command at Boulogne.

In the same month, Cobham received five

hundred Clevelanders out of Dover, while in February the
Mayor of Newcastle provided shipping bound also for the Pale
for fifteen hundred of Gamboa's footmen.

74

Some idea of the total strength of the land forces under

72 L.

& P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 250, 262.

7 3 Ibid., Nos.

431, 4 49; Spanish' Calendar, VIII, No. 223.

7 ^Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council,

I, 315, 316, 322.
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Hertford in France is provided by Paget.

In a letter to

Christopher Mont drafted a month before the earl's departure,
the Principal Secretary divulged that Seymour's effectives
would amount to thirty thousand:

75

sixteen thousand English

men, two thousand Spaniards, two thousand Italians, four
thousand unidentified horsemen,

76

and six thousand German

landsknechts, who even then, as Paget was writing, were being
levied in Low Germany by their leader, a native of Saxony and
77
denizen Hamburg, Colonel Conrad Pennink.
Paget's estimate of the size of Pennink's regiment was
exaggerated by a half.

The commission, which this highly

respected old war-chief had been extended at Hampton Court on
January 23, called for the raising of three thousand rather
than six thousand landsknechts,

78

the mustering of whom was

?5State Papers, X, 60. Though it is by no means clear,
P a get's figure would seem to have been meant to include as
well the soldiers in the garrisons at Calais, Hammes,
Guisnes, and Boulogne.
76

Definitely among them were many foreigners, as for
example Bua's Albanians, Gamboa's mounted arquebusiers, the
German men-at-arms transferred from England, and the Italian
troopers of Ludovica da I'Armi.
77
For notices on this man's career, see .the unsigned
article, "Der Oberst Cort Pennink,tr Zeitschrift des Vereines
fur hamburgische Geschichte, V (1886)'," 32 V 4 5 V Hereinafter
cited as "Obersf Cort Pennink."

& P , , XXI, pt, 1, No. 112 Cl, 21. For the original
contract, see CP. R. 0,1 S. P. 1/213, ff, 151-52, which gives
the number to be raised as four thousand,
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completed within, of all places, the cloistered confines of
the convent of Elten near Emmerich on the Rhine in the final
days of March.

Surprisingly, though the men were staunch

Lutherans, no outrages were committed.
landsknechts' conduct was exemplary.

If anything, the
The Mother Superior

was made a gift of 2 0 0 gelders; smaller gifts of money were
made to the incredulous peasants who lived about the nunnery;
and no untoward incidents of any kind were reported.

79

Henry

VIII had found a foreign officer whom he could trust implic
itly; but equally amazing was the assistance tendered by the
Imperialists, who with a minimum of foot-dragging allowed the
soldiers to pass through the Low Countries.
The emperor’s change in heart stemmed, naturally, from
a change in his politics.

The death of the Duke of Orleans,

whose marriage to an Imperial princess was to have cemented
,
80
the Treaty of Crepy,
absolved Charles from all obligations

L. & P . , XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 473, 474, 531, 533. The ex
act number of men, "elect personages and old landsknechts,
armed and weaponed accordingly as it is convenanted," was
given by the English Commissioners of the Musters as 2,9 83.
The commissioners in this instance were John Brende of
Beccles in Suffolk, and John Brigandine, step-son of Lord
Edward North, Chancellor of the Court of Augmentations.
Both were experienced in military affairs, Brende as a plan
ner and surveyor of fortifications, Brigandine as ari officer
and veteran of the Scottish raids in 1545.
This author is
indebted for much of this information to Professor S. T.
Bindoff and his staff on the History of Parliament Trust.

^^Above, p. 319, n. 80.
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to placate the French.

He had lost a potential son-in-law,

but from the Hapsburg point of view it "was no bad thing for
him."

The Netherlands were left intact, and there was no

longer any doubt that Milan would go to Spain.

More immedi

ately, the declining state of the French king's health, the
exhausted condition of the latter's kingdom, together with
the burden of the war against England, insured the emperor of
a free hand in seeking to solve the problem which had
weighed

most heavily on his own mind the past few years.

Charles had resolved to fight the Lutherans.
He was to begin
81
seriously to marshal his forces in June.
In the interim,
it was to his advantage to cater to Henry VIII.

By weaning

the English king from the Protestants and by allowing him the
services of a known sympathizer of the Schmalkaldic cause
like Conrad Pennink, Charles was simply strengthening his own
hand in a struggle in which the odds against him were already
considerable.
Pennink's landsknechts repaired through Holland and Zee
land to Sluys and from thence along the sands to Calais, which
82
the first contingents reached on April 14.
Their

SlBrandi, The Emperor Charles V, pp. 545, 547-48.
The
War of the Schmalkaldic League (1546-1555) began on the night
of July 5 when the Lutheran contingents raised in Swabia moved
on the Imperial forces at Nesselwang and Fussen.

82L. & P., XXI, pt. 1,‘ Nos. 569-71, 599.
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assignment was to assist Hertford in the construction of a
new fort within the Boulonnais at Ambleteuse.

This place,

situated about six miles north of Boulogne on the coast of
the Pas de Calais, had been viewed by the English general
during his earlier visit in January and was occupied, appar
ently without violence, sometime in February or March to pre
serve overland communications between Boulogne and Calais
and to deter the French from building a similar stronghold
83
at neighboring Marquise.
Hertford advanced to Ambleteuse on March 30 with some
seven thousand men, of which number about twenty-six hundred were mercenaries.

84

That figure was soon increased by

the dispatch from Boulogne of the larger part of the foreign
ers there, and the percentage of free lances in this English
army was further enhanced by the arrival at Ambleteuse of
85
Pennink's three thousand on April 18.
The immediate

83Spanish Calendar, VIII, No. 215. From this letter
dated March 18, Ambleteuse would already appear to have been
in English hands.
®^Gamboa's fifteen hundred Spaniards; the five hundred
Clevelanders of Hoen and Van der Lughe; five hundred Italians
under Captains Amerigo Antenori, Francisco Agello and Fran
cisco Tiberio of Calabria; and the one hundred stradiots of
Stesino and Cresia.
L. & P . , XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 356, 416, 612,
(B. M . ) Add. MS. 5753, ff. 190-91.
85 L. & P . , XXI, pt. 1,’ Nos. .438 (1, 2), 481, 494, 614
(ii), Most of Salerno's command of nearly seven hundred infan
trymen and the larger part of Bua's stradiots were assigned
to Hertford.
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objective, that of forestalling the erection of a French
fort at Marquise, was quickly obtained, the enemy failing to
reinforce the town before Hertford's departure from Calais.
Some thought was given to an attack on staples, but as the
place was strongly defended the attempt was forborne.

A

"camisade" by the Spaniards on Ardres was next considered.
However, that too was ruled out because there were no ladders
to scale the ditches and for fear of heavy casualties.

Fi

nally, it was agreed to hasten the construction of the new
camp at Ambleteuse, and that having made it tenable, remove
with the larger part of the army to Boulogneberg, an unforti
fied observation post lying a few miles east of Boulogne atop
Mont Lambert.

From this eminence, which would provide the

English an excellent view of French activity, Hertford hoped
to lend some protection to the north bank of the Liane and,
moreover, to the foragers from Boulogne, who were dependent
upon the surrounding woods and pastures to supplement their
not always adequate supplies coming in by sea.

86

The move to Boulogneberg was undertaken with some speed
on May 23.

With French troops massing at Saint Etienne

across the river from that outpost, Hertford advanced from
Ambleteuse with a thousand Englishmen, an equal number of
Spaniards, Pennink's landsknechts, and the foreign horsemen

86Ibid., Nos. 892, 893, 1016.
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"save the scout."

Joined enroute by two thousand footmen and

the cavalry from Boulogne, the English general marched to
Mont Lambert, drove back the enemy who had approached to
within skirmishing distance, and appointed John Rogers, Sur
veyor of the Works at Boulogne since September, 1544, to be
gin the construction of some defensible structure at Boulogneberg.

87

Pennink, his Germans, the Clevelander horse, and six

hundred Englishmen were left behind under Lord William Grey,

8B

who on the morning of the following day, assisted by forty
Albanians of Bua's band, laid an ambush for a troop of the
Duke of Vend 6 me's cavalry.
To Henry's delight, the action was wholly successful.
At a cost of one or two footmen, some forty or fifty of Vendome's knights were captured, about one hundred men and horses
were slain, and Boulogneberg, which the French had hoped to
occupy themselves, was secured.

89

The king expressed his

thanks for the victory in a letter to Hertford on May 26, but
at the same time bade his captains in the Boulonnais to avoid
any further exploits which might hinder negotiations for

8 7 Ibid., Nos. 892, 893; Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor
Military Engineer, p. 55.
88

His appointment as Governor of Boulogne and the
Boulonnais had become effective on April 9. L. & P ., XXI,
pt. 1, No. 716 (10).

89Ibid. , Nos. 907., 90a.
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peace which were now on the brink of conclusion.

90

A formal

treaty was actually concluded at Camp, between Guisnes and
Ardres, on June 7, not because either side had gained an ad
vantage, but because the two countries, their decrepit monarchs, and abused taxpayers were exhausted.

Just as impor

tant, Henry and Francis had found a face-saving stratagem
that preserved the honor of both.
The main provisions of the Treaty of Camp allowed in
theory that Francis owned Boulogne, but that in consideration
of Henry's conquest the city, with that part of the Boulon
nais immediately north of the port, should remain in English
possession for eight years, at the end of which time on the
payment of an indemnity of 2,000,000 crowns Boulogne and the
occupied territory should be returned to French hands.
Scotland too was comprehended in the agreement.

91

England

would not make war on her neighbor unless the Scots broke
the peace, in which case Francis, as Henry's re-found "good
brother," should "take part against them."

92

Outwardly, the Treaty of Camp was greeted with great
enthusiasm on both sides.

9 0 Ibid., No.

Henry, within days of the signing,

927.

91

Two modern copies of the treaty, misdated July 17,
are to be found in (B. M.) Harl. MS. 1064, f. 116b and (B.
M.) Lansd. MS. 141, ,£. 141.
92 (B. M.)

Add. MS. 9835, f. 18.
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stood as godfather by proxy to Francis' granddaughter, and
D'Annebaut, when he came to London to witness the ratification of the peace, received a tumultuous welcome.

93

Pri

vately, however, away from the public's gaze, considerable
tensions remained.

Reductions in the numbers of garrison

troops in the Boulonnais and the Pale began almost immedi - 1
ately.

Sir Edward Carne, Henry's ambassador in the Low

Countries, was instructed on June 13 to commence negotiations
to procure passage through the emperor's lands for the dis
charged mercenaries, whose demobilization was initiated during the third week of the month.

94

Their retiral was attended with a minimum of inconven
ience.

Though there was some delay for lack of ready funds,

the money was quickly gathered and the free lances were
sent on their way, most of the captains receiving special
letters of commendation from Hertford at Ambleteuse, except
for Salerno, whose service in the earl's estimation, had left
95
much to be desired.
Only one problem marred the foreigners'
withdrawal,

Pennink's three thousand, being notorious

^ State Papers, XI, 227-28; Hail1s Chronicle, p. 867.
94State Papers, XI, 217, 222; Spanish Calendar, VIII,
No. 278.
QC

* £ • t XXI, pt. 1, Nos. 1122, 1382 (15-26).
Henry
authorized a commendatory letter for Salerno anyway, plus an
annuity.
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partisans of Lutheranism, dared not return to the Baltic
through the Netherlands.

The way was blocked by the Count

of Buren, who under orders from the emperor was mobilizing
the Catholic forces of that region for the Schmalkaldic War.
Henry's former Albanian, Italian and Spanish charges were in
fact welcomed by the count; many hundreds were recruited;
but Pennink's bands, who assuredly would have been cut to
pieces, had to be ferried to England from whence they were
96
transported by sea to Hamburg towards the end of July.

96Ibid., Nos. 1070 (4), 1109, 1282, 1438.

EPILOGUE
Although this peace pleased both the English
and the French nations, yet surely both mistrusted
the continuance of the same . . . for the French
men still longed for Boulogne, and the Englishmen
minded not to give it over.
H a i l 1s C hronicle, p. 867.
The Peace of Camp, if it ended a war, did not terminate
hostilities.

Violence among the parties continued, on a

lesser scale in France and w i t h renewed vigor in Scotland,
until March 29, 1550.

On that date, the government of Henry

VIII's successor,^ Edward VI, accepted the Treaty of Boulogne
agreeing for the sum of 400,000 crowns to surrender immedi
ately all title to that city and the Boulonnais and to with
draw its troops from Scotland, which unfortunate land had
been invaded again in 1547.
The pact made at Camp had taken effect only for a m o 
ment.

By July 17, 1546, the day on which that peace was rat

ified in London, Henry VIII barely had six months to live.
A month earlier,

in the midst of the withdrawal of his me r 

cenaries, he had given specific instructions for the reduc
tion of his English effectives in the territories ceded to
him by the French.

For all the Boulonnais, including

■^Hehry. VIII died on Friday, January 28, 1547.
416
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2
Boulogne, Boulogneberg, Ambleteuse, and Blackness,
a mere
3
2,160 English soldiers were appointed with less than fif
teen hundred free lances to sustain them.

"Extraordinary

garrisons," that is to say, garrisons above the normal compli
ment, were retained only within the Pale at Guisnes, Hammes,
4
and the principal bulwarks within the Terre d'Oye.
Overnight, in response to the evacuation of the French
army before Boulogne, Henry's forces in France declined by
better than two-thirds, from a high of some thirty thousand,
which is where the figure had stood in March, to considerably
less than ten thousand, all of them in quarters in widely
separated posts and the vast majority of them Englishmen,
part-time soldiers whose lack of military demeanor was
5
matched only by their desire to be home.
The few foreigners
remaining in service were Italians and Spaniards.
The former
6
four or five hundred under five captains,
were stationed in

A new fort on Cap Gris-Nez begun by Hertford a few days
before the signing of the Treaty of Camp.
See L. & P., XXI,
pt. 1, Nos. 927, 960.
3
Ibid., No. 1092 (2).
4 Ibid.
5 On the poor quality of the English common soldier, see
Gruff yd, "Boulogne and Calais, from 1545 to 1550,” pp. 23^24,
31, 41-42.

^Piero Giovanni Luti, Paolo Serdo, Thomaso Deferencia,
Giovanni Domingo Calabroza, and Nicolo Demoyena.
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Boulogne, the latter, about one thousand strong under Colonel
Gamboa, at Ambleteuse.

Why these were kept is not exactly

clear, except that the Spaniards were in disfavor with the
emperor, who threatened to send into Hungary those in Buren1s
7
army, who against his ban had taken wages from Henry.
It
was perhaps for the same reason tha/t the Italians remained;
for at least one of the captains, Piero Giovanni Luti, hailed
from a state, the Republic of Siena, in which there existed
strong anti-imperialist sentiment.
Be that as it may, the more probable rationale for the
retention of the mercenaries was suspicion of the French.
That it was high is made manifest in a remarkable document
drawn up in August, 1546, by William Paget in which the gifted
Principal Secretary sought to project the diplomatic dangers
8
his nation then faced.
The pope is ranked as an obvious en
emy, the emperor, because of his ties to the papacy, as an
uncertain friend.

But heading the list of foes is France,

which country, Paget reasoned, would soon be moved by motives
of revenge to retake Boulogne.

9

The diplomatist knew his

business well.

7L. & P., XXI, pt. 1, No. 1301.
8 (B. M.) Cotton MSS. Titus B., ii, 47, ff. 79-81.
9
Strangely, Paget made no mention of Scotland, against
whom Henry at that moment was considering war.
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Even as Henry's minister wrote, the cycle which would
lead to war began again.

On August 29, Lord Grey informed

Paget that the French, in defiance of the Treaty of Camp, had
begun another fort, Chatillon, at the entrance to Boulogne
haven, directly across the water from the Old M a n .'*'0

Pro

tests were lodged in Paris, and on the night of September 5,
on direct command from Henry himself, Grey ordered a raid on
11
the diggings and the new works were razed.
The French rejoindsr was a call to arms.

Montreuil and other garrisons on

the frontier against the English were placed on alert, while
on Henry's part his forces in the Boulonnais were strength
ened.

Hertford, at home since July, was recommissioned to

cross the sea as the king's Lieutenant-General; the thousand
pioneers at Boulogne were bolstered by the dispatch of five
hundred more; and seven thousand troops were embarked at
Dover and on the Thames for immediate transportation to the
imperiled c i t y . ^
The demonstration of force temporarily averted a crisis.
Before Hertford's sailing, the French, who had resumed their
occupation of Chatillon and made it defensible, abandoned
their position, referring the whole matter of fortifications

10 L.

& P., XXI,

State Papers,
1 2 L.

& P ., XXI,

pt. 1, Nos. 1524, 1530.
XI, 289.
pt. 2, Nos. 83, 84, 89, 90, 91, 128, 140.
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to a commission to determine what might be permitted under
13
14
the treaty.
Chatillon, to H e n r y 1s. relief, was disallowed;
but for the remainder of his reign incident piled upon inci
dent, culminating in the breach of the articles of peace by
the English themselves.

In the first weeks of the new year,

as the headstrong Tudor monarch's life ran out, Grey's pio
neers collected material on the French side of the Liane
which was used in the spring of 1547 for the construction of
a new jetty across from Boulogne haven.

Ostensibly, this

fresh outwork was to control the tides within the harbor, but
in reality it was designed as a fort to protect English ship15
ping and provide a first line of defence against Outreau.
Despite rancorous objections from Paris, the English persisted.
The Dunette, as the structure was dubbed, was built, thereby
providing justification to the French to begin anew the bas
tion at Chatillon.
What part the Latin mercenaries played in these proceed
ings or how they were deployed is left unsaid.

The Italians

most surely remained at Boulogne, while some few of the Span
iards provided a diversion in the summer of 1546 by enlivening

1 3 I b i d . , Nos.

131, 157; State Papers, XI, 319.

14 L.' & P., XXI, pt.

2,. No. 330

(2).

^ 3 Ibict. , No. 715; Shelby, John Rogers, Tudor Military
Engineer, pp. 71-72, 106.

421
the celebrations attendant upon the christening- of the French
princess, Elizabeth, when one of their company, Julian
16
.
Romero,
fought a duel before the French king at Fontaine
bleau.

Romero's opponent was a fellow countryman, Antonio de

Mora, the same who, with part of his men and sixty new hand17
guns, had fled from the Pale to join Du Biez in April, 1545.
At the heart of the quarrel was De Mora's desertion, it being
considered treason, even among mercenaries, for a soldier
under contract to change sides during a campaign.

18

Some

where, after the Peace of Camp, the traitor and Romero had
met; Julian issued the challenge; and De Mora, accepting it,
arranged through Francis that the combat be fought according
to the law of arms in the lists at Fontainebleau.
For the occasion, the English Spaniard was outfitted
with the aid of "a thousand broad angels," a gift from Henry,
and having "put himself in order" he travelled into France
in the company of Gamboa, Captains Cristobal Diaz, Pedro
Negro,

"and divers other Spanish knights and gentlemen."

19

•^See below, Appendix D.
17
Above, p . 357.
18

Several instances of this type of mercenary honor could
be cited.
Thomaso Bua, the Albanian colonel at Boulogne and
Ambleteuse, was siezed on his return to Italy in September and
executed in Turin for having left the French service for Henry.
L. & P., XXI, pt. 2, Nos. 163, 457.
19
This at least according to Hume, ed., Chronicle of King
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The fight, which took place on July 15 and which Julian won,
proved highly profitable, not only to the victor but to his
companions as well.
the Spanish captains,

Lifetime annuities were awarded to all

20

.

.

.

Gamboa, as colonel, receiving no less 21
than £250 and in January, 1547, denization
and the grant,
"for his services in the King's w ars,” of the lordship, manor,
22
and advowson of the rectory of Stanmer in Middlesex.

Henry V I I I , p. 128.
This fascinating but totally untrust
worthy account of events contains much confusing information
on the role of Spanish mercenaries in Tudor service which,
like much else in the work, does not bear out when compared
with other sources.
Romero’s "camp" and its aftermath are
fully described, pp. 128-31.
For other references, consult
Charles Wriothesley, A Chronicle of England during the Reigns
of the Tudors, ed. William Douglas Hamilton (2 vols,; London:
The Camden Society, Nos. XI and XX, 1875-77), I, 173-74; L. &
P., XXI, pt. 2, Nos. 1184, 1216, 1232, 2357, 1259, 1298;
Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, I, 501.
on
L. & P., XXI, pt. 2, No. 332 (14, 17, 19, 20, 21).
The captains received as follows:
Pedro Negro, £100; Cristo
bal Diaz, £100; Alonso de Villa Sirga, £100; Ludovico de
Nogera, £100; and Julian Romero, £150, who previously, if the
anonymous Spanish chronicler is to be believed, received of
the French king a golden chain "which weighed more than
seven hundred crowns,1' a tunic "stamped with gold that was
worth more than the K i n g ’s chain," and numerous lesser gifts
from the French nobility.
21

This term implies that Gamboa became a naturalized
Englishman with all the privileges of a citizen excepting
those of inheritance and the right to hold public office.
22 L. £ P., XXI,

pt. 2, No. 771 (5, 34).
The property
with its appurtenances included over 276 acres of land, a
number of closes, two "horse-mills," and a windmill, plus
"all the messuages, etc., in St. Sepulchre's parish in the
suburbs of London and in Westham, Middlesex."
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As always, to the lucky few the mercenary life paid
handsome dividends.

On the whole, however, for the ordinary

soldier of fortune the way of the free lance provided no
more than a living and not infrequently much less.

Death in

the field or from disease were common rewards for those who
followed the wars, and if these natural hazards were overcome,
debilitating injuries and crippling poverty forever loomed as
possibilities.

The latter fates struck at more than a few of

Henry's mercenaries.

Giovanni Potito, Albanian, Diego Romero

Spaniard, and Antonio de Milanino de Parma, Italian, to name
but a few, were all part of the carnage of the Scottish wars.
Maimed in the hands or the legs, they received no accolades,
no annuities or grants of land, but rather a few paltry shil23
lings and passports out of the country.
Demetrio de Milano,
"sore impoverished by his service" and himself imprisoned for
a time in Scotland, pocketed no more than £12 10s. for his
pains, while Artillio Siciliano and Antonio Greco, "poor sol
diers," for "their conduct homeward" were awarded between
24
them the princely sum of £5.
Mercenaries, of course, were paid considerably higher
wages than were national conscripts.

2 3 (P. R. O.)

24
25

25

The average English

S. P. 351/43, mems. 9, 11.

Ibid., mem. 11.

The entire area of mercenary financing is ripe for
further investigation.
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infantryman in Henry's reign drew 6 d. per day as compared to
the foreigner's 8 d.

The disparity was greater where cavalry

men were concerned.

"A horsemen with 9d. a day, if his

horse is killed, cannot buy another," raged Paget, "and see
ing a stranger get £3 a month and he but 20s. his heart is
9g
killed."
It was a legitimate enough argument, but only on
the surface.

The English cavalryman might have been every

bit as brave as his German, Spanish, Italian, or Albanian
comrades, but the former, to point out but one discrepancy in
Paget's logic, did not have the foreigners' overhead.

The

mercenary, whether mounted or on foot, had to be fully equip
ped before his final muster.

"Firstly," begins the initial

article of Reiffenberg's unfulfilled contract, " . . .

lancers

will be armed with their head gear, with vizors, helmits and
salades, throat pieces, axes, vambraces, corselets, breeches
and tassets covering the knees, and with long gauntlets."
There was probably not one English gentleman in a hundred

27
0

.

.

who owned such equipment and even fewer who could afford the
upkeep of the six or eight destriers which some of the German
knights brought with them.
Reiffenberg's contract is as specific again on the har
ness required of his mounted arquebusiers.

2 6 L.: & P., XXI,
2 7 (P. R. 0.)

pt. 1, No. 691.

S. P. 1/203, f. 15.

These also were

425
expected to be "well furnished," providers of their own "am
munition, breeches, axe, sleeves of mail, gorgets, gauntlets,
i

,

28

corselets, and good head gear, with a swynspetts and a gun."
29
Considering early Tudor legislation against firearms,
there
were proportionately likely as few of the English commonality

who could outfit themselves with arquebuses as there were Tu
dor gentlemen who could pass muster as authentic men-at-arms.
Besides the armor, the weapons, the war horses, and the
like which foreign soldiers had to pay for out of their own
pockets,

30

there was also the matter of military experience.

No amount of money could be placed on that commodity, and in
the final analysis it was that experience which all employers
of foreigners sought to profit from.

How much, the reader

might legitimately ask, did the military expertise of Europe*s
continental legions benefit the earliest Tudors?

And the

truthful answer must be that it is quantifiably impossible to
say.

Nowhere is there categorical proof that foreigners,

whether mercenaries, auxiliaries, or combinations of both,

2 ^Ibid.
swynspetts.
2 9 Above,

30

I have been unable to trace the meaning of
p. 128 (n. 34).

The Statute of Winchester notwithstanding, English sol
diers received free of charge in most instances equipment
which they failed to bring, to themusters.
Cruickshank, Army
Royal, p. 77. Whatever the English recruit did not receive,
he was expected to return to the government in reasonable
condition on his demobilization.

426
turned the tide in any campaign or for that matter in any
single action in either the reign of Henry VII or Henry. VIII.
Mercenaries were blamed for the loss inflicted in Cobham's
31
Calesians at Oye in 1545,
and for that they rightly re
ceived some censure.

Harsh words and faint praise were in

fact the normal lot reserved for foreign men of war through
out the Tudor period.

They were faithless "knaves," "wild

beasts," "consumers of princes treasure," "Runaways in the
very Conflicts, and Spoilers of the Country," 'imported with
loss" from "far off ."32
Every charge made in the foregoing collage is easily
substantiated.

What Henrician employed in the thankless

business of procuring foreign soldiers for his country's
wars did not cringe before the rapacity of a Sickingen, the
infidelity of a Reiffenberg, or the potential for mindless
mayhem that lurked beneath the surface of all recruitment
proceedings?

"I pray God," wrote Thomas Chamberlain from

his prison in Florennes Abbey in October, 1545, "his Majesty
33
never need more this nation, but send us perpetual peace."

31 Above,

p. 390.

32

The agglomeration of quotes was gleaned from the fol
lowing sources:
(B. M . ) Add. MS. 5753, f. 155: (B. M.) Harl.
MS. 444, f. 121; L. 6 P., XX, pt. 2, Nos. 536, 750.

3'3L.: & P., XX, pt. 2, No. 681, See also, ibid., No. 656.
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How many Tudor emissaries,, commissioners, moneychangers, and
paymasters must have echoed that disconsolate invocation.
Yet, how would the Tudors have fared without their
foreigners?

It has not been demonstrated anywhere in this

work that alien soldiers won so much as a single battle.
Still, it seems to this author, based solely on the sheer
numbers in which they were hired, that mercenaries and, when
available, auxiliaries formed the backbone of virtually every
major force worthy of the name of army which the English gov
ernment raised between 1485 and 1547.

Employed initially,

after the accession of Henry VII, almost exclusively for the
wars in France, they became by the end of Henry VIII's reign
both at home and abroad the mainstay of the early Tudor mili
tary establishment.
Auxiliaries were never used much in England.

Except for

those who fought for the Earl of Richmond at Bosworth Field
and the few supplied to the pretenders, Lambert Simnel and
Perkin Warbeck, they were always utilized in France.

Auxili

aries, the last appearing under Buren at Montreuil, were of
the foreign contingents certainly the most highly prized by
the Tudor sovereigns, if only because they were provided by
England's allies free of charge.

For this reason, auxiliaries

were also the most difficult troops .to obtain.

The wages of

a landsknecht colonel amounted to 400 guilders a month; his
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lieutenant drew 100 guilders.

34

Two thousand German footmen

and five hundred Burgundian cavalry cost 24,000 florins or
about £3000 a month; the pay of an Italian hackbutter on
horseback was anywhere from Is. to Is. 8 d. per day; while
the charge by the month of fifteen hundred Spanish infantry35
men, including officers, was £1,585.
No government, not
even the mighty Hapsburg conglomerate, could long sustain ex
penses of this nature.
Emperor Maximilian I successfully pled poverty when ap
proached on the subject of auxiliaries for Henry V I I I 1s first
French war in 1513. The Burgundian and landsknecht levies sup36
plied the English on that occasion were paid for by Henry.
And in 1544, on the eve of the second Tudor's last French
undertaking, the Imperialists tried briefly through Chapuys
to persuade Henry to assume the cost of Buren's auxiliaries,
giving up only for fear that if the emperor failed in his
commitment Henry would ally himself with Francis and thus con37
ceivably bring defeat upon the Hapsburgs.

^ State .P a p e r s I X , 648.
35

L. & P., XIX, pt. 1, No. 773; XX, pt. 1, No. 883; (P.
R. O . ) E 351743, mem. 5.
O£
Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, The Life and Reign of
King Henry V I I T ; Together with A General History of those
Times (London:
1741) , pp.-' 27, 38; Cruickshank, Army R o y a l ,
p. 32.

^ S p a n i s h Calendar, VII, Nos. 22, 41 (p. 56).
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In two of Henry's three continental campaigns, those of
1523 and 1544, auxiliaries served as his armies' chief prop.
After the Peace of Crepy, which deprived England of military
allies, that nation was forced into exclusive dependence upon
mercenaries, who for the first time in many years came to be
38
used almost routinely within the kingdom itself
for defence
against the possibility of cross-Channel invasion, as in the
summer of 1545, and for the continued punishment of the Scots.
Though the question of mercenary utilization after the death
of Henry VIII has been left untouched, cursory investigation
bears out Professor Jordan's contention that their employment
in Britain, against Englishmen as well as Scots, increased in
39
the rergn of Edward VI.
Where Scotland is concerned, more free lances were being
sought for an attempt upon that northern land at the very mo40
ment the old king lay dying.
When the assault was finally
launched in September, 1547, the English army contained an

O O

Probably not since the reigns of Stephen, King John and
Henry III in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had mercen
aries been brought into England in such numbers.
Henry Hallam,
View of the State of Europe During the Middle Ages (2 v o l s . ;
London:
John Murray, 1818), I, .220-21; Henry Ellis, ed.,
Hoiinshed*s Chronicles of England, Scotland, and Ireland (6
vols.; London:
G. Woodfall, 1807-08), II, 80, 324, 374.

^ Jordon, Edward V I , the Young King, pp. 466-67 (n. 2).
40

L. & P., XXI, pt. 2, No. 444 (p. 210).
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unknown, but fairly high, proportion of mercenaries.

Accom

panying the force which was led by Edward Seymour, Lord Pro
tector and recently created Duke of Somerset, was Pedro de
Gamboa, who led a troop of two hundred mounted arguebusiers,
41
at least three of his infantry captains,
and a reasonable
sprinkling of Italians, the chief company of which was a body
of heavy horse under an Italian colonel. Count Malatesta
42
Baglione.
The destruction of the Scottish army at Pinkie on Sep
tember 10 gave the English temporary control of southeastern
Scotland.

Leith, the port-city of Edinburgh, was burned.

Inchcolm and Blackness, astride the Firth of Forth, Broughty
Castle at the mouth of the Tay, Roxburgh and Home in the east
ern lowlands, and, above all, Haddington in East Lothian were
occupied by mixed garrisons of Englishmen and mercenaries and
held until the summer of 1549.

But in Edward's reign, it was

in England proper that the most notable use of free lances
displayed itself.
In the two risings, the Western or "Prayer Book" Rebel
lion and Kett's Rebellion, which rocked the realm in 1549 and

^ C r i s t o b a l Diaz, Pedro Negro, and Alonso de Villa Sirga,
all of whom were knighted for their part in the expedition.
^ P a t t e n , The Expedition into1 Scotland, pp. 78, 123, 135,
150; Oman,: The Art of War in: the Sixteenth Century, p. 359.
Sir John Siriythe, Certain Discourses Military, ed. J. R. Hale
(New York:
Cornell University Press, 19 64), 95.
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brought disaster to the king's uncle, the Duke of Somerset,
thousands of mercenaries, the majority of them veterans of
the Scottish war, were used.

The names of many of the cap43
tains are preserved in the Public Record Office.
Italians,
Germans, Spaniards, and Albanians figured prominently in the
suppression of the "Prayer Book" insurgents, the Italian
horse and foot of Captains Jacques Jermigny and Paolo Baptista
Spinola particularly distinguishing themselves in that campaign.

44

of Warwick

In Kett's Rebellion, brutally crushed by the Earl
45

at Norwich and Dussindale in Norfolk in August,

1549, it was the turn of the German landsknechts to excel.
Twelve hundred or fourteen hundred under Conrad Pennink,
lured back to England from Hamburg in 1548, carried much of
the fighting, ably assisted by motley bands of Italians and
Spaniards, among the latter being the light horse contingents

See especially, (P. R. 0.) E 351/43, mems. 1-13, and
(P. R. 0.) E 101 531/39, mems. 103.
Both of these documents,
covering between them the years 1545 and 1551, deal almost
excusively w ith payments made to mercenaries who served in
England.
^ G r u ffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," >
p. 62.
The Welshman renders Jermigny's name as Dgermayn and
calls him a Spaniard.
Jordon, The Chronicle and Political
Papers of King Edward V I , p. 14; Sir John Smythe, Certain
Discourses Military, p. 96; (P. R. O.) E 351/43, mems. 3, 4,
5, "7, 10,: 11.
^ F o r m e r l y John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, who was granted
the earldom on February 17, 1547.
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46
of Gamboa and Carlos de Guavarra.
Germans, the ensign of
47
Clayne van Buren
and 420 horsemen led by an Englishman,
Henry Hartford, were retained to guard the Court and the king
in the summer of 1549; while at the surrender of Boulogne
which was returned to the French in 1550, of the foreigners
who made up the larger part of the garrison, Germans, again,
48
were in the majority.
The relinquishment of Boulogne, bringing as it did peace
with France and Scotland, allowed for a sharp lowering in mil
itary expenditure.

Immediate savings were realized in the

rapid "cassing" of free lances.

The greater part were dis

missed, but John Dudley, who as the Duke of Northumberland
had succeeded Somerset as head of the Council on the restora
tion of public order in 1549, retained eight hundred foreign
ers to police six counties where chronic disaffection had
been rampant since the close of H e n r y ’s reign.

Two hundred

each were placed in Essex and Sussex, and the remaining four

46

Smith, Certain Discourses Military, p. 98. The names
of the seven captains serving under Pennick are given in (P.
R. 0.) E. 101 531/39, mem. 3. For Gamboa and Guavarra, see
(P. R. 0.) E 351/43, mem. 13.
47

No relation to the Dutchman, Maximilian, Court of Buren.
For notices of Clayne, who also served under Warwick at the
time of the Kett uprising and in Calais, see (P. R. O.) E 101
531/39, mems. lb, 2a, 3a; (P. R. 0.) E 351/43, mems. 12, 13.
48
don:

J. Payne Collier, e d ., Trevelyan Papers (3 pts.; Lon
Camden Society, Nos. LXVII and LXXXIV, 1857-63) p. 2, 32.
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hundred were equally distributed in Dorset, Hampshire, Kent,
49
and Suffolk.
This aberrant use of mercenaries, unheard of
since the days of the early Plantagenets, was not liked by
Englishmen; but from Northumberland's point of view it seemed
necessary.

His regime was unpopular, and as the late distur

bances in the

West Country and Norfolk had shown, local levies,

with opinions

at variance with those of the government in
50
whose name they were raised, could not be relied upon.

'

In 1552, however, with England's financial reserve de
pleted, further cuts in military strength were called for.
Garrisons in Ireland, Berwick, and Guisnes were pared; some
coastal defences were abandoned; ships of the line were de
commissioned; and the mercenaries, untoward luxuries in an
administration faced with penury, were disbanded.

51

This

diminuation in power proved an evil portent for Northumber
land, for on Edward's demise in 1553, when the duke attempted
to usurp the throne in the name of Lady Jane Grey, his English
levies melted

away, leaving him naked and unprotected from

the vengeance

that followed swiftly on the accession of

49

Dasent, Acts of the Privy Council, III, 81; John
Strype, Ecclesiastical Memorials . . . oj[ the Church of Eng
land {3 vols.; Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1822), II, pt. 1
459-61.
50

Jordan, Edward V I , the Young King, p. 465.

Jordan, ed., The Chronicle and Political Papers of
King Edward VI, pp. 123-24, 147, 176, 177; Wernham, Before
the Armada, p. 202.
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of Queen Mary,

52

It is intriguing .to speculate on how dif

ferent English history might have been had Northumberland had
a force of mercenaries to fall back on.' Why he, a believer
in mercenary arms, did not provide against the

contingency

of mass popular support for Edward's successor by gathering
round him foreign pikes and arquebuses remains something of a
mystery.

Perhaps, as Oman suggests, it was a defect in the

man himself:

"he was so unscrupulous . . , that he had for

gotten that others might have scruples.
In Mary's brief reign, English reliance on foreign troops
fell off drastically as part and parcel of the austerity pro
gram inherited from her predecessor.

Pew free lances, if
54
any at all, were employed in England.
Gottfried von

Bocholt, whose units had been amalgamated with those of the

^ The story of Northumberland's unsuccessful machina
tions to retain his power by depriving Mary, Edward's lawful
heir, of her crown is ably told by W. K. Jordan, Edward VI:
The Threshold of Power (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1970), Chap. XIV.
53
54

Oman, The Art of War in the Sixteenth Century, p. 369.

The majority of the names which this author has uncov
ered were those of a handful of veterans of the campaigns of
Henry VIII and Edward VI, who wrote from abroad begging the
continuance of the pensions which these defunct sovereigns
had awarded them.
Robert Lemon and M. A. E. Green, eds.,
Calendar of' State' Papers, Domestic Series, of the Reigns
Of Edward VI, Mary,Elizabeth,- 1547— 1580 (London: H. M. Sta
tionery Office, 1856), pp. 85, 87.
Hereinafter cited as
Calendar 'of State Papers (Domestic) , Edward V I / Mary, Eliza
beth.
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despicable Reiffenberg at Aacheri in October,, 1545,

offered

himself with four thousand landsknechts and one thousand
hoarse for service against the Scots, but there is no evidence
that his overture was accepted.

56

Only in the Calais Pale

were alien conscripts employed, all of them auxiliaries; but
not before 1557 when, as a by-product of the queen*s illi-.advised marriage to Philip II of Spain,

57

the nation was drawn

unwillingly into war with France.
In that short-lived struggle, which among contemporaries
redounded as much to Mary's infamy as her burning of reli*gious dissenters, England was thoroughly abused by her selfish
Spanish ally.

Philip, after receiving assistance from the

English fleet and using five thousand English auxiliaries to
win the French town of Saint Quentin, refused to reciprocate.
To preserve the commercial interests of his Netherlands' pro
vinces, he refrained from declaring war on the Scots; but far
w o r s e , he diverted to his own use munitions, arms, and three
thousand German landsknechts acquired for the defence of his
C O

wife and her northern border.

5 5 Below, p.

56

371.

Calendar of State Papers,
Elizabeth, pp.~ 85, 103".

(Domestic) Edward VI, Mary

57

The nuptials were celebrated on July 25, 1554, at
Winchester in Hampshire.
58

The landsknechts were under the command of the
German colonel, Wilhelm Wallerthum, who had received
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Philip's

callous indifference to. English needs revealed

itself also in the fall of Calais.

That city and the entire

Pale came under French attack on January 1, 1558, from an
army of twenty-five thousand.

To oppose it, Lord Thomas Went

worth, the Deputy of Calais, had on hand a force of about two
thousand:

five hundred men within the main town and its out

lying strongholds, plus two hundred or three hundred armed
citizens; twelve hundred or so effectives at Guisnes; and but
a handful of defenders at Hammes.

On the English side, de

spite the presence of substantial Spanish troops around Gravelines, the only auxiliaries supplied were four infantry com
panies at Calais and but one ensign of arquebusiers, Spaniards and Burgundians, at Guisnes.

59

The conquest was

a pension and a knighthood for his part in the French and Scot
tish wars by Edward VI.
Calendar of State Papers (Domestic)
Edward VI, M a r y , Elizabeth*,' I,' 85, 103; William B. Turnbull,
ed. Calendar of State Pape r s ,' Foreign Series, of the Reign of
Mary (London:
H. M. Stationery Office, 1861), pp. 372, 376,
384, 385-86, 387, 388.
Hereinafter cited as Calendar of
State Papers (Foreign), M a r y .
59

Two hundred arquebusiers sent out by Philip from Gravelines for Calais were driven back on or about January 5 by
French reiters. As for the ensign at Guisnes, it was com
prised o f but five hundred men, fifty Spaniards under Cris
tobal de Mountdragon and the remaining Burgundians under an
officer named Dieffkie.
It fought ferociously in defence of
Mary Bulwark, an isolated tower detached from the castle.
Most of the Spaniards and a high percentage of the Burgundians,
including Dieffkie, were killed.
For several eye-witness
accounts of the capture of the Pale, see the intriguing col
lection gathered in Pollard, ed . , Tudor Tracts ,-' 1532-1588,
pp. 289-330.
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effected in three weeks.

Calais fell in six days; Guisnes

capitulated on January 20; while two days later, the garri
son at Hammes retired in secret to Gravelines.
This rapid collapse of England's last outposts in France
had lasting military significance.

The loss of the Pale, for

one thing, ended England's quest for empire on the Continent;
but of more pertinent significance where this study is con
cerned, the crushing defeat substantiates the thesis that
without the supportive crutch of large-scale foreign recruit
ment early Tudor armies were incapable of effective effort in
those contests which matched them against anything but their
island foes.

English writers of the sixteenth century, argued

that Calais could have been saved had the Marian government
been less negligent in reinforcing the garrisons there or in
putting to sea the navy which at the time of the assault had
been laid up for the w i n t e r . ^0
istic tripe.
fore it.

This was nothing but chauvin

Calais was doomed to fall as had Boulogne be

England's continental possessions were isolated by

what, for that age, was a wide expanse of water.

They were

dependent for supplies and reinforcements out of England on
uncertain winds and contrary weather.

While they remained in

Tudor hands, great reliance for their maintenance and

60

See, for example, George Ferrers,’ The Winning of Calais
by the French in Pollard, e d , . Tudor Tracts, 1532-1588, pp.
290, 294..
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protection was placed on the cooperation of the Empire.

When

Paget, in 1549, failed to persuade Charles V to take the field
61
on England’s behalf, Boulogne was lost,
and Philip II's ve62
nality insured the capture of the Pale.
The moral, therefore, seems clear.

Without massive in

fusions of foreign manpower, early Tudor armies courted dis
aster in their continental wars.

In every fight waged out

side of British waters, those armies were outrivaled by the
superior numbers, training, and technology of their opponents.
Mercenaries and auxiliaries were almost unheard of in Eliza
beth' s reign.

But, then, Elizabeth was not a warlike queen.

The forces which she raised for foreign service to aid the
Huguenots in France and the Dutch in their war of independ
ence were instruments of policy rather than engines of con-?
quest.

At home, her government, like those of the earlier Tu

dors, never created a standing army; but unlike others of her
house, Elizabeth never aspired to military glory.

^ J ordan, Edward VI., the Young K i n g f pp, 302, 3Q4,
fi 9

It was said by some that the English defenders of the
Pale consistently refused aid from the Spanish king, since
”in many English minds there was a rooted suspicion that
Philip wanted not so much to help, as to help himself to
Calais." H, M. F. Prescott,’ Mary Tudor (New York: The Mac
millan Company, 1962), p. 377,
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MAXIMILIAN, COUNT OF BUREN
Maximilian von Egmont, Count of Buren and Leerdam, Lord
of Ysselstein, Sint Maartensdyk, Grave, and the region of
Ruyck, was the only son of Floris d'Ysselstein from whom, on
the latter's death in 1539, he inherited the foregoing digni
ties.

It w as while his father still lived that Maximilian

gained his first martial laurels when, in the spring of 1537,
h e repulsed a sudden French attack upon Arras.

That same

year, as an officer in his father's army, he distinguished
himself by storming the fortress of Saint-Pol near Dunkirk,
in which action he saved the life of the French captain, Ma r 
tin du Bellay,

author of the famous M e m o i r e s , wh o was taken

by his landsknechts.
In 1540,

as a reward for his gallant service, Maximilian

w a s made Governor of Friesland and shortly thereafter a
knight of the Golden Fleece.

Other honors quickly followed.

The provinces of Groningen and Oberyssel were placed under
his jurisdiction, but as always with power came responsibil
ity.

On the outbreak of Emperor Charles' war with France in

1542, the defence of the northern Netherlands was given over
to Buren, and later in the year he cooperated w i t h Philibert
of Chalons,

the Prince of Orange, in reoccupying Luxemburg

w h i c h had been overrun by the Duke of O r l e a n s .
In 1543, Maximilian participated in the emperor's
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campaign against the Duke of Cleves.

During the subsequent

siege ;of Landrecies, he made the acquaintance of Sir John

1
Wallop, captain of the English auxiliaries,

and tried with

out effect to draw the relieving army of Francis I into bat
tle.

His activities in 1544 as commander of the Imperialist

contingents before Montreuil and recruiter of mercenaries
2
for Henry VIII have previously been noted.
English service
did little for his reputation.

His talents, perhaps because

they were not fully appreciated or because, as the Imperial
ists suspected, Henry never intended that Montreuil should
3
be taken, were never fully utilized.
But in 1546, in the
opening phase of the Schmalkaldic War, he established himself
as one of the most valuable commanders in the Catholic camp.
Commissioned that summer to prepare the Netherlands
against the possibility of attack from the Protestant leagu
ers, he was suddenly called with thirteen thousand troops to
march in August to the relief of the emperor, who was caught
unprepared by the Landgrave of Hesse in Bavaria.

Buren*s

fulfillment of his charge was one of the great feats of the
war.

In the face of formidable odds, he led his army un

scathed through better than two hundred miles of hostile

^Above, p. , 247.
2A b o v e , pp.

274-79, 292, 297 ff.

3
Above, pp. 322-23 and n. 70.
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territory, effecting in the process a night crossing of the
Rhine at Bingen and the capture of the fortress of Walluf in
Hesse, all under the fretful gaze of fifteen thousand Protest
ants commanded, among others, by Henry VIII1s old nemesis,
Friedrich von Reiffenberg.

Buren's juncture with the emperor

near Ingolstadt on September 15 swelled the Imperialist ranks
to over sixty thousand,, robbed the Lutherans of their origi
nal confidence, and permitted Charles V over the next two
months to stamp his complete authority on South Germany.
As a final service to the Empire, Buren sieged Boxberg,
Darmstadt, and Frankfurt.

Confined to bed by a severe ill

ness in Bonn, he returned to the Netherlands early in 1547
and died towards the end of the next year, having taken no
4
further part in the fighting.

"The bulk of the information contained in this sketch
was drawn from Paul Kannengeiser, Karl V und Maximilian
Eg m o n t , Graf von Bu r e n . Ein Beitrag zur Geschichts des
schmalkald'ischen Krieges (Freiburg and Leipzig:
Akademische
Verlagsbuchhandlung von J. C. B. Mohr, 1895), pp. 1-10.
Buren's physician during his last illness was none other than
Andreas Vesalius.
The count's only child and heir, Anna, b e 
came the first wife of William of Orange, who as William the
Silent is remembered as the chief founder of the Dutch Repub
lic.

APPENDIX B
LUDOVICO DA L'ARMI

457

LUDOVICO DA L'ARMI
The sinister career of Ludovico da l'Armi, after his en
gagement by Henry VIII, is easily followed in both the Letters
and Papers and the Venetian Calendar■

His intrigues, felonies,

and homicides remained the scandal of the Republic of Venice
until justice was served him in 1547.
Precisely why Da l TArmi and the other captains
with him were retained is open to question.

1

hired

That they busied

themselves in the spring of 1545 in raising troops for Eng-r
land's war with Prance is a certainty, but how, after those
forces were denied passage through the Empire, the officers
were meant to be employed is another matter.

A rumor which

became current in Italy in May, 1545, that Da l'Armi and his
confederates might in the name of the English king attempt

2
some enterprise in Piedmont on behalf of Charles II of Savoy
3
appears to have had some basis in fact,
Luigi Gonzaga, Lord
of Castiglione and kinsman to the Gonzaga dukes of Mantua,
was offered at about the same time the generalship of all of
Henry's forces in Italy.

Unfortunately, the danger of

•^Angelo Mariano, Count Bernardo di San Bonifacio, and
Filippo Pini. See above, pp. 343 f f .
2
Savoy was lost to the French in 1537,
The dutchy was
not restored until the Peace of Cateau-Cambresis in 1559.

^Above, p. 348.
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offending the emperor, w h o feared the French m i g h t think him
b ehind the scheme, forced the abandonment of the plan in'
O c t o b e r .4
In the meantime,
in Venice.

Da l'Armi ran afoul of the authorities

On August 7, he and a b a n d of his ruffians as

saulted the night watch, wounding o n e of the officers, and on
the twelfth fresh news from Treviso indicated that three of
his men had entered that town and inflicted grievous wounds
5
on one Count Curio Bua.
The gravity of the crimes left the
Venetian government no choice.

Da l'Armi and fourteen of his

followers w e r e expelled from the republic.

Harvel, without

H e n r y ’s commission, was powerless to act on his behalf,

and

the felon left Italy.
This m ight have ended the m a t t e r but for the English war
in France.

Da l'Armi,

again for reasons not entirely clear,

was still important in Henry's plans.
surfaced in Brussels where,

On August 31, Ludovico

in an audience with the Venetian

ambassador, Bernardo Navagiero, he sought the diplomat's in
tercession wi t h the Doge.

The attack upon the Signory!s

4L. £ P., XX, pt. 1, No. 751 (1); pt, 2, No. 193; V e n e 
tian C a l e n d a r , V, No. 343; State P a p e r s , X, 646-47.
c
Venetian C a l e n d a r , V, Nos. 344-48,
Bua, quite possibly
a relative of that A l banian colonel, Thomaso, wh o fought for
Henry in the Boulonnais, was scarred about the face, a m a r k
of infamy, for accepting money to serve the Tudor king but
refusing to do so.
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officials, he asserted, had been a mistake.

He had many

powerful enemies, and mistaking the night watch in the dark
for some of them, "he could not do otherwise than he did."
As for the scarring of Bua, Da l'Armi pled his honor:

"...

a person who had taken money to come and serve the King of
England and then failed to do so deserved greater punishment
than what he had received, and for this the Signory ought not
to evince resentment, both out of respect for the King, and
for the Doge himself, who being a sovereign should dissemble
this case to prove how much it displeased him that Princes
should be wronged by private individuals."

6

The matter was soon concluded in Da I'Armi's favor.

Per

sonal intervention by Lord Chancellor Wriothesley, Principal
Secretary Paget, and Henry himself secured the condottiere a
reprieve and a safe conduct, awarded December 9, for five
years.

7

Ludovico, armed with letters

8

for the thirteen year-

old Duke of Mantua, Francesco Gonzaga, returned to Italy
early in 1546.

The letters were delivered in April, but the

duchess, the duke's mother, refused to grant an interview.
Rumors were again flying that Da l'Armi was seeking men for

6 Ibid. , No.
7 rbid., Nos.

356.
367, 370; L. & P., XX, pt, 2, Nos, 491, 964.

®These, if they could be discovered, would throw consid
erable light on what it was that Henry had in mind.
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an invasion of Piedmont; and on advice from the Imperial
Chancellor/ Granvelle, the duchess declined the English sov
ereign's request for troops/ "not purposing," as she put it,
to draw on herself or her son "the enmity of any Christian
Powers."

Moreover, she continued, proclamations had been

issued of late forbidding her subjects to enter the service
9

of o t h e r s .

The signing of the Treaty of Camp in June negated Ludo
vico's commission, and the death of Henry VIII in January,
1547, assured the mercenary colonel of a fate which had pur
sued him since his y o u t h . ^

On November 3, 1546, the Vene

tians outlawed one of their own noblemen, Ser Maphio Bernardo
on the charge of treasonous dealings with Prance.

On the six

teenth of that month Ser Maphio, a fugitive in Ravenna, was
murdered, and upon investigation the murderers were discov
ered to be none other than the paid assassins of Ludovico da
l'Armi.

Further inquiry revealed that the victim and Ludo

vico had been collaborators, that each shared secrets that
11
might have been a danger to the other.
If captured and tor
tured, Ser Maphio might have implicated his accessory in

V, Nos,

& P., XXI, pt. 1, Nos, 596, 674, Venetian' Calendar,
377, 381, 385, 387, 390,

A b ove, pp. 344-45,

^ Venetian Calendar,. V, Nos, 413, 424, 431.
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treacheries against England and Venice,
Da l'Armi was arrested and examined.

Released briefly

on his own recognizance, he fled to Milan where, on February
6 , 1547, at the court of the Imperial Governor,

Gonzaga, he was siezed and placed in custody.

Don Ferrante
Though he

sought help from England and from the emperor, none was forth'
coming.

He was successfully extradicted to Venice in April,

found guilty, and publicly beheaded between two columns on
12
the mole fronting the sea on Saturday, May 14.

12Ibid., Nos. 439, 455, 456, .487, 495, 500, 502, 508-09.
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PEDRO. DE GAMBOA
One of the most honored and highly valued of Tudor mer
cenary commanders was the Madrilenian, Pedro de Gamboa, the
soldier who holds the distinction of being the first to serve
in England proper with the rank of colonel .1

His appearance

in London in March, 1545, coinciding as it did with the dis
bandment en masse of Charles V's Spaniards in the Nether2
lands suggests that Gamboa entered English service direct
from a stint with the emperor's forces in that part of Eu
rope, though there is no evidence to prove that he was among
the bands of his countrymen earlier prested at Falmouth.
There is no question but that he served in the Imperial
army during the French war in 1544.

A Spanish despatch rela

tive to the siege of Saint Dizier lists him among the casual
ties.

He had been "shot near the thigh bone, almost touch

ing on the genitals," a wound which rendered him partially
3
crippled for life.
His appointment in March, 1545, as
maestre de campo or colonel of all the Spaniards in English
service was not universally popular.

1Above,

p. 132

It caused "no lack of

(n. 41) .

2

Above, p. 342.
3
Spanish Calendar, VII, No. 163, Gruffyd, "Boulogne and
Calais from 1545 to 1550," p. 16, describes him as being
small in stature and lame, "one leg being shorter than the
other, and so deaf that he could only hear if he was shouted
at."
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envy and malice" among his subordinates, particularly at
Calais, where the attempted flight of Juan de Haro and the

4
desertion of Antonio de Mora were attributed directly to it.
Regardless of that enmity which sprang as much from his
origins

5

as from the 150 ducats a month he received in wages,

Gamboa's service pleased his masters.

Diligent and unafraid,

he proved his worth many times over in recruiting troops, .
which he seems to have had little trouble in finding, and in
leading them in battle.

Edward Seymour, under whom he served

almost constantly, had great faith in him, as witnessed in
the winter of 1545 when Gamboa and his Spaniards were hot
only retained— at a time when other mercenaries were being
dismissed— but left in some of the most forward positions
against the Scots. **

It was Gamboa also whom Seymour took

with him to France to survey the damage done by Surrey's over7
throw in January, 1546,
and at Ambleteuse in May the English
general's trust was fully confirmed when, on a threatened

4

Hume, ed., Chronicle of King Henry V I I I , p. 124;
Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais' from 1545 to 1550," pp. 15-18.
5
Gruffyd, "Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550," pp.
15-16, says of the colonel that "two or three times" he had
been Captain General under the emperor, adding somewhat fecetiously that he was "a man of great rank in the realm of
Spain, where there was not a mound, a hill or mountain which
was not blood relation to Captain Gamboa."
g
State Papers, V, 532;' Dasent, Acts: of the' Privy.
Council-, I, 285.

Above, p .
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stir fay some of Pennink's landsknechts for an additional
month's w a g e s , the Spaniard rallied his men to Seymour's, de8
fence and thereby averted a mutiny.
For these and other services, Gamboa was knighted, Henry
himself performing the honors at York Place near Whitehall
g
some months before his final illness.
But, perhaps, his
greatest reward was the grant of denization and the subsequent gift of the lordship of Stanmer.

Technically, since

denization was a form of citizenship, Gamboa became an Eng
lishman and in the process lost his free-lance status.

In

practice, however, it was as "Colonel of the King's Span
iards" that he continued to serve the new government of Ed
ward VI.

Likewise, when in the field he continued to lead

foreigners, as at the battle of Pinkie in 1547 and the siege
of Haddington in 1548.

And he always drew a mercenary colo

nel's wages.
Gamboa might have led a long and happy life in England.

Q

John Stowe, A n n a l e s , or A General Chronicle of England
. . . Continued and Augmented . . . by^ Edmund Howes, Gent.
(London:
Richard Meighen, 1631) p. 591;
L. £ P ., X X I ,'p t . 1
No. 864.
Pennink himself did much to res¥ore order and six
of his men were hanged.
g
William A. Shaw, The Knights of England. A Complete
Record from Earliest Times to the Present Day (2 v o ls.;
London:
Sherratt and Hughes, 1906), II, 58. For a list of
other mercenaries receiving knighthoods, see Appendix E.

•^Above, p. 422.
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His religious predilections, if in fact he had any, di d not
disturb his Edwardian paymaster's, and under the Catholic,
Mary, who was partial to Spaniards, he would probably have
found favor.

Unfortunately, he did not live that long.

On

January 19, 1550, while walking near his London home in Saint
Sepulchre's parish, Gamboa and his friend, Alonzo de Villa
Sirga were waylaid and murdered by four of their countrymen.
At the root of this deed was some quarrel which had developed
11
during the war against the Scots,
The chief assailant was
Carlos de Guavara with whom Gamboa had rode at P i n k i e .

He

and his accomplices were rounded up by William, now Lord,
Paget in Smithfield, and at their arraignment on January 23
they were condemned, their execution by hanging following on
12
the twenty-fourth.

pp.

1 1 Gruffyd,
77-78,

12

"Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550,"

Wriothesley, A Chronicle of England during the Reigns
of the Tudors , II, 31-32'. ' 'The’ author provides the chilling
detail’ that on the way to Smithfield, where the sentence was
exacted, Carlos de Guavara "had his right hand stricken off
on the cart wheel with an axe by the executioner," Those who
died with him were his kinsman, Balthazar de Guavara, Miguel
de Salvaron, and Francisco de Salvasto.
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JULIAN ROMERO
Though he earned his reputation in later years, the most
bloodthirsty and noteworthy of all the mercenary captains to
serve the early Tudors was Julian Romero.

Born in humble

circumstances in the village of Huelamo in the Serrania de
Cuenca, he was,

in a career w h ich spanned over forty years,

to advance through the ranks to become, as one of his contem
poraries phrased it, "commander-in-chief of great enterprises
Romero's early history is only dimly known.

When still

a boy, in the wi n t e r of 1534, he enlisted as a common footman
in an expedition against the Moors in North Africa, and for
\
the next ten years drifted unnoticed through Charles V ’s
several wars in Tunis,

Italy, Flanders, and in France,

In

1545, he was one of the Spaniards to come ashore at Falmouth.
Enrolled as a captain in Gamboa's regiment, he was posted to
Newcastle, saw action against the Scots under Hertford, whom
he accompanied to Ambleteuse,

and was attached .to the garri

son there at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Camp.

•^Cabrera de Cordova, quoted by M. A. S. Hume, "Julian
Romero-— S w a s h b u c k l e r ," in T he Year After the Armada and other
Historical Studies (Reprint; London and Port Washington, N. Y
Kennikat P r e s s , 1970), p. 121.
All of the information con
tained in this sketch, unless otherwise noted, is taken from
this source, pp. 73-121,

2Above, pp. 342-43.
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Following his successful duel with the traitor, De Mora,
at Fontainebleau, he returned to London, where his excessive
3
extravegence led to his arrest for a debt of 200 ducats.
He
was saved from jail by Gamboa, who made the money good, but
shortly thereafter he was hauled before the Council for loose
talk about Henry V I I I *s religious innovations.

In this in

stance, he was saved from dismissal and punishment by Secre
tary Paget's intercession.
It was not long after these events that Henry VIII died,
and on Seymour's invasion of Scotland in the autumn of 1547,
Julian went north with Gamboa.

His bravery at Pinkie, ac

cording to the unknown author of the Chronicle of Henry VIII,
4
earned him a knighthood;
he participated in the relief of
Haddington in August, 1548; and was captured along with Pedro
Negro sometime before the peace of 1550,

perhaps while serv

ing at Broughty Castle, near Dundee.
Romero's captivity could not have been long.

On the out

break of Charles V's war with Henry II of France in 1551, he
answered his sovereign's call to the colors.

As commander of

the castle of Dinant in Namur in 1554, he was obliged to

3

Charges were pressed by a Milanese merchant, Baptista
Baron.
4
This author has been unable to substantiate this claim.
5 CP. R. 0 .) E 351/43, mem,

10,
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surrender to the French, but for his gallant defence of that
stronghold he and his unit were allowed the honors of war,
being permitted to depart "without loss of goods, . . . their
g
swords by their side."
He was now a recognized leader, fast
becoming, as the contemporary Spanish historian, Sandoval,
assessed him, one of the foremost soldiers of his day.

He

distinguished himself at the storming of Saint Quentin in
1557, while ten years later, as colonel-in-chief of Philip II*s
Regiment of Sicily, he accompanied Fernando Alvarez de Toledo,
Duke of Alva, as part of the Spanish army of ten thousand
sent into the Low Countries to suppress the revolt of the
Dutch.

As A l v a 's henchman, Romero "was marked out now con

spicuously as one of the most unscrupulous of [his] officers,"
a man "who could be depended upon in any emergency,

...

fa

natically loyal to his sovereign and the faith for which he
was fighting."
When the English adventurer, Thomas Stucley,

7

entered

Spanish employment in 1569, Philip II promised him five thou
sand troops under Julian for the invasion of Ireland.

How

ever, the scheme was scrapped, and Romero continued to serve
in the Netherlands, where he presided over some of the most
brutal episodes in all the sad history of the Eighty Y e a r s '

Calendar of State Papers

(Foreign), Mary, No, 222,

^A. F. Pollard, "Thomas Stucley," D. N. B., XIX, 123-26.
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War.

He and six hundred of. his arquebusiers massacred the

citizens of the Flemish town of Naarderi in November, 1572;
8
on the fall of Haarlem,
during the siege of whxch he lost an
eye, his troops similarly were allowed to get out of hand;
and on his authority, on the capture of the fort of Mansendus
in Holland, the throats of six hundred of its defenders were
cut.
Even greater atrocities followed in the wake of Don Juan
of Austria's appointment as Governor of the Netherlands in
1576.

The Spanish soldiery in the still loyal southern pro

vinces, unpaid in nearly two yeairs, ran amuck to indemnify
themselves.

Romero's troops, attacked as rebels at Lier by

the largely Belgian forces of the Council of State, turned on
their tormentors and routed them, carrying the slaughter, in
cluding that of innocent bystanders, to the gates of Louvain
itself.

Immediately thereafter, having joined forces with

other mutinous units from Breda, Maastricht, and the Spanish
garrisons along the Schelde, Romero descended on weakly de
fended Antwerp.
This city, the greatest port and richest commercial cen
ter in the West, was reduced within a matter of hours to a
charnel house in the terrible "Spanish Fury" of November 4,
1576.

In the course of this and the two days following,

8July, 1573.
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eight thousand men, women, and children were murdered,
6 ,0 0 0 , 0 0 0

ducats worth of property was plundered, and for his

part in the pillage Romero and his fellow officers received
high praise:

"They deserve well of his Majesty." wrote the

Spanish politician, Jerome Rodas,

"for the services they
9
have rendered in this great victory."
The upshot of the "Spanish Fury" was the "Pacification
of Ghent," a shortlived, but nevertheless important, alliance
between the Catholic provinces of the southern Netherlands
and the militantly Protestant provinces of the n o r t h . ^

This

temporary agreement, unifying as it did the military power
of the whole Netherlands against the oppression of Spain,
forced by negotiation the withdrawal of the entire Spanish
11
Army of Flanders from the Low Countries in April, 1577.

9The classic account of the "Spanish Fury" in English
is rendered by John Lothrop Motley, The Rise of the Dutch
Republic (3 vols.; New York: Harper and Brothers, Publish
ers, 1883), III, 104 ff.
According to one Spanish estimate
consulted by Motley, twenty-five hundred victims were des
patched with the sword, while double that number were burned
alive or drowned.
10The "Pacification of Ghent," provoked by the "Spanish
Fury," held the Netherlands together until 1579.
In that
year, the allegiance of the southern provinces was won back
by Spain through the Treaty of Arras.
The Protestant pro
vinces continued the fight for freedom under the articles of
the Union of Utrecht, declaring themselves independent of
Spanish control in 1581.

^Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road,
1567-1659, p. 236.
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Romero was posted to Italy.

But on the outbreak of fresh

fighting in July, he was ordered with an army of six thousand
to return to the scene of his earlier crimes.

As he set out

on his march from Cremona, he fell from his horse, dead,

He

had served two kings of Spain for better than forty years.
In that time, he had lost an arm, a leg, one eye and an ear.
As his reward, he had been appointed general of his last com^m a n d .^

12

This according to Hume, "Julian Romero— Swashbuckler,"
pp. 76, 120.
However, Parker,: The Army of Flanders and the
Spanish R o a d 1567-1659, p. 118, states categorically that
Romero never rose above the rank of colonel.
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A LIST OF MERCENARY KNIGHTS AND THE DATES OF THEIR CREATION
1.

Pedro de Gamboa, York Place, 4-546.

2.

Julian Romero, after the battle of Pinkie, September,
1547,

3.

5.

Lord Waldeck, a German captain, "in the^camp beside Rox-^
burgh in Scotland," September 28, 1547.
4
Pedro Negro, Roxburgh, September 28, 1547,
5
Cristobal Diaz, Roxburgh, September 28, 1547,

6.

Alonzo de Villa Sirga, Roxburgh, September 28, 1547,^

7.

Jean de Barteville, a French deserter, Berwick, September
or October, 1547.'
8
Paolo Baptista Spxnola, 1549.
9
Conrad Pennink, 1549 or 1550,

4.

8.

9.

■^Shaw, The Knights of England, II, 58.
2
This only oiy the authority of Hume, "Julian Romero—
Swashbuckler," p. 90.
3
Shaw, The Knights of England, II, 61.
4

Ibid. , 62, to be compared with Patten, The Expedition
into Scotland, p. 150.
5
Patten, The Expedition into Scotland, p. 150.
6 Ibid.

7

Ibid., p. 151, to be compared with Shaw, The Knights' of
England, II, 62.
g

Shaw,: The Knights of England, II, 64.
9Ibid.-, 65.
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10..

Wilhelm Wallerthum, ."for service in the French and Scot
tish wars."10

The date of Wallerthum's. creation is unknown, but the
award was made sometime during the reign of Edward VI, See
Calendar of state Papers (Domestic), Edward V I , Mary, Eliza
b e t h , IT 85. Such creations appear to have stopped with
Mary's accession, indicating perhaps how little she employed
foreigners.
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PRELIMINARY ARTICIES AND AGREEMENT
PASSED BETWEEN THE COUNT OF BUREN AND THOMAS CHAMBERLAIN1
Hereinafter ensue the articles and agreement passed be
tween the Count of Buren and Thomas Chamberlain on the part
of His Majesty the King of England, according to which the
said Count has promised His Majesty the King of England to
bring two thousand footmen.
Item:

The Count of Buren says and promises to bring up to

two thousand footmen, well disciplined and equipped for war
with all officers and appurtenances.

And that for each en

sign there will be so many pikemen, halberdiers, and small
shot up to the number of four hundred man, of which there
will be fifty lor] sixty more or less harquebusiers in each,
up to thirty halberdiers, and the rest pikemen.
Item:

The Count of Buren promises to be ready at Bois-

le-duc

[i.e. 's Hertogenbosch] or thereabouts with his foot

men to take the musters on 14 May next.
Item:

His Majesty agrees to give the Count of Buren for

the conduct of each foot soldier from his home to the town of
Bois-le-duc aforesaid or thereabouts where the musters will
be taken by His Majesty's Commissioners a Karolus florin,
each of which is understood to be worth 20 pattars in

^•(P. R. 0.) S. P. 1/185, ff. 142-43.

Brabantine currency, , besides 100 Karolus Florins for each
ensign, with w h ich each of the said footmen will be satisfied
without demanding further entertainment or wages for their
coming.
Item:

His Majesty agrees to pay to each footman after the

musters 4 florins per month for his wages.

And the said

Count of Buren promises that the said footmen will serve His
Majesty for the said pay on condition that a captain Chris
topher de Landerberch [i.e. Landenberg], may serve His Majesty
for the same.

And in case the said Landerberch will not take

part with His Majesty, promises

(to serve him) AT THE SAID

rate of 4 Karolus florins per month.

[Mutilated] he will pay

the Count of Buren and his footmen 4 Philipus per month, at
25 pattars in Brabantine currency for each Philipus, or such
pay as the Emperor will give to his footmen, which the said
3
Count of Buren will lead in his pay to serve the King.
And
to the captains, lieutenants, and other officers contained
in the articles hereafter mentioned, such number of florins
as is declared in the said articles.
Item:

The said Count of Buren promises that His Majesty will

not be charged with double pay for more than sixty in each

2

The valuation of the pattar, which was of the same
worth as the stuiver, had to be raised.
Above, p. 277.
3
This is a reference to the auxiliary foot to be led by
B uren.
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4
ensign of foot,

one carrying the other without including

the pay of captains, lieutenants, and other officers in the
articles hereafter mentioned.
Item:

The said Count of Buren promises that His Majesty

will not be charged to pay the wages for battle or assault,
if the battle be not joined or if he be speedily beaten by
the enemy, or if siege be laid and attack made by battery and
the assault given.

And that no others will receive this pay

other than those who will be at the battle and will give the
5
assault.
Item:

It is agreed that the wages of footmen, their captains,

lieutenants, and other officers will be paid in a certain
number of florins per month.

It is understood that each

month contains thirty days, and each florin is worth 20 stun
ers Brabantine, which 20 stuners are each worth 2 soulx
[sous?] six pence sterling.

And that the florins which will

be sent for the conduct of the foot soldiers will be of the
same value aforesaid.
Item:

The Count of Buren promises that the aforesaid foot

men will be held to serve and will serve His Majesty well

4
On double pays, see above, p. 261, n. 49.
5
Assault pay was a type of bonus awarded landsknechts
when, and if, they carried their objective in pitched battle.
This author had found no indication that it was ever allowed
by the early Tudors which is not unusual, since the majority
of engagements in which landsknechts were used consisted of
siege operations.

and loyally without fraud, feint, or ill device during the
term of six months.

And will swear, the said men of war,

both foot and mounted, to be loyal to His Majesty against all
his enemies and ill-wishers, except the Emperor and the Holy
Empire.
Item:

The said Count of Buren promises that the said men of

war will be held to serve the King, marching against His ene
mies and showing themselves valiant and joining with the ene
my, doing and using extreme vigor and cruelty against the in
vader if they can, as far as to make them submit to the author
ity of His Majesty.
Item:

Mons. de Buren promises that the said men of war will

keep the day and night watch as they will be commanded to by
the Lieutenant-General of the Army, without being able to
contradict what they are ordered.
Item:

Mons. de Buren promises that the said men of war— foot

men, will not contradict what they will be commanded both as
to the skirmish, as in battle, assault, or other combat what
soever.

And in case of battle or assault, His Majesty pro

mises to give a month's pay besides what is said in the pre
vious article.
Item:

Mons. de Buren promises that the said men of war and

the principal officers will be held and charged according to
their oath to uphold and maintain justice to both great and
small, so that no inconveniences may fall out to the

prejudice of His Majesty's army.
Item:

Mons. de Buren promises that if His Majesty entertains

the said footmen as aforesaid, they may be held and charged
to serve His Majesty for so much or so little time as will
seem good to him.
Item:

After, the said men of war will be paid and enter

tained the length of time that they will serve His Majesty
without fraud or ill design from month to month, as is afore
mentioned, in mustering, as is customary.
Item:

His Majesty will order how they will take the oath.

Item:

Should it happen that His Majesty would like to give

leave to the Germans, the custom is to pay them by the half
month for their return, and those who serve longer, His Ma
jesty will have regard to favor them more than the others,
according to his pleasure.
Item:

If florins, pattars, and stuners are not current in

France of

[if] the said men of war will find themselves out

side of Flanders country, Mons. de Buren and his men of war
will be content and held to receive their pay in angelots,
ducats, escus sloters

[?] and demi-scoters

[?], and all

other kinds of money current in England and France and else
where and at the rates and values they now have.
Made at Brussels, 8 April, 1544.

APPENDIX G
THE CAPITULATIONS. OF THOMAS LIGHTMAKER

484

THE CAPITULATIONS OP THOMAS LIGHTMAKER1
First, the said Lightmaker shall be bound to bring to
the King's Majesty's service five hundred men of war, well
trained and equipped for the wars as shall appertain, among
whom he shall have 350 lances, and of them 150 arquebusiers,
the which men of war carrying lances shall be armed with
their habilments of the head with vizzards and salades on.
Item:

The arquebusiers shall likewise have good arquebuses,

well equipped with all manner of munition thereunto per
taining.
Item:

The said captains of one hundred horses shall have

for every horse passing the musters 1 philip by the month.
Item:

Every horseman passing the musters shall have 12

philips by the month, the philip amounting to twenty-five
patars of Flanders or the value which makes in sterling money
3s 2d.
Item:

The standard bearer shall have besides the wages of

his own person 24 philips by the month.

1 (B. M . ) Lansd. 155, ff. 356-58.
This is a copy of the
original capitulations written in an eighteen century hand.
Though the transcriber writes that these articles "seem to
have been made to Matthew Lightmaker," Thomas' brother, he
assigns them to the year 1544. Matthew did not enter Eng
lish service until 1545.
The articles could in fact be
Matthew's, but no matter, since all contracts followed a
similar form.
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Item:

Every man of arms having eight horses belonging unto

him to have a cuirassier, and for him he shall have by the
month besides the wages of his own person 12 philips.
Item:

The said cuirassier shall be armed from the top to

the foot.
Item:

To every twelve horses they shall be bound to have one

waggon drawn with four good horses with their appurtenances
and shall have for the said waggon by the month 23 philips.
Item:

They shall not put any horse of war passed the musters

into the waggon, and if any there be with all attrapped,

the

Masters of the same horses shall be punished with the con
fiscation of the said horses and of their wages for one
whole month.
Item:

To every twelve horses passed the musters shall be

allowed one horse for baggage with 12 phs. by the month.
Item:

To the said five hundred horses shall be allowed two

Scribners, two furriers, two trumpets, five marshals, one
surgeon with 12 phs. by the month.
Item:

Every horse that shall tarry before the enemies after

the musters made they shall be paid for every horse 30 phs.
Item:

They shall be bound to serve thirty days for a month,

and their services shall begin the day of the musters.
Item:

They shall be paid monthly, and their money and vict

uals shall be delivered unto them according to the value and
not otherwise.

Item:

Though they be not paid within eight days more or less

after the pay day, they shall be content to do all things
nonetheless as become them in like case as if they had re
ceived their wages before hand.
Item:

They shall swear to serve the King's Majesty three

months and as long as shall please his Majesty to have them
at the said sold, so it be signified unto them before the
three months expire.
Item:

They shall have from the coming from their own houses,

every horseman to the place of the musters, for a day and a
night’23 kreuzers or the value, and for every waggon drawn
as aforesaid passing the musters 48 kreuzers for their ex
pence for a day and a night, and they shall be bound to go
three leagues of Almain a day, and the fifth they may rest
themselves.
Item:

When we shall have done with them, they shall have

licence to depart in a convenient place and shall have a
months' wages for their return.
Item:

None shall go to any skirmish, booty or pillage, or

against the enemies without consent of the General or his
Ritmaster, and in case any do the contrary, whatsoever shall
happen of them, they shall stand to their hurt and yet never
theless
Item:

be punished as shall be thought reasonable.
All Dukes, Earls, Captains, Generals, head officers

of the king, and of the King's blood shall be reserved to the

King's Majesty's use,

saving that his Majesty shall depart

somewhat liberally w i t h their takers [?J ; so that they shall
be in reason contented.

All other prisoners shall be theirs

that shall take them, and they shall ransom them at their
liberty:

saving that they shall not be sent away without con

sent of the General or Ritmaster.
Item:

None shall m a k e

[mutiny] , strife, or debate in any

wise, but if any do any such or other undue thing, he shall
be punished as shall

be thought

reasonable.

ter shall have power

to put him

out

And the

of wages, saving

Ritmasthat the

Ritmaster shall give knowledge to the Clerk of the musters to
appoint him that shall depart the day of his departure and to
appoint a day when the said Ritmaster shall take another in
his place.
Item:

The King's Majesty shall pay them being come from

their houses for three months, although they be-licensed to
depart before the said three months expired.
Item:

That none shall use any falsehood, craft, or subtlety

at the musters upon pain of confiscation of his wages as
shall be thought reasonable.
Item:

The King's Majesty shall have all such towns, villages,

castles, fortresses,

artillery,

and

all manner munition

found in the same as

they shall

win

at any time.

Item:

They shall observe all letters of passport or safe con

duct granted by the King's Majesty or his General.
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Item:

They shall do no displeasure in any wise, neither to

the merchants. Victuallers, or such as shall bring any muni
tion or victuals, or any such thing to the Camp, nor to the
Waggoners.
Item:

They shall serve the King's Majesty against all manner

of persons, saving the holy Empire.
Item:

Such as have any old strifes or debates shall in no

wise revenge themselves during the wars unless the Ritmaster
can friendly appease them upon pain to be punished.
Item:

The sick soldiers shall be paid as others, saving that

they shall be visited soon by the Clerk of the musters, and
the horse and harness of the sick shall be brought to the
musters without.
Item:

The said men of war shall in nowise do any displeasure

to the King's Majesty's countries, or the countries of his
M a j esty’s friends or confederates, but shall be bound to pay
for all things honestly, upon pain to be punished as reason
requireth.
Item:

They shall not use to swear any great or 'enorme'

oaths upon pain to be punished.
Item:

They shall be bound to keep their Ward and Watch as

shall be unto them commanded by the General without contra- ..
diction.
Item;

They shall muster as often as the King's Majesty shall

command them.
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Item:

Every fifty horse shall have a Ritmaster who shall

have above the wages of his person 25 phs.
Item:

The Ritmasters shall have a Lieutenant who shall have

40 phs. by the month.
Item:

They shall have two head officers of Master of the
2
Watch and a Master of the quarter [?] , every of them 40 phs.
by the month.
Item:

Lightmaker shall have to maintain his table 100 phs.

by the month.
Item:

The said Ritmaster, Captain, and men of war shall be

bound to serve the King's Majesty without offending to the
contrary, upon pain of punishment as the Ritmaster shall
think reasonable.

And if the said Ritmaster shall not pun

ish them, then the Marshal of the King's Majesty's army see
them punished as shall be thought meet.
Item:

As soon as the said number of Horsemen shall come into

the King's Majesty's countries, they shall straight ways pass
the musters and be paid a months' wages before hand.
And to the intent these articles be firm and stable, it shall
be subscribed and sealed accordingly.

2

It seems likely that this term should be rendered as
"quartermaster.11
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HENRY VXII^S LETTER OF RETAINER TO FRIEDRICH VON REIFFENBERG
SPECIFYING THE COMPOSITION OF HIS FIFTEEN HUNDRED MEN OF A R M S ■
THEIR P A Y , AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE1
Henry, by the grace of God, King of England, France and
Ireland, Defender of the Faith, and on earth, supreme head of
the church of England and Ireland; to all who may see or hear
these presents.
Be it known that we have committed- and retained, and by
these commit and retain, our dear and beloved, the Lord
Friedrich of Reiffenberg, to serve us as captain and to bring
us for our service fifteen hundred men-at-arms, of war, and
of service, well mounted and disciplined and equipped as good
and honest men of war.

And upon such treatment, agreement,

and articles as follow, the which articles we wish to have
observed and maintained without contravention in any way,
Promising to hold firm and fixed all that we promise them in
every form and way, as is contained in the following arti
cles.

Firstly, that the said captain will be held to bring

to our service fifteen hundred men of war, well armed and
mounted as is meet, with good servants, of which there will
be for each ensign of five hundred horsemen, 350 lances and
150 harquebusiers, the which lancers will be armed with

^■(P. R. O.) S. P. 1/203, ff. 15-19.

493
their head gear, with visors, helmits and salades, throat
pieces, axe, vambraces, corselets, breeches and tassets cov
ering the knees, and with long gauntlets.
Item:

The harquebusiers likewise well furnished with all

ammunition, breeches, axe, sleeves of mail, gorgets, gaunt2
lets, corselets, and good head gear, with a swynspetts and
a gun.
Item:

To the captain of the fifteen hundred horsemen will be

given for each horse passing muster a florin per month.
Item:

For each horseman passing muster, twelve Philipus

florins per month will be given, each philipus containing 25
Flanders patars of the value thereof.
Item:

The standard bearer will be given beyond the wages of

his person 25 Philips per month.
Item:

Every man-at-arms with eight horses belonging to him

will be able to have a cuirassier and will be paid 12 Philips
beyond the pay of his person, and the said cuirassier will be
armed from head to foot in everything appertaining to a man
of a r m s .
Item:

For every twelfth horse there will be a wagon with

four good horses and their good furnishings and well equipped.
24 Philips will be paid per month for those wagons.
Item:

No war horse passing muster will be put in harness in

2

I have been unable to find the meaning of this term.

the wagonIsj, and if it should happen that one or more horses
be harnessed, the masters of them will be punished with con-^
fiscation of the said horses and [loss] of a whole month's
pay.
Item:

For every twelve horses passing muster, a baggage

horse or carrier will be maintained at 12 Philips per month.
Item:

For the said fifteen hundred horses, six clerks, six

furriers, six trumpets, fifteen farriers, and three surgeons
will be maintained at 12 Philips per month.
Item:

For every horse slain by the enemy after muster, we

will pay 30 Philips apiece.
Item:

The said men of war will be held to serve us for

thirty days a month.
Item:

The service of the horsemen will begin on the day of

muster.
Item:

They will be paid from month to month, and the money

and victuals will be given and administered to them according
to their worth and in no other way.
Item:

If payment of silver is delayed by a week, more or

less, the men of war will have patience, and notwithstanding,
do all that good and loyal men of war should and ought to do,
and they will be charged to become neither more nor less
slack than if they had received their month's pay on the

[day

due] .
Item:

They will swear to serve us for three months and after
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the said three months for so long as it may please us for the
same pay and treatment, each time informing them before the
said months expire.
Item:

We will give the said men of war for the journey from

their home to the place of muster six batz by day and night.
And they will be held to advance four German leagues by day
and to rest the fifth.
Item:

When we shall have nothing more for the ;said men of

war to do, we will disband them at some suitable place and
give them a month's pay for their Return.
Item:

None will proceed to go on skirmish or against the en

emy or for booty or pillage without the consent of the cap
tain-general or of his Ritmaster, and if anyone does the con
trary, all that he m a y carry off will be sold without recompence, and

[he] will be chastised and punished according to

what is rightly thought reasonable.
Item:

All dukes, counts, captains, generals, sovereigns,

high officers of the King or of royal blood will be assigned
to us or to our captain-general, except that we will make
some compensation to those who will have taken them, so that
he will have reason to be content.

All other prisoners will

be given to those who will take them or will have the means to
ransom them at their pleasure, except that they will not be
returned without the consent of the captain-general and
their Ritmaster.

Item;

None will proceed to make any mutiny, question or argu

ment in any way, and if anyone does the contrary [or] chooses
to be unreasonable, he will be punished according to what is
deemed right and reasonable, and the Ritmaster will have power
to dismiss him, except that the said Ritmaster will inform the
commissioners and the clerk of the musters thereof to sign the
date of the dismissal of the said dismissed, and thus to sign
the day when the said Ritmaster may take someone else in his
place.
Item:

None will proceed to make or cause to be made any de

ception, falsity or sly practice in the musters upon confisca
tion of all his pay and punishment as is rightly deemed rea
sonable.
Item:

All acquisitions from towns, chateaux, marches or vil

lages of artillery and all war munitions will fall to us.
[Item:]

The said men of war will be held to observe all re

prieves, safeguards, and passports given by us, our captaingeneral, and Marshal of the camp.
Item:

None will proceed to do any displeasure to the corps

[?] or to the sutlers or to those who conduct ammunition,
victuals or merchandise, nor to any wagon drivers thereof.
Item:

The said m e n will be held to serve us against all our

enemies, excepting only the Holy Empire.
Item:

All those who will have old quarrels or disputes may

not avenge themselves, but must allow them to rest during
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our war, if the Ritmaster cannot reconcile them, on pain of
being
Item:

*Roue,1
All invalids will be paid as other men of war, except

that they will be viewed and visited by the clerk of the mus
ters, and the horses of the said sick and their harness will
be brought to the muster without any ill device.
Item:

The said men of war will not proceed to do any damage

to our country nor to the countries of our friends and allies
and will be held to pay in all honesty, on pain of being cor
rected and punished according to what is deemed reasonable.
Item:

The said men of war will not proceed in any way to

blaspheme or take in vain the blessed name of God the creator
or any great lewd oaths on pain of being punished according
to what the Ritmaster will deem right.
Item:

The said men will be held to stand watch by day and

night as they will be commanded by the lieutenant-general of
our army, without being able to contradict.
Item:

The said men of war will be held to permit the musters

to be held so much and so often as it may please us.
Item:

For every fifty horse a Ritmaster will be maintained,

who will have for his person beyond the pay of his corps, 25
Philips per month.
Item:

The said Ritmaster will have a lieutenant maintained

for every five hundred horse at 60 Philips per month.
Item:

For every 150 horse six other officers will be
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maintained, that is to s a y f three master of the watch, and
three quartermasters, each maintained at 40 Philips per month.
Item:

To the said Captain Friedrich, 300 Philips per month

will be given for his board.
Item:

We want to have observed and maintained all our right

institutions and proclamations regarding the levying of the
war, without anything being done to the contrary, on pain of
being punished as the Ritmaster and officers deem to be rea
sonable, and if the said Ritmaster by negligence does not
punish the said transgressions as reason demands, then they
will be punished by our Grand Marshal of the camp according
as justice rightly deems reasonable.
Item:

The said captain and men of war will be held and

>

charged to be unable to demand of us or our commissioners
other treatment, pay or anything else, if not contained in
the present letter of retainer and compact with the captain,
made and contained in this letter.
Item:

And in order to hold firm and fixed what we have pro

mised in this present letter of retainer, and as we want to
have the contents of these presents observed and maintained,
we have signed these with our hand and here affixed our seal.
Item:

Each horseman in the service of His Majesty will have

four month's soldiering in hand and at the place of muster
will receive, each according to his journey from home thereto,
to be paid from month to month.

GLOSSARY

Abzug;

literallydeparture;

severance pay.

Albanians (Albanois, Albanoys): name given to the mercenary
Albanian and Greek light horsemen who served in all the
armies of Western Europe in the sixteenth century.
Argoulets: French light cavalry troops believed to have been
raised and organized by Louis XII in imitation of the
Albanian stradiots.
Arquebus (harquebus, hagbush, hackbut): term applied to a
variety of handguns of varying caliber, weight, and
length in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries;
prototype of the modern rifle.
Arquebus proof:
term used to describe armor which had been
specially reinforced to protect the wearer against small
arms fire.
Assagai:
a two-handed lance with a steel point at both ends;
the distinctive weapon of the Albanian stradiot in the
early sixteenth century.
Augmentations, Court of:
a prerogative court created by stat
ute in 1535 to administer the lands, wealth, and etc. of
dissolved religious houses; merged with the Court of Gen
eral Surveyors in 1547, it was abolished in 1554 and its
functions transferred to the Exchequer.
Bard:

any of various defensive pieces of armor for a horse.

Battle:
the traditional units into which English armies were
divided in the late Middle Ages and early sixteenth cen
tury; synonymous with "ward," as in fore-ward, middlew a r d , and rear-ward.
Bend-leather:
the thickest, strongest leather; acquired from
the back and flank of cured hides, it was used in harnessmaking and for the soles of shoes.
Bowyer:

a maker and/or seller of bows.

Bravo: Italian slang expression with the English meaning of
"bully," "ruffian," "tough;" a man of violent habits.

499

500
Burgonet:
a type of casque or steel headgear for the use of
infantrymen; a helmit with a visor so fitted to the gorget
or neck piece that the head could be turned without expos
ing the neck.
Butt:
a target shot at by bowmen and handgunners; used in
practice.
Camisade:
a surprise attack usually launched under cover of
d a rkness.
Camp: beside its usual meaning of the lodgement of an army,
the word was employed in Tudor England to indicate a duel
or honor always fought, apparently, under the ritualistic
laws of w a r .
Caparison:
a covering— sometimes decorative, sometimes pro
tective— for a horse.
Cask:
an archaic and alternate spelling of "casque," a steel
helmit of which there were many styles; also occasionally
used in the sense of "case," as in "a case of pistols."
Cass:

pay off, discharge, cashier.

Chamfron

(chanfron):

the headpiece of a horse's bard.

Colonel: originally the cabo de colonella, the head of a col
umn; the chief officer of a regiment; the title did not
come into use in English armies until Elizabeth's reign.
Corselet (corslet): an armored covering for the body, as dis
tinct from the limbs.
Crupper:
the leather hoop passing under a horses tail and
fastened to the saddle to keep it from slipping forward.
Cuirass:
a piece of armor for the protection of the body be
tween the neck and waist; more particularly, one consist
ing of a coupled breastplate and backpiece.
Cuirassier:
a mounted soldier wearing a cuirass; specifically,
in the early sixteenth century one of the heaviest types
of light cavalrymen outfitted with a cuirass and armed
with a lance and a handgun or handguns.
Cuisses: armor for the protection of the front part of the
thi g h s .
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Custrel:
from the Old French, coustillier, a squire, esquire
of the body, servant to a man-at-arms.
The French word
is retained in the modern word,' coutilli'er, a can opener.
Dead-pay:
though this term has several meanings, it was used
in early Tudor times in the sense of "double-pay;" extra
pay awarded to officers or to particularly experienced
soldiers from the rank-and-file.
Demilance:
the light, short lance employed by demilancers,
the heaviest type of English light cavalry in the early
sixteenth century; also, a light horseman armed with a
demilance.
Destrier:
Drumslade:

a war horse or charger; the mount of a man-at-arms.
a drum or drummer.

Ensign:
a military or naval standard; a flag; the officer
assigned to carry the ensign; a standard bearer; and also
the body of men who served under a particular banner, as
for example "an ensign of infantry."
Exchequer:
in theory this department of state functioned as
the royal treasury, though in practice it was only one of
many treasuries during the early Tudor period dealing
with the income and expenditure of the c r o w n 's ordinary
and extraordinary revenue.
See below, First Fruits and
Tenths, and above, Augmentations.
Farrier:
one who shoes horses; the officer in a cavalry troop
entrusted with the care of the horses.
Fausse-brav: literally, a false hill; an artificial mount
thrown up in front of a rampart.
First Fruits and Tenths, Court of:
court established by Henry
VIII in 1540 to administer the revenues accruing to the
crown through the appropriation by the state of the "first
fruits" (or annates) and tenths formerly paid to the pope.
"First Fruits" consisted of a part of a year's income of
a benefice paid to Rome by bishops on appointment; tenths,
in theory one-tenth of the annual profit of every church
living in the realm, had been collected since the twelfth
century for the recovery of the Holy Land. A chief com
petitor of the Exchequer, the prerogative Court of First
Fruits and Tenths was heavily drawn on for revenue to
support Henry VIII's last French war.
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Furrier;
the officer charged with securing and arranging ac
commodations for his unit.
Gauntlet:
a glove usually made of leather but covered with
steel plates worn as part of the battle dress of a manat-arms.
Genitour:
Glaive:

the name applied to the light horsemen of Spain.
a variation of the halberd; a type of bill.

Gorget;
neck piece; an armored collar; a piece of armor to
protect the neck.
Great horse:

destrier; charger; mount of a man-at-arms.

Great Italian Wars:
a term current among military historians
used to describe the series of campaigns waged between
France and Spain for control of the Italian peninsula.
Initiated by Charles VIII's invasion of Italy in 1494,
they continued until the signing of the Peace of CateauCambresis in 1559.
Greaves:

Armor for the .legs below the knee.

Hackbut (hagbut):

an arquebus.

Halberd:
a combination of spear and battle-axe, consisting
of a sharp-edged blade ending in a point and a spear-head
mounted on an eight-foot shaft.
Halberdier:
Jinetes:

a soldier armed with a halberd.

see above, genitour.

Lieutenant:
in Tudor England the term retained the medieval
meaning of deputy or substitute for a higher officer un
til well into the reign of Elizabeth; in continental
armies, however, the term was used to designate the of
ficer next in rank below a captain.
Limonier (limoneer, lymoner): a draft horse; a horse which
is attached to the shafts of a wagon.
Match:
a wick so prepared that it is not easily extinguished;
used for firing cannon and other gunpowder weapons.
Matchlock:
a type of gun equipped with a lock in which match
is placed for igniting the powder.
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Mint;
located in the Tower of London with various branches
throughout the realm, it supervised the coining of money
in England,
Its revenues were drawn on heavily for the
wars.
Northern horse;
English light cavalrymen recruited from the
northern counties against Scotland.
Pezetaeri: a type of hoplite or heavily armed infantryman
popular in ancient Greece and Macedonia.
Armed with thir
teen foot-long sarissas or spears, they were among the
earliest forerunners of the Swiss Gebirgsknechten and the
German Landsknechte.
Pioneer:
sapper; one of a body of foot soldiers employed pri
marily as laborers to dig trenches, erect fortifications,
repair roads, build bridges, and etc.
Plashland:

marshland.

Pouldrons (pauldrons): a shoulder-plate; a piece of armor de
signed to protect the shoulder.
"Pricker:"
a light horseman, as for example a Northern horse
man, employed as a skirmisher or scout; one who "pricks"
either his horse with his spur or his opponent with his
lance.
Regiment:
employed in early Tudor England in the medieval
sense of the authority enjoyed by an officer over his men;
on the Continent, the term had earlier come to mean a
fairly large body of troops forming a definite unit within
an army.
Reiter (rutter): literally, a rider; a German or Dutch cav
alryman, particularly a cuirassier armed with lance and
pistol; a pistoleer.
Salade (sallet): a light, globular helmit, with or without
a visor, and without a crest, the lower part curving out
ward at the neck.
Scimitar:
a short, curved single-edged sword popular among
Orientals, especially Turks and Persians; a favorite sidearm of the Albanian stradiot.
Seneschal:

steward.
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Sergeant:
in Tudor England the word was employed with the
meaning of servant or attendant; in continental armies
of the period, the title was applied to the chief non"
commissioned assistant to the captain of a company.

i

Standard:
synonymous with ensign; a body of men; a flag; an
officer entrusted with the keeping of the standard;: a
standard bearer.
Stoned horse:

a stallion; an uncastrated horse.

Stradiot:
name applied to the Albanian light cavalrymen of
the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
Tasses: A series of articulated and overlapping metal plates
descending from the corselet which form a sort of kilt of
armor to protect the thighs and lower part of the trunk.
Vambrace:

defensive armor for the forearm.

Ward:
see battle; one of the principal divisions into which
Tudor armies were divided.
Wheel-lock:
a form of gun-lock in which the powder was ig
nited by the friction of a small, spring-wound wheel
against a piece of iron pyrites.
Zweihander: a slath or slashing sword; an immense, two-handed
sword some five feet or longer in length.
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